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ABSTRACT

USING LENSES TO UNDERSTAND POLICY FAILURES
THE CASE OF THE 2012 CENSUS IN CHILE

August 2020

María Angélica Pavez García, BA Sociology, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile,
MSc. in Management and Public Policy at University of Chile.
MS., University of Massachusetts Boston
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Boston

Directed by Michael Johnson Ph.D. and Amy E. Smith Ph.D.

Policy failures are controversial, costly, and above all, messy. More often than we
wish, what begins as a well-intentioned policy becomes a failure. In all countries and policy
areas, some initiatives end up failing miserably, wasting resources, creating endless political
struggles, and even affecting countries' governance. However, the perceptions and
understanding of failure are dissimilar. Different actors, including researchers, have diverse
and indeed conflicting viewpoints of what constitutes failure, its characteristics and avenues
of resolution. The growing policy failure literature offers concepts and models to approach
this elusive phenomenon, emphasizing the critical role of social perceptions, characteristics
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of failure episodes, multiple dimensions, and the wide and complex spectrum between failure
and success.
This study recognizes the multifaceted nature of policy failure as a starting point.
Based on the existing literature, and assuming there are always different perspectives or
"lenses" involved, this dissertation proposes the Lenses Framework as a novel approach to
explore the understanding of policy failure, by analyzing the case of the 2012 census in
Chile.
In 2012, the National Statistics Institute (INE) conducted the census under a new
methodology, and what could have been a significant advance on data quality and efficiency
became a huge controversy. The census had significant implementation problems, low
coverage, accusations of data mishandling, several investigations to assess the errors, and
endless political and technical disputes, all of which ended with discarding the census and
conducting a new census in 2017.
By using the policy, organizational, and societal lenses, the analysis reveals the
different angles of understanding the causes, characteristics and interpretations of the census
failure. The policy lens emphasizes the abrupt change of census strategy, the troubled
implementation, and differing evaluation criteria. Instead, the organizational lens exposes
difficulties in INE's structure, leadership weakness, internal disagreements, and other
escalating struggles. In turn, the societal lens unveils the institutional context, political
turmoil, the rising power of social media, and the student movement's strength with the
profound clash of ideas at stake. Like this, the Lenses Framework tackles the policy failure's
messy character, providing new insights for a meaningful, but also helpful, understanding of
this complex phenomenon.
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RESUMEN
Los fracasos de políticas públicas son controvertidos, costosos y, sobre todo,
enredados. Más a menudo de lo que quisiéramos, lo que comienza como una política bien
intencionada se convierte en un fracaso. En todos los países y áreas de políticas, algunas
iniciativas terminan fracasando miserablemente, desperdiciando recursos, creando
interminables disputas políticas e incluso afectando la gobernabilidad de los países. Sin
embargo, las percepciones y la comprensión de los fracasos de políticas públicas son muy
diferentes. Los distintos actores, incluyendo a los investigadores, tienen puntos de vista
diversos y e incluso contradictorios sobre qué constituye fracaso, sus características y las vías
de solución. La literatura sobre fracaso de políticas públicas ofrece conceptos y modelos para
abordar este escurridizo fenómeno, destacando el papel clave de las percepciones sociales,
las características de los episodios de fracaso, las múltiples dimensiones, y el complejo y
amplio espectro que existe entre el fracaso y el éxito.
Este estudio reconoce la naturaleza multifacética del fracaso como punto de partida.
En base a la literatura existente y asumiendo que siempre hay diferentes perspectivas o
"lentes" involucrados, esta disertación propone el análisis a través de Lentes, o Lenses
Framework, como un enfoque novedoso para explorar la comprensión del fracaso de
políticas públicas a través del estudio del caso del censo del 2012 en Chile.
En el año 2012, el Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE) llevó a cabo el censo bajo
una nueva metodología, y lo que debería haber sido un avance significativo en eficiencia y
calidad de los datos, dio lugar a una gran controversia. El censo tuvo significativos
problemas de implementación, baja cobertura, acusaciones de manipulación de los datos,
varias investigaciones para evaluar los errores, y un sinfín de controversias políticas y
vi

técnicas, todo lo cual terminó con el descarte del censo y la realización de uno nuevo en
2017.
A través del uso de lentes de políticas, organizacional y societal, el análisis revela
distintos ángulos de comprensión de las causas, características e interpretaciones del fracaso
del censo. El lente de las políticas enfatiza el cambio abrupto de metodología del censo, los
problemas de implementación y las diferencias en los criterios de evaluación. En cambio, el
lente organizacional expone las dificultades en la estructura del INE, la debilidad del
liderazgo, los desacuerdos internos y disputas cada vez más intensas. A su vez, el lente
societal devela el contexto institucional, la crisis política, el creciente poder de las redes
sociales y la fuerza del movimiento estudiantil con el profundo choque de ideas en juego. De
esta forma, el análisis a través de Lentes o Lenses Framework enfrenta el carácter enredado
de los fracasos de políticas públicas, entregando nuevos aportes para una comprensión
significativa, pero también útil, de este complejo fenómeno.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1.

The Census
Censuses are one of the oldest public instruments in existence. There is evidence that

ancient civilizations such as the Egyptians, Babylonians, Romans, or Chinese regularly
conducted censuses for military, tax, labor, or land distribution purposes (Thorvaldsen,
2017). Today, every national government is responsible for undertaking its census at least
every ten years, and in 2010, 214 countries conducted censuses (UN, 2015).
The census is not simply a statistical exercise towards quantitative aggregates, but
aims at a qualitative listing of persons (Thorvaldsen, 2017). In fact, the word census comes
from the Latin word “censere”, which means to assess, to estimate (Valente, 2015).
Therefore, in addition to answering the question of "How many are we?” A census seeks to
answer the questions of "Who are we?" and "Where do we live?" which involves counting
and characterizing the population within the territory (UN, 2017). Thus, the purpose of the
census is to provide vital information on the size of the country, the socio-demographic
characteristics of the population and spatial distribution.
The census has a strategic role for countries, as it provides essential information for
policymaking, administration, planning and allocation of public resources. The census is also
the basis for the analysis and appraisal of the composition, distribution and growth of the
1

country's population. It provides the basic sampling framework for other studies and
statistical products as necessary as price indices, growth or unemployment (UN, 2017).
Given this importance, all social actors in a country, benefit from good quality of census
data, including government, academia, companies, civil society, and individuals.
There is a widespread notion that a census is an elementary exercise, as it requires
gathering the same information from everyone. However, a census is a highly complex
administrative, logistical and statistical task, that “consists of a complex series of interrelated
steps, and constitutes perhaps the single most extensive, complicated and expensive
operation that a country undertakes” (UN, 2017, p. 31).

1.2.

The Census in Chile, a Case of Policy Failure
Like most countries in the world, Chile undertakes its census every ten years. In 2012,

the National Statistics Institute (INE) conducted the census under the de jure strategy,
counting over three months with professional surveyors, instead of conducting the census
under the usual de facto strategy, a single day’s counting done by volunteers. What resulted
was arguably the most controversial census in Chilean history. Actors from political, social,
and academic realms differed on the quality of the data collected and its usability; while for
some of them, the census policy was a failure, for others, it was indeed a success. High media
coverage reported accusations of data mishandling, authorities’ resignations, apologies from
the President, many inquiries for assessing the census, and an endless political struggle, all of
which ended up declaring the 2012 census invalid. Finally, in the context of a new
government, the INE carried out a new census in 2017, this time coming back to the
traditional de facto modality.
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However, was the 2012 census a failure? While the 2012 census was widely deemed
unusable, significant political motivations led to that judgment. Failure for whom?
Authorities, politicians, policymakers, experts, citizens, and so too the researchers, have
different and even conflicting views about what the census failure meant, its causes, its
characteristics, and its solutions. The criteria for evaluating and judging the 2012 census as a
failure are confusing and diverse. While for some actors, it was a failure because of low
coverage, yet for others, it was because the expectations were too high. Others attributed the
failure to the poor quality of the data collected, the political tensions, or the lack of
participation, to name a few of the several criteria at stake. So, how do we understand
failure? When facing policy failures, there are several questions with no clear answer.
Indeed, some of the most prominent characteristics of policy failure are the multiplicity of
perspectives on failure and disagreement on the assessment criteria.
The causes and characteristics of any policy failure are divergent because policies can
fail in such a diversity of ways. Some policies fail—to name a few reasons—because they
did not achieve the expected goals, did not get stakeholders’ support, did not reach equity
criteria, or because, compared to similar policies, the outcomes were considered inadequate
(Marsh & McConnell, 2010; McConnell, 2010a). As a result, when a policy failure happens,
the range of reactions is vast. Different actors clamor to find someone to blame, search for
the overarching ignored signs, the critical points at which failure could have been foreseen or
avoided, or even ask why policymakers did not react in time (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996;
McConnell, 2015). After all, policy failures undermine public resources; they entail
exorbitant costs. Not just from the failure event itself, but because of the enormous amount of
resources, time, and energy exhausted to overcome the failure, the concomitant controversy,
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and the quest for solutions. Thus, the damage of failure goes beyond the limits of policy goal
achievement; it generates endless political turmoil, becoming a threat to the government’s
legitimacy or even causing a governance crisis (McConnell, 2010a, 2015; Schuck, 2014).
In Chile, a developing country with a reputable statistical institution, the new census
methodology should have meant a major improvement in data quality and the efficiency of
the census process, instead, it led to a growing controversy with technical and political
overtones. However, the census in Chile was not the only policy that has failed. More often
than we wish, what begins as a well-intentioned policy becomes a failure, fiasco, or disaster.
Whether census, tax reform, transportation, health, housing, education, and many others, in
different parts of the world, public policies do fail. As with the census, policy failures are
controversial, costly, and above all, messy.

1.3.

Policy Failure in the Literature
The interest in policy failure arises from varied backgrounds and disciplines—

political science, sociology, public management, organizational theory—which helps to
explain the diversity of perspectives, methodologies, and levels of analysis. Likewise,
literature has studied this phenomenon under different designations, including policy failure
(McConnell, 2010a, 2015; Howlett et al., 2015; Bovens & ’t Hart, 2016), policy disasters
(Hall, 1982; Dunleavy, 1995; Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996), policy fiascoes (Janis, 1982; Bovens
& ’t Hart, 1996; Oppermann & Spencer, 2016a), policy blunders (Nutt, 2002; King & Crewe,
2013), government failures (Light, 2014; Schuck, 2014), and governance failures (Bovens, ’t
Hart, & Peters, 2001; Howlett et al., 2015; Peters, 2015). Beyond the terminology, these
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approaches share a common concern over why some policies that seem to have proper
conditions for success end up failing, generating negative consequences.
Policy failure is an intriguing area of study because the notion of failure itself is
contested; the whole process of diagnosing and remedying failures yields multiple narratives.
Different actors, including researchers, address the failure event, from their backgrounds,
biases, and particular epistemologies (Bovens, 1995). The complexity of policy failure lies in
the classical epistemological tension within the social sciences between positivist and
interpretivist perspectives (Marsh & Furlong, 2002). While a positivist perspective
understands policy failure as an observable and measurable fact—according to different
assessing criteria—the interpretivist understands it as a social construction. Therefore, failure
is not objective but "is in the eye of the beholder." In this way, when facing policy failure,
there are not definite benchmarks to assess failure, but many disputed explanations.
The literature on policy failure has been fruitful in recent decades. On the one hand,
there are many and varied case studies that delve into the characteristics, tensions and effects
of the failures. On the other hand, some models of analysis endeavoring to address the
elusive and complex nature of the policy failure phenomenon. Of all the contributions, there
are three particularly significant for this dissertation. The first is the social construction
perspective, which emphasizes the role of perceptions on failure judgment. From here, failure
is not something omnipresent or "objective," but the product of a complex process of
construction and negotiation of meanings (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1995, 1996, 2016). This
dissertation incorporates the role of judgments about failure as central to its construction and
characteristics. The second is the revitalizing and recent literature that recognizes the
epistemological and methodological challenge to study policy failures. Policy failure is not
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black and white, not outcomes versus perceptions, or failing versus achieving, and
accordingly, this literature offers heuristic frameworks for understanding the grey area
between failure and success (Marsh & McConnell, 2010; McConnell, 2010a, 2010b;
Howlett, 2012). This dissertation shares this view of policy failure as convoluted and
multidimensional, but it does not venture to model or simplify, but assumes the complex
character of policy failure as a starting point. A third contribution points to the broader
perspective, emphasizing the contextual elements on policy failure; because failures occur
within cultural, economic, institutional, and social contexts (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2013,
2015; Peters, 2015; van der Steen et al., 2015). These broader elements' role on policy failure
is something slightly considered by the literature, and where this dissertation places
particular emphasis.
Despite advances in policy failure studies have been noteworthy, the research is still
linear and relies on a mechanical comprehension of policy failure. There is a bias toward
searching for causes and not paying attention to relationships between levels of analysis,
different viewpoints involved, or the context within which the policy is embedded. Besides,
while research on this topic shares the aim of improving policymaking, there still a challenge
toward translating the complex analytical keys of policy failure to courses of action to
improve policymaking (Bovens & ’t Hart, 2016). Thus, this dissertation is part of an
academic effort to deepen the understanding the convoluted nature of policy failures, but
while also understanding it in context, and seeking ways to address policy failure in a way
useful to policymakers.
To address policy failures is a challenging venture. As with the 2012 census, episodes
of failure are, in a word, messy. There are different understandings of failure, different
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yardsticks to measure them, the dispute between narratives, and above all, diverse
interpretations of the causes, characteristics, and consequences of a failure event. Based on
the advances in policy failure literature, and assuming its multifaceted and multi-perspective
nature, this dissertation does not propose another model or a new theory, but explores
different perspectives for understanding policy failures through the study of the 2012 census
in Chile.

1.4.

Lenses Framework to Understand Policy Failure
The primary research question of the dissertation is: How do we understand policy

failure? This research question yields two secondary questions: First, how do various
lenses/perspectives understand policy failure differently? And, how does a multi-lens
approach contribute to a better understanding of policy failure?
Based on the existing literature, this dissertation proposes a novel analytical approach
for understanding policy failure to answer the research questions: the Lenses Framework.
The Lenses Framework is an analytical exercise that examines the same case from different
lenses or perspectives, and involves two steps. The first step of the framework is the separate
analysis of the policy failure case under the following three perspectives: policy,
organizational, and societal. Each lens provides a particular understanding of policy failure.
Thus, the Policy Lens analyzes the case from concepts and distinctions related to the policy
process, focusing on the stages of formulation, implementation, and evaluation of the census.
Likewise, the Organizational Lens analyzes the dynamics and institutional and organizational
arrangements of the agency responsible for carrying out the census. Finally, the Societal Lens
observes the broader context of the failure case, analyzing the political and social dynamics
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of the society. The second step of the framework investigates the census case from a multilens perspective. This step gathers the respective understandings from the individual lenses
and then examines the relationship amongst those three lenses for a more thorough
comprehension of the failure.
This dissertation offers the Lenses Framework as an analytical device to tackle the
mentioned epistemological conundrum over policy failures to improve the understanding of
the levels/dimensions of policy failure. Due to the lens-by-lens or level-by-level analysis, and
then through the second step’s integrated analysis, the dissertation provides the opportunity
to comprehend the policy failure phenomenon in a better way.
To answer the research questions listed above, this dissertation stands from a case
study as a comprehensive research strategy (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2014) to examine in-depth the
case of the 2012 census in Chile. From a qualitative approach, the study relies on a thorough
analysis of secondary information (reports, assessments, media) as well as 50 in-depth
interviews with policymakers and stakeholders linked to the census case.

1.5.

Academic and Policy Contributions
This dissertation contributes to the scholarly literature by offering the Lenses

Framework for future analysis of policy failures. By embracing the epistemological tension
of the policy failure, the Lenses tackles its multidimensional and messy nature, without
falling into causal explanations or simplifications. Also, the Lenses has methodological
advantages, because, through the use of separate lenses, with well-defined concepts, it lays a
route for studying cases of policy failure. By incorporating an institutional and contextual
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dimension through an observational lens, this study helps overcome previous weaknesses
about the role of the cultural, social, and institutional context on the policy failure.
Furthermore, the case of the 2012 census has great teaching potential. The exercise of
analyzing through lenses allows epistemological distinctions and encourages reflection on the
ways of understanding and examining social reality. This is fostered by the study's
methodological approach: the case study. Thus, through a rich narrative of events,
circumstances and perspectives, the case enables the readers to ask questions, to form their
own interpretations, and especially to transfer information from the case to other settings.
The study promotes a reflection beyond the case, allowing students and policymakers to
reflect on their perspectives and practices.
Likewise, this dissertation of the Chilean census case contributes from the Latin
American perspective to a stream of research on policy failure that comes from developed
countries. Last, this dissertation has great teaching potential, because of its methods’ features
and epistemological richness, the census case is suitable as a teaching case for students and
policymakers.
Besides, this dissertation provides policy contributions. It is difficult for policymakers
to learn from past mistakes, they do not have the time or the incentives. However, policy
failure results in sometimes extravagant expense and damage, and therefore in order to
correct policy failure and overcome the crisis, policymakers need to understand them. Thus,
the Lenses Framework is an invitation to policymakers to explore different perspectives and
levels of policy failure to better understand them, without forcing a causal analysis or falling
into highly academic concepts. So, gaining a deeper understanding of policy failure, its
sources, and characteristics increases the ability to learn from what happened, helping
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policymakers to correct their mistakes, prevent further failures or better handle failure events.
Therefore, the Lenses Framework seeks to bridge between the theoretical richness about
policy failure with insights about actual policymaking. Ultimately, this dissertation provides
recommendations for the National Institute of Statistics and census policy.

1.6.

Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is structured in ten chapters. After this introduction, Chapter Two

presents an extensive literature review on policy failure. Chapter Three introduces the
research questions and the Lenses Framework proposed in this dissertation. Chapter Four
describes the data and methods of the study, including sources of information, characteristics
of the interviews, the analysis performed, and the overall research design. The heart of this
dissertation is Chapter Five, which narrates the failure of the 2012 census in Chile throughout
a dense description of events, actors, and circumstances. According to the Lenses
Framework, Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight present a separate analysis of the census case
from the policy, organizational, and societal lenses, respectively, observing how each lens
provides different takes and insights. Based on the analysis of the previous chapters, Chapter
Nine offers a multi-lens analysis of the failure case from the above findings. Finally, Chapter
Ten provides the conclusions of the study, including the academic and policy contributions of
the dissertation and future research opportunities for policy failure.
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CHAPTER 2
UNDERSTANDING POLICY FAILURE. LITERATURE REVIEW

Policy success and failure have been addressed from different backgrounds and
disciplines–political science, sociology, economics, public management—which explains
why there is such a multiplicity of perspectives, methodologies, and levels of analysis. This
section reviews relevant literature on policy failure. First, it describes how policy and social
sciences have been addressing the idea of failure and success. Next, it presents analytical
frameworks that explicitly tackle the policy failure phenomenon. Third, it analyzes several
common characteristics of policy failure in the literature. Fourth, it reviews the link between
policy failure and learning from failure. And finally, it offers a summary of the most
significant contributions of the literature, highlighting the critical elements for this
dissertation.

2.1.

Failure and Success in Social Sciences
The idea of policy success and failure has evolved significantly over the past 40

years. Social and policy sciences, although not explicitly, have addressed the issue of policy
failure through different perspectives. Within the context of the epistemological complexity
involved in policy failures, this section presents how the idea of failure has developed in the
policy sciences and policy literature, including concepts and theories such as: public policy
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as a two-stage process, incrementalism, policy process, implementation, evaluation, as well
as a diverse literature addressing policy failure cases.
What do we mean by policy failure? How do we measure failure? How do we
perceive failure? Who defines an event as a failure? These questions and their answers are
deeply rooted in epistemological assumptions about social reality and often express the
existing tension between alternative perspectives to understanding policy failure (Marsh &
Furlong, 2002; Stone, 2002). In the positivist-rationalist tradition, policy outcomes can be
observed and measured, meaning that it is possible to assess a given policy or program
against a chosen goal or standard, usually defined to be the program’s or policy’s goal. This
notion implies that, when problems are detected, it will be possible to correct the faults. In
the interpretivist-constructivist tradition, the reality is not observable but perceived and
interpreted in a process of construction of meaning.
Moreover, the concepts and words ‘success’ and ‘failure’ express certain ways of
thinking. While the success term has a clear future orientation–actions towards certain
benefits–the term failure is a retrospective judgment of policies or strategies that did not
achieve expected results. And thus, “failure is a pejorative term applied to measures that were
originally formulated with an intended successful outcome in mind” (Little, 2012, p. 16).
Thus, the meanings and emotions associated with the terms success and failure are significant
and permeate how citizens and policymakers address policies.
The determination of a policy as a success or failure is a complicated process of
negotiating meanings and positions. As said by Yanow (2000), "contending frames entail not
just different policy discourses–different languages, understandings, and perceptions—and
potentially different courses of action, but also different values, and different meanings" (p.

12

12). This tension between “objective” failure and “constructed” failure has been critical in
the way the literature has addressed policy failure, and still is critical. The very complex
nature of the policy failure topic is deeply rooted in the idiosyncratic and pluralistic nature of
policy sciences (McConnell, 2015).
Policy Process
The simplest approach to policy failure is based on the notion of policymaking as a
two-stage process, the formulation and the implementation of the policy, a conception that
still is very ingrained in the general public perception of how policies work. Under this
perspective, policy failure is understood as the disparity or lack of coordination between the
designed goals and their achieved outcomes (Howlett, 2012). Therefore, it is possible to
identify the type of failures according to which part of the formulation–implementation dyad
is deficient. When the policy formulation is rigorous, well executed, but still not able to
achieve the goals, it is considered a "policy anomaly," a rare situation or exception because
there is no clarity as to why it did not work. When a sound plan is not implemented correctly,
this is considered a "policy accident" because something occurred that impeded achieving the
expected results. When the execution of a policy is adequate, but the original plans were
inadequate, it is a "policy mistake," one that shouldn’t have been carried out; finally the last
category of "policy fiasco" result from both poor formulation and poor implementation of the
policy, leading to disastrous results that extend beyond the policy itself (Bovens & ’t Hart,
1996; Howlett, 2012; Howlett et al., 2015). From this two-step conception, once the cause of
the problem is identified, it is possible to correct and generate mechanisms to prevent it from
happening again.
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However, the challenges of policymaking, in particular the idea of failure, go far
beyond misalignment of formulation and implementation of the policy. Unlike the previous
approach, process, or policy cycle literature contemplates a more complex perspective. The
heuristics of the policy cycle' approach permits the understanding of the policy's functioning,
the sequence and dynamics of each phase, from agenda-setting, decision-making,
formulation, implementation and finally to evaluation (Jann & Wegrich, 2007). Even though
this literature does not address policy failure explicitly, it recognizes difficulties and errors
related to each phase of the cycle (Howlett et al., 2009, 2015).
Consider the following: In the agenda-setting stage, governments can fail to identify
the main issues to address or select irrelevant or even unattainable goals. This approach
conceives failure as the interruption of a process and tries to understand which factors
impede the access to the agenda, what the real intentions of the actors are, or why some topic
lacks the proper attention (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963; Cobb & Elder, 1971; Kingdon, 2011).
Likewise, at the decision-making stage, policymakers may create a policy failure due to the
lack of good information, a failure to anticipate risks, or biases favoring particular decision
alternatives (Howlett, 2007). Implementation is concerned with the consequences and effects
of a policy after formulation; with different focus and emphasis, implementation research has
revealed the important barriers for a successful implementation (Winter, 2012). At the
evaluation stage of the policy cycle, policy failure may happen because of ignorance caused
by deficiencies in the monitoring or feedback process, or because governments failed to learn
the appropriate lessons from past experiences (Howlett et al., 2009). However, and as will be
explained later, the contribution of implementation and evaluation literature go far beyond
their traditional role in the policy cycle.
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Incrementalism
A different approach to error—and, consequently, failure—comes from the
incremental or "Lindblomian" tradition. By reacting to the dominant rationalistic perspective
in policy sciences, Charles Lindblom (1959) offered the method of successive limited
comparisons, known as "muddling through," as the way that policy-making works in reality.
The complexity of the policymaking process, the conflict of values, the chain of decisions,
and limited information make it impossible to achieve a rational-comprehensive policy
process; hence, realpolitik uses small steps and trial-and-error as the only route. From this
perspective, an error is inevitable and constitutive of the policy process. Consequently,
failure to achieve initial policy goals is not an exception but the rule. As Lindblom (1959)
pointed out, "Making policy is at best a very rough process. Neither social scientists, nor
politicians, nor public administrators yet know enough about the social world to avoid
repeated errors in predicting the consequences of policy moves. A wise policy-maker
consequently expects that his policies will achieve only part of what he hopes and at the same
time will produce unanticipated consequences he would have preferred to avoid" (p. 86).
Aligned with Lindblom, Deborah Stone (2002) considers that accidents in public
policy are more than common because the complexity of reality is such that the expectation
of an errorless process is unreasonable: "In such complex interactive systems, it is impossible
to anticipate all possible events and side effects, so failure or accident is inevitable. Failure
also involves so many components and people that are impossible to attribute blame in any
fashion consistent with our cultural norm; the responsibility presupposes control" (p. 215).
Similarly, Nair and Howlett (2014) embrace the inevitability of policy failures over time.
Policymakers face the continuous challenge of responding to a problem under conditions of
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ambiguity or uncertainty. To deal with these difficulties, the authors propose the idea of
adaptive policies and adaptive policymaking.
Implementation Research
The theoretical development of the implementation research tradition goes beyond the
idea of implementation as just a stage in the policy cycle, offering significant contributions to
the understanding of failure. From the seminal work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1984)
about why expectations are dashed in the complexity of the implementation, this literature
explores the mechanisms and dynamics that explain the “deviation" of policy from the initial
mandate. Pressman and Wildavsky focused on the complexity of joint action as the key of
the implementation problem, noticing the different priorities and interests of the multiplicity
of actors involved in the policy implementation such as government agencies, courts, interest
groups, private firms, media, among others. Another foundational work in the field is The
implementation Game, by Eugene Bardach (1977) which focuses on the conflict and the
political game between actors during policy implementation. These works initiated a long
and still influential literature over the dynamics of policy implementation, that over the years
has given rise to three generations of implementation research: top-down, bottom-up and
hybrid theories (Pülzl & Treib, 2006; Winter, 2012). The top-down perspective emphasizes
the ability of decision makers to generate clear policy goals and control the implementation
stage. Bottom-up literature focuses on the role of bureaucrats as the main actors in policy
delivery, understanding the implementation as a negotiation processes within networks of
implementers. And finally, hybrid theories try to overcome the divide between the previous
approaches, incorporating elements of top-down and bottom-up (Pülzl & Treib, 2006).
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Beyond the different emphasis, the focus of implementation literature is on what
happens when the expected results are not achieved or the policy has an "implementation
deficit" necessary to correct (Hupe, 2011; Hupe et al., 2014). According to deLeon and
deLeon (2002) the underlying assumption of implementation studies is that “programs
usually fail despite the best intentions of the public administrators” (p. 476). Although the
idea of failure is present, this literature does not focus directly on policy failure, but on the
dynamics, interests, and procedures that impede a proper–or successful– execution of the
policy. Some of those impediments are: lack of resources, ambiguity or lack of agreement on
policy goals, unclear responsibilities, lack of hierarchical control, among others (Matland,
1995; Ryan, 1995; Pülzl & Treib, 2006).
Similarly, a significant body of work has focused on implementation problems from
the perspective of public organizations. This approach calls attention to the complex
characteristics of public agencies and the mechanisms and conditions of how they implement
the policies (Wilson, 1989; Derthick, 1990). The role of the organization, its routines, values,
and other characteristics determine and shape the policy. As Derthick (1990) pointed out,
"The difference lies in the fact that organizations of human beings, unlike mechanicals or
electrical devices, are thought to be infinitely pliable... are also less predictable and,
therefore, require a greater effort to understand" (p. 175). Some difficulties for an adequate
implementation in public organizations are the lack of concern about administrative issues,
common miscalculation of the capacity of the organizations to drive the policy, an
inadequacy of the allocation of the resources, a lack of commitment to goals, and inadequate
leadership (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983).
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Evaluation
In addition to the implementation research contribution, another significant influence
on the ideas of failure and success comes from the evaluation research literature. From the
assessment point of view, there are several questions to consider when facing a policy: Why
do we need to evaluate? Who should evaluate? How should that evaluation be carried out?
What criteria do we require for evaluation? What is the focus of the evaluation? These
questions are not always easy to answer and contain several tensions regarding the
understanding of failure and success.
Evaluating a policy involves benchmarks, definition of criteria, perspectives of those
involved, and also the researcher's assessment point of view. Thus, appraisal of policy failure
expresses epistemological, political, and technical tensions. As stated by Bovens and ´t Hart
(2016): “Evaluation is, after all, both a normative exercise, in that it presumes standards
against which performance will be assessed, and a political exercise, in that attaching certain
labels to a programme or project can have significant consequences for those involved in and
affected by it” (p. 3).
There is abundant contemporary writing on the role of policy evaluation as part of the
policy improvement process and learning and the varied techniques for achieving this.
Usually, the literature on policy evaluation and improvement contains implicit views on
success, taking political goals for granted (McConnell, 2010a). However, policy analysis
research and its methods has evolved significantly, reflecting on the epistemological
tensions—between rationalistic and argumentative policy evaluation—as well as the diverse
criteria used to evaluate policies, and its implications (Bovens et al., 2008; Vedung, 2006).
According to Vedung (2006), there are three broader benchmarks for evaluation: The
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substance-only merit criteria (achievement of goals, stakeholders concerns, client standards),
economic merit criteria (economy, productivity, efficiency), and process merit criteria
(legality, equity, representativeness). Likewise, there are also many other specific criteria to
assess policy failure (listed in Table N.1).
Table N.1. Criteria to Evaluate Policy Failure
• Lack of effectiveness, not achieving the original goals
• Generate negative side-effects
• Not implemented as intended
• Negative Impact on the target group
• Worsening the problem that wanted to solve
• Not meeting the client expectations
• Failing to contribute in a valued area
• Opposition from the key stakeholders
• No improvement compared to similar jurisdiction
• Lack of efficiency regarding cost-effectiveness
• The costs exceed the benefits
• Lack of innovation to respond
• Do not meet moral or ethical standards
• Fail to achieve equity criteria
• Lack of representativeness or public participation
Source: Own elaboration based on Vedung, 2006;
Howlett, 2012; McConnell, 2015

The diversity of approaches expresses existing tensions within the evaluation research
realm, and the understanding of success and failure will vary significantly, given the criteria
upon which the evaluation relies. When confronted with a policy, there is always a struggle
of approaches and urgency to clarify the primary criteria for evaluation. Thus, in the case of a
policy failure event, there is more confusion than usual: different standards are mistaken and
overlap in a tangle of approaches, resulting in full of contradictions, judgments, and parallel
readings (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1995).
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Current approaches tend to emphasize the political role of policy evaluation, albeit
with a technical component. As Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl (2009) claim, “policy evaluation
affects considerations and consequences related to assessing blame and taking credit for
government activities at all stages of the policy process, all of which can have electoral,
administrative, and other consequences for the policy actors" (p. 183). Therefore, evaluation
is an inherently political activity. Each step of an evaluative process involves decisions that
are also political, for example: Which program or policy should be evaluated? At what
moment of time? Under which criteria? For what purposes? Moreover, each policy exists
within a complex environment of actors, interest and expectations regarding the outcome of
the evaluation (Bovens et al., 2008). Consequently, the role of the evaluator is not apolitical,
even less so when it comes to episodes identified as failure or fiasco, because these labels
entail a political statement that evaluators have to deal with. So, despite attempts of neutrality
and objectivity, it is important to recognize the political nature of evaluation. Thus, Bovens,
‘t Hart and Kuipers (2018) warned: “scholars should not be naive about the nature of the
evaluation game they participate” (p. 319).
Policy assessment, especially regarding policy failures and fiascos, is permanently in
normative, methodological, and political struggles. Therefore, rather than continuing in
epistemological discussions on evaluation criteria, the challenge for policy evaluators is to
maximize rigor while at the same time being politically relevant (Bovens et al., 2008; Bovens
& ’t Hart, 1995).
Cases of Policy Failure
Literature addressing the idea of success and failure in public policy expresses a
multiplicity of approaches, methodologies, and perspectives, which is very distinctive of
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social and political sciences. Not surprisingly, there is a wide range of specific literature
examining policy failures—from a human error to global disasters— all of which have their
particular assumptions and questions (listed in Table N.2)
Table N.2. Types of Policy Failures
• Human error
• Organizational pathologies
• Leadership and group pathologies
• Crisis and disasters
• Policy fiascos and disasters
• Scandals and pathologies
• Risk
• Political system overloads and failure
• Plagues, pandemics, and viruses
• Corporate failures
• Economic crisis
• State failure
• Global calamity and catastrophe
Source: McConnell, 2010b, p. 20.

Besides, there is abundant and non-connected literature that deals with specific policy
failure cases from different points of view. These studies usually assume that something went
wrong, focusing on the causes and the subsequent impact of the failure. Examples of these
case studies are: the poll-tax policy in the UK (Smith, 1991; Dunleavy, 1995; Gray, 1996),
the Challenger and other space explosions (Vaughan, 1997; Boin, 2008; Starbuck & Farjoun,
2009), the hurricane Katrina disaster (Boin et al., 2008; Birkland, 2009), the failure of the
employment policy in the US (Mucciaroni, 1990), the bovine tuberculosis crisis in the UK
(Grant, 2009; Dunlop, 2017b), the failure of the National Flood Insurance program in the US
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(Strother, 2018), the failure of the transportation reform in Santiago (Olavarría-Gambi, 2013,
2018; Cortázar, 2015), or the bedroom tax implemented in Britain (Gibb, 2015), among
many others around the world.
In general, this abundant and varied literature arises from an interest in the unique
characteristics of each case and does not seek to link to the broader causes that led to failure
or to build models of analysis (FitzGerald et al., 2019). However, even though individual
cases are indeed unique, this research has gradually contributed to accumulating knowledge,
providing keys and distinctions to understand policy failures better
Nevertheless, there are meaningful efforts to understand the policy failure
phenomenon directly through different analytical frameworks. The next section presents
some of the most important frameworks and models to disentangle the causes, characteristics,
and consequences of policy failure.

2.2.

Frameworks of policy failure
This section identifies and describes significant contributions addressing explicitly

policy failure: early works on policy failure, determinants of program success and failure, the
causes of policy disasters, social construction of policy fiascos, policy failure and success in
public governance, strands of policy failure, sources of failures, pathologies of policy failure,
and policy failure and governance system. While some of these works attempt to unravel the
causes and characteristics of policy failure, others are unambiguous efforts to build theory
through analytical frameworks. All of this work brings concepts and perspectives about
policy failure, and inform a more in-depth analysis of the policy failure phenomenon. These
frameworks and their main characteristics are presented below.
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Early Works on Policy Success and Failure
Although Herbert Simon (1972), Harold Lasswell (1971), and other authors in the
1970s made contributions about the nature of the error, bounded rationality, or appraisal in
policy matters, policy scientists did not address policy failure directly until later. In their
work, The Logic of Policy and Successful Policies Donna Kerr (1976) discusses the
characteristics and conditions for a successful policy, and by doing that, also explains the
three ways in which policies can fail, becoming one of the earliest works using the term
“failure.” From here, the first cause of failure occurs when the policy cannot be carried out,
or implementation failure; the second occurs when the policy does not fulfill the intended
purposes, called instrumental failure; the third way failure happens is when a policy cannot
be justified to the public in terms of the norms that they promote, which is a normative
failure. Thus, this early work already confronted the difficulty of policy failure phenomena
by proposing three separate dimensions of analysis.
Later, Helen Ingram and Dean Mann (1980) directly addressed policy failure in their
book Why Policies Succeed or Fail. The authors claim that simple judgments about a policy
failure are often incorrect, miss several elements, and need a more in-depth understanding
beyond linear or simplistic explanations. Even after the policy is initiated, there are
conflicting points of view depending on values, expectations, and beneficiaries of the policy.
The approach recognizes how hard it is to define and measure success and failure; as Ingram
and Mann (1980) claim: "Economists and policy analysts have tended to measure policy
success by accomplishment of expressed objectives. Literature demonstrates that criteria for
determining policy success can neither be so straightforward nor simple. There may be
purposes and functions served for the political system by policies that are not indicated in
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stated objectives. Further, policies may fail for reasons including those relating to political
systems, beyond the scope which individual policies can affect" (p. 31).
While acknowledging that policies and politics are intricately linked, this initial
approach to policy failure proposed the fundamental distinction of political and programrelated causes of failure. Ingram and Mann (1980) identified causes of policy failure as: high
expectations placed on government that are not always achievable, lack of clarity of policy
goals, inadequate theory of causation and policy tools, complexity of the implementation
process, disparity between the latent functions of the political system and the manifest policy
purpose, challenges and obstacles of policy institutions, and the difficulties to attain
presidential goals under existing institutional arrangements.
Determinants of Program Success and Failure
In the Determinants of Program Success and Failure, Harold Wolman (1981)
presents a comprehensive framework to understand program performance. For Wolman, it is
not enough to describe how or to what degree policies are successful or fail; in order to move
forward, it is necessary to answer the question of why public programs fail or are successful.
While valuing the contributions of implementation studies—in vogue at the time—he
proposes a more complete approach, and argues, "implementation studies, at least as
presently conceived, can at best present only a partial explanation" (p. 434). Program failure
or success may result from defects or virtues in the policy formulation and design or planning
process as well as the implementation.
The framework is divided into two parts, the formulation process and the carrying out
process; each contains components that can affect the success and failure of a program. The
key components of the formulation are: problem conceptualization, theory evaluation
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selection, specification of objectives, program design, and program structure. Likewise, the
components of the implementation process are: resources’ adequacy, management and
control structure, bureaucratic rules and regulations, political effectiveness, and feedback and
evaluation. This is an explicit effort to build a framework of analysis for researchers and
decision makers. Determinants are the basis for developing new research on the elements
affecting success or failure, and at the same time, a framework for action for policymakers
and implementers. Wolman’s idea is that determinants could function as a sort of "check list"
of all those factors that could influence a policy’s performance.
The Causes of Policy Disasters
Another contribution to understanding policy failure emerged from the detailed
analysis of eight cases of large-scale policy mistakes—called policy disasters—occurring
from 1982 to 1995 in Britain. Embracing a critical opinion of the New Public Management
(NPM) adopted by the UK government, Patrick Dunleavy (1995) defined policy disasters as:
"generally constructed to mean significant and substantially costly failures of commission or
omission by government" (p. 52).
With the aim of understanding policy disasters and specifically why the United
Kingdom was prone to large-scale and avoidable policy mistakes, the analysis identified five
main factors in the generation of policy disasters: scale aggregation, overly speedy
legislation, hyper-activism, the arrogance of the Whitehall and ineffective core executive,
and lack of checks and balances (Dunleavy, 1995). The first cause is called "scale
aggregation" of widespread and highly ambitious policies under the centralist and statist
character of the British government. The second is the "overly speedy legislation" as a
characteristic of the policymaking process due to the majority in Parliament. The third cause
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is called "hyper-activism" of policymakers, which occurs when politicians wanted to gain
points with the media and public opinion by generating new public initiatives, which is
usually accompanied by a divergence between initiation and implementation. The fourth
cause of disasters is denoted as "the arrogance of the Whitehall" referring to some
characteristics of the government’s high executives who are self-confident but without the
proper background or experience. Finally, the last cause of disaster is the "ineffective core
executive and lack of checks and balances," which, combined with the other elements, leads
systematically to an unbalanced decision-making process (Dunleavy, 1995).
Dunleavy's work did not pretend to build a framework of analysis for policy disasters,
but called attention to the necessity of significant institutional changes. Nonetheless, this
study contributed to a broader policy failure debate, widening the perspective on causes of
failure beyond the particular program or political scope, distinguishing management and
institutional arrangements, as well as other structural factors. Dunleavy’s findings were
highly criticized by his contemporaries because of his bold assertion of Britain’s proclivity to
disasters, but also because of his loose definition of “disaster.” According to Gray (1996), a
better definition might contain a set of elements related to goals, perception, avoidability, and
consequences, among others (detailed below in Table N.3).
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Table N.3. Elements of a Policy Disaster
•

Failure against implicit and explicit objectives

•

Perception as disastrous by a wide range of opinion

•

Falling short of what is achievable, even from a pessimist viewpoint

•

Intensive and extensive disruption to social and political processes

•

Significant loss of control

•

Meets criteria of foreseeability/avoidability

•

Events must appear to be substantially traceable to the actions of inactions of policymakers

•

The events are likely to remain judged as disastrous

•

The events form part of a chain of consequences which reaches far beyond the immediate policy
arena
Source: Gray, 1996, pp.77-78

Through his harsh criticism to Dunleavy’s conclusions, Gray (1996) offers a different
definition, “to be a ‘disaster,' a policy must fail against all possible objectives, must be
perceived as qualitative failure by all observers, and must fall far short of what is realistically
achievable from even the most pessimistic and limited viewpoint. Additionally, full disasters
may often have consequences which clearly rebound far outside the immediate areas in
which they were intended to have effect" (p. 77).
The academic debate between Dunleavy and Gray about what constitutes a policy
disaster reveals the complexity of the topic and how important it is to consider several
dimensions of analysis. It is worth noting that reaching an agreed-upon definition of policy
failure has been a persistent concern in the literature.
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The Social Construction of Policy Fiascos
Bovens and ‘t Hart (1996) contribute to the literature, in what has become one of the
most influential works in policy failure, with the book Understanding Policy Fiascos, in
which they rigorously analyzed 26 cases of policy failure in different countries with the
explicit purpose to develop a framework of analysis. By addressing the issue from a social
constructionist standpoint, this work highlights the biases by which failure and fiascos are
being interpreted and judged, which are deeply rooted in implicit, epistemological, and
normative assumptions. As Bovens and ‘t Hart (1996) point out, “the alleged ubiquity of
failure is as much a product of social expectations and political ideology as it is due to
substantive failures of public service delivery” (p. 146). Consequently, the authors defined
policy fiascos as: “A negative event that is perceived by a socially and politically significant
group of people in the community to be at least partially caused by avoidable and
blameworthy failures of public policymakers” (p. 15). In order to tackle the complexity of
policy failures, the authors proposed a framework of four layers of meaning to unravel the
process by which a failure or fiasco is socially constructed (see Diagram N.1 below).

28

Diagram N.1. Layers of Constructed Meanings for Policy Fiasco

Policy Fiasco

Allocation of Blame
Avoidability
Government Intervention
Severity of the Damage

Source: Own elaboration, based on Bovens & 't Hart, 1996.

The first layer, severity of the damage, is the assessment of negative events, i.e. the
perception of damage or significant adverse effects beyond what society tolerates as
normal—psychological, physical, political, or symbolic—and the influence of those
judgments over the perception of failure. The second layer of government intervention is the
identification of agents or institutions involved in the policy fiasco because the damage
entails human intervention, particularly governmental decisions, actions, or omissions. The
third layer of avoidability focuses on the behavior of policymakers and institutions, under the
consideration of adverse events constituting something avoidable, either by decisions, acts, or
omissions. Finally, the fourth layer of constructed meanings, allocation of blame, addresses
the political dimension of policymaking, looking at the allocation of responsibility (Bovens &
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’t Hart, 1996). Thus, each layer is a complex process of construction of meanings that can
lead to a unique perception or classification of policy failures, from minor to major ones, or
even fiascos.
Continuing to explore the nature and characteristics of policy failure, different authors
have applied this four-layers framework (Richardson, 2007; Kearns & Lawson, 2009;
Oppermann & Spencer, 2016b). For instance, Kearns and Lawson (2009) explored the case
of housing stock transfer in Glasgow in 2003, which involved transferring more than 83,000
dwellings from the city council to community ownership. Even though the policy was
heavily labeled as a failure, after detailed analysis of the construction of failure, the authors
concluded the policy wasn't a fiasco after all, but a performance defect–because there was not
significant creation of social damage beyond the policy itself.
In a similar way, Richardson (2007) uses the four layers of meaning to analyze seven
cases in the British educational system, classifying failures as “policy controversies,” “partial
failure,” “fail of programs,” with limited political importance, or “significant crisis of
governance,” which is a policy fiasco. Analogous to the Glasgow case, this analysis found
three of the four layers of meaning, but there was no evidence of sufficient political damage
to decrease the legitimacy of the government (which doesn't imply that “smaller” failures
couldn’t generate adverse consequences and substantial institutional harm).
Policy Failure and Success in Public Governance
Bovens, ‘t Hart, and Peters (2001) go further regarding the conception of policy
success and failure, using an analytical framework to explain the factors that promote success
and failure in public governance. In line with previous works mentioned, the authors
recognize the multiplicity of interpretations and frames in assessing the failure or success,
30

which depend on temporal, spatial, cultural, and political factors. Thus, based on a rigorous
empirical work and a controlled research design, they examine four policy sectors (the steel
industry, health sector, banking, and HIV/blood policy) in six European countries (Sweden,
Holland, Germany, Spain, United Kingdom, and France).
The inquiry of the 24 cases distinguishes the programmatic and the political
dimension of policy performance, using specific evaluation criteria for each governance
challenge. In line with the previous literature, programmatic evaluation focuses on efficiency
and effectiveness of policy-making as social problem-solving (Lasswell, 1971; Lindblom &
Cohen, 1979); and political assessment involves a complicated process of judgments of
politicians and policies, through the use of discourses, symbols, political ideology, emotions,
and power relationships in the political arena (Bovens, ’t Hart, Peters, et al., 2001). Diagram
N.2 shows the integrated framework for each policy sector, placing the countries according
to their programmatic and political success and failure.
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Diagram N.2. Integrated Assesment of Policy Failure and Success

Programatic Success

Political Failure

Political Success

Programatic Failure

Source: Bovens et al., 2001, pp. 600-635

The framework examines to what extent program and political judgments coincide or
diverge. It explores the discrepancies in the policy style and the way each country manages
political and programmatic challenges. For example, the case of the HIV/blood policy in
Europe shows the crisis was handled according to the policy style of each country. While
Sweden and the Netherlands managed the programmatic and political crisis in an inclusive
and actively consensual way, Spain and France were less responsible handling the challenges
and even sometimes hostile with the groups involved (Albæk, 2001 pp.453-657). The authors
conclude that even in hierarchical and centralized political systems, collaborative and
consensual arrangements are capable of averting political problems and collaborating to
achieve programmatic success (Bovens, ’t Hart, Peters, et al., 2001).
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Strands of Policy Failure: Program, Politics, and Process
In response to the need to advance to a better conceptualization of policy failure and
overcome methodological limitations in the field, Allan McConnell and collaborators
proposed a new framework of policy failure (Marsh & McConnell, 2010; McConnell, 2010b;
Howlett, 2012). Policy failure is more complicated than not reaching goals successfully, but
there is also more to consider than the social construction that mistakenly leads to the
assertion that failure is "in the eye of the beholder." Thus, the framework is an effort to
capture nuances, and overcome the epistemological tensions between the objective and
subjective dimension of success and failure (Marsh & McConnell, 2010; McConnell, 2010b,
2010a).
Arguing that the program and political distinctions of analysis do not promote a better
understanding of policy failure and lead to a conceptual confusion, the framework proposes
“process” as the third dimension to elucidate policy failure. The process dimension is related
to issues of the policy process—agenda setting, formulation stage, decision-making,
implementation, and evaluation—in other words, those elements that aid or impede the
development of a policy idea to successful completion (McConnell, 2010a). While policy
studies have focused on program failure, the literature of public administration, public
management, and organizational studies have been meeting on process-related elements that
lead to policy failures, such as institutional design, leadership, organizational dynamics, and
other nuances beyond program attributes or outcomes. This new framework takes into
consideration that legacy (McConnell, 2010a, 2010a; Howlett, 2012).
The three strands of policy are inextricably linked, but the purpose of the framework
is to provide tools to capture the diversity of outcomes and explain why a policy fails in some
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dimension but not in others, or why some policies are considered severe failures and others,
under similar circumstances are not. Success and failures are not the only options to assess
policy, but there are "grey areas" in-between these two poles, leading to a spectrum of
intermediate categories between success and failure (McConnell, 2010a, 2011). Diagram N.3
below presents the framework.
Diagram N.3. Strands of Policy Succes-Failure
Program Politics and Process

Failure

Success

Failure

Marginal
Success /
Outright Failure

Conflicted
Success/Failure

Resilient
Success /
Tolerable
Failure

Success

Program

Politics

Process

Source: Own elaboration based on Marsh and McConnell (2010), McConnel (2010A; 2010B)

The “strands” framework presents some combinations of success/failure and the type
of evidence needed to assess each one of the points on the spectrum. Just regarding policy
failure, there are three categories: tolerable failure, conflicted failure, and outright failure
(McConnell, 2010b; 2015). A detailed definition is below in Table N.4.
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Table N.4. Categories of Failure According to Three Streams of Analysis

Tolerable Failure (=Resilient Success)
Failure is tolerable when it does not fundamentally impede the attainment of goals that proponents set out
to achieve, and opposition is small, and/or criticism is virtually non-existent. In essence, tolerable failures
are marginal features—a politically realistic ‘second best'—of dominant and resilient successful outcomes.
Conflicted Failure (=Conflicted Success)
Failures to achieve goals are fairly evenly matched with attainment of goals, with strong criticism and
strong defense in roughly equal measure. In essence, conflicted failures are dogged by periodic
controversy that is never quite enough to act as a fatal blow to the policy, but insufficient to seriously
damage its defenders.
Outright Failure (=Marginal Success)
A policy fails, even if it successful in some minimal respect if it does not fundamentally achieve the goals
that proponents set out to achieve, and opposition is great, and/or support is virtually non-existent. In
essence, failures outweigh success, and the policy is a political liability.
Source: McConnell, 2015, p. 237

This framework has triggered an intense academic debate in recent years, including the
publication of the special issue about policy failure in the Journal of Public Policy and
Administration. In one of those contributions, Newman and Head (2015) proposed not three
but four categories of policy failure: program, process, political/electoral, and distributional.
In addition to the program and process strands, the authors argue that the political dimension
of failure can connote both resource distributions between competitors as well as political
partisanship activities, and the failure policy framework should address them separately. Thus,
the “political/electoral” strand includes political parties, legislature, government and organized
oppositions, and “distributional” dimension refers to the competition for resources by different
groups.
As Newman and Head (2015) pointed out, "the main weakness of the existing literature
is that it does not formally recognize that failures and successes in the different categories can
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exist simultaneously” (p. 350). Thus, the strands frameworks acknowledge that there are
conflicting interpretations of policy failure. The reality is not always classifiable and to fail in
one dimension does not imply failure in another dimension or overall (McConnell, 2015;
Newman & Head, 2015).
Sources of Policy Failure
There are two very recent works trying to identify the sources and characteristics of
policy failure. Peter H. Schuck (2014), in Why Government Fails So Often, and How Can It
Do Better, analyzes governmental failures in the US, and Antony King and Ivor Crewe
(2013) with The Blunders of Our Governments analyze policy failures of the British
government. These works are part of a renewed interest in policy failures, and accordingly,
they have some common features. Both are concerned with the recurrence of policy failure,
are focused on policies within a particular country, apply an interdisciplinary perspective,
rely on case studies to identify the sources and characteristics of failures, and neither attempt
to articulate policy failure theory.
Schuck (2014) addresses government failure by recognizing the influence of
interpretations and judgments over policy failure, but rejects the idea that failure is in the eye
of the beholder; as he claims, “good policy assessment rest upon a number of wellestablished, relatively uncontroversial criteria that are certified in methodology and routinely
used in government practice. Although the application of these criteria to particular policies
might be contested, it turns out that the results of such assessments are also remarkably
consistent–and consistently negative” (pp. 62-63). Therefore, the author examines current
policies at the federal level, from a “substantive effectiveness” approach, including three
normative features: efficiency, equity, and manageability. The analysis identifies the sources
36

of governmental failure in the US (detailed in Table N.5), considering them as “endemic”
characteristics of policymaking.
Table N.5. Sources of Policy Failure
• Incentives: perverse and unwanted incentives in policies (for example: moral hazard).
• Irrationality: lack of rational analysis, such as cost benefit and cost-effectiveness.
• Information: costly and improperness of information for decision-making.
• Lack of credibility of the government: generates uncertainty, and reduces collaboration between public
and private sector.
• Rigidity: inability to adapt and change a running policy.
• The power of markets: obstacles to policy effectiveness and distortion of government policies.
• Implementation: lack of analysis leading to preventable implementation failures.
• Limits to law and legislation: due to their ambiguity, tensions between simple/complex or capacity to
shape the policy.
• Bureaucracy: the “decline” of the public force and the independent effects of bureaucracy over policies.
Source: Schuck, 2014

Resembling Dunleavy’s analysis of disasters in the UK 20 years ago, King and Crewe
(2013) are concerned about policy failure and why the British government is blunder-prone.
Based on case analysis of what they call “horror stories,” like the devastating mis-selling of
personal pensions in the late ’80s, or the swiped ID cards policy in 2010, their definition of
“blunder” refers to the degrees and levels of policy failure, and also delves into the policy
repercussions they entail. Policy blunders is: ”an episode in which a government adopts a
specific course of action in order to achieve one or more objectives and, as result largely or
wholly of its own mistakes either fails completely to achieve these objectives, it does achieve
some or all of them but at a totally disproportionate cost, or else does achieve some or all of
them but contrives at the same time to cause a significant amount of “collateral damage” in
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the form of unintended and undesired consequences” (King & Crewe, 2013, p. 4).
Accordingly, analysis of policy blunders distinguishes between human errors (behavioral) or
systemic failures (structural). Like Schuck’s work, the authors identify the key features of
blunders at each level of analysis (listed in Table N.6).
Table N.6. Human Error and System Failure

Human error:
1) Cultural disconnection between policymakers and recipients of the policy. 2) Groupthink and the
absence of the ‘devil’s advocate’. 3) Dominating prejudices or ideological perspectives and insufficient
pragmatism. 4) Operational disconnection between design/strategy and operation/implementation. 5)
‘Panic, symbols and spin’, or the power of populist media over policymaking.
System Failures:
1) Insufficiency of the central government to initiate, implement or monitor a policy. 2) High
ministerial movement and tendency toward short-term agenda. 3) Tendency of ministers toward hyper
activism. 4) Lack of accountability and responsibility. 5) Lack of democratic and parliamentary
accountability. 6) Asymmetries of expertise between policymakers and their consultants. 7) Lack of
deliberative policymaking.
Source: King & Crewe, 2013

Undoubtedly, both investigations offer distinctions that contribute to the discussion
on policy failure. The thorough analysis strives to correct, improve, and ultimately get out of
this “failure path” that Britain—with the blunders—and the United States—with federal
programs—are sunk in. However, beyond the critical features identified and
recommendations for each country, the analyses do not offer mechanisms to analyze and
prevent future mistakes.
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Individual, institutional, and Societal Pathologies of Policy Failure
Hindmoor and McConnell (2015) offer an alternative framework to explore why
policy failure happened, asking if it could have been avoided or not. By understanding the
policy failure’s nature as complex, manifold, and definitively non-linear, the authors claim
"failure is the product of multiple, individual, institutional, and societal factors that coalesce
in pathological ways" (p. 66). Through the in-depth exploration of the great financial crisis in
the UK in 2008, and under the rubric of individual, institutional, and paradigmatic
pathologies, the framework aims to move beyond blame games and dominant explanations of
policy failures, like "greedy bankers," "lax regulators," or destructive tendencies of "market
capitalism" toward a more comprehensive perspective of policy failure.
At the individual pathology level, the focus is on individual fallibility and human
error in policymaking, usually centered on persons holding power positions. The pathology
could lead to decision makers misperceiving the signals of a problem, exercising cognitive
biases, misjudging, overconfident about the policy, or even blind to failure (Hindmoor &
McConnell, 2013; 2015).
The institutional pathology level of analysis is centered on public, private, and nongovernmental institutions. Examples of possible pathologies are: the institution is unable to
deal with potential threats; the norms and culture of the institution do not have room for “bad
news;” an excessive focus on institutional priorities (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2015).
Finally, the paradigmatic pathology alludes to loftier models and principles of
society, ideas, and ideologies. This pathology explains why some societies may be not open
or receptive to several signals or evidence of impending failure, specific assumptions about
capacities, or confidence in historical precedents (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2015).
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Applying the three-level pathology framework to the UK financial crisis, they
concluded that "nobody saw it coming," and the different warning signs of the vulnerability
of the financial markets were weak and few. At the individual and institutional level, the key
actors failed to identify the weaknesses; meanwhile, at the paradigmatic level, there was
blind faith in the efficiency of the financial markets and their "magical" risk-dispersing
properties (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2015). Thus, the level of paradigmatic pathologies
played a crucial role in this case, supporting the importance of including this dimension in
further policy failure research.
Similarly, van der Steen, Scherpenisse, and van Twist (2015) propose a framework
with three connected levels: policy failure, governmental failure, and governance failure. To
overcome a simplified understanding of policy failure, it is necessary to advocate for a more
systemic and interactive perspective of the intricate systems involved in a policy failure. This
approach "considers outcomes the effect of interrelated interactions between different actors
and factors of the system" (p. 7). In the case of failure in the Dutch education policy, the
analysis emphasizes the exploration of the feedback mechanisms, the interactions within the
system and particularly the study of the causal loops, self-balanced loops that draw toward
status quo, and self-reinforcing loops where minor interventions can flip the balance of the
system. Thus, this framework reinforces the necessity of multi-level analysis to understand
policy failure, and emphasizes the role of the interactions and dynamics between levels,
something not explored enough until now.
Policy Failure and Governance
Most of the analysis of policy failure has been focused on the policy itself, not
considering the political or socio-economic environment surrounding the creation and
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implementation of the policy. While some multilevel approaches lean in that direction, such
as the previous one, recent literature has also concentrated on systemic determinants of
policy failure.
Along these lines, Peters (2015) offers a compelling framework for types of failure to
understand the extent by which policy failure is a function or a symptom of the governance
system, distinguishing between state failure, two types of governance, and policy failure. The
first type, state failure, is a dramatic form of failure in which the state is incapable of
providing even basic services; it is most commonly the product of extreme poverty or ethnic
conflict and may not be amenable to solution through policies. The governance failure I type
encompasses the incapacity to provide direction to the society and the economy; numerous
policies can function well, but the system is incapable of addressing fundamental issues,
usually due to political parties and their leaders. Governance failure II alludes to the
incapacity to initiate more comprehensive action across policy domains or to cope with longterm problems, such as focusing on specific policies often tied to social or economic
interests. Failures of this type are the result of failure within the bureaucracy to coordinate
and cooperate. Finally, policy failure refers to the ineffectiveness of solving a problem
through policy tools. It is the easiest form of failure to solve because it is not linked to the
organic structure of the state, and it may occur independently of the other dimensions of
failure. As stated by Peters, “Policy change is not easy, and designing the right policy is also
not easy, but it does not involve the large-scale political and even social change that may be
required to address state failure or governance failure” (p. 264).
This model offers interesting contributions. First, policy failure is not directly
correlated to governance failure, i.e. a failed regime not necessarily generate failed policies,
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and a successful system not necessarily generates successful policies. The implications of
these scenarios are very different for the improvement of policies. Another central
contribution of the framework is to stress the limitations of focusing just on the policy level,
and not the roots of failure related to the governance system and its limitations. As Peters
(2015) points out, “the best designers will be incapable of producing effective policies if the
fundamental factors within their governance arrangements are not conducive to success” (p.
272). Thus, the idea is to face policy failure in a broader context, exploring the links between
systemic conditions and policy failure. Otherwise, policymaking and the analysis of failure
are purblind.

2.3.

Common Characteristics of Policy Failure
Policy failure studies are a growing but diverse field of research, and the inherent

complexity of policy failures, is also in the multiplicity of perspectives and emphases on the
phenomenon. Thus, the literature addressing policy failure—directly or indirectly—have
different foci and assumptions. While some research streams are concerned with defining and
characterizing policy failure, others address the causes, consequences, as well as perceptions
of failure. Nevertheless, there are common elements in the policy failure literature,
distinctions that both case studies and models observe and deepen, and this section presents
the most important ones: the perceived damage, intentionality, avoidability, government
responsibility, blame avoidance dynamics, the paradox of time, visibility, and the role of the
context.

42

The Damage
One of the characteristic elements of policy failure is the concern about the harm
caused by the policy. Most of the studies dealing with policy failure refer in one way or
another to the idea of damage. For example, Linder and Peters pointed out: “a program may
or may not achieve its goals, but creates so many negative side effects” (1987, p. 3); likewise,
Bovens and ‘t Hart state that policy fiascoes “inflict cumulative damage" (1995, p. 71); and
King and Crewe refer to “collateral damage” (2013, p. 4). Under different approaches and
names, this damage component considers distinctions about the extent, intensity, duration,
and severity. Therefore, policy failure goes beyond not accomplishing the goals, because it
always implies some kind or level of damage.
The extent represents the harmful effects of the policy failure beyond the
programmatic dimension to address other adverse consequences, such as economic,
symbolic, political, and social (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996). Extent also refers to the “loss of
control,” and how the failure generates “waves of damage.” Similarly, the idea of “scale
aggregation” developed by Dunleavy (1995) captures how damage exceeds the scope of the
policy event itself, extending its consequences beyond expectations and manageable. Thus,
the extent of a policy failure can be small with a limited scope, confined to a policy event, or
large, going far beyond what was expected, and affecting an entire policy regime or systemwide (Bovens & ’t Hart, 2016; Howlett et al., 2015).
From social construction literature emerges the idea of the intensity of a policy failure
as an expression of the damage caused. Intensity is linked to the level of agreement within
the community on the assessment of the failure. Thus, it is not enough that some
policymakers or researchers judge the damage caused as severe or costly but it required the
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consensus among different groups and stakeholders that indeed the outcomes of the failure
are harsh and grave (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996; Howlett et al., 2015). Therefore, the level of
agreement about the extent and degree of the policy failure determines the intensity, ranging
from low-intensity events, minor or partial failure, or high-intensity failures usually called
fiascos. Similarly, the duration of the failure is considered when assessing the damage. While
some policy failures start gradually, but then have long-lasting and severe consequences,
other failures are short and sharp and considered as a sole "event" (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996;
Howlett et al., 2015).
From this literature, the way the policy failure is framed by stakeholders and public
opinion determines the perceived severity of the damage and the degree of politicization. One
crucial feature to determine severity is the appraisal of the violation of core societal values—
e.g. democracy, justice, and national security. If there is no threat to core values, the event
can be de-politicized and probably will be easier to overcome. If not, the situation may result
in a major crisis. After the severity is constructed, the distinction of the degree and scope of
the damage is made; this denotes whether the policy failure was a stand-alone error in a
system that usually performs well, or if the failure is a symptom of a much larger regime flaw
(focusing on underlying causes such as organizational routines or ethics), and consequently
carries a severe connotation (Baldwin et al., 2000; Brändström & Kuipers, 2003).
The damage of policy failures also lies in the significant economic costs. The case
studies in this literature allude to the enormous economic burden on governments and
citizens (Dunleavy, 1995; Bovens, ’t Hart, Peters, et al., 2001; Grant, 2009; Olavarría-Gambi,
2018). These costs point not only to the waste of resources due to the failure to achieve
policy objectives, but also to all the resources that governments allocate to correct policy
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errors, which sometimes even end up worsening initial situations, in what has been called
"fatal remedies" (Peters, 2015). However, excessive costs or the waste of resources are
important elements for the judgment of damage, but not the only ones.
Along with economic and social damages perceived, policy failures generate serious
consequences for authoritative actors. Negative policy evaluation can undermine the
credibility of the leader and the ability to command support, affects coalition behavior and
parliamentary support for the government, also distresses political party loyalties and party
member/activist behavior towards leaders and others, and finally affects voter behavior and
support for the party/government/regime (Howlett, 2012, pp. 548–549). Policy failures
usually lead to the perception of significant loss of social trust, generating an adverse climate,
and damaging authorities' ability to exercise effective governance. To this point: “A trust
deficit should concern anyone interested in good governance, even if that deficit is based on
mere perceptions of trustworthiness” (Forbes, 2004, p. 343).
Thus, the idea of damage is extended beyond policy goals achievement, affecting
other political dimensions and undermining the democratic stability. As McConnell points
out: “Policy failures can also cause electoral and reputational damage to governments, and
even lead to the downfall of public officials, politicians, governments and regimes” (2014, p.
2).
Intentionality
Another common element in the policy failure literature is intentionality. The policy's
appraisal depends on whether public opinion and policymakers deem harm as intentional or
unintentional. Usually, the initial reactions to a policy failure are to uncover the
policymakers’ real intentions, especially assessing who could benefit and who might be
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harmed (Howlett, 2012). Thus, the severity and consequences are very different if the policy
is considered an unexpected accident or intentional action. Whereas an unintentional failure
is more of a misfortune occurred despite the noble intentions of the policymakers.
Stone (2002) offers some helpful distinctions about intended or unintended
consequences and how generates different causal stories about policy failure. Unintended
consequences of a failure are due to accidental causes (natural disaster, bad luck) or
inadvertent cause (unanticipated harmful side effects, avoidable ignorance, carelessness). In
contrast, the intended consequences of failure can be provoked by a mechanical cause
(people who act like automatons, rigid bureaucratic routines, machines performing as
designed but causing harm), or intentional cause (oppression, conspiracies, "bad apples,"
harmful but ignored side effects) (Stone, 2002, pp. 208-214). Regarding this latter point,
there are several intentional causes of policy failure; as Howlett (2015) claims, governments
can fail due to “malfeasance, fraud, criminal activity, ideological intentions, conspiracies and
other kinds of self-defeating behavior on the part of government officials and decision
makers” (p. 214). Therefore, it is important to distinguish between those failures that come
from evil or malevolence, from those that result from goodwill or good intentions but
inadvertently turned out bad, and Policy failure literature focuses on the latter (Howlett,
2012).
The reaction to a policy failure may be quite different if the failure is understood to be
intentional or non-intentional. This has significant consequence on the whole judgment
process of the failure. People tend to be less harsh in their judgment if a failure is considered
non-intentional and usually prevents escalation of the conflict. However, if the perception of
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intentionality is high, the political consequences tend to be severe and long-lasting (Howlett,
2012).
Avoidability
Along with the problem of intentionality, the question of avoidability and
foreseeability—the ability to avert or anticipate—is critical when it comes to evaluating and
judging a policy failure. The discussion about avoidability is linked to other policy
alternatives that hypothetically could lead to a satisfactory result instead of the failure. This
idea has been called “neglected-alternative bias,” i.e. the failure is always influenced by the
existence of considered better policy choices (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996; Kearns & Lawson,
2009). Furthermore, the idea of foreseeability and avoidability of the failure is related to how
predictable the consequences were, as well as the capacity to control or overcome the errors
once detected. Accordingly, the attribution of failure is greater if the event is considered
avoidable or foreseeable (Gray, 1996; Richardson, 2007).
Unpredictable or unavoidable events can generate more sympathy for policymakers
and therefore perceived as a smaller failure than those that were easily averted (Howlett et
al., 2015). For example, in the case of an earthquake and subsequent tsunami that devastated
the central coast of Chile in 2010, policymakers received milder judgments than expected
despite the enormous magnitude of the damage, the failure of the alert system, and several
mistakes in managing the catastrophe (Luna et al., 2010; CIPER, 2012a). The failure,
however, wasn't considered avoidable or foreseeable by the public. In spite of a long history
of major earthquakes in the country, the cultural understanding of natural events as
unpredictable, and the public consideration that the damage had been monumental led to
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judgments of avoidability and foreseeability, and caused this leniency (Leyton et al., 2010;
CIPER, 2012a).
Nair and Howlett (2017, 2014) have a different perspective regarding the avoidability
and prevention of policy failures. This approach understands failure as inevitable. Since
decision makers often face incomplete information, this leads to the inability to adequately
predict the future, and therefore make bad decisions that can lead to policy mistakes or
failures. This difficulty to foresee is called "policy myopia," which they define as: “the
difficulty of seeing far enough into the future to discern its general shape and contour in
enough detail to be able to properly anticipate and plan in the present” (Nair & Howlett,
2017, p. 104). From this perspective, to overcome policy myopia and avoid policy mistakes,
it is crucial to evaluate policy risks and to identify uncertain circumstances.
Government Responsibility
One of the widely accepted ideas about policy failure in the literature is the notion
that failures may be the government’s responsibility, hence caused (at least partially) by
action or omission of the government (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996; Gray, 1996; Howlett et al.,
2015). “Government” may be represented in various ways, such as individual public
officials, federal agencies, regulating organizations, legislative bodies or head of
state/government. The literature addresses the notion of “action” and “omission” by reference
to organizational and social psychology research: when faced with a conflict, individual
behavior varies along the dimension of omission or commission; in other words, either a
person confronts and acts against the threat, or they ignore it. However, research has reported
a tendency toward “omission bias” in decision-making when facing risk or uncertainty
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because people perceive more risk in taking action than inaction (Mellahi & Wilkinson,
2010).
To assign responsibility for policy failures is not an easy task, especially in modern
and complex public organizations where the “problem of many hands” diffuses
accountability every time more. As said by Thompson (2014), “The failures of governments
are usually the result of decisions and non-decisions by many different individuals, many of
whose contributions may be minimal and unintended” (p. 9). The author analyzes the cases
of the response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in the same year, and the financial crisis in 2007, firmly concluding a lack
of individual responsibility in each of these cases. In order to face this problem it is essential
to have a preventive approach and design responsibility at different levels because otherwise,
these failures will happen again (Thompson, 2014). Similarly, the analysis of policy failures
in four critical areas of public service delivery in the UK concludes that “the ownership of
failure is shared” (Wajzer et al., 2016, p. 34). Thus, collective responsibility goes beyond the
particular public service in which the failure occurred, incorporating a wider system–such as
the central government, local government, regulator.
Another contribution to the idea of government responsibility and policy failures
comes from a theory of political change called “selectorate theory.” This theory analyzes
how the relations of the sizes of the winning coalition and the selectorate—every person who
has some say in choosing the leader—can explain if the leader prioritizes the pursuit of
private goods over public or government performance. Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow,
Siverson, and Smith (1999) study how those responsible for policy failure stay in politics
despite all indications to the contrary. To address the question, they investigate the role of
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institutions and their characteristics regarding policy failure and "political survival.” By using
statistical analysis to test the relationship between the size of the selectorate, the winning
coalition, leadership, and failure, the authors conclude that some type of political systems—
typical autocracies, small victorious coalitions, and large selectorate—are prone to policy
failure. Those political groups are easily influenced by the leader's vision, inducing an
endogenous norm of loyalty by the members toward their leaders, even when faced with
policy failure. Unlike what is expected in a democracy, those systems are less attentive to
failure “because in such systems, policy failure does not represent a major threat to the
political survival of the leadership" (p. 160).
Judgment on government responsibility for failures involves different actors, political
parties, citizenship, voters, and also the scientific community. Regarding the latter, a widely
studied case is the public health hazard BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy), better
known as "mad cow disease," that led to the death of 80 people and the slaughter of millions
of cattle, costing billions of pounds in the UK (Carrington, 2000). The case shows a
particular relationship between science and policymaking that finally end up worsening the
crisis. Authorities misrepresented the policy goals and the grounds of policy decisions “by
acquiring, interpreting and representing scientific information and advice in ways that were
unscientific and anti-scientific” (Van Zwanenberg & Millstone, 2003, p. 28). Likewise, this
case points out the critical role of public inquiries—in this case conducted by Lord Phillips
and lasted two and half years—in order to understand the scientific causes of the disease and
determine government responsibilities. The public investigation determined that the outbreak
could not have been foreseen and the measures taken by the government were adequate given
the information available at the time. However, it assigns responsibility to the government
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for mismanagement of the crisis (Klein, 2000; Forbes, 2004). According to Gerodimos, the
governmental response to the crisis was inadequate in different realms, “Expert advice;
review of this advice by officials; pace of policy-making; communications within
departments; coordination; control and delivery of implementation; scrutiny and
transparency; honest communication with the public; the adjective that unites them all is
‘inadequate’” (2004, p. 926).
Responsibility for failures usually rests on governmental authorities. Several policy
failure studies pay special attention to the role of policymakers at the top of the hierarchy,
those small groups wielding significant influence and power, and how their characteristics
and ways of thinking contribute to policy failures. This is evinced in what Dunleavy (1995)
called the "arrogance of the Whitehall,” alluding to a particular “managerialism style” as one
of the causes of policy disasters; the “overconfidence” of policymakers, in the case of the
great failure of TranSantiago transportation reform (Cortázar, 2015); “leadership traits” that
might increase leaders propensity ending up with policy fiasco (Brummer, 2016); the “great
leap forward politics" or ambitious decision-making style which led to catastrophic economic
consequences in the case of rail privatization (Moran, 2001). Other similar concepts are: the
idea of “cognitive bias” and “blindness to failure” as part of an individual pathology of those
who hold power (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2015); the “stubbornness,” or the refusal to
accept that policy was not working and continuing regardless of the warning signs (King &
Crewe, 2013); the “culture of secrecy” of decision makers that aggravated a public health
crisis (Gerodimos, 2004); and finally, “overvaluation, overconfidence, insensitivity and
wishful thinking” that lead to a lack of preparedness and insufficient collective reaction to
hurricane Katrina (Parker et al., 2009). Like all of this, several works refer to characteristics
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of managers and decision makers and how these characteristics are linked to policy mistakes
or failure.
In this same line, it is worth pointing out the literature of Groupthink, which has
focused on understanding the dynamics of public officials and especially high-level decision
groups in policymaking. Originally from social psychology and public administration,
groupthink is focused on the influential role of the small group, their ideas or ideology over
policymaking, generating a distorted view of reality, and excess of optimism leading to
reckless policies, failures, and fiascoes. Initially defined by Janis (1982), groupthink is "a
mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group
when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise
alternative course of action" (p. 259), or in other words, the propensity of decision makers in
small groups to make sub-optimal decisions. When groups are under a lot of pressure and
they are highly cohesive, they change the way they operate and become a threat to decisionmaking. Once the groupthink is installed, a series of pathologies or symptoms appear (listed
in Table N.7), which leads managers to miscalculate events and thus to defective decisionmaking—such poor search of alternatives, ignorance of outside information and biases
information processing—and finally failure (’t Hart, 1991; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2010). For
Janis (1982), “even individuals who are generally high in self-esteem and low in dependency
and submissiveness … are quite capable of being caught up from time to time in the group
madness that produces the symptoms of groupthink” (p. 243).
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Table N.7. Symptoms of Groupthink

• Illusion of invulnerability
• Belief in inherent morality of the group
• Collective rationalizations
• Stereotypes of out-groups
• Self-censorship
• Illusion of unanimity
• Direct pressure on dissenters
• Self-appointed mind guards
Source: Janis, 1982; 't Hart, 1990

The groupthink approach does not arise as the only explanation, but there is a
tendency to use groupthink dynamics as the leading cause of fiascoes. Later work has
suggested that groupthink can be a meaningful but limited explanation for policy failures.
Decision groups do fall into the trap of groupthink, risking flaws in the decision-making
process, but the scope is limited because a low percentage of policy decisions are the subject
of these trends (’t Hart, 1990, p. 281). This literature underscores the importance of
groupthink prevention and the improvement of the decision-making process of the
government.
Blame Avoidance
After a policy failure event occurs, the common reaction of policymakers, media, and
public opinion is to seek out the responsible party for the failure: who was powerless to avoid
it, who did not see the failure coming, or who, despite warnings, decided to "push the button"
that led to disaster. This search is a complex dynamic of arguments and accusations is the
focus of blame avoidance behavior literature (BAB), commonly known as the “blame game”
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(Hood, 2002; Howlett, 2012; Hinterleitner, 2015). This section presents the main
contributions regarding policy failure.
There is an extensive literature in political science and political psychology on blame
avoidance as the crucial motivation for politicians (Weaver, 1986; Bovens et al., 1999; Hood,
2002). The central idea is that voters are more sensitive to political losses than gains, leading
politicians to look for strategies to avoid the blame at all costs, even if that means not
pursuing policy objectives. The “blame game” metaphor represents those who blame and
those who avoid blame as “players”–blame makers and blame takers—who are trying to
persuade others to side with their position regarding a policy issue, especially when the game
takes place in the public eye (Hood, 2011; Hansson, 2018). The nature of the blame game
helps explain why policies are so difficult to change, even if they fail; as Weaver (1986)
noted, "if policymakers and their constituents perceived cost and benefits symmetrically, they
would be willing to change policies quite freely … but cost and benefits are perceived
asymmetrically, policymakers fear that new policies will not win them as much support as
dismantling the old ones will lose" (p. 394). There is a relationship between the risk that
policymakers are willing to take and the blame that they will receive from the voters. The
way that politicians handled those variables (risk and blame) led to a combination of games
between blamers and blamed (Hood, 2002).
There are different strategies to minimize and avoid liability, some of the most
important are: “risk defensive strategy,” “spin your way-out trouble,” and “find a scapegoat.”
A defensive risk strategy concentrates actions and statements on good things instead of the
failure, but this is not necessarily effective, sometimes intentionally avoiding blame and
liability may worsen the political situation (Hood, 2002). The “spin your way out of trouble”
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strategy seeks to shape public impression over the policy controversy, and therefore the
strategy is to publicly deliver arguments for limiting blame (excuses) or turning blame into
credit (justifications) (Hood, 2002, 2007). However, the most common strategy is
scapegoating: “Having a scapegoat at hand for ritual sacrifice in the face of public criticism
provides senior office-holders with one more option for surviving scandal and demonstrating
resolute ‘crisis management’” (Brändström & Kuipers, 2003, p. 299). But scapegoating is
only effective when failure events are not perceived as structural or endemic; in extreme
cases, this and other strategies are not enough because the whole institution is delegitimized.
Hence, when the causes of the failure are related to complex causal chains and the interplay
of several actors, the attribution of responsibility is complicated. Usually, the blame is
dispersed, and the sanctions avoided. If the failure is defined more narrowly, then the
attribution of liability is easier to address (Brändström & Kuipers, 2003). Other strategies to
avoid blame are delegation, the redefinition of the issue, to delay the blame game by
providing resources to prevent losses, or to deflect the blame by supporting popular
alternatives, among others (Weaver, 1986; Hood, 2002).
These mechanisms of blame avoidance are subtle and deeply embedded in the way
that organizations operate and members behave (Hood, 2011). When a policy failure happens
in an organization, the common ritual is the leader taking responsibility for what happened
and suffering few consequences (Thompson, 2014). However, this default is an obstacle to
understanding the sources of the failure, which elements are structural defects and which
ones are human error, and so how to prevent similar errors in the future.
In the last 15 years the concept of blame avoidance has been applied beyond
politicians’ goals and re-election, considering it as widespread behavioral phenomenon in the
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political sphere, opening new eyes to better understand blame avoidance dynamics. As stated
by Hinterleitner (2015): "Public actors are generally held accountable by different actors in
different forums, for different things and in different situations" (p. 6). Thus, recent literature
on blame assignment and avoidance observed that the escalation of guilt could lead to
behavioral adaptations and change policy practice. In order to avoid blame, officeholders
apply policies differently. Consequently, the effect of the blame game goes beyond the scope
of the initial policy failure, leading to institutionalize a more politicized policymaking
practice, which also affects the legitimacy of the policy and even undermine democracy
(Hinterleitner, 2018). Another area of study is the role of expert judgment and information in
attributing blame for policy failure, concluding that people tend to ignore information and do
not change their original opinion, “rather than acting as a means for cultivating objectivity,
expert information appears to only exacerbate individuals’ partisan tendencies” (Lyons &
Jaeger, 2014, p. 335). Another dimension recently studied is the role of language in blame
assignment. Within the symbolic persuasion realm, Hanson (2018) analyzes different
narrative and discursive strategies—the language games—that allow an enhanced
understanding of the dynamics of assignment and avoidance of blame. From here,
government blame is: “a goal-oriented and often highly mediated discursive struggle over the
meaning of (potentially negative) events and (potentially blameworthy) actors, including
policies and policymakers who try to retain their legitimacy” (Hansson, 2018, p. 16).
The Paradox of Time
In the classic work Speaking Truth to Power, Aaron Wildavsky (1979) coined the
concept "paradox of time" to show how past successes can lead to future failures and the
irony of time in policymaking. Things considered achievements at one moment can—a
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decade later—suddenly become dilemmas or abject failures. Likewise, the paradox of time
can work the other way around. The most studied case is the construction of the Sydney
Opera House from 1954 to 1973. Throughout this protracted period of implementation, the
project was considered a major fiasco; the construction took ten more years than planned, the
costs rose dramatically—more than 10 times, and the whole process was accompanied by
criticism and confrontations between the architects, public officials, and stakeholders. Years
later, the building became the major tourist attraction and symbol of Australian prowess
(Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996; King & Crewe, 2013). Similarly, in the 1960s, as a response to
problems of urban overcrowding in the US, the government developed the policy of high-rise
apartments (tower blocks) that initially was considered a major success. However, time
change that idea and the policy ended up been considered a major failure, even more, as the
epitomizing urban squalor associated with poverty, crime, unemployment, and drug abuse
(Marsh & McConnell, 2010). Thus, criteria to assess a policy may evolve over time; the
environment may change, priorities fluctuate, or the policy can produce unforeseen or
unexpected consequences.
Policies are dynamic entities and unfold over time, and the convoluted nature of
policy failure and their multiple perceptions is also changing as time passes. Groups are
changing their judgment about the effectiveness, adequacy, or other criteria of the policy, and
also support and opposition to policy varies depending on the political climate. Different
actors often express judgments and advocacy for policy change long before the
implementation and impacts of the policy settled. As Smith pointed out, sometimes, "policies
may not be given the time to prove themselves before declarations of success or failure are
forthcoming" (Smith, 1989, p.13). Therefore, the timeframe to evaluate a policy is
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particularly challenging both to policymakers and researchers. As Lasswell said in 1971, “at
the same time success must be kept suspect particularly when all seems to be going well (…)
because short range success is often the parent of long range failure” (p. 84).
In the face of conflicting outcomes, the chosen period to evaluate a policy is crucial
and it is important to distinguish between short, medium, or long-term priorities (McConnell,
2011, p. 66). The role of time should be addressed explicitly in any policy failure analysis;
moreover, it should be considered as another dimension of analysis, just as relevant as the
strands of process, policy, and politics (Marsh & McConnell, 2010; Newman & Head, 2015).
Depending on the circumstances, a policy failure, a disastrous management of a crisis,
or even minor policy mistakes, may be the catalyst for future transformations. For instance,
by studying 40 years of health reform in Australia, Kay and Boxall (2015) explored the
causal link between policy failure and future policy events. They concluded that time is
critical, because failure generates pressure for future improvements, necessitating
assessments and understanding of errors that will shape the subsequent policy change, or,
quite differently, by deinstitutionalization mechanisms through processes of institutional
erosion.
The time factor is critical for learning from failures. However, time doesn’t always
contribute to overcoming policy failures or facilitating learning, and sometimes does just the
opposite. More often than expected, people witness the same type of failures, in the same
sectors, repeating over time and across countries (Howlett et al., 2015). For instance, by
studying the evolution of wildfire management in the US, Busenberg (2004) notes that some
policy failures persist over time. He defines propagation of policy failures as: “a process in
which policy errors persist (with mounting impacts) over long periods of time” (p. 145). He
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states that bounded rationality of policymakers and self-reinforcing mechanisms–over issue
definition and institutional arrangements—accentuated failure of wildfire management over
the decades. Thus, this and other several cases show that, despite the detrimental
consequences of failures and opportunities for learning, the persistence of policy failures is a
prevalent phenomenon (Howlett et al., 2015).
Visibility
The idea of failure is linked to the visibility acquired by the policy, its "publicness"
(Howlett et al., 2015). The visibility and salience of policy failure are especially relevant for
the literature of social construction (Bovens, ’t Hart, Peters, et al., 2001; Bovens & ’t Hart,
1996). Sometimes policies fail abruptly in reaching their expected goals and waste a
substantial amount of public resources, yet public opinion or stakeholders do not perceive it
as a failure. Similarly, an entire organization may not achieve the planned goals, recognize
this, and not label the results as failure. As Anheier & Moulton (1999) openly admit, failure
is “independent of performance, an organization is not truly failing until the public perceives
it as such” (p. 280).
The social perception is a complicated process of negotiation of meanings to frame
and label some policy event. The so-called "public perception bias" underscores the idea of
perception of the failure, requiring the agreement of a great amount of people believing that
something went wrong (Hall, 1993; Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996). Likewise, the level of
perceived severity is crucial to capture the attention of public officials and the media. If the
event is framed as a major crisis that affects the core values of the society or if more actors
are likely to get involved, the wider the scope of the controversy will be (Brändström &
Kuipers, 2003).
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The visibility of a failure event is not just about the extent or scope of the damage
generated by the policy, but also the political situation at the time, where different actors may
consider it appropriate to label the policy event as a failure. Thus, public attention depends
on how opinion leaders and the media frame policy events, so it is always a political act, "a
policy failure, like all news development, is a creation of the language used to depict it: its
identification is a political act, not a recognition of a fact" (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996, p. 34).
The framing process by the media involves definitions, interpretations, and attribution
of causes and responsibility that finally leads to constructions of failure, which range from
technical issues to moral controversies. Hence, the role played by the media is always key in
how an event becomes a policy failure. With negative coverage, the media creates a climate
that encourages further negative comments from interest parties, and biased assessments are
easy to produce because they resonate with the public discourse (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996;
Kearns & Lawson, 2009). Thus, the degree of visibility achieved by a case of policy failure
should be carefully analyzed, as stated by Light, “all government organizations fail from time
to time, but that some fail much more visibly than others. Visibility, however, is not
necessarily an indicator of either impact or importance, nor is it a harbinger of continued
risk” (2014, p. 2). Alongside framing the policy failure, journalism and media actually have
an active role in promoting accountability in different ways: presenting social problems in
terms of causes, solutions, and responsibility; organizing arenas of debate and opinion; and
actively interviewing the stakeholders related to the policy failure event (Djerf-Pierre et al.,
2013).
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The Role of Context
Considering the context to understand policy failures may seem straightforward or
even obvious; however, the emphasis on understanding and systematizing the causes and
characteristics of policy failures have led the majority of the literature to inadequately
consider context’s role in the failure (Gray, 1996; McConnell, 2016). As Peters pointed out,
"the causes identified for failure in the policy literature are legion, but the majority of these
failures have been connected to characteristics of the policies themselves rather than to the
political or socio-economic environment within which those policies are being made” (2015,
p. 261). Therefore, policy failure analysis should consider institutional, social, economic,
historical, and cultural variables. The context is not something external but constitutive, and
often it can become an essential element to understand why some interpretations about a
policy failure are formed (McConnell, 2016; Moynihan, 2006).
McConnell (2016) points out that analyses of policy failure cases usually give the
impression of having understood the whole story, generating a narrative that links decisions
and actors toward failure; however, these cases usually ignore the prior historical context in
which the policy was designed and discussed. He states, “we should avoid a fruitless search
for a definitive, scientifically rational cause of any particular policy failure, or getting caught
in the trap of saying definitively that failure has a single cause, isolated from its context” (p.
11). McConnell recognizes the task of incorporating context is complex and entails
methodological challenges, but dares to propose ways to "capture" and operationalize this
context. One approach, for example, is to identify how different actors frame the causes of
policy failure.
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Oppermann and Spencer (2016b) claim that fiascos are not factual episodes but
constructions in a political discourse of what they call “failure narrative.” Here, the setting of
the story, the negative characterization of the actors, and the causal plotting of the event—the
sequence of connected events in time—are keys in the narrative of the fiasco. The setting
(similar to a theater’s stage) is understood as the background or location in which the story
unfolds, representing a set of norms and values, and in this way, alluding to the context of
policy decisions for what is considered appropriate behavior. The setting is not external or
neutral but meaningful and even determinant in understanding the nature and characteristics
of failure in the narrative.
King and Crewe (2013) also delve into the role of cultural elements as relevant
variables of blunders. One interesting distinction is the concept of “cultural disconnection”
between policymakers and the real situation that the policy wanted to address. For instance,
with the aim to solve the problem of divorced parents not contributing to the wellbeing of
their dependent children, and by doing so reduce social security costs, the UK’s Child
Support Agency (CSA) in 1993 applied new rules to reduce dependence on state benefits.
However, the policy was poorly implemented and operated with inflexible rules that did not
consider the existing complex arrangements between divorced parents. These problems led to
several controversies, including massive protests of divorced parents against the CSA, rising
program costs, and a loss of legitimacy of the government (Dunleavy, 1995; King & Crewe,
2013).
Depending on cultural worldviews and values, people deem different events
"failures." Individualists fixate on inappropriate governmental intervention (waste or
resources, excessive bureaucracy); for people inclined toward hierarchy, failure relates to
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unlawfulness, insubordination, or bureaucratic disruption; egalitarians will concern
themselves about a failure in the protective role of government or growing inequalities
(Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996, pp. 29-31). Likewise, there are important divisions between and
within nations about what is failure, the so called “cultural bias.” Cultural frames and
expectations about the government's actions can lead to what in one country is considered a
success, while in another a failure, which leads to endless debates and comparisons and even
to an “ethnocentrism trap” (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996). Thus, policy decisions that seem
reasonable and could work in some contexts may not work at all in others; differences in
outcomes may be associated with differences in cultural narratives, history, and values
(Kearns & Lawson, 2009). Echoing Bovens and ‘t Hart (1996): “The very concept of policy
or organizational failure is culturally loaded” (p. 29).
Present-day literature is increasingly considering the role of context, culture, and
influence of institutions and governance arrangements on policy failures. As discussed in the
previous section, some of the studies emphasize institutional and structural variables that
determine and shape how failures occur and their interpretation. Thus, policy implementation
is embedded in institutions and societal paradigms that usually are unnoticed or disregarded,
but play a significant role in understanding failure and the likelihood of learning from them
(Walsh, 2006; Dunlop & Radaelli, 2018b). Stated by McConnell: "All policies are formed
and decided upon by individuals, but they are produced and enacted in broader institutional
contexts, which in themselves operate in broader societal contexts of governing ideas,
powerful groups, changing technologies, global interdependencies and so on" (2016, p. 9).
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2.4.

Learning from failure
As other concepts in social science, there are multiple approaches and interpretations

regarding the meaning of policy learning, its origin, the trigger of policy change, those who
learn and their motivations, and the role that environment plays. Consequently, the literature
on this subject is vast and varied (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Dunlop & Radaelli, 2013;
Dunlop, 2017b). This section focuses on the connection between policy failure and policy
learning, identifying categories, dimensions, and levels of analysis.
When a policy fails, it is expected this will lead to changes; do not repeat mistakes,
made changes, and better handled the situation next time. In other words, it is expected to
learn from the failure. From the policymaking perspective, a policy failure will expose
decision makers to intense criticism, threaten the dominant coalition, and the prevailing
ideas. Therefore, failure expresses the lack of effectiveness of existing policies and gives
incentives to new directions to restore legitimacy (Walsh, 2006; McConnell, 2010b).
Unfortunately, policy failure is rarely a sufficient explanation for policy change. As Walsh
(2006) claimed, “Failure does not always produce change; instead its effects are mediated by
the interest of important constituents and alternative policies’ accounts of past failures, and
either of these, can block the adoption of a new policy” (p. 499).
Barriers for Learning
There are several countervailing forces in learning from past policy failures. Policy,
as socially constructed or even as an institution, reflects the result of past power struggles.
Thus, the learning process arising from failure, can be restricted by power (Kay & Boxall,
2015). From a political point of view, governments are reluctant to accept their failures and
seek to remain blameless at all costs. Their actions are frequently designed to downplay
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failure and assign blame, denying the existence of failure and protecting the reputation of
policymakers and government rather than improving policy outcomes. If they are strong
enough, political groups will oppose or block any intent to a change, which exposes the
previous failure (Hood, 2002; McConnell, 2010b; Newman & Head, 2015).
From an institutional perspective, there are also challenges in learning from past
failures. For instance, the complex interdependence between organizations and actors
prevents easy agreement upon the nature of failure and even more regarding the direction and
characteristics of change. Additionally, institutional arrangements diffuse authority and make
it harder to convince leaders about the necessary transformations. Thus, decision makers can
reject a new policy proposal because of a lack of institutional capacity to implement the
changes or fear of repeated failure; the government may limit evaluative efforts, from fear of
explanations that may arise; or from a desire to maintain organizational stability. Like this,
policymakers and organizations face considerable uncertainty about the availability of
change and the outcomes of new ideas and alternatives (May, 1992; Walsh, 2006).
From the perspective of organizational psychology and organizational studies, Brown
and Starkey (2000) reflect on the complex learning dynamics in organizations. They
highlight the five most important defense mechanisms: the denial of the problem and the
responsibility of failure; rationalization as an attempt to justify the impulses and reasons
considered unacceptable to make them tolerable; idealization of the situation that causes a
course of action to be followed; fantasy that represents the unconscious effort to achieve
impossible goals or aspirations confirming previous ideas and keeping the course of action;
and finally the symbolization that makes an external object or process the representation of
an idea, person, or value (Brown & Starkey, 2000; Mellahi et al., 2002). In order to avoid
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these negative aspects, individual and organizational reflection is critical. Consequently,
“management’s role is to promote mature and adaptive wise thought and action in pursuit of
the collective organizational good” (Brown & Starkey, 2000, p. 114).
The magnitude of policy failure affects the probability of policy change. If a failure is
perceived as minor or the characteristics of failure are contained, the likelihood of change is
low, but if a failure is perceived as major and if it appears that evasion of the crisis appears
impossible, there is significant pressure for change. High public expectations after huge
disasters often force policymakers to project a desire for change so as to indicate to the public
that they recognize the need for transformation after a fiasco (Birkland, 1997; Walsh, 2006).
As Bovens and ‘t Hart (2016) claimed, “big policy failures can be, but all too seldom are, a
trigger for big policy learning that reduces the likelihood of their recurrence” (p. 10).
However, no matter how serious the failure is, and how significant political and
programmatic is the pressure for change, failure alone does not provide a guide to the correct
alternatives. According to Walsh (2006), to truly learn from failures, requires two conditions.
First, there must be a clear explanation of the failure, and second there must be a politically
viable alternative that will yield improvement. In Walsh’s words: "[the public requires] a
convincing explanation of past failure and a new way forward that is acceptable to
individuals and groups whose support is important to decision makers. If either of these two
conditions is missing, decision makers will allow policy to drift, making only minor and
perhaps contradictory changes after failure" (p. 491).
Types of Learning
Therefore, even if the policy failure leads to further improvements, it does not mean
learning has occurred or that the changes that have occurred are appropriate. Sometimes there
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is a missing intellectual link between policy tools and desired outcomes, and policymakers
continue implementing the failing policy or making only minor policy changes that do not
address the source of failure (Walsh, 2006). Post-crisis reform studies show that despite
transformations, those changes are not as profound as expected. An interesting incident is the
Challenger explosion in 1986, a shocking and widely analyzed case that finally led to many
procedural and highly technical modifications, which unfortunately disregarded necessary
organizational and cultural changes within NASA to avoid future failures (Vaughan, 1997;
Boin, 2008).
Along the same lines, O’Donovan (2017) explores the association between policy
failure and policy learning. By analyzing three cases of failure as a result of tornados—
Kansas 2007, Missouri 2011, and Oklahoma 2013—the author concludes that policy failure
leads to policy learning, but not necessarily by addressing the original problem that the
failure revealed. Thus, observing the role of past experiences and governmental capacity is
critical to promote instrumental and social learning (O’Donovan, 2017). Similarly, Dunlop
(2017a, 2017b) shows that “learning is not always a good thing” (2017b, p. 10), and
introduces the idea of dysfunctional or degenerative learning. By analyzing the management
of bovine tuberculosis (“mad cow disease”), Dunlop concludes that sometimes learning
involves “negative lessons” that end up worsening the policy.
As noted, there are varied nuances and perspectives in discussing policy learning after
a failure episode. What is the scope of the learning? Who are the agents of learning? What is
the nature of the learning? What are the effects of the learning process on future policies?
These and other questions have different answers depending on the analytical perspective
chosen. For instance, a useful definition of policy learning focuses on a better attempt to
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adjust policy goals or tools of the policy in light of past experiences and new information
toward the ultimate objective of governance (Hall, 1993). This approach considers learning
as part of the normal policy process and the effort of policymakers to understand why their
actions succeed or fail.
Heclo (1974) had a different vision of learning, a less conscious activity in response
to changes in the social environment, a political adaptation process. As distinct from Hall´s
previous idea, Heclo considers policy learning as an activity undertaken by policymakers, a
reaction to external changes from which policymakers must adapt to succeed in their policies.
A different approach is learning as "lesson drawing” (Rose, 1991), referring to the ability of
policymakers to learn from other's experiences, analyzing the problem, and extracting lessons
that help them to solve their problems in different sectors, issue areas, or jurisdictions.
Bennett and Howlett (1992), in their influential work, The Lessons of Learning:
Reconciling Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change, explored policy change under
different notions of learning and offering different categories (in Table N.8). The authors
claim, "The all-encompassing term ‘policy learning' as it is often used at present can be seen
actually to embrace three highly complex processes: learning about organizations, learning
about programs and learning about policies" (p. 289). First, there is learning at the
governmental level, in which state officials and policymakers are the agents of learning; this
mostly focuses on process and the improvement of organizational dynamics or change. The
next step is lesson drawing, in which agents are the policy networks and the foci are policy
tools and instruments to improve the programs. Finally, social learning represents a broader
conception of learning where the communities are learning about ideas that lead to a
significant paradigm shift.
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Table N.8. Categories of Policy Change and Policy Failure
Type of learning

Who Learns

Learns what

To what effect

Government Learning

State Officials

Process-related

Organizational Change

Lesson Drawing

Policy Networks

Instruments

Program Change

Social Learning

Communities

Ideas

Paradigm Shift
Source: Bennett & Howlett, 1992, p. 289

In a similar vein, but directly connecting failure and learning, Peter May (1992)
thoroughly studied eight policy cases in the US reformulated after their failures, offering
another categorization: instrumental, social, and political policy learning. Instrumental policy
learning occurs by recognizing deficiencies of policy tools, instruments, or implementation
design; this type of learning can be facilitated by adding learning instruments into policy
designs, such as evaluations or hearings. Social policy learning requires rethinking about
fundamental aspects of the policy, such as causal reasoning about policy problems and
interventions. This review touches on the core values and fundamental social construction of
a problem and the policy. As May (1992) claims, “Demonstrating social learning requires
showing that the dominant policy elite’s beliefs have either been altered or reaffirmed in light
of policy experience” (p. 338). Finally, political learning requires that policy elites and
advocates learn about their failure to move toward new policy ideas, implying an in-depth
revision of the feasibility of the policy and the relationship between past strategies and their
impacts. In this framework, neither form of learning is necessarily antecedent to the other.
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Organizational Learning
Research on learning from failure has been a common topic on organizational
literature. The foundational work of Levitt and March (1988), Organizational Learning,
stated that organizational behavior is guided by routines, rules, strategies, and technologies
that shape and constrain change within organizations. The authors noted three important
characteristics of organizational learning: “routine-based, history-dependent, and targetoriented” (p. 319). The first characteristic of organizations is that routines are based on
interpretations of the past and anticipations, thus organizations respond in an adaptive
reinforcement process. As a result, the second characteristic is that organizational action and
learning is history-dependent, and change requires time and accumulated experience until
new practices can reflect the experience. Thus, “learning from failure it is an imperfect
process meaning that is path dependent and therefore somewhat sluggish. Organizations are
often unable to change or adapt quickly and perfectly to lessons from experience; thus
experience and action are often disconnected” (Desai et al., 2017, p. 7). The third
characteristic is that organizations are oriented toward reference points; organizational
behavior depends on the relation between the outcomes observed and certain expectations, or
targets (Levitt & March, 1988).
Complementary to those characteristics, organizational behavioral theories introduce
issues of power, conflict, and bargaining into the learning process within the organization.
Usually, failures are defined by the focus of powerful observers. Different groups might
experience certain events differently and even have contested interpretations, and therefore
organizational goals shift over time, reflecting the dominant coalition’s interests. In this way,
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“what constitutes a failure and how organizations respond when a failure occurs, both tend to
change with respect to organizational power dynamics” (Desai et al., 2017, p. 5).
Another point of interest in organizational literature is the relationship between
disasters or accidents and learning. Busenberg (2001) investigates the relationship between
failure and learning by exploring the role of “institutional arrangements” that promote or
constrain individual learning when faced with incidents or accidents that act as “focusing
events” (Birkland, 1997). Through an examination of cases, the study claims that both
focusing events and operation of learning arrangements can be linked to an enhanced policy
process.
In the work Organization at the Limit: Lessons from the Columbia Disaster, Starbuck
and Farjoun (2009) take an intensive look at the organizational process that contributed to the
Columbia disaster. One of the findings is that organizations enthusiastically learn from
successes, but they become unrealistically overconfident. This attitude becomes increasingly
inappropriate given their evolving contexts, leading to failure. Another finding is that large
organizations have great difficulty learning from failure because managers interpret the
causes of failure as external and idiosyncratic. The analysis warns about the risk of repeating
mistakes and the importance of continual learning, because: “An organization that does not
see, analyze, and solve problems, is likely to repeat its failures” (2009, p. 355). The evidence
shows that ineffective learning in organizations can precede failures and even perpetuate
them.
From a systemic point of view, Kay and Boxall (2015) explore the nature of learning
from failure by distinguishing two mechanisms whereby past policy failures count as
feedback to future improvements: change in beliefs and deinstitutionalization. The first
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mechanism is the widely accepted conception that learning from the past enables future
policy to overcome failure. However, there is no guarantee that actors will draw the right
lessons from failure because, given the entrenched beliefs of stakeholders and policymakers
that created prior policy, there only will be learning if those beliefs changed upon
consideration of the outcomes. As Kay and Boxall (2015) claim, “Learning concerns the
capacity of actors to reflect on, and draw accurate and useful lessons from, the policy
processes within which they are involved” (p. 36). The second mechanism for learning from
failure is related to the deinstitutionalization processes. Some policies fail slowly and
imperceptibly, undermining the political support and the context of their action, leading to a
gradual weakening of the institution. Kay and Boxall (2015) emphasize that "failures are both
a symptom but also a cause of deinstitutionalization. Where learning breaks the paradigm is
the interesting point, when social learning takes over from instrumental learning that we see
change” (p. 39).
There is an agreement in the literature about the importance of differentiating policy
learning types and further exploring characteristics and dimensions that have not been
studied enough (Stronks et al., 2006; Dunlop & Radaelli, 2013; Howlett et al., 2015). Those
distinctions are crucial to identifying what policies can be corrected via instrumental or
technical learning and which are not, requiring a different approach (Howlett et al., 2015).
The context of Learning
Dunlop and collaborators' recent and influential work is a leap forward in policy
learning research (Dunlop, 2017a, 2017b; Dunlop & Radaelli, 2013, 2018a, 2018b). One key
contribution is the identification of the different contexts in which learning occurs. There are
four varieties of learning: epistemic (based on authoritative or expert knowledge), reflexive
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(learning from reflection based on argument, thought, and dialogue), bargaining (learning as
by-product of bargaining resources), and hierarchical (learning through rules of formal
authority). These contexts are key for understanding why and how learning occurs, and in the
authors' point of view, this should be the starting point for any policy learning analysis. As
they state, “We suggest to start from capturing the context and then moving on to learning
[...] it is important to understand the tone of the policy process in order to get learning right”
(Dunlop & Radaelli, 2018b, p. 268).
Besides, there is an increasing interest to consider the structural, systemic or societal
levels of analysis, something not much pondered by analysts in the past. There are persistent
policy failures, despite some learning and transformations to correct them, some policies
keep repeating the same mistakes. Likewise, some organizations cannot learn from failures or
even fail again after learning (Desai et al., 2017). Echoing the words of Howlett, Ramesh,
and Wu (2015): "the persistence of such failures may be addressed through enhancing the
capacity of policy actors and better designing policy processes and institutions to recognize
and overcome common sources and types of failures. Better understandings of these ‘meta'
factors can offer policy makers critical insights about institutional design and the reforms
needed to avoid consistently poor policy outcomes" (p. 211).

2.5.

Literature Review: Summary and Key Elements
This chapter offered a broad review of literature encompassing policy failure. The

examination of the various frameworks of analysis, the characteristic elements of policy
failure, and the exploration of the link between policy failure and learning revealed a
persistent interest in understanding the nature, causes, and characteristics of policy failures.
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This section summarizes the essential elements, highlighting areas of contributions for this
dissertation.
The first section of this chapter reviewed how social and policy sciences have
understood policy success and failure over the last decades, showing approaches from
different research streams and diverse case studies of policy failure. By reviewing the ideas
of academic traditions, this analysis recalls significant contributions—such as the policy
process, implementation, evaluation—as well as different viewpoints over what they
understand as a failure. This perspective reinforces the idea that, although policy sciences
have not always addressed policy failures directly, the inquiry into policy failure always been
part of the policy science’s concerns.
In addition, the literature review presented frameworks that directly address policy
failure, fiasco, or disaster. Each framework proposes a way of observing policy failure, as
well as concepts and characteristics for understanding the phenomenon better. Consequently,
each approach focuses on some elements of the failure, but also ignores others; this facilitates
an analytical insight that provides valuable but limited contributions. These different ways of
observing are like “lenses” to tackle the policy failure problem, an idea that is at the
foundation of this dissertation.
This literature review identifies three moments that change the understanding of
policy failure. First, Bovens and ‘t Hart have provided the influential contribution in the
social construction of policy fiascos (1995, 1996, 2016). This work emphasizes the role of
perceptions over the judgment of policy failure, which occurs via a complex process of
meaning construction. This perspective persists in the literature, and also plays an important
role in this dissertation. The second key moment relates to the recent and revitalizing work of
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McConnell and collaborators (Marsh & McConnell, 2010; McConnell, 2010a, 2010b, 2011,
2016). By recognizing the epistemological and methodological conundrum in policy failure,
this perspective states that, policy outcomes are not usually understood as unambiguous
successes or failures, facts or interpretations or black or white; they mostly involve the “grey
areas in-between” (2010a, p. 345). Thus, McConnell offers an integrated framework to tackle
policy failure from the political, policy, and process point of view. This dissertation shares
the conviction that the policy failure problem is convoluted and multidimensional, but unlike
this approach, it does not attempt to simplify, but assumes the complex nature as a starting
point. Finally, the third key moment in this literature offers a broader perspective
emphasizing the role of institutional, systemic, and contextual elements over policy failure
(Hindmoor & McConnell, 2013, 2015; Peters, 2015; van der Steen et al., 2015). Effectively,
policy failures do not occur in a vacuum but embedded in cultural, institutional, and social
contexts. The context in which a failure occurs it is meaningful and even determinant in
understanding their occurrence, characteristics, and interpretations (McConnell, 2016;
Oppermann & Spencer, 2016b). Hence, this dissertation rescues the importance of these
institutional and societal dimensions to understand policy failure
Another interesting distinction is the relationship between scholarly-oriented and
policymaking-oriented research. These two sides of the policy failure research—academic
and applied—are the base of the entire policy failure literature. Some approaches seek to
build theoretical frameworks (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996; McConnell, 2010b; Peters, 2015), and
other approaches help decision makers to avoid or better face policy failures (Dunleavy,
1995; Gray, 1996; King & Crewe, 2013; Schuck, 2014; Light, 2014; Shergold, 2015). This
dissertation aims to achieve a dual result; it attempts to distance itself from highly academic
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analytical frameworks, seeking simpler and more intuitive ways to address the complexity of
policy failure. Therefore, this study does not attempt to build theory, but rather, based on
accumulated knowledge, to offer a more useful perspective to decision makers facing failure
episodes.
The literature review presented numerous case studies of policy failures, most of them
from Europe and the United States. The absence of Latin American research on this topic is
striking. With very few exceptions (Olavarría-Gambi, 2013, 2018), there is no research on
policy failures in Latin America. Therefore, this dissertation is a unique effort that
contributes significantly to understand how policy failures unfold in the Latin-American
setting.
In order to provide distinctions and finer concepts for this study, the literature review
chapter presented characteristic elements of policy failure, deepening ideas and revealing
how different kinds of literature grasp them. Some of these elements are: the assessment and
judgment of damage caused by the policy failure; whether or not the failure was intentional;
whether the event was anticipated and how avoidable it might have been; how visible the
failure episode is and its public character; and an assessment of the responsibility of leaders
and the government over the occurrence of the failure. An additional widely studied
characteristic are the blame avoidance dynamics or "blame games." Another element is the
role of time and the paradox that judgments about policy failure and success change. A final
characteristic is the role of context on policy failures, something that literature hasn’t
considered enough. Thus, to a greater or lesser extent, all these elements and their nuances
nourish the analysis of the policy failure case of this dissertation.
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Finally, policy failure is intimately linked to learning, and there are similarities and
relevant connections between both bodies of literature. By focusing on the relationship
between policy learning and failure, this review has identified significant contributions for
this dissertation. This analysis showed that learning is something elusive and challenging,
and policy failure does not necessarily lead to learning; or, even when there is learning, it is
not the “right” learning.
Also, there are the questions of who learns, what is learned, and what is the effect of
this learning. This literature distinguishes different actors—state officials, policy networks,
and communities—, and types of learning—government, lesson drawing, and social
learning—, as well as purposes of learning—organizational, program change, or paradigm
shift–, and categories of policy learning from failures—political, instrumental, and social—
where learning might or might not occur (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; May, 1992). Besides,
policy learning literature studied some cognitive, organizational, institutional, and political
barriers against learning, drawing attention to the persistence of policy failures and
evidencing the challenges to truly learn from them. All of this provides intriguing insights for
this study about analytical dimensions, the linkage of failure and learning, and reinforces the
importance of learning-oriented policy failure frameworks.

This extensive literature review shows that this dissertation is part of this burgeoning
stream of research on policy failures, contemplating useful concepts and perspectives to
better understanding the phenomenon. From here, this dissertation:
•

recognizes the complex and multidimensional nature of policy failures as a starting
point, with all its epistemological and methodological tensions;
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•

observes that diverse analytical frameworks always account for certain assumptions or
"lenses" that reveal elements of the policy failure, but it also ignores others.
Therefore, the lenses depended on the purpose of the analysis;

•

understands the dual nature of policy failure research—academic and applied—opting
for an analytical approach, far from theoretical complexity, to be useful for
policymakers;

•

explicitly incorporates the institutional perspective and societal context as critical
elements to understand policy failures;

•

considers that the understanding of policy failure is closely linked to learning and
therefore points to concepts and frameworks that promote this relationship;

•

takes part in the existing research trend on policy failures through case studies, and
contributes from a Latin American background.
Thus, based on these statements, the following chapter presents the analytical

framework of the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 3
LENSES TO UNDERSTAND POLICY FAILURE. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The previous chapter presented a detailed review of the policy failure literature. From
different epistemological positions, and emphasizing varied dimensions of analysis, the
policy failure stream of research has evolved. As a result, unveiled particular analytical
elements and several statements have become the foundation of this dissertation. Along with
the research questions, this chapter presents the Lenses Framework as the analytical device to
investigate the 2012 census case in Chile.

3.1.

Research Questions
This dissertation seeks to answer the following primary research question: How do we

understand policy failure?
This research question yields two sub-questions: First, how do various
lenses/perspectives understand policy failure differently? And, how does a multi-lens
approach contribute to a better understanding of policy failure?
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3.2.

Lenses Framework
To answer these research questions and based on the lessons provided by the

literature review, this dissertation offers a new analytical framework, called the Lenses
Framework to explore the case of the failure of the 2012 census in Chile.
The Lenses Framework is a conceptual arrangement that provides structure to
organize descriptive, investigative inquiry, but without losing the characteristic power of
metaphors, which describe a phenomenon in an approachable, discoverable way or connected
with real-life experiences (Goyal & Howlett, 2018). The simple idea of lenses refers to a
“way of looking,” which involves the object of inquiry, epistemological assumptions,
analytical tools, and belongs to a particular research tradition. The Lenses is an analytical
exercise for understanding and framing a particular situation in multiple ways; therefore, it is
a novel way of addressing social problems' complexity by revealing characteristics and
dynamics that other approaches cannot observe. Thus, this framework recognizes that policy
failure can be comprehended, and often is understood, in multiple ways or through various
lenses, and upon that important recognition is precisely where this dissertation aims to
contribute.
Using the analogy of architecture and lenses, if someone can only look at a house
from one perspective—from the front, for example—the perception and understanding of that
house is framed by that angle of observation. On the other hand, if someone can observe the
house from several perspectives—for example, from the front, the sides, the top—the
understanding of that house will be much more complete than the previous insight, and
consequently much closer to its real complexity. Similarly, the Lenses approach allows
capturing different dimensions of the policy failure problem that weren’t previously
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identified. It is possible to recognize some particular nuances of policy failure through one of
the lenses, and completely different findings appear via the other lenses. In Allison’s words
(1999), whose work inspired for this study, “The glasses one wears magnify one set of
factors rather than another in ways that have multifarious consequences. Not only do lenses
lead analysts to produce different explanations of problems that appear, in their summary
questions, to be the same. Lenses also influence the character of the analysis’s puzzle, the
evidence assumed relevant, the concepts used in examining the evidence, and what is taken
to be an explanation” (pp. 387-388). Like this, the Lenses Framework is an analytical device
to investigate perspectives of the policy failure, which will engender a better understanding
of the phenomenon overall.
Like the photography analogy, policymakers usually approach policy failures from
particular angles and positions, their own lenses. Similarly, researchers commonly analyze
policy failures from specific theoretical and disciplinary backgrounds, and perspectives of
analysis, which also constitute lenses. Recognizing the limitations of partial perspectives in
understanding and addressing policy failures' convoluted nature is the starting point of the
Lenses Framework analytical exercise.
As stated in the literature review section, recent studies have asserted that failure and
success are not binary values, or two poles, but rather extremes of a spectrum, and therefore
plenty of nuances exist between them. This idea underscores efforts in the earlier literature to
classify and frame features of a policy as a failure, fiasco, or blunder, and reorients attention
toward understanding the policy failure phenomenon. No doubt policy failure literature has
advanced significantly in distinctions, concepts, and detailed frameworks. However, much
remains to be explored to promote an understanding to better face and prevent failure events.
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Thus, the idea of the Lenses analytical exercise is indeed meant to contribute to addressing
the complex phenomenon of policy failure, in a way that is more approachable for decision
makers, and that facilitates learning. Based on the power of the figure of the Lenses, the
proposed framework of analysis takes the advances of the literature and puts them at the
service of a better understanding of policy failures from a pragmatic approach.
The types of lenses to use depend on: the questions of those who observe, what they
observe, what purposes, and the object in question. The Lenses Framework encompasses the
use of different lenses to examine the selected case of policy failure separately, and
afterward, a comprehensive or “multi-lens” analysis to explore the case. Thus, based on the
literature review and the particularities of the 2012 census case in Chile, the three lenses of
analysis for this study are policy, organizational, and societal, presented in the Diagram N.4
below.
Diagram N.4. Analysis of Policy Failure According to Different Lenses

Policy Lens

Policy
Failure

Organizational
Lens

Societal Lens
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Consequently, the first step of the framework applies the three lenses of analysis
separately. Each one of the lenses will provide different perspectives and comprehension of
the nature and characteristics of the policy failure under study. The policy lens considers
elements regarding the policy process using the heuristics of the policy cycle, in particular on
the stages of formulation, implementation, and evaluation. Therefore, this first lens explores
the programmatic dimension, paying attention to expectations, definitions of the goals,
availability and allocation of resources, control mechanisms, and results, among others.
Likewise, the organizational lens alludes to those values, routines, and arrangements
at the organizational level of the agency involved in the policy failure. Thus, this second lens
analyzes the organizational structure, leadership, mission and values, culture and climate,
power, and decision-making dynamics of the organization affecting the failure of the policy.
Finally, the societal lens observes the broader picture of the case and pays special
attention to elements that are not usually considered, that is, the broader context in which the
policy failure occurs. Hence, this third lens delves into the historical, ideological, and
institutional dynamics that determine or shape the policy failure and the interpretations and
meanings given by the actors to these context elements.
Hence, the first step of the Lenses Framework provides answers to the primary
research sub-question: how do various lenses/perspectives understand policy failure
differently? The three lenses approach can be seen as three layers of the case study or/and
even as three different cases. Each of them has its particular foci, theoretical assumptions,
and observes a distinctive type of evidence, and in the process, manifests significantly
different insights. Table N.9 presents each of the lenses, their foci, unit of analysis, and a
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The organization is the National Institute of
Statistics, INE.
Description: Based on organizational literature
(organizational failure, organizational sociology,
organizational behavior, public management and
organizational theory), this lens considers relevant
factors of the main institution/organization
affecting the census policy, i.e. the National
Institute of Statistics. Some of the themes
explored are: values and mission, organizational
structure, leadership, power and group dynamics,
capabilities and motivation, hierarchies and power
dynamics, among others.

The policy is the 2012 population and household

census in Chile.

Description: Based on policy failure, policy

analysis, public policy, and implementation and
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evaluation literature, this lens observes the census

policy and several elements that impeded fulfilling

the goals. The analysis follows the heuristics of the

public policy cycle, i.e. formulation and design,

implementation and evaluation. Some of the themes

explored are: definition of goals and expectations,

roles and participants on the implementation,

availability and allocation of resources, supervision

and control, evaluation criteria, among others.

Source: Own elaboration

to all these elements of context.

the meanings and interpretations given by the actors

and challenges of new institutional configuration, and

social transformations of the country, the adoption

context, the census and statistical institutionality, the

policy. Some of the themes explored are: the political

shaping practices and ideas that affected the census

institutions on providing meaning, legitimacy, and

lens observes the role of societal context and

institutionalist, and institutional logics literature, this

Description: Based on sociological, neo-

the Chilean and Latin-American setting.

The institutions, history, and contextual elements of

Unit of Analysis: The Societal Context

Unit of Analysis: The Organization

and cultural elements playing a role in the way that

Unit of Analysis: The Policy

carries out the policy and its characteristics.

elements that contribute or impede the proper

Focus: This lens focuses on the contextual, historical,
the policy is carried out.

Focus: This lens focuses on the organization that

Focus: This lens focuses on the policy and the

SOCIETAL LENS

achievement of the expected goals.

ORGANIZATIONAL LENS

POLICY LENS

short description of the lenses characteristics for the case under analysis, the 2012 census in

Chile.
Table N.9. Three Lenses: Foci, Unit of Analysis, and Description

By focusing on each one of the lenses in turn, the study will deeper dig into the many
layers of the policy failure, revealing the characteristics, tensions, and keys of analysis that
arise from each perspective. From this particularities and findings, the analysis allows
exploring differences and similarities between perspectives, and in that way, leading to the
following step of the framework.
The second step of the Lenses Framework investigates the selected case of policy
failure from a multi-lens perspective. This analysis assembles the respective findings from
the individual lenses, but also focuses on the interactions, and other relations amongst those
three lenses. For example, the analysis identifies feedback or reinforcing mechanisms
between different analysis levels, the dynamic of tension between lenses, or even the absence
of a relationship between some of them. All of this seeks to go beyond the linear or causal
understanding of policy failure, exploring mechanisms not previously studied.
Assuming that there always are different views of a failure, the goal is to overcome
the barriers between lenses, discover commonalities, and assemble dominating explanations
to create a more profound and informed understanding of the policy failure case. Thus, multilens analysis enables us to analyze the failure problem from different perspectives
conterminously, conceptualizing their parts and the interactions between them in an
analytical exercise toward enhanced understanding. Therefore, this step of analysis seeks to
answer the second of the research sub-questions: how does a multi-lens perspective
contribute to a better understanding of policy failure? Diagram N.5 illustrates the multi-lens
perspective of the Lenses Framework.
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Diagram N.5. Lenses Framework

Policy Lens

Policy
Failure
Organizational
Lens

Societal Lens

The diagram shows the Lenses Framework examining a policy failure case by the
three lenses and then through the multi-lens approach. This integrated analysis requires the
individual in-depth analyses, i.e. it is only possible on the basis of separate lens distinctions
and findings. Thus, the new perspective incorporates the three previous lenses, and the
complex interactions and relations among them. Therefore, the outcome not only exceeds the
sum of its parts, but also is an altogether distinct approach.
One of the greatest strengths of the framework of the Lenses lies in its simplicity.
While maintaining the power of the lens metaphor and the advantages of "looking" from
different positions or perspectives, the framework offers concepts and distinctions to better
understand the policy failure’ complexity and makes them available to decision makers.
Therefore, this dissertation seeks to connect the accumulated knowledge with real
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policymaking, which points to one of the foundations of the study, the pragmatic approach,
briefly explained below.

3.3.

Pragmatic Approach
The Lenses Framework is based on a pragmatic approach to policymaking, which

seeks to connect the analytical understanding of the policy failure with the realpolitik and
improvement of public policies. Pragmatism rejects the distinction between thought and
action, and advocates for the construction of the meaning of concepts by their practical
consequences (Zittoun, 2014). As Sanderson (2009) pointed out, “The key proposition of
pragmatism is that the ‘validity’ of a belief or concept is defined in terms of its practical
consequences, if we act upon a belief and our actions turn out for good, then that belief can
be taken as ‘true’ in a pragmatic sense” (pp. 708-709).
Unfortunately, there is a lack of consistent translation from research to real policy; the
world of ideas and academic research is far away from what policymakers are dealing with
day-to-day. Some reasons for this distance are the overwhelming complexity of the policy
process, the language gap between scientific research and policymaking, different timing and
incentives of both worlds, among many others (Brownson et al., 2006; Henig, 2008). As
Brownson et al. claimed (2006), “Even when research findings from research studies are
clear and consistent, there are often multiple policy options. There is often little correlation
between the quality of science and the policy derived from it” (p. 164).
It is important to recall that the distance between academia and policymaking is a
longstanding concern in policy sciences. Almost 40 years ago, Lindblom and Cohen (1979)
in Usable Knowledge analyzed the link between research in social science and problem-
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solving and proposed professional social inquiry as a type of applied knowledge or a tool to
advance the resolution of social problems. They write, “the stimulus that gives rise to this
book is dissatisfaction with social science and social research as instruments of social
problem-solving. Policy makers and other practical problem solvers frequently voice their
frustration with what they are offered. And many social scientists and social researchers seem
to wish to be more drawn upon, useful, or influential” (p.vii).
Hence, this is a two-sided problem, where each party identifying different barriers.
On the one hand, policymakers and practitioners complain that research is not adequately
focused on their practical concerns. Academic research fails to generate findings when
needed, recommendations are too elaborate or complex languages, results are ambiguous and
sometimes with confusing evidence, and research is published in journals that policymakers
don't read. On the other hand, academics complain about the lack of impact of their research.
Policymakers are resistant to perspectives that come from academia, lack the capacity to
understand and use research, don't have the motivation to explore research to inform
decision-making, and usually, their decisions are framed by dominant ideologies that prevent
them from considering significant changes (Hammersley, 2005). According to Carol Weiss,
some elements that facilitate the use of academic research in policymaking are: relevance of
findings to the work of policy makers, conformity with the prior knowledge and experience,
the overall quality of research–particularly resistant to criticism and discrediting–action
orientation, and findings that challenge existing policies, which can be thought-provoking
(Weiss, 1995).
In an interesting work about the contribution of research to the policy debate in the
case of charter schools, Henig (2008) recognizes dueling cultures between research-think and
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political-think, meaning, “One–that of the researcher–tends to add complexities and resist
final closure. The other–that of the political actor– tends to demand straightforward and
easily communicated lessons that will lead to some kind of action” (p. 222). However, these
cultures are not pure forms; they are expressions of the expected roles or the incentives
embedded in their institutions. There are plenty of politicians willing to learn from science to
improve their practices, and likewise, scholars passionate about their research to make a
change. Thus, just as there are distances, there are also connections and meeting points
between those two worlds. Rather than the metaphor of these two separate communities,
there are ranges of varied interactions where individuals value that connection more than
others (Newman et al., 2016).
Given this distance between policy research and realpolitik, this dissertation aims not
to build a unifying theory of policy failures, but rather to move towards a better and more
useful understanding of policy failure. In a pragmatic sense, it is not an “instrumental” or
“technical” exercise about what contributes to improving policy, but rather a domain of
“practical” reason regarding what is “appropriate” given the circumstances.
Due to the complexity of policy failure and its epistemological thorns, this study
seeks to understand how we comprehend policy failure, the various lenses used, and proposes
a particular analytical device—the Lenses Framework under a pragmatic approach—to
explore whether different lenses in turn, or a more comprehensive approach to policy failure,
may contribute to teaching us from past failures.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND METHODS

This chapter addresses the dissertation research design, methods, and data. First, it
introduces the case study as the research approach and the qualities that makes it suitable for
this research. Then it explains the selection of the 2012 census case, presenting the features
of the policy selected–the census–and the setting of the case–Chile. Following, it focuses on
the data, describing the primary and secondary sources, including different types of
documents and the interviews performed. Next, it introduces the method used to analyze the
data, its characteristics, and the stages of the analysis. Then, it explains the validity
mechanisms used to safeguard the quality of the study. Following that, it outlines the
limitations of the study. And the final section offers some reflections over the researcher's
position in this dissertation.

4.1.

Research Strategy
This dissertation seeks to answer the research questions through qualitative analysis

from a pragmatic perspective1. Based on a set of primary and secondary sources of

1

Different philosophical perspectives guide qualitative research. Some of these are: interpretative frameworks,

post-positivism, social constructivism, transformative frameworks, postmodern perspectives, feminist theories,
critical theory, critical race theory, queer theory, disability theory and pragmatism (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

information—in-depth interviews, documents, media—the dissertation is positioned in a
particular research strategy: the case study approach.
Case Study Approach
The case study approach is a comprehensive research strategy seeking to understand
larger phenomena through an intensive and in-depth examination of a specific instance or
event, called the "case” (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2014). Robert Yin (2014) states: “The case study
as a research strategy comprises an all-encompassing method—covering the logic of design,
data collection techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis. In this sense, the case
study is not either a data collection tactic or merely a design feature alone but a
comprehensive research strategy” (p. 14).
This approach is especially suitable when the research questions correspond to
questions like "how" or "why," focus on contemporary events, and do not require control of
other events (Yin, 2014). Moreover, unlike other research approaches, case studies rely on
various techniques to gather data, from multiple sources with different perspectives to
generate detail and a thick description of the case (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; Yin, 2014).
The flexibility and multifaceted character for the use of information is what distinguishes
case studies from other approaches. Along these lines, the case study is consistent with the
pragmatic approach. Creswell and Poth, stated that researchers using the pragmatic
perspective “will use multiple methods of data collection to best answer the research
question, will employ multiple sources of data collection, will focus on the practical
implications of the research, and will emphasize the importance of conducting research that
best addresses the research problem” (2018, p. 27). Another characteristic of case studies, is
the importance of the context. As stated by Yin definition, “case study investigates a
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contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in its real-world context, especially when the
boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (Yin, 2014, p. 32).
Unlike other methodological approaches that isolate the phenomenon of study from its
context, case studies observe the social, cultural, political and economic variables of the case,
as well as its historical features.
This dissertation proposes the Lenses Framework to analyze a case. This idea of
exploring a case, containing multiple distinct "cases" is linked to Yin's (2009) concept of
embedded units of analysis, which recognizes case studies where the data come from
different layers. Usually, they are cases with abundant information from different levels, but
pointing to understanding a single or main case. Throughout this approach, the research
process allows addressing, layer by layer—case by case—the complexity of the larger case of
the census in Chile.
A common criticism of case studies is the representativeness of their findings.
However, the case studies focus is not on representativeness in a statistical sense or the
prospect of extrapolating results, but on the opportunity to learn comprehensively. It is not
about the number of cases or the sample's characteristics because the case study is not a
sampling method (Stake, 1995). The contribution of a case considered “typical” can be as
enlightening as a case considered “unusual.” What is essential is that the case selection
should be theoretically driven (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Thus, the choice of the 2012
census case is not random but theoretically inspired by policy failure literature, and the
research questions of this dissertation.
Another criticism of case study is their lack of generalizability. However, this claim is
strongly biased by a quantitative-positivist approach of research because generalizing from
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samples to universals is not the only way to generalize in social science. Case studies offer
“analytical generalizations” that seeks to deepen and generalize theories and not extrapolate
statistical generalizations (Yin, 2014). The complex and rich understanding of the case can
be transferred or applied to other contexts or similar conditions, and therefore case studies
are about “transferability” and not generalizability (Bloomberg, 2018). Consequently, the
initial theoretical ideas about understanding policy failure are enhanced by the census case;
and thus the study contributes to analytical generalization from corroborating, modifying,
rejecting, or advancing toward new ideas that arose from the case. For example, the single
case study about the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 is not generalizable to the use of missiles or
the US–Cuban relationship, but the theoretical propositions of this work allow the
transferability of their findings to extend beyond the case to the decision-making process
under crisis, and models of decisions (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Yin, 2012, 2014). Similarly,
the case study of the 2012 census in Chile from the Lenses Framework, seeks to contribute to
a better understanding of policy failures in other policy areas and latitudes.
Case studies, whether single or comparative, have been the most explored
methodological approach in the still incipient field of policy failure research. Some of the
best-known single cases involve the Challenger explosion (Boin, 2008; Vaughan, 1997), the
Poll-tax policy in Britain (Dunleavy, 1995; King & Crewe, 2013), the US Employment
Policy in 1945-82 (Mucciaroni, 1990), the financial crisis in 2008 (Hindmoor & McConnell,
2013, 2015), the housing transfer in Glasgow (Kearns & Lawson, 2009), and the
transportation reform in Santiago (Olavarría-Gambi, 2013, 2018) to name a few. Likewise,
some comparative case studies of policy failures are: the eight cases in the UK (Dunleavy,
1995), the 26 fiasco cases all over the world (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996), the 24 cases in
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European countries (Bovens et al., 2001), the seven cases in British educational system
(Richardson, 2007), the four policy reforms in the Netherlands (van der Steen et al., 2015),
the four cases of critical areas of policy delivery in the UK (Wajzer et al., 2016), the 41
failures of the federal government in the US (Light, 2014) among many others; some of these
single or comparative case studies were stated in the literature review section. From a case
study approach, the analysis of the 2012 census failure in Chile will become part of this casebased stream of research.

4.2.

The Case
According to the interests, case studies are intrinsic or instrumental. Intrinsic cases

are characterized by an inherent interest in the case, on the part of the researcher, and a desire
to explore the case deeply. Instrumental cases are defined by the researcher's desire to
achieve something beyond the understanding of the particular case. The dissertation focuses
on a theoretical issue of concern and then selects a bounded case to illustrate and pursue the
issue (Stake, 1995). While understanding policy failure is a broad area of research, this study
has an instrumental interest in the case of the 2012 census. As Walton (1992) claims: “cases
come wrapped in theories” (p. 211), meaning that case studies aim to demonstrate how some
general social forces, or theories, take place in particular settings, shaping and generating
results. Accordingly, the case of the census in Chile was theoretically selected. The events,
causes, and features of the census case will be the means to examine broader distinctions
about policy failure, and contribute to the literature in the field. Following is a brief
description of the policy–the census–and the context or setting of the study–Chile.
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The Census Policy
Censuses have a long and extended history. Clay tablets found in ancient Babylon
suggested that censuses were conducted at least 6,000 years ago (UNECE, 2015). Egyptians
undertake censuses from around 2,500 BC mostly to allocate the land near the Nile and
calculate the workforce to build the pyramids. Similarly, Greeks, Chinese and Romans also
conducted census regularly by recording all individuals and their details through the
competition of population lists (Valente, 2015).
With history, censuses have evolved. The 17th century led to the “imperial censuses,”
where French, British and Spanish authorities undertook censuses to oversee the
development of their settlements in the colonies. In the 18th century, the censuses allowed
authorities to monitor the growth of countries and colonies. However, none of the censuses
taken before the 19th century considered the aboriginal population, and most of them were
male-census–not including information of the family or household composition– and
therefore, according to Thorvalsen (2017) these were not proper censuses, but pre-censuses
or “census-like” materials.
Thus, modern forms of the census can be traced to the 19th century, when nations
started to conduct censuses using statistical methodologies systematically, and later on, when
countries agreed on international definitions and recommendations (Baffour et al., 2013).
In the core aspects, modern censuses are no different from these versions of the
ancient world, and the information is still collected throughout the territory of a country in a
relatively short time. Thus, Whether it is for military conscription, taxation, allocation of
lands, administrative or labor purposes, “the census has never just been about counting the
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population. Even early versions of the census helped codify the relationship between the state
and its subjects” (Kukutai et al., 2015, p. 6).
There are censuses of population, housing, agriculture, among many others, but the
term “census” more often refers to population censuses, and countries usually undertake their
housing and population censuses together. Following are the definitions according to the UN:
A population census is the total process of planning, collecting, compiling,
evaluating, disseminating and analysing demographic, economic and social data at the
smallest geo- graphic level pertaining, at a specified time, to all persons in a country
or in a well-delimited part of a country (UN, 2017, p. 2).
A housing census is the total process of planning, collecting, compiling, evaluating,
disseminating and analysing data relating to the number and condition of housing
units and facilities as available to the households pertaining, at a specified time, to all
living quarters and occupants thereof in a country or in a well-delimited part of a
country (UN, 2017, p. 3)
Consequently, the questions population and housing censuses seek to answer are:
How many are we? Who are we? and Where do we live? (UN, 2017), which comprises
counting and characterizing the population within the territory. Following the Table N.10
presents the essential features of a population census:
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Table N.10. Essential Features of a Census
• Individual enumeration. Each individual and set of living quarters should be
enumerated separately (and separately recorded). This requirement can be addressed by
different methods.
• Universality within a defined territory. The census should cover a precisely defined
territory, including every person present and/or living within its scope. This does not
prevent the use of sampling techniques.
• Simultaneity. The enumeration of persons and living quarters should be as of the same
well-defined point of time, which can be a day or a more extended period.
• Defined periodicity. Census should be taken at regular intervals to allow comparisons
and estimations. Countries should attempt to undertake census at least every 10 years–
in years ending in “0” or time as near to those years as possible. However, some
countries may find it necessary to conduct census more frequently.
• Capacity to produce small-area statistics. The census should produce data down the
lowest appropriate geographical level, and for small population groups, all the while
protecting the confidentiality of information of each individual.
Source: UN, 2017 (pp. 19-20)

Censuses are always undertaken by the national government, often under the auspices
of a National Statistical Office (NSO) and play an essential role in state governance,
providing vital information about the size of the country, social demographic characteristics
and spatial distribution. According to the UN (2016, 2017), the census has several roles and
uses: i) To provide the data essential for planning, policymaking and administration. Census
results are critical reference “to ensure equity in distribution of wealth, government services
and representation nationwide” (UN, 2016, p. 8). ii) The census constitutes the principal
source of records to constructing the master sampling frame, from which depends on surveys
and several official statistics. iii) The census generates statistics on small areas and small
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population groups with no/minimum sampling errors, which is a key strength of a census
compared with other statistical instruments. iv) Census results are the base for research and
analysis, as well as the generation of benchmarks, particularly population projections. In this
way, censuses are policies with a strategic role for countries, and all social actors benefit
from quality census data, including government, academia, the corporate sector, civil society,
and individuals.
There is an increase in the number of countries undertaking censuses. In the 1990
census round (covering from 1995 to 2004), 31 of 241 countries did not conduct censuses,
and in 2010 round (from 2005 to 2014) the number declined to 12 countries. The ubiquity of
the census reflects the systematic effort of international and regional agencies supporting
countries to conduct a census at least every ten years (Kukutai et al., 2015).
All countries face the permanent challenge of obtaining better data with their censuses
and able to capture each time more complex social diversity (Baffour et al., 2013).
Historically and until 1970, population censuses were conducted exclusively using the
traditional approach, that is, “all individuals are enumerated directly and their characteristics
are registered through the completion of census forms. The information is collected in the
field at the same time across the whole country, usually over a period of a few days or week”
(Valente, 2010, p. 2). However, this situation has changed. In the last two decades, in OECD
countries and especially in Europe, the census discussion pointed out to the growing
challenges of census taking, such as: the high costs of censuses, the concerns about
intrusiveness, the decrease in response rates, the difficulties in enumerating unsafe areas, the
growing difficulties ensuring cooperation and public participation, among others. All these
difficulties have led countries to use other census modalities, particularly the replacement or
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complement of census data by administrative registers (Coleman, 2013; Skinner, 2018;
Valente, 2015). Table N.11 below describes different census methods used by countries.
Table N.11. Diversity of Census Methods
1) Traditional census: all individuals are enumerated by filling out census forms. Information is
collected at the same time in the country through de jure or de facto approach. In some countries filled
by the respondents, and in others by enumerators who act as interviewers, and more recently also
answering via web questionnaire. Examples: Latin American countries, the UK, Portugal, Hungary.
2) Long-form & short form: all individuals are enumerated. A long-form applied to a sample, and short
and more detailed information filled by the majority of the population. For example, Canada.
3) Register-based censuses: all the population is measured based on information from combined
administrative registers (usually at the individual level). Examples: Denmark, Finland, Sweden &
Norway.
4) A combination of register & full enumeration uses complete enumeration, and administrative
registers, simultaneously allowing improved precision of the count and the quality of the records.
Examples: Italy, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Spain.
5) The “virtual census" is a variant of the previous approach but without field operations. It is a
combination of register data with existing surveys. Created by the Netherlands in 2001, and also
applied by Slovenia.
6) Register data & ad hoc surveys, this is an enumeration based on administrative registers combining
with focused surveys to evaluate the accuracy and completeness of the registers, and/or to include
new variables. Israel has used this approach since 2008.
7) Traditional full enumeration & yearly updates: this is a variant of the traditional census design. It
involves full field enumeration every ten years combining with an extensive household sample survey
on an annual basis —the only country currently applying this approach in the United States.
8) Rolling census: only used in France since 2004. This strategy is a combination of full census, and
surveys applied to samples of small and large municipalities, along five consecutive years.
Source: Valente, 2010; Baffour, King, & Valente, 2013

In the 2010 census round (covering the period from 2005 to 2014), among the 40
European countries, almost half of them abandoned the traditional form of census, five
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countries conducted their censuses based exclusively on registers, 13 adopted a mixed
approach using data from records and other sources, and France implemented the rolling
census (Valente, 2010; UN, 2013; Coleman, 2013). Thus, global figures show a decrease in
using the traditional census, from 200 countries in 1990 to 188 in 2010, increasing the use of
alternative methods, from eight countries in 1990 to 39 in 2010. However, alternative
methods is concentrated in European countries, and the progress toward new census
methodologies in the rest of the world has been limited (Kukutai et al., 2015).
Despite the importance of census transformations at the global level, Latin America
remains using the traditional forms of census with variants of the de facto or de jure
approach. While both are under the category of traditional forms of census, de facto and de
jure censuses have significant methodological and logistical differences. The de facto census
is applied in the whole country in a single day by trained volunteers, asking, "Where did you
sleep last night?" and thus, considering where the person slept at a specific moment in time.
In the de jure, the census enumerates people of the country regarding their usual residence,
asking, "Where do you usually live?" and applied by employed, i.e. paid, specially trained
interviewers, in a period of three-month application (Chackiel, 2009). Thus, there is a strong
tendency to carry out de jure censuses in the region, and the case selected for this
dissertation, the 2012 census in Chile, addresses the shift from de facto to de jure census
mode.
In the census 2010 round, only five Latin-American countries out of 20 performed the
de facto census approach: Argentina, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Bolivia; the remaining
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countries of the region applied de jure approach2 (CEPAL, 2014). Whether the de jure or the
de facto, traditional forms of census are highly complex undertaking, this is what the UN
states:
The traditional census is among the most complex and massive exercises a nation
undertakes. It requires mapping the entire country, mobilizing and training an army of
enumerators, conducting a massive public campaign, canvassing all households,
collecting individual information, compiling vast amounts of completed
questionnaires and analysing and disseminating the data (UN, 2017, p. xv)
There is constant and stimulating thinking on improving censuses from both the
specialized academic literature and the applied experience of censuses in different countries.
There is a community of knowledge, led by the United Nations, through World Programmes
of Population and Housing Censuses, to generate research, to promote debate and discussion
to facilitate the encounter of countries, guiding them toward better ways of censing,
analyzing and use census data (UN, 2009, 2017; CEPAL, 2011a, 2014). The topics are
diverse: the design of questionnaires and specific questions, enumeration approaches,
strengthening national capacities to conduct censuses, citizen support and census
campaigning, error measurements, corrections and statistical imputation methods, uses of the
census, among many others. It combines specialized research—demography, statistics–and
census policies, where the experience of previous censuses and the successes and failures of

2

In the 2010 census round, México, Argentina, and Brazil complemented their census with an extensive survey

administered to a sample.
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different countries provide technical and practical grounds to develop better census
methodologies.
The Chilean Setting
Chile has a recognized quality of public policies, democratic stability, economic
growth, low corruption, and other particular conditions that positioned the country as a leader
in the region in recent decades. Thus, the failure of the 2012 census challenges a series of
assumptions regarding policymaking, presenting a powerful case to explore. This section
describes essential characteristics of the Chilean political administration and other relevant
features of the Chilean setting.
Chile is a long and narrow South American country with 18 million people, where
more than 7 million live in the city of Santiago (INE, 2018c). Following, the Map N.1
presents Chile in its regional context, with Argentina, Bolivia and Peru as its neighborhood
countries. Besides, the map highlight Chile's particularly geography, the divisions of the
country's 16 regions with the Metropolitan region of Santiago, its capital, located at the
center of the country.
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Map N.1. Chile: Regional Context and Internal Division

Most of the population (87.7%) lives in urban areas, and 12.8% of Chileans consider
themselves belonging to some native or indigenous people, and of these, the majority to the
Mapuche people. By 2017, 4.35% of the population was international immigrants, two-thirds
of whom arrived in the country between 2010 and 2017 (INE, 2018c).
Chile is a Democratic Republic under a Presidential regime with a bicameral
congress. The country had an institutionalized party system with distinct ideological
differences in two relatively stable coalitions, low polarization levels and programmatic
parties (Olavarría-Gambi, 2016). The country has an Exaggerated Presidentialism–the
powers concentrated in the executive are formally granted by the constitution– which has led
to a great influence of the president on the legislation (Fuentes, 2015). Since the peaceful and
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successful recovery and installation of its democracy in 1990 after 17 years of dictatorship,
the country has been one of the most stable democracies in Latin America; as Castiglioni and
Rovira point out, "the comparative literature on Latin American politics usually considers
Chile as one of the countries of the region with the most stable party systems and strongest
political institution" (2016, p. 4). Table N.12 summarizes the main characteristics of the
Chilean political administration.
Table N.12. Characteristics of Chilean Political Administration
Public Administration
Chile is a unitarian country, a democratic republic. The country is divided into 16 territorial units called
Regions, and each of them is in charge of an intendant, which is appointed by the President of the Republic.
The regions are divided, in turn, into provinces that are in charge of a governor, and these are finally divided
into 346 communes, which are directed by a mayor elected by popular vote.
Executive power
The President of the Republic is chief of the State and head of government. The President is elected by direct
ballot, and needs an absolute majority of the valid votes, and for that, there is a two-round system election.
Therefore, in order to win the election in the first round, the winning candidate must have more than 50% of
the valid votes, if not, the two more voted candidates compete in a second election or “balloting” and the
candidate with the majority of valid votes is elected President. The presidential term lasts four years without
immediate reelection, but in the subsequent period (SERVEL, 2020).
Legislative power
Legislative power resides in the President and the National Congress, which is bicameral (Senate and Chamber
of Deputies) and located in the city of Valparaíso. Since the reform of 2015, the Senate consists of 50 senators
from 15 electoral circumscriptions, elected by popular vote and who remain in office for eight years with the
possibility of reelection. The main function of the Senate is to concur with the chamber of deputies in the
preparation of laws and approval of international treaties (Senado, 2020). The Chamber has 155 members
elected by popular vote corresponding to 28 electoral districts. Deputies remain in office for four years with
the possibility of reelection. The main function of the Chamber is to legislate with the Senate and the President,
and also has the attribution of supervising the act of government and exercise control over public authorities
(Cámara de Diputados, 2020).

___________________________________________________________________________
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About the economy, Chile is one of the most prosperous and stable countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean. The country has the highest per capita GDP in the region,
controlled inflation with rates below 3%, and 7% unemployment (below the regional average
of 8.4%) (ILO, 2019; WorldBank, 2020; Banco Central, 2020). Consistent with these figures,
the 2018 World Economic Forum (WEF) report shows Chile's good position in the world
competitiveness scene, with the best performance in the region, and taking 33rd place in the
world ranking. Moreover, from the 140 countries, the report highlights Chile in
macroeconomic stability (1st), product market (12th), financial system (20th), health (30th),
and the quality of institutions (32nd) (WEF, 2019).
Regarding education, the average level of schooling for Chileans reaches ten years,
the graduation rate in high school reaches 87%, and 29.8% of the population over 25 years
reached tertiary education (OECD, 2020). Health indicators also show good figures, the life
expectancy at birth reaches 80 years (even higher than the US), infant mortality rate of 5.7
(per 1000 live births), and immunization coverage for children under one year of age reaches
93% (OMS, 2019; WorldBank, 2020). United Nations observes a "very high" human
development index HDI of 0.84 (1 is high development), placing Chile 44th in the world and
first in Latin America and the Caribbean.
In addition, Chile's levels of corruption are low. According to the Corruption
Perception Index of Transparency International (2020), on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to
100 (very clean), Chile scored 67 and ranked 27th out the 180 countries evaluated. Moreover,
for the democracy index developed by the Intelligence Unit of The Economist, the country
recently scored 8.08 (10 is full democracy) and ranked 21th out 165 countries, reaching
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category of “full democracy,” due to the recent outbreak and social mobilizations in October
2019 (The Economist IU, 2020).
Poverty reduction is one of the country's most recognized achievements in recent
decades. While in 1990, 38.6% of households lived in poverty, thanks to growth and welltargeted public policies, the poverty rate in 2015—with comparable methods—decreased
below 10% (CASEN, 2018; Urzúa, 2018). However, the country exhibits worrying levels of
income inequality. Despite the slow but progressive decrease in inequality in recent years,
from 101 countries studied, Chile appears to be one of the ten most unequal countries in the
world (WorldBank, 2016), and in 2017, the GINI index reached 46.6 (WorldBank, 2020).
Gender inequality is also a problem, the gender gap is 2.3 times that of countries with very
high human development, and the gender inequality index reaches 0.32 (0 is greater
equality), understood as the loss of human development due to inequality in the achievements
of men and women (UNDP, 2018).
Since 2006, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) developed a policy index
to assess the quality of different countries' public policies. The index encloses the following
key features: policy stability, policy adaptability, policy coordination and coherence, policy
implementation and enforcement, policy efficiency, and public—regardless of policies. The
policy index spots Chile as the country with the best quality of public policies in the region—
followed by Uruguay and Costa Rica—placing it in the group of countries with "high"
quality policymaking in the world (Stein et al., 2006; Franco & Scartascini, 2014).
Following, Table N.13 below summarizes relevant indicators of Chile.
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Table N.13. Chile´s Relevant Indicators
Population:

18,054,726 at the 2017 (INE, 2020)

GPD per capita:

25.283 dollars at 2018

(WorldBank, 2020)

Annual GDP growth:

3.28% in 2018

(WorldBank, 2020)

CPI, annual Consumer Price Index:

2.8 in 2018

(Banco Central, 2020)

Global competitiveness Index:

70/100 (rank 33/140)

(WEF, 2019)

Unemployment Rate:

7% in 2018

(ILO, 2019)

Poverty Rate:

10.7%

(CEPAL, 2019)

Gini Index (WB estimation):

46.6 at 2017

(WorldBank, 2020)

Indigenous People:

12.8% at 2017

(INE, 2018c)

Corruption Perception Index:

67/100 at 2018

(Transparency Int., 2020)

Democracy Index:

8.08/10 at 2019

(The Economist IU, 2020)

Secondary Graduation rate:

87.12% at 2017

(OECD, 2020)

Average Schooling (years):

10.02 at 2017

(INE, 2018c)

Life expectancy at birth:

79,73 at 2017

(WorldBank, 2020)

HDI, Human development index:

0.84/1 at 2017 (rank 44th)

(UNDP, 2018)

Gender Inequality Index:

0.32/0 (rank 72th)

(UNDP, 2018)

Policy Index (IADB)

“High” at 2014

(Franco & Scartascini, 2014)

The above description shows that Chile reached significant economic, social, and
institutional progress, standing out from its peers in the Latin American region. Despite these
leading indicators, the 2012 census was considered a colossal failure, which led to discarding
the collected data and conducting a new census in 2017. Thus, through the Lenses
Framework, this dissertation explores this particular case, delving into the dynamics of
census policy, the organization of the National Statistics Institute, and the social and
institutional context that led to the failed census.

4.3.

Data
The use of multiple sources of information is another particular feature of the case

studies, which is even considered a “principle,” as it helps to deepen the understanding of the
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phenomenon under study from different formats and points of view (Yin, 2014). In line with
this approach, this dissertation relied on multiple sources of information and data collection
strategies, combining secondary and primary sources of information: documents, media
records, and in-depth interviews with INE participants and stakeholders. Further detail about
these sources is provided below.
Secondary Information
Abundant and diverse types of documents were collected for this dissertation—a set
of information from the National Institute of Statistics including reports, official mandates,
and legislation; also included were INE internal information, such as letters, e-mails, meeting
minutes or memorandums; as well as several evaluations, audits, and other inquiries. This
secondary information was collected on an extended period (from 2015 to 2019), and was
relatively easy to gather since by law it must be publicly available. Thus, most of the
documents were available on websites or different public platforms, and other information
was requested following the transparency law N.20,285 and their procedures (Transparencia,
2020). Complementary to this, another secondary source of information for the study was the
media, including regular news, specialized journalist research reports, news videos, blogs,
radio interviews and news, social media, and political opinion pieces.
All of this information was collected in digital format (or converted to digital form)
for further analysis, supported by qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti (2017). More
than 700 items were collected ranging from the preparations of the 2012 census with the
initial “de jure” enumeration strategy (starting from 2010) to the most recent discussions and
news about methods and the data quality gathered in the 2017 census and other statistical
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challenges of the National Institute of Statistics (until mid-2019). Following, Table N.14
presents the secondary data collected.
Table N.14. Type of Secondary Information
Type of information

Num. Instances

INE documentation

52

Letters and emails

14

Presentations

23

Inquiry and assessment reports

17

Testimonies (Hearings)

12

Video and audio pieces

35

Blogs and opinion pieces

63

Media (articles, chronicles, news)

525
Total

742

Source: Own elaboration based on the registers of collected data.

The use of these diverse sources of information was essential for thorough case
analysis, allowing: to identify moments and actors of the case, to distinguish points of view
and positions of the actors at the very same time that events occurred, to capture the ideas
and perceptions of relevant stakeholders and social actors, to explore elements of the
political, institutional, and social context of the case, to examine specific issues, and finally
to check information among different sources.
In-depth Interviews
The most important sources of information of this dissertation are in-depth interviews
of INE officials, stakeholders, and other relevant informants on the census case. Based on
previous analysis of the case and oriented by the research questions, the selection of
participants was a purposeful sample (Schutt, 2011), including different types of actors
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linked to the 2012 census from different roles and stages of the policy. These actors included
INE Directors, INE high officials, political and statistical advisors, INE professionals,
members of the census team, authorities and high officials of the central government,
members of the different inquiry commissions, experts and scholars, and finally other
organizations—including the media, Chilean Society of Statistics (SOCHE), the General
Comptroller of the Republic, and the Latin-American and the Caribbean Demographic Center
from the UN-CELADE. Over one year (from March 2017 to August 2018), in-depth
interviews with 50 participants (more than the 35 initially planned) were conducted. Table
N.15 below presents the interviewees according to their role in the 2012 census.
Table N.15. Type of Interviewees
Type of interviewee

Num. Interviews

INE Directors and high officials

7

INE professionals

8

INE advisors

5

Census team members

6

Central government

6

Inquiry commissions members

6

Experts and scholars

8

Other organizations

4
Total

50
Source: Own elaboration

In-depth interviews are particularly suitable for this type of study and advantageous
for capturing elements of a complex topic. An in-depth interview “is a method of gathering
information from a person in his or her own words by mirroring the back-and-forth, typically
one-on-one structure of everyday conversation while keeping specific research questions and
objectives in mind" (Guest et al., 2013, p. 163). This type of interview helps us comprehend
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individual perspectives of a far-reaching event, deepen the understanding of a unique topic,
generate descriptive data, gather the insight of the participant's thought process, and learn
about the context (Rossman & Rallis, 2012).
The in-depth interviews conducted were semi-structured, that is, they possessed an
initial structure of the topics to be explored, maximized the conversational sense of the
interview, followed the interviewee's experiences and thoughts, and accounted for the
nuances and topics not initially considered (Guest et al., 2013). For this, the interviews were
conducted with the support of a specially designed guideline, which, rather than checking
information, sought to trigger conversation and facilitate insight. These guidelines were
designed based on the distinctions identified in the literature review, combining the lenses'
key themes—policy, organizational and societal—and policy failure themes. Therefore,
following the semi-structured character of the interviews, the guide was organized around
broad themes, supported by open-ended questions, which were asked as the themes unfolded.
Consequently, the number of open-ended questions or follow-up questions and the questions'
sequence were different for each interviewee. The interviews guidelines are available in the
Appendix N.1.
Selected interviewees had some involvement with the 2012 census or specific
relevant expertise; all of them had a particular viewpoint that helped inform this research. For
example, interviewees from the census team participated in the formulation and
implementation process, the interviewees from the inquiry commissions were involved once
the census controversy erupted; likewise, interviewees from the central government and other
organizations were involved from their particular organizations at different moments. This
means that each interviewee had a specific experience with the census case, from a certain
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position, and at a particular point in time. In order to facilitate the conversation and the
emergence of the interviewee’s own experiences, opinions, and meanings, there were
different interview guidelines according to types of actors.
However, it is essential to mention that much of the interviewees’ involvement and
opinions go beyond their specific roles at the 2012 census time. For example, a member of
the national inquiry commission was also a member of an international organization, a
former manager of the INE is an expert in demographic matters, or a census team
professional in 2012 was in a different position in the 2017 census. Since the study focuses
on understanding a complex phenomenon in a historical and institutional context, different
perspectives are valuable for the analysis.
Fieldwork
The interviews were conducted through different strategies and using diverse formats.
Given that most interviewees work in the government, universities, or international agencies,
the standard way to contact them was by email or telephone. However, some of them were
approached through professional networks, in this case, LinkedIn (widely used in Chile and
Latin America). Once the fieldwork started, additional interview subjects were identified
through snowball sampling.
The 2012 census case had significant media exposure and was also investigated by
specialized commissions at various times in past decades. Several of the interviewees
participated in instances of technical, political, or even judicial investigation. Due to the
intense coverage of the census case and its judicial edges, some of the interviewees were
initially reluctant about the interview, but after clarifying the academic focus and the
conditions of confidentiality, they agreed to participate in the study. Once the interviewees
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agreed to participate, they were willing to discuss their experiences and perceptions.
Likewise, one element that increased enthusiasm to participate in the study was the new
census in 2017, which revived the controversy of the failed census, encouraging different
actors to reflect on this matter.
All interviews were performed in Spanish and lasted anywhere between 30 minutes to
2 hours and 40 minutes, with an average time of one hour and 23 minutes. As stated, the
interviewees were eager to talk about the case and share their experiences and opinions. With
two of the participants, the interview was conducted in two meetings. In one of those cases,
the first interview was in 2015 and the other in 2017; in the other case, the two meetings
were held one month apart during 2017.
Some people refused to participate in the study. Six individuals openly declined to
take part, two unfortunately died, and seven others, despite different contacting efforts
(emails, phone calls), could not be reached. Of those who rejected the interview, some had
political responsibility for the failures that occurred or those for whom the census case had
personal or emotional costs. On the other hand, there was an exception in a respondent
residing abroad who did not agree to the interview in a semi-structured format but provided a
written document to the set of questions by email. Although the quality of the information
provided is different, for the records of the dissertation, this was considered an interview.
The interviews were conducted in two waves. Most of them were carried out during
2017—mainly focused on census professionals and the inquiry of the failure—and, after a
first analysis of the information, the second wave of interviews was conducted in 2018—with
the remaining interviews, experts, and stakeholders.
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Regarding the place and format of the interviews, 21 took place in the interviewees'
workplaces, 17 were held in cafeterias, four in the interviewee's houses, and seven interviews
using Internet platforms (Skype or FaceTime). The last corresponds to interviewees who live
in Chilean regions or abroad. Thus, and thanks to technology, all the interviews were
conducted from Santiago de Chile. Additional information about the interviews performed is
available in Appendix N.2.
The interviews were conducted with the support of the interview guideline—the list
of themes and questions—but the logic of the interviews and the emphasis on topics
depended on each participant and their experience with the census case. Also, notes were
taken during the interviews, identifying the most critical elements of the conversation and
distinguishing those issues that required additional inquiry or follow-up questions. The
interviews, except for one, were taped and then transcribed for the later analysis. In the
unrecorded one (by request of the interviewee), detailed notes were taken and later
transcribed.
Ethical Considerations
Following the IRB and ethical considerations, informed consent and confidentiality
agreement are vital elements to ensure voluntary participation in the study. However,
considering the cultural context, and the minimal risk involved for the interviewees, this
research did not require written documentation. Thus, the Institutional Review Board of the
University of Massachusetts Boston approved the dissertation as exempt from continuing
IRB review; the document is available in Appendix N.3.
The written consent, involving signature, is not a standard research practice in Chile
yet. The research procedure is very similar to US protocol, but it does not require signing a
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document, just a conversation. This comes from a cultural practice where the culture of
"word" is more powerful than paper; so, in this context, asking for a signature could be
considered "rude," "inappropriate," or even a sign of "distrust," especially considering that
the participant already accepted the interview. Even though there are shifts ongoing in the
country, and some universities are creating ethics committees and using written consent
forms, this is a new practice. Therefore, and approved by the IRB at UMass Boston, this
research used verbal consent. The conversation between the investigator and the interviewee
ensured the understanding of the purpose of the interviews, described procedures for
maintaining confidentiality and asked permission to record and transcribe the interviews
(McLellan et al., 2003). All interviewees understood and accepted the conditions of
confidentiality and the use of the information collected. In this context, one interviewee
asked not to tape the interview and a few others asked to pause the recording at some
moments during the interview. In general, once the interviewees understood the research's
academic focus, they trusted in the research motives and were enthusiastic about taking part.

4.4.

Methods of Analysis
Following the guidelines of a case study approach and according to the methods

described above, this dissertation relied on qualitative research tools to analyze the
information gathered, specifically through qualitative content analysis. This section describes
the analysis performed through its different steps.
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Qualitative Content Data Analysis
Qualitative content data analysis3 is: “a research method for subjective interpretation
of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and
identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1278). Qualitative content
analysis “comprises descriptions of the manifest content, close to the text, as well as
interpretations of the latent content, distant from the text but still close to the participants'
lived experiences”(Graneheim et al., 2017, p. 30). Therefore, It is “a method for
systematically describing the meaning of qualitative data” (Schreier, 2014, p.170), and also is
characterized by three features: it reduces data, it is systematic, and it is flexible. These
characteristics of the methods are described below.
The qualitative content analysis helps to reduce the amount of research material. By
focusing only on those aspects linked to the study, this method allows the attainment of an
adequate number of categories to answer the research questions (Schreier, 2014). This
dissertation collected and reviewed abundant material (more than 700 documents and other
secondary data, and 50 interviews) where some part of the information is not connected with
the subject; therefore, this analysis allowed a focused approach to a diverse and large volume
of material. In addition, content analysis is highly systematic. The method requires
examining every single part of the material relevant to the research question, and thus
counteracts the biases to look the material according to preconceptions or expectations. It is

3

It is important to not confuse the qualitative and interpretative content analysis method with the quantitative

content analysis, which is closer to a quantitative text analysis. Due the predominant use of the latter, qualitative
content analysis approach has not been well known as a method in its own in English-speaking countries until
recently (Schreier, 2014).
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also systematic because it requires a particular sequence of steps; although it is an iterative
process, the steps remain the same (defining and identifying codes/categories, data coding,
revising codes/categories) (Schreier, 2014).
Moreover, qualitative content analysis is flexible. It allows using inductive and
deductive approaches or a combination of both for data analysis. Deductive methods start
with predetermined themes and categories4 derived from prior theory, and inductive methods
draw codes and themes directly from the data (Schreier, 2014; Cho & Lee, 2014). This
combined approach has been called complementary or “abductive,” and requires moving
back and forth between inductive and deductive analysis (Graneheim et al., 2017). Thus,
derived from the literature review and Lenses Framework, the examination started from preestablished themes and initial codes (deductive) but then extracted new themes from the data
(inductive), some of them as part of the previous categories, others in a complementary way.
The flexibility of qualitative content analysis also means that the method is suitable to
examine any communication material, including observations, open-ended survey questions,
interviews, printed media, websites, blogs, among others (Cho & Lee, 2014; Schreier, 2014).
The abovementioned characteristics of qualitative content analysis, that is, to tackle
abundant material with focus, to address systematically different types of sources of
information, and to generate categories and themes through a combination of inductive and

4

While some qualitative methods literature distinguishes between categories and themes, others do not. For the

purposes of this study, these will be equivalent concepts, i.e. the identification of things, opinions, perceptions,
and meanings (Yin, 2014; Schreier, 2014; Graneheim, et al., 2017).
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deductive analysis, is highly coherent with the case study approach (Staa & Evers, 2010; Yin,
2014).
Stages of Data Analysis
For this dissertation, the data analysis process required the following five stages:
preparation of the material, identification of the main themes, coding and revision process,
integration according to lenses, and multi-lens perspective. Diagram N.6 below presents the
data analysis stages, and following, is the description of each one of them.
Diagram N.6. Stages of Data Analysis

First stage:
Preparation

Second stage:
Identification
of main
themes

Third stage:
Coding and
revision

Fourth stage:
Integration
according to
lenses

Fifth stage:
Mult- lens
perspective

Source: Own elaboration

First stage: Preparation
The first stage of data analysis, preparing the data, required organizing the files and
documentation and making them available in digital format (pdf or docx) for further analysis.
Regarding the in-depth interviews, over 70 hours of audio were thoroughly transcribed
verbatim in their entirety by professional transcriptionists. Audio transcriptions were done in
what Mayring (2014) calls "clean read or smooth verbatim transcript,” that is word by word,
which generated a coherent text reproducing the original wording and grammatical structure.
Once the data were available in digital format, the analysis began with the support of the

118

qualitative software Atlas.ti 8.4.4 version for Mac (2019). This software has the advantage of
allowing integrated analysis between different sources of information such as reports, news,
and interviews, but it also allows differentiated analysis according to specified criteria (type
of information, types of actors, stages of the policy, among others).
Second Stage: Identification of the Milestones of the Case
The main characteristic of a case study and critical endeavor is creating a detailed
description of the case, including context, actors and chronology of events (Creswell, 2007;
Yin, 2014). This stage involved identifying the most important moments and milestones of
the case, establishing a timeline of events and actors to classify and organize it. Identifying
the main events provided a first structure of the case narrative and facilitated the organization
themes within the case. Thus, the case is divided into four major moments or stages: Census
Strategy Change, Carrying out the 2012 Census, Census Controversy and Evaluations, and
The 2017 Census and Future INE Challenges. The narration of the case according to these
moments is available in Chapter Five.
Third Stage: Identification of Themes and Coding
Following qualitative content analysis strategies, this dissertation combines an
inductive and deductive approach for data analysis. Accordingly, the coding process did not
start from scratch, but began from a set of initial themes (or categories) derived from the
literature review and analytical framework. The themes were gradually specified and grouped
into broader categories—what Stake (1995) called “categorical aggregation” or Yin (2014)
denoted as the “iterative nature of explanation building.” Therefore, the identification,
classification and interpretation of themes evolved in an interactive manner, which contained
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initial codes and new themes or distinctions not initially considered. Diagram N.7 presents
the sequence and logic of this coding process.
Diagram N.7. Coding Process

Initial themes coding
(deductive approach)
•Initial themes from:
Literature Review
and Interview
Guidelines

Coding
•Identification of
new themes and
codes from data
•Revising codes and
themes

•Coding
•Revising codes and
themes

•Revising codes and
themes

Open coding
(inductive approach)

Initial themes

Source: Own elaboration

The first step of the coding process was the elaboration of the initial set of themes or
categories. From the deductive approach, these themes come from the literature review, the
Lenses Framework and the interview guidelines. This first list of themes led to coding and
revision. Thus, the coding process allowed identifying major themes such as expectations
about the census, the recruitment and training the census takers, INE leadership or
organizational climate, among others. Following that, the inductive analysis identified new
themes and codes that complemented or corrected the previous ones, such as the assignation
of blame, perception of social media, leadership style, INE power struggles. Based on that
improved set of codes, and supported by the qualitative software analysis Atlas.ti, the coding
process continued.
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As the analysis process evolved, the initial themes were less broad and became more
precise and clearer. Echoing Weiss’ (1995) words, “The investigator’s preconceptions help to
decide the initial organization of the material, but then the material forces modification of the
investigator’s thinking, which then leads the investigator to revise the organization of
materials, and so on for several iterations” (p. 169). Thus, the analysis of information sources
was an inductive and deductive process, with a focus on a permanent revision of themes and
codes, the relationship between them and the whole structure of themes. Appendix N.4
presents the themes and the overall coding organization, which was the basis for case
narration and subsequent lenses analysis.
Fourth Stage: Integrating Themes According to Each Analytical Lens
The next stage was the analysis of themes and codes according to each lens of the
framework. This stage led to identifying and connecting codes based on the themes from
each one of the lenses (policy, organizational, societal). Thus, once set the three groups of
themes—corresponding to the lenses—the analysis led to additional exploration and
interpretation of the data to understand connections and underlying relationships between the
categories within each one of the lenses. This process of analysis led to three separate
examinations of the failure case—or different layers of the same case, or different cases
within a case—each one of them with their own unit of analysis, foci, and particular
perspective. Thus, these analyses work to effectively untangle the complex nature of the
failures, observing the different points of view that each lens provides for the same case.
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight present the most important findings from each one of these
lenses.
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As stated before, the interviews were conducted in Spanish and so was the analysis.
Thus, there was no translation of the interviews into English after their transcription. Only
later relevant selected excerpts were translated into English to exemplify the themes and
place in the report the voice of the actors, with their nuances and feelings. There was an
additional challenge in the translation process. To ensure the original meaning of the
sentences was adequately captured, the translation from Spanish to English came with a
proper linguistic external check.5
Fifth Stage: Multi-lens Perspective
The final stage of the data analysis refers to the use of the multi-lens perspective to
understand policy failure in the case. The analysis arises from the previous stage's findings,
where each lens provided a particular perspective, and then, an integrated analysis of lenses
to identify common or connected themes among the separate perspectives, allowing for a
more integrated analysis. Examples of these additional type of observations are: the way the
political context may have triggered decisions about the census, how the INE's recent history
might influence the enumeration, how census conflicts and performance affected the
organization, or the extent to which collaboration with other organizations, or lack thereof,
affected policy decisions. The most important findings from a multi-lens perspective are
available in Chapter Nine.

5
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4.5.

Validity
In this study, the validity of the study is part of the overall, interactive research

process. It is not an additional stage or requirement to comply with, but a primary concern
throughout all dissertation phases. The concept of validity has been, and still is, controversial
in the qualitative research field. The strong epistemological connotation of the word
"validity" comes from a positivist perspective regarding the "real world," and the role of
knowledge, and while some qualitative researchers abandoned this concept entirely, others
have intended to redefine it. Beyond discussions, validity refers to those procedures of the
qualitative research that safeguard the quality of the study (Maxwell, 2012). More concretely,
they are validation procedures or called “validity tests.” Following are the relevant validity
considerations for this dissertation.
One form to contribute to the validity of qualitative research is through
“multivocality," or the use of different "voices" or perspectives about the case (Creswell &
Miller, 2000). This study included in-depth interviews with actors connected to the 2012
census, possessing different roles, acting in separate phases of the policy (some in the
formulation, others in the implementation, or from organizations linked to the case). Also,
the interviewees had different levels of power and influence (positions of authority, technical
expertise), diverse political views (political parties, voting preferences, beliefs), distinct
levels of responsibility within organizations (directors, advisors, high officials,
professionals), and positions from within different agencies (academia, international
organizations, government agencies). Also, regardless of their roles, the interviewees held
different views on the idea of failure of the 2012 census and how it could, or finally could
not, be solved.
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Another mechanism for validity is "triangulation," understood as using multiple and
unique sources of information, methods, and perspectives to corroborate evidence (Creswell,
2007; Yin, 2014). Thus, triangulation is linked to two distinct key purposes of case studies:
the construction of valid interpretations by the convergence of evidence, and the achievement
of a deeper insight by combining methods, data, and analysis techniques (Staa & Evers,
2010). According to Staa and Evers (2010) there are six triangulation types, and except for
one (triangulation by more than one researcher), the remaining five were intensely used in
this dissertation. They are: 1) Data source triangulation: to use different strategies to collect
data—interviewing and gathering secondary data—from different moments, ranging from
2010 to 2019, and with a variety of persons—the 50 interviewees and other secondary
sources of individual testimonies. 2) Theory triangulation: to rely on more than one
theoretical perspective to gather and interpret data, in this dissertation through the Lenses
Framework. 3) Data type triangulation: the use of diverse types of data, such as interviews
transcripts, news, blogs, reports, assessments, and others. 4) Methodological triangulation:
the use of more than one method to gather data—interviews and diverse types of secondary
data. 5) Analysis triangulation: the use of separate data analysis or multiple units or levels of
analysis, in this case, the policy, organizational, societal, and multi-lens.
Multiple triangulations confirm the breadth and accuracy of data and their
interpretation, in line with what Yin calls "convergent validity" (2014). However, it is
essential to note that triangulation does not necessarily lead to confirmation; it is not about
validity in seeking objective truth, but about improving the understanding of a phenomenon.
Indeed, data and methods triangulation does not necessarily lead to having "a unique version"
of the 2012 census policy failure; on the contrary, it exposes the different interpretations and
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points of view. Therefore, "Triangulation is thus seen as a means of enhancing the
completeness of the findings, rendering a more in-depth understanding" (Staa & Evers, 2010,
p. 752).
A thick or dense case description is fundamental to the case study approach and
another way to contribute to the research validity. The thoroughness in collecting information
and incorporating varied perspectives and sources of information provided a deep
comprehension of the census case. This is how Denzin refers to the power of thick
description, “it inserts history into experience. It establishes the significance of an experience
or sequence of events for the person or persons in question. In thick description the voices,
feelings, actions, and meanings of interacting individuals are heard, made visible” (2001, p.
102). Through a rich description (available in Chapter Five), the case enables the readers to
form their interpretation, conclusions, and even transfer information from the case to other
settings (Maxwell, 2012; Yin, 2014). That is precisely a significant role of case studies, to
provide a narrative that engages and challenges readers to interrogate the facts and
circumstances, to identify keys to analysis and thus, little by little, to deploy a better
understanding of the specific case—the 2012 census in Chile—and the phenomenon under
study, policy failure. The study gathered a considerable amount of relevant information
including reports, media, INE documentation, and especially the in-depth interviews; all of
this accreted to become the rich and dense description of the case, which is the cornerstone of
this dissertation. The production of rich data was facilitated by a long-term involvement with
the case—which is another way to check validity—helping to check and confirm the
observations (Maxwell, 2012).
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Complementing the above, another mechanism to combat validity threats is "peer
review or debriefing" (Creswell, 2007; Creswell & Miller, 2000). This process consists of
sharing write-ups to check accuracy and interpretation with peers and colleagues. The
debriefed peer plays "devil's advocate," challenging the researcher, asking hard questions
about meaning, methods, and interpretations (Creswell, 2007). This dissertation relied on the
valuable support of colleagues from government positions and academia. This mechanism
was essential to clarify concerns, and particularly significant to the analysis from different
lenses.
Reaffirming what was stated earlier, this dissertation did not consider validity checks
as another step of the methods but as a permanent and pervasive concern for the quality of
the investigation. Therefore, credibility, legitimacy, and the research's worth require more
than the above validity tests. They are born of a disciplined re-considering throughout the
research process, which was a permanent and challenging process for this dissertation.

4.6.

Limitations
One of the challenges of this dissertation was timing: the census was carried out in

2012, the presentation of the data and most of the controversy happened from 2013 onwards,
and most of the in-depth interviews were performed years later, in 2017, when a new version
of the census was carried out. Thus, the question about how to handle timing was a
permanent concern of the dissertation.
The timeframe to analyze a topic has been a constant preoccupation in the policy
failure literature, because time shapes perceptions and even can change the assessment of
failure. This research assumes that the 2012 census failure in Chile is a social construction
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that occurs over time, and this temporal tension is part of what is under study. In this way,
the dissertation assumes that having information from different moments of time is not a
limitation, but a characteristic of qualitative research (Creswell, 2016). The subsequent
analysis showed that having information about the case over time actually allowed building a
rich and dense description of the 2012 census case.
To generate a consistent account of the case, these temporary tensions were faced in
different ways: using various sources of information (media analysis, reports, INE internal
documentation, in-depth interviews), data triangulation, and the search for discrepant
evidence. For example, since the interviews were conducted years after the 2012 census, the
interviewees' accounts were not necessarily accurate about the dates or sequence on which
some events occurred; therefore, the analysis of the news of the time, and document review,
allowed to check these inconsistencies.
The interviews conducted in 2017 and 2018 cannot be separated from the events of
the new census. In other words, the events of 2012 were interpreted from this new moment of
time. The use of pre-2017 sources of information helped to identify the interpretations and
meanings from that time. However, conducting the interviews in 2017-2018 turned out to be
a facilitator and an asset in conducting the interviews. Due to the 2017 census, the
controversy about the failure of the 2012 version was more present than ever. Likewise, most
of the legal conflicts and investigations the case had already finished, so the census’s legal or
criminal threat was not an obstacle as initially thought.
There were also limitations concerning the fieldwork. Some key actors in the census
case refused the interview or did not respond to efforts to contact them. To address this
weakness, the study relied upon other sources of information (documents, media interviews,
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hearings) and also other interviews allowed to explore those missing perspectives. Besides,
given the limitations of time and resources, and in conjunction with the country´s centralized
nature, most of the interviewees were from Santiago. Therefore, this study does not
adequately incorporate the perspectives of regional or local actors.
Finally, the multiform nature of policy failure itself led to the confrontation of biases
and differing perspectives from the interviewees. The census was labeled by several actors
and the citizenship as a failure, with public opinion, the media, and several technical and
political reports later confirming the defectiveness of the data gathered, including the census
being declared “illegal” by the Comptroller agency (CGR, 2015b). The whole process of the
census seems inextricable from "failure," which implies that actors´ perspectives are shaped
by this context. That is why validity mechanisms are so important in qualitative research, as
they allow addressing these complexities and weighing them up properly. From here, a dense
description of the case is especially critical, as it will help stifle biases and allow for a careful
analysis of the case.

4.7.

Researcher’s position
In addition to the validity mechanisms and strategies mentioned above, another

critical element for the quality of a study is the researcher’s position. In quantitative studies,
the researcher tries to be neutral and impartial, abandoning his or her values and beliefs, and
using rigorous and "objective" methods to avoid biases that could affect the research.
However, qualitative research is different; researchers' beliefs and values are part of the
inquiry process, and this study is no exception.
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There are two broad concerns regarding the researcher's role in qualitative studies, the
researcher's subjectivity–known as bias–and the researcher's influence on the setting of
individuals studied–known as reactivity (Maxwell, 2012). However, more than fighting
against our influence or controlling our personal characteristics or biases, qualitative research
proposes "reflexivity" as a permanent attitude throughout the research process. Maxwell
states, "It is impossible to deal with these issues by eliminating the researcher's theories,
beliefs, and perceptual lens. Instead, qualitative research is concerned with understanding
how a particular researcher's values and expectations influenced the conduct and conclusions
of the study" (2012, p. 124). Researchers are part of the social world we are studying, and
therefore we cannot avoid who we are, the way we approach the phenomenon it or the
influence we exert. But we can be aware of our role in the study and to think and ponder the
different limitations that may exist, and thus be able to deal with adverse effects in a better
way. Below I share some reflections on my role as a researcher in studying the failure of the
2012 census in Chile.
The whole process of investigation is permeated by who I am. I am a Chilean,
middle-aged woman, an academic, a public policy advisor and consultant. I am also a
sociologist and a master in management and public policy from the two most prestigious
universities in my country, Universidad Católica, and Universidad de Chile. This background
speaks to my capabilities, relationship with the academic world, professional setting and
networks.
I have been working in the public policy area throughout my professional career–
studies, consultancy, evaluations– but I am not a policymaker, and I have never worked in
the public sector. While I try to build a bridge between academic knowledge and decision
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making, this is academic research, and particularly a doctoral dissertation. Therefore, I am in
a paradox. I am an academic, this is my doctoral dissertation, but I am critical of what we
often do in academia. And thus, by studying the policy failure phenomenon, I attempt to
explore–academically–, ways to better connect with decision making.
Another important element is my political leanings. The 2012 census, and its failure,
had powerful political overtones, and it occurred during the administration of right-wing
President Sebastián Piñera. Like any human being, I am not neutral; I have experiences and
opinions on the events in my country, and its effects. Besides, although I am not a member of
any political party, I identify with what in my country is a center-left position.
Some of these and other elements could work as facilitators, but also as limitations.
For example, my training as a sociologist helped investigate complex statistical and
demographic issues about the census, but perhaps for some interviewees, this same
background was perceived differently. Similarly, most interviewees have graduate studies, so
there were open to this type of research, however other interviewees this academic tone could
be a limitation or even the reason to reject the interview.
Thus, qualitative research is full of challenges, and our role as researchers is not
external but is very present in every step and decision of the research process. In order to
contribute to the quality of the study, it is essential to cultivate reflexivity, that is, maintain a
thoughtful attitude about who we are, our ideas and preferences, and how we might be
influencing the research. In Stake's words, "All researchers have biases, all people have
biases, all reports have biases, and most researchers work hard to recognize and constrain
hurtful biases" (Stake, 2010, p. 174).
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CHAPTER 5
THE 2012 CENSUS IN CHILE: A CASE OF POLICY FAILURE

Every ten years, the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas,
INE), the organization responsible for implementing the census in Chile, is tasked with the
logistically complicated but clear mandate: count and characterize all the people who live in
the territory of Chile. Unlike what happened in previous decades with the censuses, and
contrary to the reputation of the country's statistics, the 2012 census was considered a failure.
Based on different sources of information—including interviews, news, and reports—
this chapter narrates the 2012 census case, emphasizing the elements that led to failure.
Throughout a detailed and dense description of the events, actors, and circumstances, the
narrative presents the complexity of the policy case, becoming the starting point for a more
in-depth exploration carried out in the following chapters.
The narrative of the case is organized in four stages. The first is Census Strategy
Change, which presents the context, reasons and characteristics of the methodological
change of the 2012 census. The second stage, Carrying Out the 2012 Census, is about the
implementation, identifying the difficulties and dynamics during the long enumeration
process. The third stage, Census Controversy and Evaluations, focuses on the polemic over
the quality of the data grabbed, the different evaluations performed in an atmosphere of
growing political conflict and technical controversy. The final stage, The 2017 Census and
131

INE Future Challenges, describes the circumstances that led to a new census in 2017, its
characteristics and the modernization challenges the INE is still facing.

5.1.

First Stage: Census Strategy Change
This first stage of the case focuses on the change of methodology to carry out the

2012 census enumeration. This section presents the context in which the census takes place
in Chile, its symbolic value, and the role of the INE in the country's statistics. Then, it
describes the circumstances under which INE authorities decided to change the census
methodology, the characteristics of the decision, and the reactions of different actors.
The INE and the Census
Historically the census has been a significant milestone for the country (Pinto, 2015).
Until the 2012, the census day was always a holiday, and all Chileans stayed at home waiting
for the "censista" or census taker. In a long, narrow and geographically diverse country, with
so many separated areas, the census has successfully reached the most remote places. The
spirit of census day is conveyed by stories of those who waited for the census taker, offered
them a tea, talked, met, or simply showed off the census sticker on the door that
demonstrated their house was already registered. As one interviewee put it, "It was almost an
honor to participate in the census, be registered and wear the sticker as registered."
The census represents a democratic tradition: no matter if you are rich or poor, if you
live in the city or the country, the State will seek ways to reach you, to know about you. In
the words of one of the interviewees, “The census has a particularity, it is the only time
where the State ‘in person’ knocks on your door and asks you who you are. I want to know
about you, your house, your flat.” In this way, for Chileans, the census was much more than a
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population count; it was a symbolic instance of citizen encounter, an expression of the
Republican idea—alluding to a sense of nationhood and pride in the form of government that
comes from the will of the people. As one of the interviewees explained:
It is like when you have the option to vote that day and that we are all equal. It does
not matter your income level; it does not matter who you are, it does not matter your
color, your vote and my vote worth exactly the same. That is the census, civic
education, and Republican culture!
Founded in 1843, the National Institute of Statistics (INE) is part of the ministry of
economy. Today the institute is responsible for more than 70 statistical projects of different
kinds, such as the Consumer Price Index, the National Employment Survey, social,
environmental and productive surveys, and large logistics operations such as the population
and housing census and the agricultural census (INE, 2020).
The United Nations6 recommends censuses every 10 years (UN, 2017), and so does
the Chilean law (Ley N.17,374, 1970). Given that the previous census was in 2002, the
following would be, and was, in 2012. According to the interviewees, for the INE, the census
is its most important task: the symbolic value, the logistical complexity of the enumeration
process and the importance of the data collected through the census for other statistical
products, and its preparation takes several years. By tradition, preparation for each census
begins on the same day that the previous census ends, representing ten years of preparation.

6

The UN’ presence is significant in Latin America. For demographics and censuses matters, the UN agency is

the Latin American Demographic Center CELADE (Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía), dependent on the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el
Caribe, CEPAL) whose regional headquarters are located in Santiago de Chile. Interviewees refer indistinctly to
these agencies, and for this study, CELADE, CEPAL, and UN are equivalent nomenclatures of the UN.
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As an interviewee pointed out: "The census is always the most complex operation in times of
peace. That’s the way it is, the preparation, the amount of resources, the mobilization of the
people is quite large."
In general, Chilean censuses achieved low omission rates, 2.1% and 3.1% in the 1990
and 2000 census rounds, figures below the regional average of 7.0% and 5.1%, respectively
(Mendez & Sacco, 2016)7. Also, interviewees recall good participation and citizen
commitment on Chilean censuses. Thus, even in the 1980s, during a dictatorship and deep
economic crisis, the census was carried out without political pressure and with high technical
standards. For the interviewees, the census is a task of the State, not of the governments in
power; it is a collective effort that should go beyond the partisan interests of the moment.
Consequently, the census was the clear expression of a meticulous and serious statistical
institution, a source of pride for all Chileans, and a recognized model for other surrounding
countries.
However, this story changed abruptly in 2012. With the slogan "more modern, safe
and professional" (Piñera, 2012), the census had a different enumeration strategy. Instead of
the traditional "de facto" census—a single day for the whole country, applied by trained
volunteers, and considering the residence as where the person slept—the new authorities of
the INE decided to run the census under the strategy, "the right to be censed" or "de jure,"
which enumerates people considering their usual place of residence through the work of

7

These figures are based on an indirect assessment comparing censuses figures with UN population projections.

More information regarding the omission rate in Latin America is available in Appendix N.7.
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employed, i.e. paid, specifically trained, professional interviewers, in a three-month period of
application.
From de facto Toward a de Jure Census
Both the literature and experts’ opinions agree about the multiple benefits of
migrating toward the de jure census methodology. This shift has been a trend throughout
Latin America, where in the 2010 decade only five out 20 countries in the region continue
performing a de facto census (CEPAL, 2014). The most important advantages of this type of
census are the concept, quality data, reduced risk and lower costs. Regarding the concept of
usual residency, instead of asking, "Where did you sleep last night?" the de jure census asks,
"Where do you usually live?" which recognizes the idea of citizen's rights related to the place
that they live, more than the random circumstances or sleeping there the night before
(CEPAL, 2014; Villacis, 2017b). Thus, this criterion better reflects the number of people
who inhabit a territory, since it considers who would be the real demanders of goods,
services, and public policies (Chackiel, 2009).
Another advantage is the better quality of the data collected. The old strategy is run
by volunteers, usually students, and public servants. INE and experts interviewed recall that
recruiting enough volunteers for the enumeration was becoming increasingly difficult for the
statistical organizations of the world; meanwhile, a de jure census hires professional
pollsters, who should receive better training and supervision, which also contributes to
obtaining a better quality of information (DANE, 2014; Villacis, 2017b).
The de jure census allows for a more controlled planning and monitoring process than
the de facto approach, promoting the identification and correction of errors in the
enumeration process (CEPAL, 2011). By having more time, this methodology allows to
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better face any kind of problems. To census a whole country in a single day could be
hazardous. Several problems may arise that may jeopardize the census operation, particularly
in Chile, which often suffers natural disasters such as floods or earthquakes. Experts
interviewed agreed that the de jure census operates over an extended period and, with that,
decreases the risks, and, if problems occur, there is enough time to face them.
Thus, the operational and logistical advantages of a de jure census stand are strong
(CEPAL, 2014), and different interviewees, experts, managers, and professionals agreed that
Chile should move toward a new census strategy, but that that transition should not happen
for the 2012 but the 2022 census. As stated by one of the high officials of the INE, "Chile
was transitioning toward a de jure census. This had been discussed within previous census
teams at the INE, and they decided that Chile was not yet prepared to move to a de jure
census at that time." Therefore, the INE had been preparing the census according to the old
strategy, with all of the instruments, methods, and logistics designed for a de facto type of
census. Moreover, at the moment of the decision (September 2011), the pre-census, one of
the most critical preparation stages—it allows for updating the sampling frame, and
organizing the logistics for the census day—was already in process (the pre-census took
place between March and October 2011) (INE, 2014a).
The government announced the new census via TV, radio, and newspapers as a
significant and highly positive change. The Minister of Economy proudly stated: "This is a
breakthrough in public policy. This change will allow us to have a better tool, which will
benefit every town in Chile, and all inhabitants of the country" (La Tercera, 2011). Besides,
the government stressed another argument in favor of the new census: it is cheaper and will
save significant resources. In the old census method, by decreeing a holiday on the census
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day, the country suffered economic losses of around US$200 million. Thus, authorities
argued that the extra cost of this census (hiring pollsters) was significantly lower than what
the country would lose for the holiday (7% of that amount); therefore, the new modality was
more efficient (La Tercera, 2011). Hence, the idea of a more professional and efficient census
fit in with a government that had declared itself of "excellence."
The Decision to Change
The decision to change the census methodology was made by a small group of the
highest INE authorities (Director Francisco Labbé and his closest advisors) and promptly
approved by the National Census Commission, without consideration of technical criteria or
participation of the INE specialists or high officials, who were merely informed about the
change. Interviews conducted revealed that INE managers felt overlooked in this decisionmaking process; this was the first instance of conflict between the new director and INE
officials. The interviewees recounted how surprising the decision was, and how shocking and
even offensive it was to be informed of a significant methodology change. An INE
interviewee describes:
And the truth is they just apprised us; they informed us about the decision, that is to
say: this is changed, it is a decision taken and it is taken. When they notified us about
this, they told us: it is a decision made by the President of the Republic.
The INE did not have previous experience in this type of census or any other logistic
operation of a similar scale. The census was scheduled to take place in April 2012, and the
change in the implementation approach was officially made in September 2011 (INE, 2011b,
2011a), so, indeed, INE interviewees declared there was not enough time to undertake pilots
and run the proper pre-tests (thus leading to adaptations of the process, the questionaries’ and
the organization) for the new method. Moreover, this inadequate preparation ignored the
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abundant recommendations regarding the necessary safeguards over a change of census
strategy (UN, 2008; Chackiel, 2009; CEPAL, 2011b). Regarding testing, the UN states:
[testing is] essential for countries without a long history of census and for those in
which fundamental changes in census methods are being considered. [...] Such tests
can give important information on the adequacy of the field organization, the training
programme, extent of respondent burden, the processing plan and other important
aspects of the census (UN, 2008, pp. 45–46).
The methodology changes not only meant that the census was carried out in more
than one day but also implied a change in the overall census strategy: planning, use of
cartography, monitoring systems, among many others. According to the UN, “Planning can
be regarded as the core of the census phases and the processes, it is most critical to the
completion of a successful census” (UN, 2016, p. 9). However, this census was not planned
adequately. The INE, specifically the census team in charge of this task, had only a few
months to change the entire census policy. For all professionals within the INE, the decision
to change the strategy was overwhelming. In the following excerpt, a professional of the
census team points out how significant the change was:
We were still working like stupid for the traditional [de facto] census, considering
how we allied with the ministry of education, how to recruit volunteers, how to train
the students, that is, we had thousands of ideas of how to do it better. And suddenly,
180 degrees to the other side! Not just 25 degrees, but 180 degrees!
Although the recommendations aimed to change the mode of the census for the next
decade, the interviews revealed the real reason for the change in census methodology at that
time, although not publicly recognized, which was the eruption of a social movement
unprecedented in the history of Chile. In 2011, college and high school students all over the
country were mobilized for a "free education, of good quality, and for all," accusing the
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structural problems of the prevailing educational market system (BBC News, 2011; WSJ,
2011).
Sebastián Piñera was the first right-wing president after 20 years of government
control by the center-left coalition and, therefore, represented a set of market-oriented
policies, developed during the dictatorship (1973-1990), and was under intense criticism.
Piñera was a focus of the social movement’s attack, and the information collected revealed
his government feared that political opposition might result in a lack of volunteers to perform
the census or even a boycott of the census. An interviewee refers to the political basis of the
decision:
The reason was entirely political, and had a cause: the youngsters were super
mobilized at that moment, and there was fear by the rightwing government of the
mobilized youngsters. Fear of bot being able to recruit them, train them, or that they
might use the census as a mechanism of force.
The student movement was, then, the main argument for the change of the census
strategy. Another interviewee, an INE Director's advisor, describes how they built the case to
change the census strategy:
It was the winter of 2011; the students' crisis begins, students marching on the street
every week. The base, the 75% of the census takers, should be students, therefore:
panic! We came to that meeting on a Saturday and said: look, we are facing this
situation, what do we do? What do we do? Let's do it, let's change the methodology;
the decision was political, but it had to be presented as a technical argument.
To recruit 500,000 volunteers was already a difficult task for the traditional census
team (who were developing strategies to ensure the number of census takers), and the social
movement was a real risk to the census’s success. However, this threat was not made explicit
as one of the reasons for the methodological change. Most interviewees, especially those who
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understood the complexities of censuses, quickly realized that the protesters were the actual
reason for the change, and that reason was considered legitimate. Thus, the paradox occurred:
everyone knew the main reason, but it was "the elephant in the room." An INE interviewee
refers to the situation:
Then Mr. Labbé said: well, you know, we are planning the census and we have some
problems, that we won’t get enough census takers, and therefore we have decided to
change the census type. He never spoke about the issue with the students at that time,
he did not mention it, but you knew the particular problem that was behind it [the
student movement], the problem was there!
There are different views about hiding the real reason. While some strongly criticized
the lack of transparency that affected the technical foundations of the decision, others
understood or even endorsed the idea of not exposing the cause, given the hectic political
scenario. Most actors understood the seriousness of the situation due to the strength of the
social movement–that had paralyzed the country–and the uncertainty about how or when the
social protests would resolve. Below, an interviewee describes the power of the social
protests:
The census was going to be in April of the following year, and suddenly they [INE]
said, no, they were going to change it. Then, of course, it was a tremendous shock, it
was incredible, but you didn’t need to look at the newspapers anymore [to understand
why]. That was it! That year high school students and college students were on strike
for six months!
However, more than to the methodology change, the significant criticism and
confrontations were about maintaining the initial date of the census in April 2012. Most of
the interviewees understood that due to the political circumstances, the census should be de
jure, but with proper preparation, and for that, the INE needed at least one more year. Thus,
there were several requests to modify census date, both from within the INE, experts, and
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from other organizations, but without success. The chief officer of the Latin American and
Caribbean Demographic Center, CELADE, pointed out at that time: “When we, as CELADE,
were informed that a census of de jure would be made, we thought that they were going to
postpone the census, but they said no” (CIPER, 2014a).
Moreover, the internal INE committee that analyzed the implications of moving to a
new census was emphatic in recommending a postponement, as one of the INE analysts
declared, "one of our main recommendations was to postpone it" since they needed time to
build a new strategy, make pilots of the questionnaire, etc. Likewise, the following words of
a UN expert describe one of the failed attempts to warn the director about the change of date
of the census given the complexity of the task:
Labbé finished making his comments about the decision he had already made but did
not say anything about the date. So, I asked him, are you going to keep the same date?
And he said: Of course, of course, the INE is very strong. Then I said: I don’t think
you can have everything ready for the change, it’s very difficult! He told me: No. And
the conversation ended. It was not a consultation, it was nothing, the conversation
ended there.
The de facto and the de jure census have significant differences in content, logistics,
and operations (CEPAL, 2011b; Chackiel, 2009), however even after census problems arise,
the INE Director insisted that there be no objections to the changes in methodology: "It was
demonstrated at the time that it was not necessary to conduct a pilot census because most of
the activities that were checked were already safeguarded, in particular, training, logistics,
testing of the questionnaire and the control system" (Cámara Noticias, 2013a).
Most of the technical arguments indicated the census should have been postponed,
and that such a decision had been made at other times in history (INE, 1982; Pinto, 2015), so
the question is: why was it not? Based on the information collected for this study, there are at
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least three explanations that conspired to prevent postponement. First, the personal
characteristics of the new INE Director, Francisco Labbé, who comes from academia: he is a
civil engineer, with a Master’s in economy (Chicago), and was Dean of the faculty of
economy and business at a private university (UNAB, 2010). Different interviewees agreed
Labbé lacked experience in public management, statistics, or public policy, and also that he
believed that the census was a much simpler task than in reality. Second, the eruption of the
social moment into Sebastián Piñera´s first government–in office for only a year and a half–
that did not want to provide public recognition of student protests for fear of acknowledging
political weakness. Finally, there was the matter of the INE managers who, faced with a new
rightist government, a new director, and authoritarian decisions—that resembled
dictatorship—did not dare to express their technical arguments more strongly out of fear of
dismissal.
Later, the chamber of deputies (2014), after running an investigation about the
decision-making process, referred in harsh terms to the lack of technical rigor:
The decision [census strategy change], was adopted by people who did not have the
technical qualification, nor had any type of technical input prepared by the technical
teams of the INE; therefore, it was not quantified, nor was the decision of the
methodology change and its consequences in the process of the census pondered
(Cámara Noticias, 2014 p.2).
Thus, in the context of the tensions inherent to a new government and new authorities,
the INE treated the decision on the 2012 census, made at the highest administrative levels
and without consultation with experts, as a fait accompli. This attitude of "moving forward"
was even more evident in the more distant regions of the country, given the high centralism
of the Chilean public administration, regional administrations tend to abide by decisions
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coming from the central level. The following quote shows the thought of a regional director
interviewed concerning the strategy change, where despite the lack of piloting and
preparation, he had to move forward:
I have to forget that I think it won’t work because if I do not manage it myself,
nothing happens. I have to convince myself of, well, this doubt. There are people in
Santiago who think it is possible, I will trust them, we will change the questionnaire,
it does not matter that we have not piloted it, I mean, these are intelligent people. And
that is the argument that I built, and under that argument, I say: I guess we are doing
this, then, and we are going to focus on finding the people we have to hire, we are
going to train them, and that’s it, here we go.
International standards emphasize the importance of planning each step of the census:
“Without such a programme, the census data when finally produced may contain many errors
which can severely diminish the usefulness of the results. If data are of poor quality,
decisions based on these data can lead to costly mistakes. Eventually the credibility of the
entire census may be called into question” (UN, 2008, p.32). However, the 2012 census
didn't have the proper planning process and therefore, few months before the enumeration,
the census team initiated the task of modifying instruments, creating monitoring systems, and
designing recruitment plans and new strategies for training. Those interviewees who were
involved, remember how difficult it was to adopt those challenges in such little time.
Running a census is a complex task that requires the coordination of various processes at the
same time, and making sure it is consistent, leading one interviewee to recount
dumbfounded: “We had to set up a whole machine to hire, recruit, train, assemble, get places,
and put together all the logistics involved from scratch, in three months! And with little
money!” And the following quote from an INE professional illuminates the coordination
challenges and complexity of a census:
143

The census project is that brutal, and big. It’s like, I think… actually those who do not
know censuses or have not participated in any census, do not really understand that
you are talking about a giant dragon with 25 heads … and every head impacts the
others.
The INE faced one more challenge: unreasonably high expectations. In line with the
idea of a government of excellence that installs a "new way of governing," and "we will
govern with the best" (Piñera, 2009), President Piñera tweeted: “2012 census will be the most
modern, safe and professional” (Piñera, 2012), and then declared: “this is going to be the best
census in the history of Chile," (La Tercera, 2013a) raising expectations and putting the
census at the center of political attention and the media. For many, those simple words ended
up politicizing the census. From that moment on, the census ceased to be the country's effort,
or an INE task, and became the “Piñera census.” It was a new political scenario, in the words
of government authority, “I think when Piñera said ‘the best census ever,’ they all [media,
political opposition] said the same thing, how best to obliterate this census? Then, it was
politically a cake [all too tempting].” Similarly, another interviewee comments on how
Piñera’s words broke a statistical tradition, “the best census ever … historically a government
prepares the census and the next government runs it; one prepares it, the next one runs, and
no one was ever saying such terrible things. That was a milestone political provocation.”

5.2.

Second Stage: Carrying out the 2012 Census
This second stage of the case focuses on the implementation process of the 2012

census, its characteristics and tensions. The section describes and analyzes the INE’s
numerous arrangements made to carry out the census under the new strategy and the several
complications faced given the short preparation time and lack of resources. It also delves into
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the operational and technical difficulties that occurred during the long census process, as well
as the conflicts within the INE, given the complications of achieving the proposed goals.
Preparing the Census
Despite the initial resistance in public opinion and among actors, the census was
carried out in 2012 under the new methodology. Given the scarcity of time to prepare, the
operating structure was not much different than previous de facto enumerations regarding the
organization, employing a top-down hierarchical approach, and going from the national level
down to the local. Thus, there was a national committee to coordinate and supervise all
census operations and regional, provincial, and communal offices. The INE was responsible
for census functions at the national and regional level, but at the commune and local level, a
census manager and a supervisor were responsible for the coordination and enumeration
operation (INE, 2014a).
Along the way, the implementation of this new census experienced several
difficulties, the first of which was a lack of resources. The new census methodology required
an additional 6,500 million pesos (approximately US$11 million by 2018), negotiated by the
National Congress8. However, INE managers, especially in the operations area, realized that
those additional resources were insufficient and poorly calculated, and they informed the INE
Director and head of census. However, INE authorities refused to request more funds from
the ministry of finance, which in practice meant that the entire census operation began with a
budget deficit of 2,800 million (approximately US$4.7 million by 2018). One interviewee

8

The law that regulates the public budget is discussed and approved in the National Congress in November of

every year for each of the State’s ministries and agencies (with programmatic details).
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commented on why the INE authorities did not request the missing resources: “there was no
money because they did not dare to ask for more financial resources." Likewise, another
interviewee recalled that the authorities did not want to admit that they were wrong in
calculating the necessary resources:
And the reaction at that moment was: ‘we already told the Minister the amount of
money needed; do you want us to acknowledge with Minister Longueira that we
made a mistake?’ [Ironic tone] And I looked at them and said: Obviously! Obviously!
And they said, ‘No! You have to fix it with whatever we have.’
The evidence collected showed that one of the more challenging tasks for
implementing of the census was the recruitment of census takers. The new approach required
hiring a massive number of people, in a short period, and all of this given the highly
demanding quality and transparency requirements of the public sector in Chile. One INE
interviewee explains the difficulty of the task: “just imagine what it is to hire 15,000. There is
nobody in the country that hires 15,000 people in a month. Not even mining projects are
capable of doing it.”
INE authorities, aligned with the idea of a “professional” census, decided to outsource
the recruitment and selection of the census takers to a private company, and the respected
firm Trabajando.com (laborum.com) took over. The government opened the application to
fill the 14,000 positions (censistas, local managers, and supervisors) with simple initial
requirements: be over 18 years old, Chilean (or permanent resident), and have completed
secondary education (Emol, 2012a).
The census team, headed by Eduardo Carrasco, estimated 14,000 enumerators needed,
but this number was the subject of controversy from the beginning by other INE officials.
Various interviewees recalled technical discussions with the director and the head of census
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on the number of census takers, considered insufficient, which was a risk for the census
operation. An INE official pointed out how they tried to warn the director about the shortage
of census takers; however, he took these warnings as political challenges: "We kept saying
‘but,’ and we told him that the people calculated were too few to conduct the census. But
Labbé believed we were boycotting the census. Still, we warned him!”
Among other things, pilot tests make it possible to evaluate the duration of the survey,
the workload, and the profile of the census takers (CEPAL, 2011a, p. 32). There was no time
to carry out the necessary operational and content tests as recommended, so the criteria for
estimating and making decisions did not have a technical foundation, which generated
several discussions within the INE. Another interviewee explained how, based on experience
in other operations and surveys of the institute, INE officials realized the number of censistas
was low and tried to alert authorities:
You calculate, first. I have questionnaire tests. How long is the questionnaire on
average? How long in rural areas? How much then is the burden that a regular person
can carry, in a day? And with that we should calculate. And we, even without having
the experience of census de jure, we said: this is not enough people. And this number
[initial 14,000] demonstrated later to be even less [than we had thought], because we
had no experience in this census.
However, these warnings were not considered at the time, and later reports confirmed
the shortage of census takers (Bravo et al., 2013; CGR, 2015b).
The salary of the census takers was also a much-discussed subject within the INE.
Some interviewees recount that the initially calculated wages were much lower than those
paid to the enumerators in other INE projects (around 30% lower), but after intense
negotiations, authorities agreed on a salary of 300,000 pesos (equivalent to US$530 as of
2018) per month for 40 hours a week. INE interviewees agreed that the wages were low for
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pollsters, and with this in mind, the risk that employees would leave census work for a better
job offer was higher. The amount of money offered also caused intense reactions in social
media, for example, this expression on Twitter, "A vulgar scam, work on the 2012 census.
Get out of here with your exploiter census thing!" (Aspe, 2012). However, from the
government, other arguments were occurring on wages. In the first place, this was the first
census that paid, and paid for a three-month work period; secondly, authorities argued that
hiring census workers would be a boon to the economy (La Tercera, 2011).
The government considered the application process successful; more than 310,000
people applied (mostly women) for around 14,000 jobs for all the communes all over the
country (Labbé, 2013b). According to the interviewees, the high number of applicants was
due, because they thought that the census was a one-day job, as was the case in previous
versions (Bravo et al., 2013). Although the Laborum company carried out the recruitment
process through the web page (also through municipalities), the INE was the one who
selected the applicants, causing a heavy administrative load for the institution. A regional
INE Director referred to the struggles with the selection: “at this stage there were problems
due to the numerous applicants and the short time to pre-select and train, so that the final
selection was not satisfactory" (Becerra, 2013a). Along the same lines, another regional
director reported, “there was no time to interview candidates and make a better selection,
especially of census takers. Local managers and supervisors were chosen by each communal
manager” (Villa, 2013). Likewise, an INE interviewee recalls the complications of the
recruitment process:
Such numerous details of administrative management were impossible to foresee in
two, three months. It also happened that, for hiring people, they tried to find someone
to outsource, and in the end, the only thing they could outsource was the recruitment.
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But the selection had to be taken over by the INE. Imagine what it is to process
14,000 contracts, make payroll for 14,000 contracts, who does that? The
administrative department of the INE, we say, well, our number varies [INE
employees], sometimes we’re 2,000 or 3,000, but 14,000! It was then that, for three
months, it was tough; the whole selection process was complicated.
The INE, through its central and regional offices, selected the applicants who fulfilled
the requirements and sent them an e-mail informing the training’s place and date (La Tercera,
2012a). One of the greatest strengths of the de jure census strategy is that, unlike volunteers,
hired pollsters are, by design better trained; moreover, given the relatively ample time
available, the censistas can correct, consult on doubts with their supervisors, and learn, and
thus collect better quality data (CEPAL, 2011b, 2014). Therefore, the training was critical,
and the INE managers knew it. The training was conducted by "cascade" or “train the
trainer” strategy, that is, the national trainers qualify the regional ones, who train the people
in charge of the communes, and so on until the very last supervisor and surveyor of the
territory. There were five days of training for the supervisors and four for the censistas, and
the training covered the following topics: operational functions, the questionnaire, and the
census survey (INE, 2014a).
Reports and interviews reveal that the training stage was not exempt from
complications, some of the most-mentioned by the interviewees were: i) low attendance at
training sessions. At the beginning of the process, few of the interviewers summoned to
training actually arrived. ii) Delay in materials. In some regions of the country, training
materials came late, which hampered the task of training. iii) Rushed training. The timeline
did not allow field practices. In addition, training days were reduced. iv) Census takers
waived half of their training. Some respondents declared this happened partly due to
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confusion over wages and working conditions, so once those working conditions were
clarified people abandoned the training. The following is how a censista described the
disorganization of the process to the press:
It was a very disorganized process, because they were going to inform us by email
and the emails did not arrive. They said we will start tomorrow, and it was not like
that, and now it is still disorganized because there isn’t any material, which is the
most important thing in order to start to census (Diario UChile, 2012b).
These difficulties triggered the alerts that things weren't going as expected, and the
INE initiated strategies to ensure the training of census takers, such as: to summon more
people to the training, to photocopy the training documents, to extend the hours of training,
running online tests, among others (Becerra, 2013a; Villa, 2013). A census team professional
stated, "we, with all the madness, made sixteen capsules [training modules], we did elearning, we did face-to-face training, we did, a thousand things." Different INE interviewees
agreed that despite difficulties in this stage–before the enumeration–they managed to solve
problems and deliver good training.
However, as time passed, many pollsters resigned, and their replacements did not
receive quality training; on the contrary, in the simple words of one INE interviewee, "they
hired others and did not train them well, so those guys filled out the census questionnaires the
way they wanted." Also, another interviewee alluded to the lack of preparation, but also to
the lack of commitment on the part of the censistas: “that [the whole census operation] was
so fragile, with zero experience in massive operations, with people who never in their life
conducted surveys, as well. And then they weren’t necessarily very committed [to the work].
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They did not necessarily know, then, bye! [They’re thinking] Let’s make it quick, cachai9?”
Later inquiries confirmed the exceptionally high turnover of pollsters, one of the major
operational problems of the census. All told, after the initial hiring stage, 35% more pollsters
were hired in addition to those initially trained (Bravo et al., 2013; CGR, 2015a).
Buttressed by the press and social media, claims of irregularities and lack of
organization in the census arose throughout the country. In the social imagination, the new
census had to compete with Republican ideas and the affection that Chileans had to the old
census conducted by volunteers. Most of the comments alluded to how things worked
compared to how they had worked in previous decades. The following tweets nicely
encapsulate this notion: "When you make a list of mistakes that Piñera made in his
government, don't forget the privatization of the 2012 Census and the destruction of a
tradition" (Callís, 2012), and “in what sense is it better to privatize and outsource a process
that, before, its own citizens were carrying out? What's Next? Pay for being a voting
volunteer?” (Jara, 2012). Alluding to the census slogan, one blogger said, "I liked my country
less modern, less safe, less professional ... it was a much more humane and much more
entertaining country!" (Bravo, 2012). Likewise, below are the words of a census supervisor,
who, in addition to denouncing the poor planning, illustrated the constant comparison with
the old type strategy census:
The 2012 Census started with a weakness: the training was very sudden, very rushed
and had few replacement people, compared to the previous censuses, in which the
volunteer census takers allowed you to cover several sectors if you managed people

9

The word “Cachai” is a Chilean slang. Literally means catch? or get it? or am I right?
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well. All these problems happened despite being remunerated today and therefore, in
theory, more attractive to participate (Almarza, 2012).
A few weeks after starting the census, the Director and the head of the census
informed teams throughout the country that, they should reduce the budget for supervisors
and interviewers by 10% (CGR, 2015a; CIPER, 2013f). The news fell like a bucket of cold
water over INE professionals since there were only a few days to start the fieldwork. Without
much time to react, the teams began to dismiss interviewers, adjust their budgets, and make
last-minute changes. An INE interviewee recalled the situation: “then, three weeks from the
census, 10% less! It was shitty! And we just have to push forward, see how the rhythm goes,
and see how we put it together." This sudden reduction in the budget generated ample tension
within teams and contributed to the loss of confidence in the census process, as another INE
interviewee recalled: “people had to be taken out of the training rooms that were already
selected, and they had to be sent to their home! Therefore, in April, we started with fewer
people, but the same data collection times!" Likewise, alluding to the meaning of censistas
for the success of the census, another INE manager said, "and they the [INE authorities] took
away 10% of the most valuable thing we had!"
The teams from the 16 regions of the country worked intensely to coordinate the
resources and activities needed for the census and to adjust to the new resource conditions. It
was a rather complicated logistics crunch that included having offices in each of the 346
communes of the country, transport systems adapted to the local geography, computers, and
telephones. Both the regional and communal reports and the interviews carried out show the
different strategies implemented by the INE teams to face problems and challenges in the
territories.
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The New Census Is Underway
On April 9, the enumeration process began throughout the country. Like all civic
tasks, authorities, organizations, and media were called to participate, to learn about the
questions and the new census system, to verify the identity of the interviewer, and finally to
"open your door" to the censista (CNN Chile, 2012). Thus, in the first weeks of enumeration,
the thrust of the news and information was educational and informative. For example,
regarding the census workers’ appearance, that they "will carry a credential with all their data
and also have a special outfit to distinguish them, for example, a blue backpack and a
breastplate of the same color" (Emol, 2012b). Also, given the security needs required, there
was a system to verify pollsters "by just typing the RUT [national ID number] document of
the census taker. [Citizens] will be able to know if the person belongs or not to the
institution" (GeoCensos, 2012). The topics that generated the most attention were the new
questions of the questionnaire, especially on the cohabitation of same-sex couples, inviting to
respond "#IDreamfor Chile that all same-sex couples declare it in this 2012 Census!"
(Iguales, 2012). The 2012 census was the first to ask this openly, and was a milestone in the
advancement of social recognition for the LGBTQ community in Chile (Movilh, 2012).
However, the calm did not last long; records show and interviewees confirm that a
few weeks later, numerous problems manifested throughout the country: a lack of census
takers, conflicts over salaries, and the resignation of pollsters. At the same time, there were
areas of the country with a shortage of censistas from the outset, especially in the north of the
country (where salaries are higher due to mining). The Antofagasta census, a city in the
north, was especially troublesome: "Lack of pollsters complicated the first day of the 2012
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census. Commissioners are training more staff to replace young people who deserted at the
last minute" (El Mercurio Antofagasta, 2012).
Salaries were another point of conflict at the first stage of enumeration. In some
sectors of the country, information about wages to census workers and supervisors was
confusing, with the applicants understanding that the payment was greater than what they
finally earned (Carrasco, 2013). This confusion provoked annoyance and public complaints
about the poor preparation of the census, as well as a change in the labor conditions when the
enumeration process was just beginning (Emol, 2012c). On this, a commune of the capital, a
public demonstration was held demanding an official response on salaries, with the slogan:
"no response, no survey" (Emol, 2012d). Likewise, a census taker aptly expressed her
annoyance at the changes in working conditions, and denounced the situation into the press:
“the advertising they did about the census was totally misleading: money cuts, change of
hours and working conditions. I find it terrible because, in the end, they take advantage of
one who is in need of work" (El Observatodo, 2012). In the following quote, an interviewee
explains some of the confusions about the interviewers' salaries:
The census had not started, and there were problems because, of course, they said that
there would be 300,000 pesos, but those 300,000 pesos were with a ‘bill.’ People
didn’t know that 10% of the bill had to be reduced, and also the training was not paid,
those two weeks were not paid10.
The authorities acknowledged the difficulties of the process, as stated by Flores, the
Undersecretary of Economy, “We are hiring about 14,000 people, and it is probably the most

10

The “bill” or "Boleta de honorarios" is an invoice of professional services fees. In Chile, the Treasury

withholds 10% of the value, which, depending on the level of the person's annual income, is returned or is part
of their year’s tax payment.
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important hiring event that has taken place in Chile in recent years, and when you have that
amount of hiring there may be problems of adjustments” (Diario UChile, 2012a). The INE
resolved these small strikes at that time, but the resignation of pollsters and coverage
problems would be a constant throughout the next months of data collection. Later, Director
Labbé delivered a statement describing some of the problems faced:
Already in the first weeks, we showed problems of resignations of census takers for
having to work on Saturdays and Sundays, and claims of some of them through the
media for having to work on those days, and at different times than normal, even
though it was clearly stipulated in the contracts. The census rotation was a continuous
variable throughout the data collection (Labbé, 2013b).
Unlike a de facto census, where all people are waiting for the census taker at home on
a specific day, a de jure census takes place over an extended period. Interviewees recall that
in the 2012 census, citizens did not know what day the census taker would visit their home,
nor the time of the day, and thus, the probability that the censista would not find anyone in
the home was higher, especially on weekdays. This situation led to a severe problem of data
collection. Simply, most people were not at home during office hours, as one interviewee
commented on: “they hired census takers paid from Monday to Friday during work hours.
But, how am I going to go if all the people are working? There are dormitory communes;
then you have to go on weekends.” Likewise, another interviewee alluded to the poor design
surrounding the working hours of the census, "It was an extremely long process because of
the bad design. You cannot perform the census from Monday to Friday from eight until six in
the afternoon!"
Although the schedules’ difficulty was contemplated, INE officials stated that they
never thought that it would be so severe. Once INE realized the magnitude of the trouble,
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they employed—all over the country—a complicated process to modify the contracts of the
census workers, changing the schedules of enumeration, reinforcing shifts on weekends and
after hours. The following quote from a regional INE manager explains the chaotic situation
and the type of arrangements made to face the challenge of enumeration:
And we realized that people were not in the houses and that we had to change
schedules. Thus, that was another failure. Given the contract terms, the mode was
mainly to hire for the daytime hours. But then at two weeks, you realize that it does
not work, that is, instead of having three [pollsters] during the day and one at night, it
should have been the other way around: one in the day, three at night.
Not finding people in their houses led to another complex enumeration problem: the
incorrect classification of houses with inhabitants as unoccupied dwellings. The specialized
literature and demography handbooks clearly warn about this problem of the de jure
methodology, offering a set of detailed recommendations to avoid mistakes (UN, 2008;
Chackiel, 2010). However, the situation of unoccupied dwellings or absent residents was
difficult. One INE manager explained the problem of misclassification as such:
Imagine the next thing, the guys [censistas] bang on the door but no one opens. Is it a
dwelling occupied with an absent resident, or is it an unoccupied dwelling? For
example, the guys started to census here, 'no, this one is empty,' and they put the
sticker on the house as being censused.
The problem was severe and was observed throughout the country. As a senior
executive of the INE put it, "there was concern about two very important indicators in a
census: the number of dwellings with absent residents—houses you see that have people who
live there, but they are not there—and the number of unoccupied dwellings" (CIPER, 2013b).
In many sectors of the country, if, after the third visit to the home, the interviewer did not
find anyone, they should have identified that house as "absent resident", they nonetheless
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bestowed the sticker on the house as an already censused household, generating another
error, because "this had the logic of census the de facto and not the de jure" (Villa, 2013).
The INE detected these problems and looked for different ways to correct them in what was a
complex process for recovering misclassified homes; as stated by an INE regional
coordinator, "for the recovery of absent residents the conditions of the contract were
changed, modifying the schedules and days of work" (Becerra, 2013b). Likewise, another
INE official recalled how difficult it was to manage the recovery task:
We were not prepared to face the problems of absent residents. The schedules of the
census takers and other field personnel were complex to manage. In particular, parttime enumerators, on whom lay the burden of recovering homes with absent residents,
had a low level of commitment to the census and showed the highest rates of errors
made in the questionnaires (Villa, 2013).
Despite efforts to correct errors, most of the energies were devoted to recovering
homes with absent residents, as stated by an INE official: “the recovery work focused on
housing classified as absent residents, but focused on houses classified as unoccupied
dwellings” (Jara, 2013). An INE interviewed from the census team recalled how difficult the
absent resident problem was for the enumeration process: “to not encounter people at the
house was very serious, because later there was the need to go there again, going back and
going back. That was fatal, fatal, fatal!”
When examining what caused this problem of household misclassification, the
answers point to a set of factors. To name the most mentioned by the interviewees: lack of
resources, insufficient supervision, inadequate training, and a dearth of pretests or pilots.
Regarding the resources, the budget cuts led to inadequate supervision, as a regional Director
explained, "the budget was already done, people were already hired, and although we had
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some flexibility to make some changes, we could not increase the number of supervisors we
needed." Likewise, another interviewee pointed out how the budget cut affected the
fieldwork, "Initially, it had been considered to have one supervisor for every five census
workers, but budget problems led to elimination the ‘second check' of censused dwellings."
The lack of pollsters led supervisors to put aside their work to support data collection, as
stated by the head of the census, "supervisors ended up collecting data from the census and
setting aside their functions" (Carrasco, 2013).
Some of the enumeration problems were due to insufficient training, as one expert
declared, “due to the short training, [and] perhaps the inadequate training the hired officials
had, they made mistakes like not identifying the difference between a house with no people
and an abandoned house" (Cooperativa, 2013a). Furthermore, later demographics and data
consistency analyses revealed more errors attributable to poor training (Arriaga, 2013; INE,
2014b).
Regarding the lack of proper preparation, INE interviewees agreed that several of the
assumptions they worked with were never adequately tested, and therefore, they could not
foresee these complexities of the de jure census. An INE high official stated this:
No pilot was performed; we should have done a pilot. Because the INE knows that the
non-sampling errors are the most complex, they make the data more complex, and
this census did not have a pilot, so we could not realize that the pollster could not
reach the goals. What if, instead of enumerating ten homes, it enumerated five?
Another factor that affected the enumeration was the type of contract the census
takers had signed. To simplify the contractual process, salaries of census workers were
monthly and not tied to goals or incentives, which, combined with other weaknesses in
monitoring and planning, generated unwanted incentives for pollsters (Bravo et al., 2013).
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Accordingly, an expert pointed out, “thus, various difficulties stemmed from the fact that the
census takers were paid a fixed amount and not per questionnaire, a customary practice in the
market of surveys” (Neupert, 2017b).
Along with the problems of data collection, the INE faced another challenge: pay the
censistas. INE informants remember that salary payments were delayed, resulting in rows
and rows of people visiting INE offices demanding payment for their work in different
regions of the country. An INE official remembers how difficult it was to face the pollsters
given their legitimate demands:
I happened to receive people, and people told me: you know? I did not come to the
office to ask for a free service, I came to ask for the work I did, I want them to pay me
for what I did ... and they were right!
Interviewees gave different reasons for INE’s struggles with the contracts and
payments of census takers. On the one hand, the characteristics of the Chilean public
administration, which has a quite strict regulation about hiring procedures, to ensure the
suitability of the person applying for the position, avoid nepotism, and the transparency of
the process (Rajevic, 2008). Interviewees agreed that these requirements, ultimately, posed
an additional difficulty in the process of hiring and paying census workers. The other primary
reason for the INE’s problems was its lack of experience and capacities to process a large
number of contracts, payments, and additional administrative charges. This led an INE
regional manager to recall, “there was also a lack of administrative personnel to support these
tasks and there were delays in the processing of payments, which led to some conflicts with
the censistas” (Becerra, 2013a).
Those who were part of the INE report how difficult it was to assume the enormous
administrative burden that meant to hire and pay thousands of interviewers, and to solve
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problems without the proper preparation or resources. All this added tension to a work
environment that was already quite degraded. As one INE official recalls, "the technical issue
was combined with the administrative issue, that the INE could not pay if there were 16,000
contracts! This, and other difficulties triggered the relationship [within the INE] to be
stressed."
A Long, Long Census…
In mid-June, after more than two months of data collection, the INE and the citizenry
understood that there was a lag in the enumeration–in some areas of the country more than
others– and in general, the problem was about the “absent resident.” These difficulties led the
authorities to define an extension in time, an additional three weeks of data collection
(Cooperativa, 2012). The zones with greater lags were those of the north of the country due
to the shortage of census takers, and the communes of the affluent neighborhood of Santiago,
where access for censistas was particularly tricky due to several reasons: people were not at
home, there was greater fear and resistance to open the doors to surveyors, condominiums
were difficult to access, and communities closed (Labbé, 2013a; La Tercera, 2012c). Time
passed, problems continued to accumulate, and the general feeling was of tiredness, and a
lack of confidence in the enumeration. Social media was filled with comments and jokes
about the census taker that never arrives, or questions of why, if their home had not been
surveyed, was a census "sticker" on their doors. The following story of a citizen through
social media expresses the feeling of that time,
In front of the TV cameras, many families reported that when they returned from
work to their homes, they found the sticker attached to their doors, under the
circumstance that nobody had surveyed them. And others literally said they were left
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waiting, like 'Penelope,'11 and as much as they hoped that someday some pollster
would knock on their doors, it never happened (Campos, 2013).
The resignation and rotation of censistas was a persisting problem throughout the
census process that distracted managers from their expected roles of supervision, quality
control and recording progress. Given the difficulties, many of the INE's efforts in the
territories concentrated on the basics, i.e. ensuring that there were enough pollsters to census.
The INE report stated, “The measures designed to control the censistas turnover during the
project were overtaken, as they [INE communal managers] were no longer just responsible
for replacing staff, but had to be in charge of constantly recruiting people” (INE, 2013b, p.
32).
The process was not exempt from vices and bad practices on the part of the
interviewers, and the social networks and the media spread that information with enthusiasm,
too, thus becoming a means of reporting and denouncing problems as they occurred. Some of
the irregularities detected were: not asking the questions correctly, marking the house as
unoccupied if there was no response to even one inquiry, asking only some questions and
"filling in" the others, inventing missing data or assuming information without asking the
questions, among others (Almarza, 2012; Emol, 2014; UAH, 2017). A census taker of the
Maule region admitted, "It was an open secret that the way we did it, it did not allow us to
finish and do a good job, so we had to resort to some vices to move it forward" (Emol, 2014).
Another pollster describes these “vices:” "When I went to a villa where all the houses were

11

This expression alludes to the famous character from the Greek tragedy The Odyssey, who, for many years,

awaits the return of her husband, Ulysses. Thus, the figure of Penelope has become an emblem of patience and
endless waiting.
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the same, I would skip those questions and fill in the answers, so it would end faster, and I
could go to lunch at my house" (Emol, 2014). Likewise, a census taker of the Valparaíso
region said that she observed lack of motivation in other censistas; noticing that for example,
they said, "'Why should I do this? If they are going to pay me anyway’ or 'I won’t walk there
anymore' [in areas where the houses are far away]" (La Segunda, 2014). A supervisor recalls,
“censistas in some cases were corrupt, and maybe they falsified data, they surveyed nonexistent houses, stuck stickers without taking into account housing and its inhabitants, or they
simply resigned due to such disorders" (Almarza, 2012). Accordingly, the following blog
lines reflect the questioning of the incentives of the census takers, the constant comparison to
the previous census modality, and the complaint about lacking supervision,
When economic incentives condition the primary survey of information, can we trust
that this information will be taken properly in all cases? In the previous census
modality, two interviewers were in charge of the census of each household, and the
key to the process was monitoring, not the stipend (Jara, 2012).
With social media on top of censistas and always vigilant, the teams at the regional
and communal levels were exhausted, and the relationships between different actors involved
became tenuous after months of a very grating census. The interviewees who participated in
this stage remarked that it was a long process, much longer than everyone thought. For them,
the most tiring tasks were the additional logistic efforts to census those habited dwellings and
to correct the errors of those classified as not occupied. INE interviewees remember that the
process was so draining, as stated by a regional INE professional, “In the de facto census you
prepare yourself, but it is a headache that happens to you in a day, it is 24 hours that you push
through. But this census is three months, three months and a half...”

162

Some interviewees also considered that the excessive duration of the census generated
more problems, specifically a loss of confidence and tiredness. In addition, in the case of the
de jure censuses, a longer enumeration period increases the probability of errors of "usual
residence," whether of duplication or omission (UN, 2008; Nathan, 2018). Knowing this, an
expert commented on her concern about the census extension and the effect on the quality of
data grabbed: “this was July, August 2012 and I almost had a panic attack, atrocious, my
God, how? There were four months enumerating, four months! Meanwhile, people moved.
Meanwhile, people had no idea!”
Not Reaching the Goal
As stated, one of the advantages of the de jure census modality is that it allows
correcting mistakes along the way (CEPAL, 2011b). For this purpose, the INE designed a
particular control and supervision system, the Census Progress Control System (CPCS). The
system observed the progress for each territorial office and therefore detected difficulties and
lags. Each territorial office inputs their advancement into the system on a daily basis, which
allowed the regional units and the central level to observe the progress concisely. An INE
official described the system and its advantages, “the system informed the director daily, all
the managers, the regional directors, all over the world, of the progress of the census, locality
by locality, commune by commune, region by region, the country." Likewise, but more
critical, the INE CEO commented on how they made use of the system information,
We began to hold weekly meetings where each area chief in Santiago explained what
percentage of coverage they had. We had daily reports from the regional offices, so
that in the face of a problem generated in a region, we could devise a solution and
distribute it throughout the country to the extent that it was applicable. We acted
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fairly agilely in that sense, but not with all the due transparency because not everyone
had access to information.
Effectively, the CPCS allowed the INE to monitor progress and correct along the
way. Also, it was through this system that the different teams (national, regional, territorial)
grasped that they would not reach the weekly and monthly census goals, as described by a
regional INE official: "We had this management control system, and there was a goal, and I
could see it: we are not going to reach this goal, impossible, I mean, at this rate of
performance of the country, impossible!" Likewise, another INE official remembered how
they quickly realized that the census performance was below expectations, "I started to
observe things and to have meetings with the heads of operations, and I realized that this
situation is going badly, beyond the point of return, due to the low rate of data collection."
The numerous difficulties in the data collection and the magnitude of the lag were
exacerbated by the lack of motivation, as described by one census team interviewee:
At some point they [the INE authorities] finally asked for help, everybody in the INE
came out; we [the census] were already with a level of delay that we could not cope
with and, besides, people were unmotivated, did not have the same commitment, did
not have the same faith, it was a problem. Saying, no, this is a mess, it is, and I do not
know what to do.
By order of the head of census, only a few in the INE had access to the CPCS. INE
interviewees pointed out that Labbé did not trust the INE executives and therefore kept them
out of census data collection. Thus, the enumeration progress was in the control system, but
not shared. One interviewee explained the layers of protection: “the information was entered,
but it was not reported to the operations people, because it was a data handled under seven
keys, which were managed by the head of IT, the head of the census, and the Director."
However, and contrary to these indications, the CEO shared her passwords with the INE
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teams so that “they [INE officials] could alert her [Alcérreca] daily to their analysis because
she did not have the technical knowledge" (Alcérreca, 2013).
Even with all the internal tensions at the INE and the restrictions on access to the
progress on reporting, the CPCS forewarned the INE over the country about the problems of
data collection. However, according to the interviewees, Labbé and Carrasco did not trust the
professionals that delivered the analyses. A high INE official recalled a situation arising from
this issue:
We had a meeting where the technical team delivered a report saying this is a disaster.
The report was elaborated at the beginning of July, projecting how we were going to
finish, and the projection says—because they know the matter—that we were going to
end up with a population of 15.7 million, which was a million short of what we
should have. The professionals revealed the existing differences in unoccupied
homes, dwellings, as well as dwellings with absent residents. Those 'who know'
[experts] at that moment said: 'This issue is wrong, some data does not fit, hey, this is
happening.' There was no fieldwork control; there was no supervision.
However, the interviewees reported that by then, the work environment in the INE
was already tenuous, and the tensions between the groups did not allow for better
information use. Also, the interpretations of the information were different: in the words of
one of the INE interviewees, "We [INE officials] would see the figures on a screen, and some
would feel satisfied, and others would be terribly nervous.” Thus, some interviewees
believed they could have done much better if they reacted on time to the alert information.
As an INE advisor interviewee explained: "I believe this, I insist again, if we had paid
attention to everything we were seeing, we should have corrected the actual operation of the
data collection, and we could have done it."
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There is abundant literature discussing mechanisms and statistical procedures to
address census omissions (Tacla, 2006; Chackiel, 2010; Mendez & Sacco, 2016). According
to international standards, to assess the census undercount and the quality of the data
collection there are two approaches: indirect (demographic analysis) and direct evaluations
(Post-Enumeration Survey or PES). The post-enumeration survey12 should be carried out
shortly after completing the enumeration by an independent team of highly trained survey
takers and based on probability sample methods that allow collation case by case (Chackiel,
2010; UN, 2017, 2010b).
Following recommendations, the INE Technical and Operations Sub-directorate were
in charge of running this survey. However, due to the problems of data collection, the lack of
access to information required for the survey, and the many tensions within the Institute, the
post-census assessment also suffered delays and several modifications. An interviewee from
the PES team remembered how hard it was to jumpstart the survey: "It was crazy because we
designed it. But then they [authorities] said no, it is not starting. Then, the President asked for
it, and they asked us to perform it in a month, but with a lag of many months." Likewise,
another interviewee recalled that the census team did not provide the necessary information
promptly to adequately design this survey,
I needed information that they [the census team] had to give me to do the design of
the post-census survey, and they did not give it to me, and they did not give it to me.

12

Post- enumeration surveys (PES) have the following objectives: to assess the degree of coverage during

census enumeration, to examine the impacts of coverage deficiencies, to grab data for future censuses and
surveys and to examine the characteristics of missing persons on census enumeration. In addition, the under- or
overcount are the bases for adjustment factors for further population estimations. Depending on the design and
characteristics, the PES may address one or more of these objectives (UN, 2010b, 2017).
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And later, [by the time they did] the survey was poorly done because it was done just
to get by.
The INE implemented the survey four months after the completion of the census,
which technically meant that the survey was not useful for measuring the census omissions,
as it was applied with too much lag, contrary to international standards. In the words of an
expert, "It was very late, and I don’t know, I mean, it did get done […] and it did not work
for the purposes that were expected."

5.3.

Third Stage: The Census Controversy and Evaluations
This third stage of the case points to the heart of policy failure and its convoluted

nature. This section describes the reactions, debates, and accusations unleashed when the
census results came to light. Given the controversy and confusion over the census data, there
were various inquiries to assess the data's quality and usability, the legal and political
responsibilities for the errors, and administrative irregularities. In a climate of disagreement,
conflict and accusations characteristic of policy failure episodes, the polemic over whether or
not the census was a failure, who says it was, under what criteria, and who are to blame,
lasted a long time.
The Census Results and the Communication Game
The enumeration started in April 2012, and in some areas of the country, it was not
completed until the end of July 2012, a period of almost four months, much longer than
planned (INE, 2014a). However, once the census was completed, the government presented
preliminary results as a great success, claiming 98.5% of the country's homes. Minister
Longueira proudly declared, “[the 2012 census] elevated the Chilean census internationally,
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with a methodology according to the times we live in, and this allows for better information
to design public policies to accommodate Chileans for the next ten years" (La Tercera,
2012b). The announcement also emphasized the “historical coverage,” with low omission
rates, much lower than other countries in the region (La Tercera, 2012b). Days later, the INE
launched preliminary census results—manual counts of housing and population delivered by
the census takers—announcing that the number of Chileans was an estimated 16,572,475
habitual residents (INE, 2012; LT, 2012).
These announcements ignited the spirits of the INE managers and experts, because it
was not clear how the number of Chileans was estimated. Although the 2012 was a
population and housing census and censistas visited households, in a population census one
of the essential features is the individual enumeration (UN, 2008, 2017), therefore reporting
coverage at the housing level leads to confusion. Likewise, an opinion piece expressed: “a
census without counting people is like playing soccer without goalposts […] the omission is
calculated based on people and never based on housing, which is the estimate of coverage
referred by the INE Director, the Minister and the President” (Mayol & Azócar, 2013). These
figures increased the already existing suspicions about the data quality.
About hearing these initial results, one expert interviewed described his reaction, “so,
was this the count of people actually counted or was it already an estimate? That is, it seemed
strange to me because the estimate takes months." Indeed, the processing of census data
requires a complex editing and estimation procedure to address both content and coverage
data problems (CEPAL, 2011a). Specifically, this involves developing a series of analyses,
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tests, and adjustments ranging from correction of simple content errors (such as misreporting
age) to missing population estimates through very specific statistical designs.13
Interviewees recall that these figures were only the beginning of several technical
disputes over the information delivered. The supervision system showed that 15.8 million
were registered; but this was not the figure disseminated to the public, because it exposed
coverage problems. Then, under the argument of more transparent communication, the INE
published that estimate, but without saying so14. The discussions about what to present and
how to do it were rough, so the INE’s CEO explained, “Do I have actually registered 15.8
million or do I have registered 16.6 million? There begins the discussion of what figure it is
and how it will be delivered. And there the technical team no longer participated: it was
marginalized” (CIPER, 2013b).
Authorities operated under the assumption that there was a certain percentage of
absent residents, and therefore, it was possible to estimate the missing population. However,
at the time, no one knew the methodological criteria for making these estimates. According
to INE interviewees, everything happened "between four walls." The absence of technical
discussion and lack of transparency led the entire INE to suspect that "census data was being
cooked."

13

The evaluation of content includes: evaluation of the age declaration, analysis of database records, analysis of

the internal and external consistency of the data, monitoring and assessment of the quality of data capture and
codification, and the application of specific census consistency statistical packages, as well as countries’ census
experiences (Bankier, 2007; Chipperfield et al., 2017; Thorvaldsen, 2006).
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The population actually censused reached 15,758,929 but the INE published that it was 16,634,603 that is,

875,674 people corresponding to the estimated and imputed population (INE, 2013a).
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There is still a spectrum of positions on why the INE communicated or handled the
numbers in the way they did, even knowing it wasn't the correct way. For some interviewees,
it was because Labbé wanted the best census. So, said one interviewee, “then why lie? That
is above my understanding, I swear! That's why I tell you that it is pure human stupidity of
egos because there was no reason to lie." For others, it was a communicative awkwardness,
as another interviewee said, “what was clumsy is not having explained that this is an
estimation, that is if he had said: look, this is the census, this is the estimate of absent
dwellers and this is my estimate." For another group of respondents, the number adjustment
was framed as a communication strategy to make the data easier to understand, as stated by a
Director’s advisor, "that number, nobody ever doubted that it had to be given, it was the way.
How you deliver the data so that people understand. It is how you deliver the data and
perhaps associate information so that it is [perceived as] correct." Building on this, another
interviewee declared, "I think it was simply a mistake of appreciation. Sometimes you
simplify things too much to the public, because you presume that people will not understand.
It can cost you dearly." However, later, the head of INE's department of social studies
declared,
Mr. Labbé made the decision not to make the difference between the census
population and the imputed population transparent despite having been warned on
countless occasions that this had to be done, even despite receiving a memorandum
with a recommendation from the United Nations, so it cannot be said that it was not
known (Cámara Noticias, 2013b).
While that discussion was only about the initial figures of the census, data processing
was done in the following months, and with that, there were even more issues. The
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processing included an optical reading of the questionnaires, generation of the databases, and
a series of subsequent corrections, estimations, and analyses (INE, 2014a).
After months of processing the information and various conflicts and technical
disagreements within the INE, the government presented the final census results in a colorful
ceremony with the highest authorities (LT, 2013). Again, the stamp on this presentation was
that this was the best census in Chile’s history Conscious of the poor quality of the
information and errors in data presentation, some INE high officials attempted to prevent the
presentation of the census results, and mainly to prevent the President from participating in
that ceremony, but they were not successful.
The days following the presentation were filled with subsequent corrections and
addenda to the census. In the opinion of INE managers and experts interviewed that was a
clear signal that the analyses were not well conducted or guarded. The census results had
numerous and very grave technical errors: absent dwellers included in the number of those
actually registered (CIPER, 2013a); the fertility rate was poorly calculated (González & Roa,
2013; Alcérreca, 2013); a high male omission rate that could not be explained due to
demographic reasons, among others (Arriaga, 2013). Alluding to the inconsistency of the
data, an opinion piece sarcastically pointed out: "The INE took a ‘photo’ to Chile and came
out a strange combination of German fertility, the proportion of men from countries at war
and the population of La Florida [commune of Santiago] 11 years ago" (Mayol & Azócar,
2013). Some of these problems were detected by the INE departments of demography and
social statistics, and also by specialized analysis, such the renowned international
demographer Eduardo Arriaga, who even without knowing he analyzed the database
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containing imputations, warned of severe data inconsistencies (Arriaga, 2013; Paulsen,
2013).
The “Letter” Episode
Everything that happened during the previous stages of the census and its subsequent
processing "behind closed doors" had left a deeply divided INE with easy-to-identify
sides. On one side were the Director, his advisors, and the head of the census; on the other
stood the department heads supported by the "INE CEO" (this latter was also Director's
advisor). Interviewees commented that there was an atmosphere of distrust, heated technical
discussions, and much strife in the organization. One of the INE manager interviewees
explained the origin of the dispute:
Labbé always said that we wanted to boycott the census […] He never understood
that there was a professional, a technical question here, it was a matter of protection,
and that is, it was a matter of minimum professional responsibility, which was what
happened.
Additionally, there was a leak of census data to the press—presumably done by
Labbé's advisors—which ignited the atmosphere even more, because for INE officials it is
extremely serious given the statistical secrecy. Thus, the leakage problem, and the census
results—with all the errors and the complicated delivering to the citizens—generated an
intense dispute within the INE that ended up with the firing of the head of the technical area,
Marcela Cabezas, who according to different interviewees, is a woman of reputed strong
character and highly respected for her technical knowledge. This situation triggered the
reaction of the INE's leading officials, who wrote a letter to Labbé and leaked it to the media,
denouncing severe problems in the census information delivered and raising the alarm about
the management of the INE. The high officials claimed, "We express concerns about his
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[Labbé] conduct in command of the institution, we've experienced a real setback in handling
technical issues" (Radrigan et al., 2013).
The letter is an expression of a workplace embroiled by a lack of respect as well as
technical arguments that finally erupted. In the words of one of the signers of the letter
interviewed: “the goal behind the letter, the goal we had, was to safeguard or try so that the
institution was not affected regarding its credibility, that was what we were looking for."
Likewise, another high official of the INE explained, “and the departure of Marcela triggered
the letter, not even because of the census issue, but we, the eleven [signatories], worried:
what is going to happen with ‘the technical’ within the INE?” Different INE interviewees
agreed on the intent of the letter since the greatest preoccupation was the INE's leadership
and the threat to the technical quality of the INE. As indicated by an interviewee, the political
motive of the letter was to draw political attention and hopefully cause changes from the INE
management, as stated by another interviewee, "because what they expected with that letter,
and that is why they released the letter, was to shake up the economy ministry to get Labbé
out." It is necessary to recall that the census issues (which would explode a few days later)
were not the focus of the letter, as one of the signatories of the letter wanted to make very
clear,
But there is something that people do not know, to tell the story precisely: we wrote
this letter because it was already ‘a mess.’ We had no idea that they [INE authorities]
had lied in the census. About the census we found out later. We did not ‘create the
scandal’ because of the census data, but because of the problems of internal
management.
Despite their agreement, many INE managers and high officials who participated in
the meetings did not dare adhere to the complaint and to sign the letter for fear of being fired.
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As expressed by an interviewee outside of the INE, "I mean, all those who signed knew they
were putting their career at stake, but we were trying to protect the technical autonomy that
an institution like this must have." Other INE professionals were extremely upset with the
letter because, as the old saying goes, "dirty clothes should be washed at home." For a few,
the letter revealed things that should have been resolved within the institution, and those
things published damaged the prestige of the INE.
Based on the evidence in the case, the letter did not meet its objectives. Later, when
the controversy broke out, it came to light that Director Labbé dismissed the letter and
attributed it to "internal struggles and animosity toward him from the INE teams" (Sáez,
2013), and therefore, the minister of economy did not react to it. A political analyst explained
the authorities’ reaction to the letter: “Labbé told the government that it was an almost
emotional dispute over having fired Marcela Cabezas, INE technical Sub-directorate. Such
an explanation made sense to the executive branch, and they allowed Labbé to continue
doing his job” (Sáez, 2013).
The Accusation of Data Manipulation and the Eruption of the Media
The letter was only the first step and did not create as much of a stir as might have
been expected; instead, a larger controversy about the census broke out days later when
Mariana Alcérreca, advisor to the INE Director and considered as the CEO of the INE,
decided to reveal the seriousness of the situation at the INE through a prestigious
investigative journalism newspaper:
I tried to give all the possible alerts within both the institution and the ministry of
economy, and they did not listen to me, and I have come to the conviction that the
truth has to be known. Because the INE is a technically autonomous institution, which
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houses a heritage of great value for the design of all public policies of the country
(CIPER, 2013b p. 2)
The accusation was brutal. The heading of the newspaper exclusive was: “INE
Director might have manipulated the 2012 Census figures” (CIPER, 2013a), followed by:
"Mariana Alcérreca: In the 2012 Census, yes, there has been manipulation" (CIPER, 2013b).
These articles unleashed the polemic of the census, generating an endless string of news, and
provoking diverse and heated reactions.
The statements to the press by the INE Director’s advisor represented a breaking
point. Alcérreca herself and several other interviewees recounted the different failed efforts
to warn of the technical problems that the census was facing: first, numerous conversations
with the INE Director Labbé and the head of the census Carrasco; then, meetings by the INE
with the central government (the chief of staff of the ministry of economy) to warn about the
poor quality of the census data and the risk of announcing that truth to the public. As noted,
those efforts to prevent the announcement of doubtful census results were unsuccessful.
The press investigation disclosed abundant information about the census process and
its irregularities, and in particular, about data imputation that happened behind closed doors
and with no precise technical foundations, applied by Labbé and close collaborators.15 It was
already clear for several actors that the INE was suffering some institutional crisis, but most
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Among the methodologies to overcome census coverage problems, there are some that estimate missing

population or other missing information by using "donor" data. One of the methods currently used is the
Nearest-Neighbor Imputation Methodology (NNIM), which is a complex imputation technique that extracts
data from the closest similar neighbor to replace missing information (UN, 2010a).
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of them learned about the census data problems due to this press report. As one interviewee
recalled,
At that time, it was not even known, the INE's technical teams did not even know that
they [INE authorities] were lying. No, all that level of detail, the estimations and all of
that, nobody knew! They suspected, but we did not know and many of the things we
found out, well, almost everyone found out through the reportage. That is, people
suspected that things were going badly, but not with that level of detail.
As with the letter, opinions on this matter are diverse. For some actors, the press
report was an act of desperation at the threat of inadequate and irresponsible management,
and particularly about secrecy concerning the census data handling. In that way, many
understood and even justified the decision to go out to the press. An interviewee alluded to
the difficult position in which the INE CEO was placed: “sooner or later Mariana knew that
the scam of the data was going to be disclosed and they were going to ask her: why didn’t
you tell us? She was between the rock and a hard place.” Another interviewee declared, “the
officials did everything possible to get out in the best way, but there came the point where
apparently there was no other way out." Likewise, another interviewee of the INE comments
about the crossroads of the moment:
I believe that extreme conditions require desperate decisions … because I told the
director: director, this question does not go over here, and not only did I tell him this,
the whole team told him, and he still made the decisions he made. So, you say: how
long should we wait?
Alternatively, several interviewees are grateful for Alcérreca and her denouncement.
They consider her brave as expressed in the following quotes: “then when Mariana writes
this, and for us, it is a relief, someone understands us there, someone speaks for us. She is the
´Wonder Woman.´”, and “She finally immolated herself for a greater good.” So too, in the
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following quote, another interviewee justified Alcérreca’ action because it emphasized the
importance of public institutions:
I think the situation warranted it, because such was the technical and ethical
commitment of the people who worked at the INE. That we knew, we knew, and in
that, I included myself, that a bad job does not [only] affect people. It affects the
institution. People pass, but the institutions are those that remain.
Other actors, those close to the political right, perceived the public denouncement in a
vastly different way. They believed that Alcérreca betrayed Labbé and Piñera's government
(she was officially Labbé’s advisor), and they also felt the accusation was a political act, a
plot to discredit the "Piñera census" and the management of the ruling right. For some actors,
the indictments that went out to the press were part of a larger scheme to contribute to the reelection of Michelle Bachelet in 201316. When Labbé resigned, he stated, "I do not doubt that
there are political reasons disguised as technical aspects and I am prepared to defend myself"
(Diario UChile, 2013a); along the same lines, a Labbé advisor interviewed showed his
conviction that this was a plot against Piñera and nothing else:
I believe that there was a plot, a political plot to damage the census, to harm Piñera
and that’s what it was. And I confirmed it later, that’s why I tell you it was true. I
talked with certain people and they explained to me that the strategy was actually to
destroy the census to beat Piñera. It was as simple as that.
Likewise, another interviewee, a director's supporter, pointed out the combination of
the betrayal of the right-hand director with the political plot for electoral purposes:
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In Chile, currently, the presidential term is four years without re-election in the following period, but possible

at the subsequent one. This explains the particular situation that the last four presidential terms correspond to
two presidents alternately. Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010), Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014), and then again
Bachelet (2014-2018) and Piñera (2018-2022).
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There are two factors. One, a small internal betrayal by a key person attached to the
director, which was Mariana Alcérreca and, on the other hand, everything that an
electoral year entails, cachai? It is destroying a public policy to get an electoral
benefit.
Some interviewees refer to the "political plot" or "conspiracy idea," as well as other
explanations of a political nature. As will be seen later, these political explanations continued
for quite a long time. However, most respondents disagreed with these ideas. A former INE
high official emphasizes how ridiculous the boycott hypothesis was:
No one at the INE, no one, wants to make something they do fail. No one. In other
words, for them [INE officials] the census is a party, it's such an important event, they
feel they own the country in one day, that's an event that marks them for the rest of
their lives, so there's no one in the INE that wants to make the census fail, not because
it was organized by Piñera or because it was organized by someone else, no, no one!
The mere idea of manipulating data in the INE would have been considered crazy,
something impossible to believe given the history of technical rigor and probity. However,
when the complaint about the altered census data arose, experts and public opinion didn't
reject the idea. This begs the question, why? In part was because regular citizens were aware
of numerous problems in the enumeration process; but also because the complaint coincided
with other data problems of the INE and government agencies, in particular the polemic with
the CASEN survey of poverty measurement and the questioning of the CPI figures (CIPER,
2012b; El Mostrador, 2012, 2013a; La Segunda, 2013a). Consequently, given the recent
history, the academic community wasn’t surprised with the census denouncements; this is
what one specialist claimed:
The fact is grave because it happened after several questions about the National
Statistical System, such as the results of the CASEN survey, the measurement of the
CPI and the splices in the employment figures, which ended up generating distrust in
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the national indicators […]. and yet given the circumstances that Chile had always
been respected for the quality and seriousness of its official figures (Sanfuentes,
2013).
Likewise, alluding to the arrogance of the Piñera government and the desire to “being
the best,” an analyst commented: "They [the government] began to modify all the
instruments and have wasted everything: the census, the CASEN, the employment figures,
everything!" (Jimenez, 2013a). Along the same lines, the prominent economist José de
Gregorio reacted to the census problems by pointing out: “this [the census problem] came
with the history of the CASEN, in which there was a data presentation that was not very
transparent, methodological doubts, decisions of doubtful validity, some manipulation of
results” (Emol, 2013). Social networks also echoed this sense of damage to institutions,
“Piñera specializes in destroying institutions. He began with environmental institutions and
continued with CASEN, SII, INE and SERVEL” (Lupin, 2013), another tweet stated, “the
Labbé management in INE has the seal of this Government. Extreme arrogance, contempt for
existing institutions, sense of impunity” (Gumucio, 2013).
Assessing the 2012 Census
Based on these accusations, the government asked for the resignation of Labbé and
his collaborators, and immediately ordered an inquiry by a national commission of
independent experts in charge of analyzing the methodological and institutional issues related
to the census and its results. A characteristic of policymaking in Chile is the existence of a
tacit and robust alliance between expert knowledge and political power, particularly with the
president (Olavarría-Gambi, 2016). Consistent with this approach, the formation of expert
committees has been a common practice in Chile over recent decades. Governments have
convened panels of experts to advise, evaluate, or formulate policies on education,
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transparency, pensions, childhood, among many others (Aguilera, 2009). It is considered an
honor to be a member of one of these committees. The specialists work pro bono, and
although the results of the commissions have never been binding, they’ve always been valued
technically by governments and appreciated by the citizenship. This commission of inquiry
was the first of several investigations and evaluations of the 2012 census, which will be
detailed later.
In the midst of the political and communicational crisis, the undersecretary of
economy Tomás Flores and the incoming INE Director Juan Eduardo Coeymans summoned
commission members. It was constituted of five data experts from both the government and
externals, which included: a researcher in data analysis from the University of Chile, a
researcher of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the coordinator of the
demography area at CELADE, the head of the social observatory division of the social
development ministry, and finally an analyst from the housing and urban development
ministry. Two of them had participated in previous public policy commissions (CIPER,
2013d). The composition of the commission did not seem to be a problem at the time, on the
contrary, as in other times in Chilean history, the government announced the names, and the
experience of each one was valued. However, as will be explained later, when the results of
the inquiry came to light, the commission was criticized and discredited.
The primary task of the commission was to examine the quality of the data collected,
and for that, they worked exhaustively, running sundry tests, gathering testimonies, holding
hearings with the INE officials, and documenting the process and results. Given that the
census databases were not yet available, the experts initiated the inquiry process by
interviewing those involved in the formulation and implementation of the census. The
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members of the commission interviewed for this study commented on how shocking it was to
uncover the massive amount of census problems. One member recalled, "It was a thing that
they [INE] never imagined, the dimension it had. The moment we started talking to people,
the lid come off the pot, and it was so frightening." Another member commented,
The moment when we realized that this was indeed a significant issue, it was when he
[the head of the census] basically told us: ‘I arrived at my house late, about ten
o'clock at night and saw in the control system that lack of coverage. The fallout was
coming…’ for what he told, finally, was all poorly planned.
After three months of inquiry, the commission determined the census had “serious
problems” in essential aspects of this type of instrument and recommended not to use the
data for official public policy purposes. The report (2013) pointed out:
The omission rate of the population is conservatively 9.3%, which is three times those
obtained in recent censuses in other countries in the region. In a fifth of the
communes, the omission rate would exceed 20% because, in them, a concentration of
factors that cause coverage problems occurred […] The problems described seriously
compromise the achievement of the main objectives of the census, which is to count
and characterize the population and housing at the country level, regions, provinces,
and communes in urban and rural areas (Bravo et al., 2013, pp. 2–5).
One of the most problematic issues that the commission found was the
misclassification of occupied housing as unoccupied, which led to several inconsistencies
with the pre-census and the projections of population growth. The INE authorities tried to
correct this problem through the imputation of unoccupied housing (and then households and
persons in a similar fashion) with the procedure relevant to non-responding dwellings, which
is a separate situation, and wasn’t applicable nor an accepted practice (Bravo et al., 2013).
According to interviewees and later inquiry reports, they applied a “version” of the nearestneighbor imputation methodology NNIM (UN, 2010a), which in practice meant that more
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than 200,000 households and nearly 800,000 people were “cloned,” that is, all household
data was replicated to fulfill the missing dwellings.
The investigation also revealed the magnitude of the census implementation
problems. Training was supposed to be conducted under the “cascade approach,” where
supervisors and full-time enumerators received five days of training and part-time
enumerators three days. Despite the planned replacement of 20% of enumerators, the
turnover was higher than expected, and there were several local reports about troubles in
hiring new interviewers. Records show that nearly 26% of the enumerators did not receive
any, or merely partial, training (INE, 2013b). Another issue related to the miscalculation was
that initially there were an estimated 14,000 enumerators, but that number ballooned to over
17,000, which generated administrative burdens for the INE. This irregularity was also
another signal of the difficulties in the enumeration process (Bravo et al., 2013).
As a result of the inquiry, the experts identified some elements that might have
affected the census implementation: poor coordination between different areas of the INE,
inadequate estimation of the cost of the new method, poor training, high turnover of
interviewers, a lag in progress reports, sudden budget reductions, and a misuse or neglect of
the supervision system, among others (Bravo et al., 2013). All this and other elements
detected created a litany of institutional, organizational, and local challenges to running the
census consistent with the initial plan.
However, the most controversial conclusion of the inquiry was that the census data
was not suitable for policy decisions, and thus endorsed a plan to repeat the census in a
reduced format, which sparked a series of statements throughout the entire political and
academic spectrum. Reacting to the results of the inquiry, the new INE Director declared: "I
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expected a tsunami, but not of this magnitude” (El Dinamo, 2013). For all the interviewees,
the results of the investigation were surprising. Most INE officials knew that the census had
many problems, but they never imagined the conclusions would be so drastic. An INE
interviewee told how shocking the investigation results were:
The people of the INE expected the census to have problems; they expected that at the
communal level to have complex problems in some areas, and that indeed there was
going to have to be a way to rescue some information … But when the results of the
report came out, it was so dreadful. We were stunned because it was shocking. It
ended by saying there isn’t an INE anymore.
INE officials knew the census had several flaws. For most of them, the data
imputation mechanism and the lack of transparency were the critical points, and what raised
the most suspicions. Other interviewees acknowledged the significant coverage problems,
and they expected the investigation to identify them. However, no one expected such a stark
and cutting conclusion. Why was it so excruciating for the INE? An interviewee explained, "I
don’t think anybody at the INE expected that the commission was so dreadful, nobody. We
all realized weird things in the census, but nobody expected the commission to be like that,
so drastic!” Likewise, another INE professional described the paling of his personal concerns
to what the INE was facing: "I almost fell apart, because I thought that they were going to
say that I had a huge omission problem and the whole story, but at that point, I did not know
that the whole database was bad."
The Forgiveness Episode
The report's findings of the recommendations of the commission were strongly
critical, so much so that even President Piñera himself apologized to the country: "Indeed
mistakes in planning and execution were committed in the 2012 census. I want to humbly
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apologize to all Chileans for all those mistakes" (CNN Chile, 2013). The President also
declared his annoyance with the errors: "when I was informed of these errors I felt the same
annoyance and the same indignation that millions of Chileans have felt throughout the
country" (CNN Chile, 2013). Piñera’s apology marked another milestone in the case, and
ended up deepening the idea of a failed census, and hindered subsequent attempts to rescue
the data.
The idea of policy failure during the first Piñera administration is ironic. This was the
first right-wing government after 20 years of left-wing coalition administrations, and Piñera’s
political motto was: “24/7” (to work to improve the efficiency of the country). Likewise,
many of the arguments to overthrow the previous coalition focused on policy mistakes that
occurred during the Bachelet administration, and most especially the failed policy of
TranSantiago17 (Olavarría-Gambi, 2013, 2018), and the failures in the management of the
2010 earthquake and subsequent tsunami (CIPER, 2012a). Thus, from a political stance, the
failed census is one of the deepest wounds of the first administration of Sebastián Piñera. It
points at the very heart of a "government of excellence."
Consistent with the idea of policy failure as eminently public, the results of the
experts’ commission echoed throughout the national and international press. Numerous
reports, interviews, and debates about the failed census ran during the following months.
Some of the national newspapers headlined: the census is “the TranSantiago of Piñera" (El
Mostrador, 2013c), "La Moneda [Government Palace] falls ’knock out’ with the death

17

TranSantiago was a massive urban transportation reform implemented in 2008 in the capital city, deemed as a

policy failure.
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certificate of the "best census in history" (Jimenez, 2013a). Likewise, the international press
headed: “The failure of the best census of history” (BBC News, 2013b), “Chile may annul
flawed census” (BBC News, 2013a), and “What is up with Latin American censuses? Chile
may annul 2012 census after it skips 10% of population” (IBTimes, 2013).
Similarly, the voices in the country also harshly denounced what happened with the
census; for example, an opinion leader commented, “Fatal perfection. What is the scope of
this calamity? But how could anyone stop this narcissistic project?” (García-Huidobro,
2013); and similarly, important political figures pointed out, “The INE is lying” (Mayol &
Azócar, 2013). Another politician declared, "The 2012 census became a big scam for our
country" (El Observatodo, 2013). Thus, the census became associated with error, disaster,
calamity, catastrophe, and failure. To Chileans, TranSantiago is synonymous with failure;
therefore, as one interviewee said, “What was Piñera's failure? What was the TranSantiago of
Piñera? The census was Piñera's TranSantiago.”
Given the census is the basis for the allocation and targeting of public funds (INE,
2018b), an inadequate characterization of the population has severe implications for the
territory. One senator exemplified the seriousness of the problems in resource distribution,
"the municipality of Maule has more than 40,000 inhabitants and since the results of the
Census are not official, it will continue to receive resources for the 16,000 it had in 2002;”
likewise, consequences for the voting system: “the Province of Cauquenes, which should
have three regional councilors starting this year, will only have two because of the delay in
the official information" (Senado Prensa, 2013b).
The director of CELADE at that time emphasized the role of the census for Chile and
the risk of not having reliable and quality data, "If we go to the commune level, the
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differences can be fierce: if one thinks about the implications, the transfer of financial
resources to the communes, the population factor, and its characteristics are critical elements"
(CIPER, 2014a). In addition, census data are critical to statistical production and the
conformation of a "sampling frame" for household surveys, statistics, and population
projections (INE, 2018b); therefore, the consequences of a bad census are severe, as stated by
an INE manager, “if the census data are badly collected, it is a big problem and you have to
go on for ten years with that. It's super serious.” Likewise, alluding to the importance of the
problem, a statistician concluded:
This is only the tip of the iceberg and there are many errors to discover, mainly in the
database [...] at this point, we have to swallow the sixty million dollars that cost the
census and throw the data to the garbage (UV, 2013).
The Census Goes into the Trashcan
After the results of the inquiry commission, the inevitable questions were: was it not
possible to find solutions? Is it possible that the entire census is useless? Political actors, the
press, and experts began an endless debate on the pros and cons of "throwing the census into
the trashcan," looking for ways to "fix the census" or “to rescue the census data.” The
undersecretary of economy said: "I never thought that the conclusion of the Chilean
commission would be to throw the data in the trash" (Pulso, 2013a). A census expert echoed
that statement: "It is unthinkable to throw away the mass of data from the 2012 Census." (La
Tercera, 2013c). Similarly, the president of the Chilean Statistics Society (SOCHE) said,
I refuse that this [the 2012 Census] has to be thrown away; it cannot be that because
of one person or a group of people who did things so badly and who perhaps
inadequately delivered the information and without the support of technical reports, it
cannot be that all this effort does not work (La Segunda, 2013b).
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Let us examine how the experts decided that the data was not suitable for use in
public policy. Aware of the importance of the work of the commission for the country, the
experts indeed faced a dilemma: to weigh whether it was possible to recover the census data.
How reasonable was it to make specific use of the data? How feasible was it to correct some
errors? The following quote from one of the members of the commission pointed to this
dilemma and the challenges they faced:
The decision was not made in a single meeting; it was a much more complex
conclusion because, look, in my opinion, first you had to understand if there was or
was not a problem, then you had to measure the problem, that is, what are we talking
about? It is a problem of such a size [small] or a bigger problem. And the essential
question is: well, I have an aggregate of data that covers the vast majority of the
population, beyond the omission rate that exists, how is that going to be useless?
Another member of the commission narrated how the five members concluded:
"When we reached that conclusion, that was a further conclusion, that was more radical; it
was a conviction of the five. There was no discrepancy between us, of course, it was totally
consensual." Likewise, another interviewee of the commission agreed with the above and
pointed out:
We [the members] understood the census, we understood why what happened,
happened, and then we quantified, and in the end, we realized, let's say, that it had
abundant faults. But the final conclusion we reached was that the census did not meet
minimum conditions to be a census of the quality we had had in Chile, which we
defined at the very end.
A key element behind this critical conclusion—that the data was not usable for policy
decisions—was that the commission realized the INE did not know (or they couldn’t find)
the original databases of the census. The lack of backup mechanisms, the prevailing
administrative disorder, the secretive situation in which the final analyses were carried out
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(and the patchwork population estimates) all led to the original census databases to become
lost, and all the databases were already modified. This is how one INE interviewee explained
what happened with the database, “the problem was that the ‘zero’ database already has
imputations. Many of the corrections they made, corrections in the good sense, that is,
validations, were stepped on, that is, recorded over. You don't do that!” Likewise, one
member of the inquiry commission clearly described this situation,
We didn't access the raw database! That is, what is presumed is that they [the INE]
received a ‘raw’ database and in the disorder that existed, those who were making
changes, they found an error, corrected it, but on the same database. There were many
databases, there were databases that the computer group worked on, and there were
other people who had worked with Labbé and those who had worked with Labbé and
who had finally made the estimations.
Blaming the Messengers
The analysis of interviews, press, and documents shows another sharp criticism to the
commission’s findings: a severe questioning of the skills and political independence of its
members. Regarding the technical capabilities of the members of the commission, critics
pointed out the following issues: the members were not experts in statistics but rather users
of statistics for public policy, and only one of the members knew about census work since
coming from CELADE, but despite this, neither was an expert in censuses.
Much in line with the saying, "blame the messenger and not the message," the
members of the commission were subject to harsh criticism. The tone of the reproach was
quite heated and the level of debate was considered by many as improper and even offensive,
disqualifying the members’ professional expertise. The analysis of diverse sources shows that
many of the criticisms pointed to the fact that there were no experts in censuses, and that the
member who came from CELADE was “nothing more” than an international official
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(referring to an official from the UN organization, with all the bureaucratic duties that
imply). An interviewee referred to the lack of expertise in censuses, “the mistake is to tell the
fool that he is a strong man. Deep down, they do not know about census. They have never
conducted a census.” Another interviewee emphatically countered these criticisms, stating
that the person from CELADE was the coordinator of the Demography and Population
Department for Latin America, and also worked with the support of that entire institution. In
other words, CELADE’s whole team was analyzing data, running tests, and monitoring for
information inconsistencies. Such were the arguments in defense of the attacks from an INE
interviewee:
So, they say: ‘none of them knew anything about a census.' Lie! I mean, this person
had experience in censuses already, but it is not just this person, because this person
came with all CELADE behind them. When the commission reviewed the issues, they
sent the databases, and they ran the analysis on the databases.
The absence of a statistician and someone with operational experience in censuses
was another side of the criticism. One of the statisticians alluded that the initial composition
of the commission did not include a statistician, “he [Coeymans] blundered by not having put
any statistician on the commission. But he screwed up, and then, of course, he tried to fix it,
but it was too late.” Likewise, another expert noted that the lack of statisticians in the
commission prevented evaluation of the possibilities of data repair “just because a
commission that has no statistician says that this cannot be fixed and you have to throw
things away does not mean you cannot fix it, it means that the commission does not know
how to fix it.”
Another line of major criticism concerned the lack of political independence of some
of the commission members, recalling the charges of a political plot against the Piñera
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census. For political actors and some interviewees, the commission was not politically
neutral. Although two of the five members came from the government, the others possessed
ideas closer to the left coalition (the former Concertación); one of them in particular, who
was an academic at the University of Chile18 and during the inquiry process operated as
spokesman, was perceived as the leader (and his surname identifies the commission). An INE
professional referred to the political tone of the commission, "I think the commission also
harbored a political bias, I could not tell you much how that happened, but it is like this, it's
kind of weird;" moreover, another interviewee commented that the commission (which
included a CELADE member) was politically influenced,
Look, there were also parts in which the CEPAL commission was very influenced …
several people from the former Concertación that have friendships and relations with
people of the commission. So, if I take the results of that commission, then, to me,
they [the results] generate noise.
Reinforcing the previous ideas, the incoming economy minister declared that, from
the beginning of the investigative process, he knew the investigation would not have
favorable results because of the political leanings of their members,
This person [a commission member] is a weak person, who has worked in the
University of Chile. I studied at the University of Chile, and there is an unfortunate
conception in the faculty, ideologically quite powerful, so he would not be able to
abstain from that. Also, the CEPAL, well … The CEPAL director, who hires
everyone, is a lefty, undoubtedly.
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The University of Chile is one of the most important public universities in the country and the most

influential in terms of public policies. The ideas of the University of Chile tend to be more liberal, secular, and
in general, closer to the political left.
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Accusations of political bias were considered offensive and painful for some
members of the commission. Respondents emphasized the commission never had tones or
political purposes, and even less, they never had an initial idea about the results they were
getting. In one member’s words, “I feel that my participation in the commission was with my
best available technical tools, and I did not see anything different in the people I had to work
with. I did not see political discussions, none.” Along these lines, another member recalled
how complicated their relationship was with the INE Director, and the idea of how he
"repented" once he appointed the members of the commission:
Then he [Coeymans] appoints this commission, but after he calls the commission, he
kind of repents, and he starts to say: it's that these, they're all from the left. Then he
blocks our work… and blocks our work! So, the first thing was not to deliver the
database [to us].
It is important to recall that when the commission was convened, the government
authorities never thought that there were significant problems with the census and tended to
put "cold cloth" on the census problem. Interviews conducted disclose that government
authorities assumed the issues were only methodological, and specifically associated with the
population estimation stage of the absent residents. In this way, while Alcérreca accusation
pointed to a lack of transparency in how this estimate was made, in general, most of the
actors thought it was something possible to fix.
Government statements showed the idea of a failed census was never an option for the
authorities. The Minister of Economy noted: "the only thing that has happened here is a
methodology discussion. Problems have arisen only at the stage of data conciliation"
(Cooperativa, 2013b). Another government authority claimed, “there may be methodological
doubts about issues, for example, such as absent dwellers or adjustments for new housing,
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but that does not call into question this census and the data collection" (La Tercera, 2013b).
Likewise, the Undersecretary of Economy, when asked about the possibility of a new census,
responded, "that event is already ruled out [a new census]. We have 15,810,000 legit census
cards with their own backups. They opened the door for us and the pollster filled in the
information sheet" (Cooperativa, 2013d).
It is noteworthy that at the same time that allegations were reported in the press, the
government coalition was enduring a critical crisis of political leadership. The presidential
candidate of the government coalition, Laurence Golborne abandoned the race due to serious
questioning about his statement of assets, and so, Pablo Longueira, who was the economy
minister (the government agency upon which the INE depends), rose as the new presidential
candidate, all in the midst of INE crisis (La Tercera, 2013a). These shifts within the ministry
coincided with the appointment of the new director of the INE, the formation of the
commission of experts, and other measures taken to contain the emergency.
Interviewees agreed that minister Longueira did not get involved in the INE matters
and declared he never really knew of the numerous problems at the INE and the census. The
highly political profile of Longueira and the imminent promulgation of his presidential
campaign kept him away from INE´s issues, and his exit from the ministry was a strategy to
shield him from the INE crisis. With no minister in charge, Undersecretary Flores was the
person who finally managed the INE crisis. He declared his intent: "I want to put my
academic career at the service of this task so that Chileans have confidence that the data we
are going to publish is true" (La Tercera, 2013a). However, the lack of strong political
leadership and the bad decisions made were a breeding ground for more problems. In the
words of one INE interviewee, "and the mistake came in some way, from Tomás Flores for
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having made bad decisions. Longueira was 'in another world,' so Longueira never got
involved. Yes, because he trusted Tomás Flores, and they were wrong.”
Thus, the Director, Juan Eduardo Coeymans, assumed office amid a political crisis,
with very little information about what had happened with the census, but with a clear
political goal: to solve the INE crisis, and thereby to save the census. Along these lines, and
given the political guidelines, for Coeymans, the national experts’ investigation should have
supported the future task to repair the census. The following statement made by the Director
showed the initial expectations for the work of the commission:
They are going to help the INE analyze the proposal of how we are going to process
the figures, if the controls that we will use are correct, how the data will be presented,
[as well as] validate the process of estimating the inhabitants in the homes with absent
residents [...] I trust that we will reach a Census that will be credible for everyone
(E&N, 2013b).
However, similar to prior work of national committees of experts for other relevant
policy matters, the experts had a mandate: to evaluate the census quality, thoroughly and
independently. As stated by one of the members, “we were invited by the INE Director, but
we were an independent, autonomous commission.” Another member, stressed the idea that
they had no prior impression about the results: “We did not enter at all with an ex-ante
perception of what was going to be the result of our investigation, we had a clean slate.”
Some interviewees pointed out that Director Coeymans always thought the census
problems were not so serious, and therefore, he believed the investigation would confirm that
idea. As one INE interviewee put it, "Coeymans was sure the commission, at the end of the
day, was going to have endless more positive results." These differences in expectations,
combined with the new INE Director's personality, caused complications for the experts in
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maintaining independence. Some respondents observed that Director Coeymans tried to
patrol or influence the work of the commission, that is, give indications about the type of
analysis to be carried out or expected results, as stated by an INE official,
They [the government] imposed the commission on him [Coeymans]. But he tried to
do what he should never have done, which is ‘set the tone’ … Of course: “Do this,
investigate this,” or saying, “well, this thing about what Labbé did makes sense,
right?” Something like that!
This pressure generated conflicts between the commission and the Director, tensions
so great that finally the experts decided to take action, for example, not to assemble at INE’s
offices or even to present the inquiry results at the university and not at the INE. Regarding
the latter, the presentation of the results, the Director Coeymans commented, “this whole
issue was set-up; the issue that they [the commission] want is to have a political picnic, that
is, bad intentions.”
There are different interpretations of what happened between the Director and the
commission of experts. For the Director, the political stance and the prior biases of the
commission prevail—in his words, "I have a terrible opinion of that commission that I
named"—while for the members of the commission, they took measures to ensure the
technical independence given the pressure exerted by the Director himself.
The paradox of this situation is that Coeymans himself (with the support of other
government authorities) chose and convened each commission member. Therefore, all
criticisms of the composition of the commission, its political tenor, or the type of analysis
performed were poorly received by most stakeholders. In this regard, one member described
the situation: “so, in reality, you form a commission, you choose the members, and then you
let them work. You don’t want to handle them like puppets, right?” Another INE interviewee
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referred to the special animosity of the Director toward one of the members, “it was himself
[Coeymans] who summoned him [a member]; therefore, it seems strange to me that there
was a subsequent doubt, if, anyway, this person didn’t propose himself for the commission,
but was recommended."
Second Opinion
After the report of the national experts, the political pressure and the technical debate
were more intense. Despite the President’s public apologies for the errors, and the resignation
of the INE Director and all his advisors (CIPER, 2013c; El Mostrador, 2013b), the
government was still defending the quality of the information gathered. All of this added to
the criticism, raised by the authorities and some experts, of the capacities and political
independence of the members of the experts commission, pushing the INE Director to look
for a "second opinion." Using a medical analogy, the Director explained the need for this
second opinion: “If you are told by a doctor to amputate your leg because of a tumor, do you
amputate your leg or ask for a second opinion? What is responsible or common sense is to
consult a second opinion” (AmericaEconomía, 2013a). Similarly, but alluding to the
enormous amount of resources invested in the census, the incoming Minister of Economy,
Felix de Vicente, commented:
Because when a country invests US$60 million in a questioned project, it must have
two evaluations to make the best decision about what to do with that project, with its
conclusions, with the data obtained. It was prudent to go to a second consultation, and
even more so after receiving the report of the national commission (La Tercera,
2013d).
Thus, the government announced the hiring of international consultants to compile a
second report. The Director Coeymans, explained the need for this second assessment:
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If they [the experts] ratify the census must be dropped, that is what I am going to
report and that is what I will do. If they say, 'here is an alternative to repair it,' which
may be the same as or different from what we have thought, well, we are going to
follow their advice, because they are much more adept at that kind of thing than
people we have today in the INE (Radio ADN, 2013).
Initially, the INE Director announced that the second evaluation of the census would
be carried out by the European Union Statistical Office (Eurostat) or the World Bank, an
announcement disseminated throughout the press (AmericaEconomía, 2013b; CIPER,
2013e), but days later was denied. There were annoyance and suspicion among political
actors about the seriousness of this second assessment, in the words of a senator,
How is it possible that the government announces the arrival of a mission to analyze
the 2012 Census and then we learn from the press that this is not true? We are facing
a problem of unsuspected magnitude and we need to know whether or not institutions
with international prestige will endorse this second opinion as we were told, or are
mere independent consultants. Are we going to continue delaying a solution? […]
This is not an academic problem, it is a country problem and we can no longer wait
for a second opinion, especially after the WorldBank made it clear that it will not be
part of this process (Senado Prensa, 2013b).
The international agencies did not agree to carry out the assessment, and the
government ended up hiring independent consultants recommended by Eurostat. Ultimately,
the commission of international experts was composed of Griffith Feeney, Roberto
Bianchini, and Rajendra Singh19. They were hired directly by the INE Director and supported
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Ph.D. in Statistics.

196

by the INE with the information they needed. They worked independently for almost three
months in Santiago. Although, they did conduct visits in two regions of the country, unlike
the previous commission, these consultants did not meet with the census team or other INE
managers or calculated the census's omission rate. Finally, they identified problematic issues
in the enumeration and specifically recommended not using the data obtained from the
imputation of unobserved homes–precisely the process of data imputation that originated the
disputes– they nonetheless considered the quality of the data as suitable for general public
purposes (Feeney et al., 2013), and concluded:
We find that the percentage of missing data for most variables of the questionnaire is
low. The rate of ‘no response’ of the occupied and the percentage of vacant homes are
not far from the experience of other countries. Countries with similar rates of noresponse in their census use the data (p. 6).
How could one group of experts recommend repeating the census, and other experts
say that it was good or acceptable? While some considered the census a failure, others called
it—literally—a success, as it happened at a press conference, where the commission
coordinator Feeney said: "This Census was not a failure, it was a success. I am going to give
a B+ to this Census" (Cooperativa, 2013f). As expected, the overwhelming differences
between the reports generated new controversy over technical, political, and timing issues.
The investigation results raised concerns–among political and technical actors, as well
as public opinion–regarding commission' technical and political independence. Unlike the
previous commission, the consultants were hired, and under the clear mandate to "save the
census." Moreover, the favorable results to the government raised suspicions about the
objectivity of the group of experts. In the words of one senator, “there is no data in this report
that details how much population was counted, and curiously the expert judgments coincide
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with Mr. Coeymans when he hired them and made it explicit to the public." In addition, the
amount paid to international consultants amounted to US$180,000 (El Mercurio, 2013). The
following quote from an INE official, explained the skeptical view to this second assessment,
paid by the government:
The second commission did not make a dent–said in a simple and direct way. It did
not make a dent. I also think there’s another logic behind it: the first ones were free,
and the government paid the second ones. Thus, it [the investigation process] could be
completely transparent, but in the end, how ordinary people perceived, guess who
wins?
Secondly, this commission didn't calculate the census coverage or any omission rate
that would account for the quality of the census. They didn't calculate under the argument of
the lack of quality certification of the country’s vital statistics (live births, deaths, fetal
deaths, marriages, and divorces). The consulting report argued the following:
So far as we have been able to determine, no evaluation study providing an estimate
of the level of completeness of birth and death data between 2002 and 2012 is
available […] Lacking the requisite evaluation of data quality, therefore, these
estimates do not, based on international recommendations, provide a statistically
sound basis for estimating 2012 census omissions (Feeney et al., 2013, p. 49).
Demographers and statisticians and INE employees considered this argument
extremely odd since it underestimated the Chilean statistics and with that, the consultants
evaded the critical issue of the omission rate (DF, 2013; Pulso, 2013b). The reactions came
quickly; for example, an expert expressed distrust about this decision: “they ranted against
the vital statistics of Chile, that is something very odd.” Another academic pointed out, “I
believe that the vital statistics are very good, in Chile nobody buries the dead without
declaring them in the civil registry. There are no births as clandestine, you know?”
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Consequently, reacting to these statements, experts from different areas and INE officials
reacted passionately to the scorn of the quality of vital statistics20. Below, an interview
excerpt detail this discomfort and disagreement:
They lack knowledge! Do they have any idea what vital statistics are in Chile? Where
did they get all this? They didn’t check. Are they saying they couldn’t contrast with
vital statistics because they don't know their quality? What are they talking about?
Have they looked at the reports? We have medals; we have international recognition
for the vital statistics of the country. […] And that is the big shit that the international
commission left: they did not use the vital statistics […] our vitals were with no
registered children or registered deaths, and in Chile, those things are impeccably
good. I mean, it is one of the best, and probably the best in Latin America, cachai?
The experts interviewed for the study rejected that the consultants did not calculate
any census coverage rate. That’s why the vast majority of respondents, regardless of their
positions on the census failure, its political stance or their expertise, distrusted the
international commission and its results. Another interviewee expert explained this matter:
What I think of commission two: it was a disgrace […] because the measure of the
quality of a census is the estimate of coverage. But, to not calculate the estimation? I
swear to you that when I read that report, I said: No! Not doing it is super
irresponsible.
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the University of Berkeley and the Max Plank Institute—containing mortality data from only 40 countries in the
world (HMD, 2019).

199

On the question of why the international consultants did not calculate the number of
Chilean censed and the omission rate, they responded: "this was not exactly our objective,
our objective was to evaluate the 2012 Population Census, to help, as much as possible"
(Cooperativa, 2013f). And they added, "We believe that this is an operation that must be
decided by the INE, we believe that it is not a topic for foreigners like us" (Cooperativa,
2013f).
Another element that generated annoyance among Chileans was the comparison with
censuses from underdeveloped countries. The commission noted that other countries had
validated censuses with more significant problems. However, Chileans aspired to OECD21
Standards, so the comparison was considered kind of offensive and showed the consultants
didn't grasp the Chilean demands. As expressed by statisticians, "It should be noted that
international experts have particular experience with African countries, so the quality
criterion does not seem to be very demanding" (Del Pino & Jara, 2013). Similarly, alluding to
the reaction of the statistics community, another interviewee noted, “that was a very weak
report, all the statisticians who read it said no! That report did not have any firmness […] so
basically, the report fell on its own.” Likewise, an INE high official explained why the
country didn't consider the consultants' work:
I do not know technically what they [the consultants] would have been like. When
you looked at the CVs, they were always advisors from African countries. And, after
all, considering the process of Chile's entry into the OECD, the only country
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comparable to us is South Africa. So all the other countries were not comparable to
us, which makes me think that, technically, they were not very good. Because when
you do a consultancy to a country, you observe the context of the country, who it is,
what they are, how they have moved in the last ten years, including the governments
they’ve had, because you realize some are more technocratic, less technocratic, etc.
Another element that influenced the reception of the second investigation results was
the timing and the political context. Concerning timing, the first commission was the one that
set the tone, followed by the President's apology, so, despite efforts to save the census, the
results of the first commission framed the subsequent conversation and thus set the political
agenda. In one interviewee’s words, "they [the first commission] won the public opinion,
they delivered the first ‘combo,’ without a doubt, and that carried forward in the discussion."
Also, the second commission report came to light in November 2013, just days before the
presidential election. Thus, the favorable results were interpreted as a political maneuver to
save the Piñera census.
These commissions were not the only investigations into the 2012 census. Parallel to
the inquiry of the first and second commission, administrative, judicial, and political
inquiries were also carried out (detailed in the subsection to follow); all this slowly
reaffirmed the ideas of irregularities, errors, and therefore, resulted in a loss of confidence. In
short, the Chileans had already grasped the inadequacy of their census. Despite
recommendations given by the second commission or the endless debate between authorities
and experts, the concept of failure was installed.
The Failure or Not: The Never-ending Investigative Processes
The discussion about whether the census was a failure or not, what is involved in a
failure, the quality of the data, and who is responsible, somehow is still ongoing today in
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Chile. In addition to the commissions’ investigations, by the national and international
experts, once the controversy was uncovered, several other inquiries were conducted to
evaluate the 2012 census appropriateness; the most important were: i) The chamber of
deputies special’ commission of inquiry, which focuses on political responsibility and
irregularities of the census process (Cámara de Diputados, 2014); ii) The INE technical
audits of the process of recruitment, training, and payment to census workers (INE, 2015),
and audit regarding the technical quality of the census data (INE, 2014b); iii) The General
Comptroller audit about the legality and administrative appropriateness of the census,
including integral audits to the INE (CGR, 2014, 2015b) and special audit to the census
(CGR, 2015b); iv) The Council for the Defense of the State (CDE) and Prosecutor office
investigations about possible crimes committed. Below is presented the discussion of these
investigations.
In parallel with the national experts' investigation, the chamber of deputies also
initiated their investigative process, which considered the analysis of information and special
hearings to those in charge of running the 2012 census. This investigation focused on
administrative irregularities, manipulation and delivery of census results, and other issues
related to the management of the Statistical Institution by the Labbé administration (Cámara
de Diputados, 2014).
Interviewees observed the investigation process by the chamber of deputies had an
eminently political character. The hearings and the inquiry process ended up deepening the
differences that already existed. As one interviewee said, "when the issue moved to the
Congress with this famous commission, which was a joke, it was a political commission, it
was a fight between the two groups." A Labbé advisor commented on the hostile treatment he
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received from the deputies, "they began to call me to the chamber of deputies, which was a
circus, a true circus. I felt harassed, I mean, the tone of their questions!” So, too, an INE
professional referred to the political nature of the investigation:
Then the circus came to the chamber of deputies, which I didn’t want to go to because
I swear to you … it was a spectacle. It was such a terrible display. I really felt like I
was in another world. They talked pure nonsense, and I didn’t know why they
politicized the census there.
Concerning political responsibilities, there were two elements that the Chamber’s
commission investigated in detail. The first was into those actors who knew the census data
delivered to the public was incorrect (estimates to cover the census omissions, in a nontransparent procedure). Also, the inquiry confirmed that the chief of staff of the economy
minister was alerted to the problems by INE officials, but he did not duly inform the minister
(Cámara de Diputados, 2014).
The second set of inquiries focused on the director’s closest advisors. They were
young people with no experience in statistics or public policies, salaries above their
professional references, and a lot of power and influence at the INE and the census. For
example, some of Labbé’s close advisors participated in meetings and significant decisions,
but without having a formal position at the INE (BioBio, 2014). The investigation detected
several administrative irregularities and practices that are at odds with ethics, some
“triangulations” of money to pay salaries over what the Chilean public administration allows,
and also specifically inquired into the leaking of confidential information (under statistical
secrecy) that occurred under the Labbé administration (Cámara Noticias, 2013c; Radrigan,
2013). The inquiry also detected that Labbé hired a communication company without the
appropriate public bidding process (Cámara de Diputados, 2014). All this investigation

203

happened with extensive press coverage and in a climate where accusations were being made
rapidly . Thus, The Chamber placed the blame of the census failure mainly on Labbé, the
INE Director. The final document concluded:
Given the establishment of a vertical administrational hierarchy within this institution,
as well as the establishment of parallel administration structures, the former Director
Labbé is responsible for not respecting the operation and structure of the Service,
leaving aside the directing instances of communication that probably would have
allowed identifying the difficulties generated in the Census process (Cámara de
Diputados, 2014 p.203)
The chamber of deputies’ report also questioned the Director of the INE, Coeymans,
for "having been erratic and unclear about the ways to remedy the problems identified"
(CIPER, 2014b).
By that time, and following the international consultants' recommendations, the INE
corrected and published the 2012 census data, and therefore, officially, data could be used
with caution. However, the technical and political discussion about the scope and reliability
of the 2012 data was far from closed. Thus, pending further clarity, most of public and
private agencies continued to use the 2002 census data.
The year 2014 began with the new government of the center-left coalition under the
presidency of Michelle Bachelet. One of the first measures taken by the also-incoming INE
Director, Ximena Clark, was to order a technical audit of the 2012 census database to end the
controversy and public confusion due to previous reports. This time, the INE itself carried
out the inquiry and with a strictly technical focus on the quality of the data obtained (INE,
2014b). While the investigation progressed, the INE removed, for the second time, the census
databases from the official website. In policymakers' eyes, not having publicly available
census information was very strange: something that had never happened before, a bad sign.
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Through the criteria of coverage, quality, and heterogeneity, the INE analysis
confirmed the inadequacy of the data obtained. Thus, the audit (2014b) called attention to
problems of traceability in the database, which was expressed in the inconsistency of the "no
response," due to the lack of control in the enumeration or high volume of corrections in the
questionnaire readings. Thus, "it is not possible to make a rigorous quality analysis based on
the non-response, nor to know the magnitude of data loss in the survey, since the different
versions of the database already have imputations incorporated with no record." Hence, the
audit concluded that the data had shortcomings for constituent elements of a census, that is,
information for public policies, updating of population projections, elaboration of the
sampling frame, and information for smaller geographical areas. The final word: “data
generated for the year 2012 do not meet the standards for this operation to be called a census"
(INE, 2014b, p. 6).
Also, given the results of the previous investigative endeavors, in March 2014,
members of the chamber of deputies requested the Comptroller General of the Republic give
a detailed analysis of the administrative appropriateness of the census. The Comptroller22 is a
highly respected independent body of the state that supervises state agencies in legal,
accounting, and financial matters. The final audit report (2015) found several procedural and
managerial errors, declaring many of the actions of the 2012 census as illegal or counterregulatory. The report concluded:
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“oversees the legality of acts of the state administration and safeguards the correct use of public funds,
independently of the executive branch and the national congress”(CGR, 2020).

205

The methodological change determined for the said survey [the census] was set apart
from the international recommendations that the first precept requires carrying out
pilot tests; careful planning of the process; having sufficient qualified personnel; and
providing the necessary training (CGR, 2015b).
The idea of the illegality hit hard in the political debate and in public opinion due to
the high respect for the resolutions of the Comptroller, where the administrative and legal
requirements were central to the analysis, not politics. The inquiry results gave support to the
criticisms of the validity of the census, generating a new wave of debate and accusations in
this endless process of investigation. The following quote comes from a government
spokesman, reacting to the results of the Comptroller's investigation: "they [the government]
tried to sell us the idea that it was the best census in history. Yesterday it was confirmed that
it is the worst in history” (El Dinamo, 2015).
The findings of these audits to the census process added to the irregularities already
discovered in the functioning of the INE, detecting, for example, that the National Statistics
Commission, INE’s supervisory body, did not meet during the Piñera administration nor
approve the national statistical plan, thus contravening the law (CGR, 2014). All this led to
sharpening the judgments on the disorder and lack of probity of the Labbé administration.
The Final “Blame-game”
Another of the investigative facets was the legal–penal responsibility. There were
various questionings of the Labbé administration and the census, the significant amount of
wasted public resources to modify the policy without proper analysis, the data manipulation
through the housings’ “cloning,” imputation methods, the threat to statistical secrecy, and the
misinformation delivered to the citizenship. Paradoxically, it was the government itself (first
the undersecretary of economy and then the newcomer INE Director) who, in order to be
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transparent and showing determination, started the judicial edge of the search for
responsibilities before the prosecutor’s office (La Tercera, 2013b).
Later, with the explicit intent of avoiding impunity and doling out responsibility
(Diario UChile, 2013c), representatives filed another lawsuit. As said by one representative,
“here we are dealing with manipulation of data that can configure not only administrative
sanctions but eventually crimes” (Cooperativa, 2013e). Furthermore, almost a year later, a
new complaint was also filed by the Council for the Defense of the State, CDE–an appendage
whose object is the legal defense of the interests of the State (CDE, 2020). With a focus on
the falsification of data, the legal claim argued: “[Chileans] were induced by falsehood to
believe that the data there consigned was actually counted, to hide or disguise the high rate of
omission” (The Clinic, 2014a). Given those various complaints, the prosecutor’s office
investigated the possible crimes of “falsification of a public instrument,” “embezzlement of
public funds,” and “eventual violation of statistical confidentiality.”
Finding accountable and naming the former Director Francisco Labbé as the primary
reliable was a process widely covered by the press, but particularly in the investigation
carried out by the prosecution. Television and newspapers reported the seizure of INE
Director’s computers by the police’s special unit, the interrogation of various officials during
extended hours, and Labbé’s anguished statements in his defense. Moving from
administrative and political inquiries to a criminal investigation generated a climate of
concern and surprise. An advisor remembered the impact of that investigation: “When I saw
the prosecutor’s office seizure, I thought I was dying … because I never imagined that this
could involve crimes.” Likewise, Director Coeymans was shocked by the investigations:
“Labbé may have made mistakes, but he is not a criminal” (Cooperativa, 2013c).
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This examination took almost three years, and unlike the previous investigations, the
prosecutor’s inquiry did not have conclusive results. The prosecutor’s office desisted further
investigation, and so it concluded: “[although] there were serious administrative errors, both
in the methodology and in the procedure applied, there was no crime” (Pulso, 2016a). From
the legal point of view, a crime of adulteration of a public instrument could not be declared
since the census was not defined as such. Thus, the former director Labbé and his advisors
were not criminally sanctioned, which finally concluded the blame game, at least from the
legal perspective.

5.4.

Stage Four: The 2017 Census and INE Future Challenges
This last stage of the case points to the closing of the 2012 census disputes. Although

the controversy over the failed census and the INE’s weaknesses continued for quite some
time, the concluding milestone of the case was undoubtedly the new census of 2017 under
the traditional de facto methodology. Furthermore, this final stage of the census case shows
several advances and setbacks regarding the challenging INE strengthening process toward
an integrated national statistical institutionality.
INE's Quest to Get back on Its Feet
A few weeks after assuming office in 2014, and based on the importance of the
census for the country and the unreliability of the data gathered, Michelle Bachelet
announced a new census would take place in 2017. The also-new INE Director Ximena Clark
emphasized the severity of the situation: “we have an emergency today: we need to collect
this information as soon as possible […] we are going to apply a census with a reduced
questionnaire which contains mainly demographic variables” (The Clinic, 2014b). In this
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way, the INE followed the recommendation made by the first commission of experts about
the urgency of an abbreviated (shorter) census version. Moreover, the INE decided that the
new one would be de facto, that is, in a single day with volunteers censistas, in a clear move
to recover the statistical tradition. The new Director stressed this:
There is a long-term tradition in which the censuses have been carried out with high
participation of citizens, with volunteering that has summoned thousands of people,
and through this new process, we must reactivate and deepen that valuable capital of
our country (Minecon, 2015).
The preparation of the new census was extremely challenging for the INE. The
Institute was severely damaged by the internal conflicts, lack of guidance, and the loss of
reputation of the institution. As one INE manager pointed out, “the people who work at the
INE are the ones who got the most damaged with this because they continue to work until
today and they know that everyone is constantly looking at them questioningly.” Likewise,
another INE official stressed how unfair it was for INE workers bearing the burden of the
census failure, “there was enormous institutional damage here and it hurts me a lot. I want to
say please stop bothering and blaming the INE, the people of INE are hardworking people,
this is very unfair, they have had a terrible time.” Another INE worker mentioned the sadness
of being the object of ridicule, “If I go out into the street now and say I’m from the INE, ah,
then immediately the jokes start about the census: ‘Hey, how many Chileans are we?’” Along
the same lines, the INE officials’ union, ANFINE, expressed their annoyance,
The press has pointed out that census 2012 is useless. To say so seriously undermines
the honor of the officials who, with the usual vocation and conviction, were dedicated
to carrying out such a census for months, working from Monday to Sunday, without
additional remuneration but only compensated time (2014, p. 2).
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Thus, the 2012 census conflicts left a deeply divided INE. Even today, interviews
from the INE have opposing views on issues such as: the propriety of the public letter sent by
the INE’s high executives about INE problems, the accusation of manipulation of data to the
press, and especially over the conflicts and politicization that prevented further efforts to
rescue the 2012 census data. INE officials and managers interviewed highlighted how
damaged the working environment was at that time. A census team member recalled, “We
were just doing things and all of a sudden, you see people crying… they felt mistreated, that
is, the level of stress that this [the census] produced was huge, they divided, they accused
each other, etc.” Likewise, a high INE executive commented on how profound were the
wounds: “this wasn’t a typical fight between a couple of bosses, but it escalated very deep,
very low in the INE. So, people were hurt by different things and wanted to be heard.” Thus,
in a climate of helplessness and deep wounds the INE began the challenging task of “getting
back on its feet,” viewing the new census as the opportunity to recover public confidence.
In addition to the census, INE faced several other challenges. At the end of 2015,
another technical controversy broke out, but this time, the doubts were about the national
employment survey figures. These figures differed from those reported by the University of
Chile survey and heavily criticized by the Latin American Center for Economic and Social
Policies (CLAPES UC, 2015), who observed survey weaknesses identifying people outside
the labor force, leading to lower unemployment rates. What was initially a technical
discussion then acquired a political tone; this is how a senator referred to the situation, “these
figures are not real, and here there is some type of manipulation that makes these results not
represent what is happening in reality” (Senado Prensa, 2015). This was the first questioning
to the INE after the 2012 census, to which the INE Director reacted categorically: “Any
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comment on possible manipulations of the figures or changes to the survey have no support,
being merely inappropriate speculations and reckless for other purposes, which do not
correspond to a rigorous technical analysis” (El Mostrador, 2015). It returned then to a
strictly technical discussion on the survey’s ability—which recently had modifications—to
gather particular labor market movements (El Libero, 2015). However, interviewees
understood this controversy as an expression of the general mistrust towards the INE
remained after the census crisis. Thus, defending the quality of the figures, a former Piñera
government authority stated: “there may be a technical discussion of how a particular
indicator is elaborated [...] but as long as the INE is not autonomous, it will always be the
object of suspicion in each of the statistics it elaborates” (Pulso, 2015).
The INE Autonomy Bill
Another of the repercussions left by the failed 2012 census were the proposals to
increase the INE’s autonomy and move toward an integrated national statistical system,
which were met with intense debate. Since the first census disputes broke out authorities had
submitted two bills, the first presented by President Piñera in 2012, and the second presented
during the Bachelet administration in 2015. In the opinion of most of the interviewees for this
dissertation, the first bill wasn’t a good project and therefore was never approved by the
legislature (Cámara de Diputados, 2019; Senado, 2019). Alternatively, most of interviewees
agree the second bill better reflects the concerns and debates on statistical institutionality.
All interviewees very much agreed on the importance of this law and, at the time of
the fieldwork, they were enthusiastic about the INE´s future. Given the census crisis, the
bill’s support was universal, and the first stages of the approval process of the law were fluid.
For some respondents, the census crisis was a window of opportunity to place statistical
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institutionality on the agenda, so said one interviewee: “I think that the INE, without this
crisis, would never have achieved it, because it also ensured the bill was executed faster and
taken seriously.” This bill advanced relatively fast until the end of 2017; however, because of
the presidential elections, change of government and priorities, the bill made no progress
because it did not have “urgency,”23 and therefore the processing of the law paused.
The core of the bill is to provide the INE with the necessary autonomy and
independence to ensure the technical quality of its products, separating it from political
pressures and influences, thus preventing events like the 2012 census from happening again.
As of writing (2020), the executive branch appoints INE Directors, which for different actors,
makes the INE politically vulnerable; in the words of a CELADE authority, “it is unfortunate
that an institute like the INE is subject to the government of the day” (CIPER, 2014a). For
several interviewees, the statistical institutionality is at risk, and the census problems and
other troubles (as the employment survey and CPI), were caused by this lack of
independence. In the words of a former minister:
I also believe that if the INE had been autonomous, the criticisms for the difficulties
of the census would have been more constructive than destructive, because it would
have been a transversal institution owned by all Chileans and not as it is seen today:
as the property of, and with the brand of a government (E&N, 2013a).
Interviewees remarked that the INE should be like the Central Bank, that is,
technically rigorous and politically autonomous, as an interviewee pointed out: “The INE
should be exactly the same as the Central Bank, which is the model. And there must be a
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"Urgency" is a mechanism established in the Political Constitution that empowers the President to set the

priority of bills in their legislative process to the National Congress. There are three categories: simple urgency,
extreme urgency, and immediate discussion (Cámara de Diputados, 2020).
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head, an executive director with a council, like the Central Bank, paid, well evaluated,
elected.”
In the years of discussion for this law, the issue of autonomy or independence
continues to be the point of significant debate. Although Piñera’s first law advocated broad
autonomy for the INE, government officials have had more nuanced positions, as the
Minister of Economy declared: “the INE should be autonomous, but responding to the
country’s needs for data” (E&N, 2019b); similarly, a think tank legislative specialist
recognized the merit of the independence criteria on the bill, but also argued: “It [the law] is
not indispensable for the INE, which has all the technical capabilities to do its job well”
(Pauta, 2018). On the other hand, a former INE Director also commented, “while the INE
decides their products based on of technical elements, the fact that every time there is a
change of government the INE Director is changed, is the best proof that it is not technically
independent” (Pauta, 2018); all of this continues in a back-and-forth debate while the law
remains in Congress.
Another element that contributed to loss of support of the bill was the new regulation
to the system of selection of senior public officials, SADP. In 2018, new legislation came
into force, limiting the discretionary appointment of the first and second level of high
authorities in the government hierarchy, by incorporating them in the SADP (Servicio Civil,
2020). Different actors valued the norm as an important step in overcoming discretional
authorities' appointments–such as the INE Director. However, the regulation contains an
exception; the President is allowed to appoint 12 second-level authorities in strategic services
during the three first months of its administration. Using this attribution, in his second
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administration, President Sebastián Piñera named Guillermo Pattillo as INE Director
(Estrategia, 2018).
Census Preparation
The 2017 census slogan was “we all count”24 in a clear gesture of recovering the
collective sense of the de facto censuses and aligned with the idea of a citizen-based
government of President Michelle Bachelet. As economy minister Céspedes stated: “the
census does not belong to the INE, the census does not belong to the government, the census
belongs to all Chileans and therefore we all have to work on it” (LT, 2015).
Those who participated in the preparation stage of the census commented on the
enormous pressure they were under, because, as one INE officer mentioned: “we knew this
was going to be the most-watched census in history, with no room for errors.” An expert also
commented, “people were very expectant about what was going to happen with this census,
all eyes were on the process.” Accordingly, the census became the INE’s top priority and all
energies and capacities were at the disposal of the project, which meant, for example, census
team had the best and most qualified professionals; the director Clark recalls how they
strengthened the teams “in addition to the census team, we brought the best elements, the
best professionals in each area to take care of this.”
They were few and intense years of planning for the census with several
complications along the way. The most salient was the difficulty in keeping someone to lead
the census project, which in the short period of preparation, had three different heads of the
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"Todos contamos" is a Spanish game of words with several meanings: that we tell other people, that we are

all counted by others, and also that everyone counts, in the sense that we all have worth.
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census. The first head of census was Ninoska Damiánovic, former INE demography high
official, advised by the eminence in censuses, Odette Tacla; both were key in detecting the
imputation errors of the 2012 census and had a long career at the INE. For the academic
community and the government, these experts’ presence provided warrants of serious and
rigorous work. However, after just five months, they resigned due to profound differences in
working styles with Director Clark, unleashing concern about the future of the abbreviated
census (CNN Chile, 2014; Diario UChile, 2014; Lagos, 2014). After several months without
census leadership, the engineer Patricia Morales assumed the role, but she didn’t last long in
office either; both those within the INE and external actors disapproved of her because of her
lack of census experience and her difficulties managing the scope of the undertaking. With
less than a year to the census, Carolina Cavada, Director Clark’s closest advisor, finally
claimed the census leadership (Pulso, 2016b). Interviewees agreed that Director Clark was
heavily involved—overly involved for some—in census decisions. But, due to those several
changes in the leadership of the project, she ultimately ended up being the actual head of the
census.
After the 2012 failure, all eyes were on each one of the INE’s steps. Then, the INE
faced the huge challenge to manage people’s expectations, as shown by numerous press
headlines, television reports, expert interviews who filled the news and social media during
those years, for example: “2017 Census: no margin for error” (Alonso & Lopez, 2017),
“Nothing more political than the census” (Navia, 2017), “From 2012 failure to the April
census” (El tipógrafo, 2017), “The census war” (Duran, 2017).
Undoubtedly, the primary concern of politicians and media was the recruitment of
more than 500,000 volunteers needed, then the training and finally ensuring they would show
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up to survey the census day. Concerned about the census arrangements, the special
commission of the chamber of deputies summoned Director Clark to accountability for
census preparations, contingency plans, and especially the process of recruiting volunteers
(Cámara Noticias, 2017). Despite these worries, the number of volunteers reached more than
needed, about 540,000 censistas (CNN Chile, 2017).
Another criticism of the 2017 census was the high cost compared to 2012,
approximately 58% more expensive, without considering the productive losses given the
census holiday (Concepción, 2017). As a former INE Director pointed out: “this census was
very expensive and why did they do that? Because they couldn’t accept that they should have
done a de jure census. So it´s clear the issue became politicized.” Another objection was the
abbreviated nature of the census; instead of the 42 questions of 2012, this version only had
21, which led to criticism by minority groups, some politicians, and advocates of the 2012
census. For example, the lack of questions on disability, cohabitation of same-sex, religion,
the commune of study, or work, among others, inspired disagreement (El Libero, 2017).
Also, another point of criticism was that given the higher number of interviewers and shorter
training, the quality of the data would be vastly inferior to the 2012 census. Following the
words of an academic defender of the 2012 census criticizing the 2017 endeavor: “In
restrictive economic circumstances, the country had the ´luxury´ of carrying out the most
expensive census in its history, with results that predict a worse quality than any of the
previous censuses” (Araujo, 2017).
As noted, critics pointed to elements of census efficiency and effectiveness of the de
facto strategy, such as the higher cost, better training, and better data, but this also reflected
political and ideological positions on the census of the governments of Piñera and Bachelet
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(Navia, 2017). According to some interviewees, these criticisms were framed by the idea—
from few politicians, academics and ex-INE authorities—that 2012 had quality data, and that
INE authorities discarded it only for political reasons. However, most respondents
understood these criticisms as an attempt to damage the 2017 census in a “political tie”
strategy (BioBio, 2017). As stated by INE Director Clark, “from time to time, they have
wanted so much to tie the previous census with this census, and Coeymans is one of those
stubborn ones who wants to tie it, but I don’t know why.”
The 2017 Census. The Expected Twist
Finally, the 2017 census was carried out on April 19, with more than 500,000
volunteers surveying Chileans in their homes across the nation. Thus, infused with a
democratic and citizen-led tone, the different actors agreed the process was a success. INE
Director Clark remarked: “It has been an exemplary civic journey of which we all have to
feel proud” (Emol, 2017b). The economy minister remarked, “This day allowed us to recover
the confidence in the statistical institutions and to unite the people of the country. We were
able to unite in a country project, in which, as we always said, we all count!” (Censo2017,
2017b). An INE Manager remembered the tenor of the process, “this republican feeling that
when you see Boric [a congressman] as a pollster or President Bachelet surveying. That
mystique made the difference!” Also, international observers valued the lessons of this
census for the region, “in this case, it allows for feedback on censuses to be conducted in
other Latin American and Caribbean countries” (INE Noticias, 2017). Likewise, the
following quote from an expert interviewed expresses the civic feeling of collaboration:
In this context of distrust with institutions and politics, the census was like a balsam.
It seems that we still live in a country where there are people in solidarity, who are
willing to give their time for others; we are doing something together, all paddling to
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the same side. And does the census produce all that? Yes! There are countries where
it is not this way anymore, and they do not have this collective experience. It’s a
lovely experience.
Social media also expressed this sense of citizenship; the following tweets illustrate
the sentiment: “When Chileans unite, we are an insuperable force, a torrent of energy that
moves the country. I am a volunteer for the 2017 census!” (Troncoso, 2017); “The 2017
Census was a success: this is confirmed by the opinions of experts, authorities, censistas and
counted people” (Moreau, 2017); “2012 Census: professionalized, a fiasco. Census 2017:
with public officials, volunteers and a republican sense, it worked” (Vidal, 2017). Along with
feelings of civic pride and satisfaction for the task accomplished, interviews and public
statements show the idea of revenge or rematch; after the “defeat” with the 2012 failure, the
country was able to “win” this time. As stated by an interviewee,
I think it was good because we had to have a rematch and finish this. A political
revenge, but it is also a revenge of the people, because the people wanted to respond
well, wanted to show. [...] I think people felt like the census was out of line with what
we usually do, therefore they wanted to say: ‘No. Look, no!’ Because the 2012
problem was a group of inept people who were not capable, but in Chile, we Chileans
are good, we are the best in Latin America.
Interviewees assessed the census day positively, and so the media and social
networks. However, the census was not exempt of problems such as: minor security issues,
difficulty to access to some areas of the country, and mostly, complaints from unsurveyed
people; as stated by an opinion piece: “there were areas with a surplus of census takers and
others where they never arrived, leaving relevant neighborhoods without census” (Ruiz,
2017). Finally, as usually happened in de facto censuses, some households were not surveyed
on the census day. Therefore, and consistent with planning, during a few days following the
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census, the INE carried out a field operation to survey uncovered areas, and set up a web
page for remaining families to answer the census online (PubliMetro, 2017).
In spite of valuing the feat of the citizenry that the 2017 census became, several
specialists consider the de jure methodology a step backward. There are many risks in this
strategy: recruiting enough volunteers (difficult in several areas), the potential of inclement
weather, and, in general, focusing all efforts on a single day. Alluding to these risks, the chief
of the 2017 census commented on events that happened in tandem with the census, “the day
after the census, there was a flood in Santiago and closed schools in twenty communes, two
or three days later there was an earthquake in Valparaíso. A single day is very risky!”
Another expert emphasized: “everything happens in a single day, that’s madness itself.”
Likewise, the President of SOCHE said, “I tell you with all my heart I would do it again, but
with my head, I would never do it again, that is, it really is a tremendous risk and also it
doesn’t make sense to paralyze the country.”
Interviewees agreed that relying on volunteers is very fragile. Many factors can put at
risk the attendance of volunteers, such as a rainy day or lack of motivation. For the 2017
census, several actors were concerned about whether the trained volunteers would finally
show up on the census day, as an INE professional said: “the great doubt that everyone had
was whether the volunteers would arrive, and what surprised everyone on the day of the
census was that they arrived!” However, this shows that the census “depended heavily on the
goodwill of people and institutions” (Ruiz, 2017). The majority of interviewees conclude that
2017 should be the last de jure census in Chile, since the success of the census should not
depend on the mobilization of volunteers.
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Was It a Good Census? Did We Learn?
Participants in the 2017 census recounted how previous errors served to prepare all
edges of the 2017 census adequately. There were lessons learned in several areas; the most
important were: in the internal organization of the INE to face the census, the collaboration
and articulation with other actors, the training strategy, the supervision system, and the
transparency of the whole process.
Thus, first learning for the INE was to re-emphasize technical issues and leave aside
all kinds of political considerations on the census. The goal was to regain the prestige of the
INE, and for that, the census became a top priority; and unlike the previous version, the
entire INE, all units, were involved somehow in the project. Interviewees reported on the
intensive work demanded the new endeavor, with regular meetings, close collaboration
between departments, and in general, resuming work under an institutional structure with an
evident technical seal. In the words of one INE manager,
We returned to having an internal institutionality! We returned to have a steering
committee with clear roles; the technical issues were assumed by the technical Subdirectorate; the operations Sub-directorate carried the operations. We achieved the
formation of a management team that did not exist.
According to INE managers and other experts interviewed, another lesson learned
from the 2012 census mistakes was expert advice and collaboration. Therefore, by 2017, the
INE set up an expert advisory committee, worked closely with CELADE, and emphasized
relations with other agencies, both at central (other ministries) and local levels. A census
team professional commented on the importance of resuming collaboration with the UN, “it
was very important to talk with CELADE, because they know what has happened with
censuses in other countries, and talked with other countries and asked them: ‘What
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happened? What did they do?’” The INE worked intensively to collaborate with different
organizations, municipalities, NGOs, unions, the private sector, universities, and many other
(Emol, 2017a). Interviewees stated that thanks to these efforts, the INE could attract
volunteers, coordinate training, provide information, and persuade the population to
participate actively in the census.
Unlike the 2012 census, the 2017 census developed a complex communication
strategy with an emphasis on citizens and informational campaigns in line with an idea of
public pedagogy; for example, the educational campaign starred by the famous puppets of
“31 Minutos,” which placed a focus on recovering the census history, presenting the type of
respondents and its particularities, the role of the censista, and presenting the survey´s
questions (31 Minutos, 2017). Similarly, the 2012 version had several weaknesses in training,
and for a de facto census, adequate preparation is even more critical, as it is for volunteers.
Interviewees mentioned various efforts to ensure coverage and quality of the training process
in the 2017 version, such as detailed manuals and support audiovisual systems (Censo2017,
2017a). In general, actors agreed they learned from past mistakes and had a favorable opinion
of training achievements, as detailed by an INE professional,
There was a lot of learning. For example, about training too, that is, the mistakes that
were made in training in 2012 were not made again here; maybe others, but not the
same. There were many things known about what we have to be cautious about,
because someone would say: ‘look out, this happened in 2012,’ and when, in addition
they tell you: ‘and in 2002 we did this, then we already tested this, 2012 this,’ then
little by little collecting the experience.
Along the same lines, census supervision was an especially weak point in 2012, so
this time the INE designed an online supervision system that delivered information minute by
minute and was used by several governmental agencies at different levels to verify progress,
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identify areas that were lagging behind and to re-distribute censistas. Interviewees agreed the
system was a significant contribution; a census team member pointed out: “for me, the best
decision was the monitoring system that allowed us to know what was happening at each
time of the census day. To identify each censista, all information online.” Similarly, the head
of the population demography area of CELADE emphasized the usefulness of the system:
Ah, something I also want to highlight, because it was fantastic, was the monitoring
and control system for the operation day. We visited the control center and it was very
interesting because the INE had all the census takers’ registry online, very
disaggregated. And then, on the census day, they had the previous registry, and then
the verification of the registry at the time the census takers arrived at the census
center.
Under the Chilean transparency law, each decision and policy step is public, and
though, it can be subject to analysis, oversight, and criticism. Therefore, the last significant
lesson was the importance of transparency in administrative processes, technical foundations,
and through publicity of all information. Thus, the INE made substantial efforts to document
the different stages of the census and its results adequately. In this regard, an INE official
said: “there is tremendous learning from the 2012 census that also reaches other areas: the
transparency. Census traceability, documentation, the decision-making; everything is clear
and transparent.”
The census was during the Bachelet administration, but its results were available in
Piñera’s second administration in 2018. Guillermo Pattillo, the new INE Director, appointed
by Piñera, delivered and validated the census results, ultimately dismissing the insistent
criticisms and legitimizing the INE’s work . Without any mention of the 2012 census data
and with a strictly technical tone, the presentation of results focused on census results only,
such as: the low fertility rate, the greater economic well-being of Chileans, highest levels of
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education attained, and the growing presence of immigrants in the country (INE, 2018a). The
academic community appreciated that Director Pattillo endorsed 2017 census results, thus
closing the 2012 controversy. An expert from the 2012 national inquiry commission
applauded the INE Director, “[he] has made the right decision to reinforce the ongoing
process and no longer confuse public opinion by trying to resurrect a Census that did not
have adequate quality standards” (CNN Chile, 2018). Likewise, a renowned analyst praised
the tone of the presentation of the results,
With sober solemnity, the recently appointed INE director delivered the results last
week. There is much to celebrate in this: the culmination of a formidable task, the
effort of many and the participation of all. We can only congratulate the INE, the
incoming and outgoing authorities who, as befits, have made the institutionality work;
in this case, the statistical institutionality. For citizens, to applaud that we have an
instrument that sheds light on who we are. But, above all, it reinforces confidence in
the continuity and robustness of our public statistics (Méndez, 2018).
The INE Beyond the Census
INE interviewees acknowledged that the intensive work in 2017 bore fruit: the rescue
of citizen values, reliable data for public policies, and recovery of the INE’s damaged
reputation. However, these achievements also meant organizational costs. For a few years,
INE’s main task was the census and only the census, and according to interviewees, the
institution neglected other processes. The modernization and autonomy bill stagnated, and so
did other internal improving processes. An INE manager referred to this: “the rigor of the
census process was impeccable, and therefore, in superfine words, Ximena [INE Director]
´exploited´ the INE, pushed it to the limit.” Referring to the idea of an abandoned INE,
another public official claimed: “What a pity, five years passed, a lot of time passed and
nothing to strengthen the institution [...] It’s like forgetting what happened, covering it up and
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doing a new census. Hey, actually, an institution doesn’t learn that way!” Thus,
unfortunately, recovering the census policy did not necessarily mean strengthening the
organization. The INE still holds a pending debt.
This sense of achievement by the 2017 census contrasts with the INE’s internal
organizational climate. Interviewees from the INE and other INE-related agencies agreed
about the problematic working environment. The intense effort to perform the 2012 census,
the difficult relationship with INE Directors, the subsequent inquiry and audits, and
especially the damage to the institution’s reputation, strongly affected public officials’ selfesteem and left an increasingly deteriorated working climate–confirmed by organizational
climate studies conducted in 2015 and 2017 (Pulso, 2018a). During the Clark administration,
the INE National Association of Officials (ANFINE) made some complaints about the lack
of consideration of INE employees’ demands and opinions and unjustified firings. They even
formally requested the incoming minister of economy to remove Director Clark, and admit
the validity of the 2012 census data (ANFINE, 2014, 2017, 2018a, 2018b). However, these
demands were not accepted by the Government.
At the end of 2018, on the occasion of the annual monetary policy report, the Central
Bank seriously questioned the INE’s employment figures, due to the underestimation of the
contribution to employment of the significant recent immigration, which the surveys did not
capture (Banco Central, 2018). However, the report exempted INE from responsibility, “we
[Central Bank} are not criticizing either employment surveys or the INE. What we are saying
is that given that they [INE] cannot capture a shock that was totally surprising, they should
rely on other sources of information” (Pulso, 2018b). Thus, once again, the INE’s technical
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capacity was called into question. Later, the INE Director acknowledged the survey’s
weaknesses and assured future improvements (Emol, 2019; E&N, 2019a).
However, the questioning of the INE continued. Starting the 2019, another polemic
aroused, and this time regarding the CPI figures. Unlike previous episodes, the new INE
internal audit unit–created by the INE Director–detected a few inconsistencies in the clothing
item of the index, but as with other episodes in the past, the crisis was framed as
“manipulation of figures” (INE Noticias, 2019a). With this, another scandal broke out, the
INE reviewed and corrected the numbers, the chamber of deputies began another special
inquiry, and the newspapers headlined, "A crisis that recalls the 'best census in history'"(DF,
2019).
The year 2020 was not without controversy, either. With a new error in the CPI
figures, this time with electricity prices, issue that triggered Director Pattillo's resignation
(DF, 2020). Evidencing the seriousness of this new situation, the Economy Minister Lucas
Palacios pointed out, “It is not about sweeping the garbage under the carpet; it is about
showing it and generating concrete actions to solve the problems.”(El Mercurio, 2020).
Additionally, the national association of INE public officials declared, “We are facing a
complete failure of a ‘managerialist’ and decontextualized vision of the technical nature of
the statistical institution”(ANFINE, 2020, p. 2). Each of these episodes put the INE once
again in the limelight, with its reputation in doubt. Also, each polemic reinvigorated the
public debate over the strengthening and INE independence, and the government’s
commitment to reactivate the bill that waits in Congress (Pauta, 2019; T13, 2020).
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Next Step: The 2022 Census
Given the risk of the de facto method and consistent with the trend of the region, most
interviewees agreed that the appropriate methodology for 2022 is the de jure census.
However, many were enthusiastic about the citizen feat of 2017 and the power of the
country’s republican tradition. A census team manager pointed out, “there are people who
proposed that the next census could be again with volunteers, because social cohesion and
the celebration of citizen participation, but I think it is super difficult to call volunteers.”
Former INE Director Clark also promotes the de jure format for the 2022 census, “in one day
it’s like laying all your eggs in one basket, in one day if something severe happens you have
no way to deal with it.”
Conversely, some interviewed have a different take on census methodology. In the
words of an international census specialist, “my colleagues are very supportive of the de jure
censuses, I’m not so much, I’m not so dogmatic, because I think it depends on each country’s
socio-historical context and data needs.” Therefore, the country’s idiosyncrasy is a critical
factor for the census success, as described by the following lines of an expert,
If public trust is in a de facto census –and well, public trust is a primary variable in
operations of this type– then if people don’t believe and there is no cultural change
and communication policy to generate trust around the new census, jumping into the
de jure census can be more dangerous.
Despite preferences and opinions about different approaches, the INE announced that
the 2022 census will be conducted under the de jure methodology (Pulso, 2020). However,
beyond de jure or de facto, the debate over census data increasingly points to the importance
of using administrative records to complement or replace census information.
Acknowledging the good quality of Chilean administrative registries and following
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developed country practices, several interviewees believe Chile should shift toward better
data integration and not rely only on the census. This is what an INE high official said: “As a
State, we have to be capable of incorporating administrative data. It is a conversation of
administrative records that allow you to build census variables, and crosscheck them, and
validate them.” However, the coordination and use of data between Chilean agencies still
depend on the approval of the bill, as stated by an ex-INE Director: “within the areas of
improvement, one of the matters is to someday be able to use the administrative records
finally, but for that you need to have access to them, and that requires a legal change.”
Given the urgency of having data, the 2017 census was abbreviated, with only 21
questions. Thus, there are many unexplored topics since the 2002 census, and therefore also
many expectations regarding what should be asked in the first full version in 20 years. With
only two years before the next census, preparations are already underway, considering for
example, the participation process with citizen organizations and public agencies regarding
information needs for the design of the 2022 census questionnaire (INE Noticias, 2019c,
2019d). Also, it is already clear that the census will have technical support from CELADE, as
commented by a UN officer interviewed: “they want our support, because they want to make
things right, because it wasn’t the methodology that failed, what failed was preparation. So
they want to prepare well, and they are on time to do so.”
The census failure deeply disturbed politicians, public officials, the media and the
citizenship, and the effects of the failure are still very much present on some debates and
projects such as: the strengthening and modernization process of the INE, the discussion of
the statistical modernization and autonomy bill, expectations about the next census. Thus, the
INE faces the enormous challenge to overcome the wounds of the 2012 failure and move
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toward a statistical institutionality in line with Chileans’ expectations. With the
announcement of the next census in de jure mode, the unresolved status of the INE's
institutionality bill, and recurring concerns about the quality of INE's work, here concludes –
for the purposes of this dissertation– the narrative of the 2012 census failure in Chile.

Supported by diverse secondary sources and especially by the protagonists' voices,
this chapter provided a rich and detailed narrative of the census case in four moments or
stages. The case description offered valuable information about the actors, its opinion and
perceptions, the census policy and decision-making, the organizations involved and their
dynamics, as well as the social, cultural, and political circumstances under which the census
events were deployed. Therefore, and following the Lenses Framework, this description is at
the service of the different analyses presented in the following chapters.
Diagram N.8 below temporarily locates the most significant events of the case from
2010 to 2019. Besides, the diagram observes those years where many events occur and other
years with fewer relevant events linked to the census case, which is represented by the size of
the circles in the timeline. Complementary to this, Appendix N.5 provides a brief description
of the most important events of the case from 2010 to 2019.
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Diagram N.8. Milestones and Relevant Events of the Case of the 2012 Census in Chile
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CHAPTER 6
POLICY FAILURE. ANALYSIS FROM THE POLICY LENS

Based on the case narrated in Chapter Five, this section analyzes the case of the 2012
census failure through the policy lens. Relying on the literature on policy analysis, public
policy research, implementation and evaluation, this lens takes as its purview the census and
the elements that lead to failure. In this way, the policy lens considers the census policy as a
unit of analysis and interrogates it from different concepts and distinctions from literature.
According to the policy cycle framework and its stages—problem identification and
agenda-setting, formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation (Jann & Wegrich,
2007; Birkland, 2014)—a census is a very particular policy. Unlike other policies, for a
census, the identification of the problem at the policy formulation stage is less relevant in the
policy process. The foundations of running a census and the goals to achieve are welldefined. Different actors agree upon the significance to enumerate and characterize the
population, and following the international conventions and internal laws, it is mandatory to
run censuses at least every ten years. Therefore, the census policy process emphasizes other
elements of the policy cycle such as the specific design of the policy, the implementation,
and subsequent evaluation. Based on the abundant evidence gathered in this study, the policy
lens allows identifying several weaknesses in the 2012 census formulation, especially the
abrupt change in the census strategy and limited time for planning and proper adaptations. It
also delves into the main difficulties in implementing the census, including recruitment,
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training of pollsters, supervision, and administrative support processes. Finally, regarding
evaluation, this lens investigates the controversy of the numerous evaluations of the 2012
census, the criteria used, and the actors and their different perceptions. Appendix N.4
presents maps of themes and codes for each one of the four policy stages of problem
identification and agenda-setting, formulation, implementation and evaluation.

6.1.

Policy Formulation
Chile was one of the first Latin American countries to systematize population counts.

Records show that the first population counts in Chile were in 1812–1813, and the first
official census was carried out in 1835; also, that same year, the country's statistical office
was born, which later would constitute the National Institute of Statistics, INE. Thus, with
only a few exceptions (1854, 1905), the censuses in Chile have been carried out successfully
every ten years (INE, 2009; Memoria Chilena, 2019). Until 1940 censuses were only
population counts, but since 1952 and in line with international trends, the counts in Chile are
censuses of population and housing (INE, 2020). Population and housing censuses preceding
the 2012 census were conducted under the de facto modality, and although countries in the
Latin American region had already moved toward the de jure strategy, until September of
2011 the 2012 Chilean census was prepared under the traditional de facto approach.
Depending on the literature, the selection of alternatives and decisions on the specific
policy design is a particular phase of the policymaking process. This stage is labeled,
alternatively, policy proposals (Dunn, 2004), policy adoption (Anderson, 2014), or policy
formulation (Gupta, 2011; Jordan & Turnpenny, 2015), as well as a critical piece at the
implementation stage (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983). Whether the policy's design is
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understood as the last step of policy formulation or the beginning of the implementation
process, the analysis of the diverse information gathered revealed that the decision-making
process regarding the 2012 census was far from meeting the minimum standards of quality.
Some of the main elements concerning the formulation phase that contributed to the census's
failure are analyzed below.
The first element points to the abruptness of the decision, the lack of time. Given the
pressures of the student movement, the sensitive political climate of 2011, and the potential
threat to the de facto census under preparation, the INE modified the census design just a few
months before starting the population count. Although the decision was made in a few days
and authorities did not communicate it transparently, the consequences were enormous. The
need for more time for an adequate methodological change was not considered. For the vast
majority of interviewees, the lack of time was the main reason for the failure. The INE
Director Clark explained the importance of time: “censuses, normally worked with years of
preparation, never less than three years, can be around four, five years at times, but six
months is too narrow a period to adjust something as fundamental as the modality of a
census” (El tipógrafo, 2015).
As described in the case, the challenge of change was overwhelming. In just a few
months, the INE, and particularly the census team, had to modify the entire strategy,
including enumeration logistics, recruiting of interviewers, training, supervision,
questionnaires materials, and much more. In short, there was not enough time to adopt the
new design and make the necessary transformations to ensure the proper development of the
policy according to the new format. As stated by an expert from CELADE, “The logic of this
census is very different, and also there was very little time to prepare if you consider all the
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logistics and the conceptual challenge involved.” Likewise, another expert stated: “and the
countries that have started this path [de jure census], some of them some time ago, use much
more time for the preparation of the census" (E&N, 2013a).
This abrupt change contradicts international standards of UN and expert advice,
which recommends great caution when making changes to census methodologies, especially
those that require time and necessary testing; also, they insistently point out the complexity
of censuses and the importance of proper preparation, “planning can be regarded as the core
of the census phases and the processes that is most critical to the completion of a successful
census” (UN, 2016, p. 9).
Another critical element was the basis for the decision. As stated in the case, the main
reason for modifying the census strategy was the pressure of the student movement on
Piñera’s government and the future census –by not having enough volunteer censistas or that
the social movement could boycott the operation on census day. Therefore, the decision on
changing the methodology—and also to not postpone the date—was undoubtedly a political
decision. The political basis of the shift was widely disapproved by stakeholders, but
especially by experts and statisticians, who, while understanding that there was an actual risk
to the census run by volunteers, considered that the decision was not technically
substantiated. Thus, the disputes over the grounds of the decision return to the classic debate
about how to assess the feasibility of public policy (Meltsner, 1972; Majone, 1975) and the
tension between the technical and the political (Heinelt, 2006).
It is essential to consider that the political pressure of the student social movement
was very strong, and therefore the threat to the success of the census under preparation was
real and not just a political maneuver. Hence, the de facto 2012 census, as a public policy,
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was at risk at that time, and modifications and even a change in strategy seemed reasonable
from a political and technical point of view. However, the INE authorities did not have the
technical knowledge to make an adequately informed and rigorous decision about the census
design. Accordingly, while the political grounds of the shift of census modality were
substantial, the technical foundations were fragile. The following quote from the advisor of
the INE Director at the time and part of the small group who made the decision corroborates
the lack of technical foundations of the methodological change,
The decision was not technical; the decision was political and super irresponsible. [...]
What antecedent did we have? Nothing! Just the marches in the streets. It was a super
political analysis, or just a political one. Because we did not have any certainty, we
did not have any information that told us the political risk was so significant as to
change the methodology at that stage of the game. That is the issue, cachai?
Closely related to the above, another element that affected the decision on change and
its characteristics was the lack of participation. The current political pressure and the INE
Director's distrust of the INE professionals led to the decision on the change being taken
“between four walls” by a small group of people, where the only person with any experience
in censuses was the head of the census. While INE authorities held some consultations with
experts and a few INE managers, those conversations were merely formal, as the decision on
the change was already made.
Given the importance of the census for the country, and the high complexity of the
proposed changes, it would have been preferred to consult experts, to analyze the de jure
census implementation in other countries of the region, and thus, receive all necessary
required support to achieve an adequate transition from the de facto census toward the de
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jure. None of that happened, which shows the isolation of the INE authorities from the INE
itself and also from other organizations and actors with statistical or census expertise.
Thus, the decision to change expresses the underestimation of the complexity of the
census task. The initial formulation had embedded the simplistic idea that the most
significant difference between de facto and de jure census was that the latter had more time
to conduct the surveys in the territory. This consideration expresses how many policy edges
were not weighed, not in logistics, resources, or the type of data collected. Thus, there was
ignorance about the conceptual implications of this change, as one of the experts interviewed
narrated,
This census not only changed the operations of how to do it, but the whole concept
also changed, and nobody analyzed what this meant for population projections, what
it meant for public policies. For example, for the allocation of communal funds,
nobody examined in depth what it meant for the sampling frame and how to put it
together when you have complicated situations, a lot of other implications were not
seen, and that was because of the conceptual change.
Another essential element to understanding the decision on change and its context
was the lack of leadership in census matters. During the preparation time, the 2012 census
had six census leaders, each of whom had different perspectives to cope with the census,
leading the census team, but with no clear or coherent direction. In the words of an INE
official, “the INE was bouncing, and the census was bouncing and bouncing, as it assumed a
person as a leader, then assumed another, then assumed another, then, in the end, you
realized the census had no direction." Another INE professional similarly pointed out,
“[T]hen this census started limping from the moment you had many bosses with different
visions, and with a team where the large part was new without experience in the census.”
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Even before the modification of the methodology in 2011, there were critical
technical arguments about the census within the INE, particularly on how much participation
the census questionnaire should have, and how to achieve data transparency according to
current times. However, and given the high turnover of census leaders, these demands did not
come to fruition; the issues remained mostly unresolved, and by 2011 the 2012 census in its
traditional method came with significant delays and ambiguities. This antecedent means that
long before the change of strategy, the census already carried weaknesses in planning.
Regarding the census team, those professionals within the INE responsible for
carrying out the census project, the team was very unstable over time and it lacked
professionals with experience in census operations. Different interviewees stated that the
census has never been a priority project for the INE (such as the CPI or employment
surveys), so the census team was extremely marginal to the INE, and therefore never
garnered the best professionals. So minor was the importance of the census unit within the
INE that when an INE manager performed poorly, was politically conflictive, or had other
problems, INE authorities transferred the professional to the census team. One INE manager
referred to the lack of priority of the census unit: "Instead of saying that the census is the
largest project and therefore I have the best people, there was the idea that those who are
punished go to the census."
Thus, the high turnover of the head of the census, the lack of leadership in census
matters, and the team’s overall weakness were fertile ground for a methodological change
without significant opposition or adequate safeguards. The following quote from an INE
professional shows the census team and INE professionals were not able to raise their voices
and adequately give alerts about the technical risks on the strategy change:
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I feel that there was a political decision to change the methodology for an obvious
reason, but mainly the ‘Jiminy cricket’ [the alert] failed. I think someone should have
raised their hand and warned: let's see, this is super complex, we are not prepared to
do it, and if we are going to do it, we have to be careful with the omission rates.
Thus, there were several elements at the INE and in the census team that contributed
to the difficulties of the census endeavor, but the decision to change the census strategy (and
the characteristics of the decision) was a critical component toward the failure. However, the
policy process is more complicated than the formulation. Thus, it may happen that even if the
policy decision is suboptimal, the implementation can compensate for poor planning and
policy design.

6.2.

Policy Implementation
Following the heuristic of the policy cycle, once the decision has been made, the

implementation process begins. The study of policy implementation began with the seminal
work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1984), examining how great policy expectations are
dashed in the complexity of implementation. From this perspective, the decision is only the
trigger that initiates a complex process of implementation: “An authoritatively adopted
policy is ‘only a collection of words’ prior to implementation. At most, it is a point of
departure for bargaining among implementers” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984, p. 166).
Likewise, for Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983), implementation is “the carrying out of a basic
policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of
important executive orders or court decisions” (p. 20). Of the many contributions from the
field of policy implementation, this study emphasizes the “top-down” implementation
approach (Pülzl & Treib, 2006). The main element of the approach is the idea that the policy
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is formulated at the “top” or the center of the government and then implemented by the
agencies, with a clear separation between the formulation and the implementation stage of
the policy process. It is a normative and hierarchical perspective, where the critical step is the
proper and legitimate policy decision. Therefore, when the expected results are not achieved,
it is understood that the policy fails, deviates from its initial mandate, or has suffered an
“implementation deficit” (Hupe, 2011; Hupe et al., 2014).
The hierarchical normative implementation approach is reasonably straightforward to
apply to the 2012 census case. The census policy had a clear, normative, and legitimate
mandate, emanating from the national level, to enumerate and characterize the people living
in Chile. There was a widespread consensus about the importance of the policy and a general
knowledge about what the census implied in practice, which was a standard application of a
questionnaire to households and families all over the country by a certified censista.
Therefore, the census case evinced the significant separation between the formulation of the
policy—with the decisions made by INE top authorities—and the implementation stage. The
distance and lack of coherence between the policy idea and policy implementation are
expressed in the absence of clarity of the means to fulfill the goals, the high expectations, the
decreased commitment and support for the policy, lack of proper resources, and the
inadequacy of controlling mechanisms, among other elements.
Thus, the implementation literature emphasizes that problems in public policy arise
because the formulation stage does not foresee the numerous complexities of
implementation, which was clearly observed in the census case and severely affected the
progress of the census. Some of the unforeseen elements were the resignation and very high
rotation of census takers, which led those in charge of the territory to dedicate a lot of time
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and effort to replace censistas, not to mention increased recruiting and training. Reports show
that only 73.62% of the censistas received complete training, the rest may have received
partial or no training (INE, 2013b) Census recommendations, handbooks and specialized
literature identify training as a critical element for a good census; therefore, that more than a
quarter of the census takers were not properly trained was a determining factor in coverage
problems and poor classification. Another unforeseen element is the limited and inadequate
use of the census progress monitoring system, the CPCS. On the one hand, the problems
during enumeration in the territory led to delays in the progress records, and on the other
hand, supervisors and authorities did not make adequate use of the information available in
the system to correct deficiencies in time.
The policy failure literature analyzes the role of decision makers and how their
characteristics and behavior affect the policy. It states that many of the disasters are due not
to the initial difficulties but to the actors' inability to deal with those problems during
implementation, which eventually worsens and enlarges the problems. Similarly, Neupert
(2017a, 2017b), in his work The Fallacy of Planning analyzes the difficulties of censuses in
achieving the expected results. The author points to the existence of cognitive biases of those
who run, plan, and operate censuses that lead to excessive optimism and then to making bad
decisions. Thus, and referring to the Chilean census, Neupert points out that decision makers'
cognitive biases led to ignoring warnings and countless available information that could help
reduce difficulties: "alternative possibilities were not considered, despite the availability of
manuals and experiences in other contexts" (2017a, p. 9).
In implementation research, it is commonly understood that some policy problems
arise from an inadequate definition of the goals or the desired actions to achieve these goals
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(Matland, 1995). For policy, it is not enough to declare and define the goals, but it is also
necessary to structure the implementation process, that is, the mechanisms to accomplish
those goals (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983). Given the limited time to re-make the entire
census process according to the de jure methodology, the INE was unable to prepare for
policy implementation, leading to a poorly-structured execution. Evidence of poor
implementation provided in the case description include: the miscalculation of the number of
enumerators required, ambiguities about the census workers’ job, training difficulties, and
poor control, among others.
In line with the definition of objectives and their relationship with the
implementation, Matland (1995) offers an interesting model to understand what happened in
the implementation process according to two dimensions of the policy: ambiguity and
conflict, presented in the Diagram N.9 below. Ambiguity indicates how well defined are the
goals, means, and roles for the implementation, and conflict refers to the level of agreement
and congruency of the goals between actors and organizations. Thus, low conflict and low
ambiguity are characteristic of an administrative type of implementation, with clear and
shared policy goals, and the resources and the proper mechanisms of compliance determine
the results, which is consistent with the expectations from a policy such as a census.
However, in the current case, given the lack of planning, the census case showed high
ambiguity in implementation. Although the census goals appeared to be clear (to count and
characterize the population), the evidence from the case shows that the necessary resources
were not available and the means to achieve the goals were not clear enough for different
actors (census team, experts, media, censistas, citizens). Thus, this lack of coherence was
gradually revealed throughout the census enumeration.
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Regarding conflict, contrary expectations concerning this type of structured and
standardized policies, the change of strategy generated disagreements between actors, and
distrust in citizenship. Therefore, this led to highly ambiguous implementation with
significant degrees of conflict. Following Matland's model, when implementation presents
both high ambiguity and high level of conflict, it is a symbolic type of implementation;
typically this type of policy plays a role in confirming goals and reaffirming commitment to
values and principles: “policies that invoke highly salient symbols often produce high levels
of conflict even when the policy is vague" (1995, p. 168). Consequently, the 2012 census
implementation shows significant signs of symbolic implementation given the permanent
resistance and disapproval of the new census strategy and its “more professional” approach
with paid census takers, contrary to the versions based on volunteers and with a democratic
tone.
Diagram N.9. Matland´s Ambiguity and Conflict Matrix
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The implementation literature also considers how organizational characteristics affect
the performance of the policy. In his classic work, Wilson (1989) emphasizes the
complexities of public organizations and notices that the characteristics of the agencies shape
and transform the policy implementation in different ways. There are two interesting
considerations about the agencies and the likelihood of successful policy implementation: the
first is if policy results can be measurable (the outcomes), and the second is if the activities
and tasks that the agency does can be observed (the outputs). Different implementation
challenges depend on how observable the outputs are and how measurable the policy
outcomes are. Ideally, the census policy should have worked as a "production agency" where
the outputs and outcomes were highly observable and highly measurable, and managers
would have had the opportunity to design a compliance system for an efficient and
standardized result (1989, pp. 159–160).
According to Wilson's model, one of the problems faced by managers in production
agencies is that they tend to pay the most attention to those more easily measurable results to
the detriment of those that are less observable or quantifiable. Thus, INE's focus on
advancing the census at the household level led to critical errors in its classification—
uninhabited households rather than absent residents—, lack of thoroughness—stickers in
unregistered housing—, and leaving in second place the quality of the enumeration at the
individual level. In addition, the scarcity and high turnover of censistas and the problems of
housing classification led supervisors to set aside their control tasks to support on-site tasks.
In contrast with previous de facto approaches—single day counts run by volunteers—
this new scheme should have resulted in more control over the enumeration and the
possibility to correct errors and even revisit houses and redo enumerations. However, the
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dearth of supervision of the enumerators, the weakness of the control system, as well as other
factors impeded the production of the desired outcomes of the implementation process—the
enumeration—leading to a lost opportunity for corrections and adjustments. Ultimately, the
outputs (i.e. process measures) of the census communicated the failed implementation, but
these sirens sounded too late.
Another critical element for implementation is the expectations and commitment of
the official actors as well as other non-governmental actors over the policy, and changes in
levels of commitment and support for the policy over time (Ryan, 1995; Mazmanian &
Sabatier, 1983). Public policy literature draws attention to the role that expectations have in
the implementation since they can align the actors and their actions toward the achievement
of the objectives. The change in census strategy was framed within the Piñera's government's
promises of higher quality in public management. When President Piñera declared that the
2012 census would be “the best census in the history of Chile,” expectations became a major
problem.
Expectations are a powerful force for policymaking because they involve multiple
pressures and practical tensions. On this idea, McConnell offers the metaphor of "policy
traps," referring to all that pressure on the government when facing a complicated issue, but
also knowing that it doesn't have the capacity to respond accordingly (McConnell, 2020).The
President`s statements exposed the census to the scrutiny of the public, media, and political
actors, generating enormous pressure on the INE.
Furthermore, the commitment of the actors with the policy was diminishing over time
as more and more difficulties appeared during the implementation. Complementary to the
above, the citizens and the media showed their displeasure and disappointment in the absence

243

of census takers at their doors or "stickers" that erroneously classified households as already
counted. So, despite the numerous efforts of the INE managers all over the country, there
were many problems: the turnover of interviewers, the unexpected difficulties in the field, the
misclassifications of houses, the pressure of the media, the lack of collaboration with Chile’s
citizens–the traditional partners in the de-facto census scheme. All of these difficulties
reduced the support and commitment of the INE officials themselves with the census project.
The implementation literature also highlights the importance of having adequate
resources to carry out the policy goals (Ryan, 1995; Pülzl & Treib, 2006), and as stated in the
case chapter, this was a particularly weak point for the 2012 census. Given the reliance on
newly hired enumerators instead of volunteers and the longer duration of the census, the INE
authorities requested additional resources from the ministry of economy; the National
Congress then approved this request. However, the INE had no experience in this type of
census, did not carry out the necessary pre-tests to calculate workloads, and did not consult
experts with experience in surveys. Thus, the budget was based on generalized and
unexamined assumptions. The amount of funds requested by the authorities were finally
poorly calculated, underestimated by at least 23% (INE, 2013b, p. 20). Even though some of
the INE managers quickly realized those resources were insufficient, the INE authorities did
not dare to demand the additional funds needed, for fear that this calculation error would be
exposed and generate undesirable political consequences.
A lack of resources was clear from the very beginning and was a constant limitation
throughout the implementation. For example, the number of people to be trained was
reduced, the control system based on cell phones was discarded, and the educational program
for the population eliminated. Also, the lack of resources limited the access to transportation
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of censistas and supervisors, particularly in rural areas and isolated sectors. INE authorities
made calculation errors first, and then, did not correct the mistakes. In line with the idea of
avoidability highlighted by policy failure literature, the scarcity of resources that caused
many problems could have been avoided.
The top-down implementation perspective emphasizes control and hierarchy as
critical elements to ensure compliance with policy goals. In the 2012 census, the lack of
controls on census takers and the flaws of the supervision system—both of its design and its
use—showed many weaknesses. Although the new census featured a new control system and
monitoring tools, the administrative records confirmed that the expected controls were not
applied and therefore the information available was not enough nor of sufficient quality to
detect correct errors in time. As stated by the INE CEO: “the decision [census change] was
irresponsible, of that there is no doubt about it. But it was more irresponsible not to control
the census than to have changed the methodology; we could change the methodology; we
could have done it well."
The weakness of the training and the inadequacy of the operation meant that the
implementation did not fully conform to the de jure logic, but in many aspects, it operated
according to the old methodology. Thus, the 2012 census implementation was full of
assumptions, practices, and tools that corresponded to the de facto modality. A few of several
elements that express this lack of coherence were: i) The initial assumption that the surveys
could be applied during weekdays and working hours—in the de facto modality the census
day was a legal holiday, so people waited at home for the censista. ii) The organization and
division of the territories corresponded to de facto modality and initially designed for the
work of a single day. iii) The questionnaire and folder group management system was
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designed for a single day interviewer's workload, and therefore, it did not work well in the
new modality, as a later report confirmed: "the calculations in terms of the daily productivity
of each census taker, taking as a reference the coverage achieved in a de facto census, turned
out to be assumptions not applicable to the reality of a de jure census" (INE, 2014b). iv) The
confusion between absent residents and unoccupied houses, which caused significant
omission problems, also corresponds to the de facto logic.
Thus, the implementation of the census could not solve the difficulties that already
came from the formulation stage, and contributed to more complications. Even though the
new census policy had a clear mandate, the implementation process was not structured
enough, nor did it have proper resources or adequate control mechanisms. Also, the
commitment of the implementing officials–INE employees and census takers–diminished
over time, and as problems arose, so did the support and confidence in the quality of the
process by stakeholders, authorities, and citizens.

6.3.

Policy Evaluation
Continuing with the use of policy cycle heuristics, the final stage of the process is the

evaluation, which can lead to the termination of the policy, redesign, development of
feedback mechanisms, and diverse patterns of policy learning (Jann & Wegrich, 2007). The
census case shows interesting tensions in this respect because of the numerous evaluations
performed and the intense debate about the failure or non-failure of the census, which finally
resulted in the rushed abbreviated census in 2017.
Censuses usually take place every ten years and therefore the assessment of the
previous census and learning obtained will be reflected in the next count. Thus, the pace of
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the census is very different from other policies, and so is the evaluation. Before the 2012
episode, assessing a census was a strictly technical process, carried out within the INE, in
collaboration with specialized organizations such as CELADE, and without the participation
of the citizenry or political actors. Undoubtedly, as seen in the case description, the 2012
census was particularly controversial and evaluation didn't follow these regular channels and
was suffused with controversy.
The census literature points out that the quality of a census goes beyond its statistical
accuracy and rigor; also, "[Census] quality has to do with user needs and satisfaction" (UN,
2008, p. 54). Therefore, evaluating a census is a complex task that is increasingly
approximated as a multidimensional concept. To assess census quality, the UN recommends
considering at least the following dimensions: relevance, completeness, accuracy,
comparability, coherence, timeliness, punctuality, clarity, accessibility, and metadata (UN,
2008; CEPAL, 2011a). For example, census data may be accurate and meet high statistical
standards, but not deliver information relevant to user needs; or data may be accessible
across different platforms, but unclear or difficult to understand. Given these dimensions,
scarce resources, and the diversity of user needs, evaluating a census is undoubtedly a major
challenge. However, the challenges of assessing a census are no different from other policies.
Neither are the inherent epistemological and methodological conflicts regarding evaluation,
as well as the tensions over the idea of success and failure.
The field of policy evaluation is full of different perspectives and conceptions. As
examined in the literature review section, there are several perspectives and benchmarks to
understand policy failure and success. In terms of failure, some of the considerations to
define a policy as unsuccessful may be quite diverse: inability to achieve the planned goals,
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lack of effectiveness, lack of social legitimacy, failure to meet client expectations, or
opposition from key stakeholders, among many others (Vedung, 2006; Howlett, 2012;
McConnell, 2015). Confirming what this specialized literature points out, in the case of the
2012 census different actors had diverse parameters to understand what happened. There was
also a strong disagreement on the criteria for assessing failure (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996).
Different investigations of the 2012 census had diverse emphases, methods, and
purposes. The commission of national experts evaluated the census considering the training,
the survey process, the quality of the data obtained, the omission rate, as well as
organizational considerations at the INE. This investigation concluded that errors were
severe, the data were not reliable for public policy purposes, and they strongly advocated for
running a new census in an abbreviated format as soon as possible. These are clear elements
of support for the proposition that the census was a “failure.” Unlike the previous
investigation, the commission of the international census consultants focused their inquiry on
the quality of the data obtained, its usability, the possibility of correcting and rescuing the
data, and assessing the census as utilizable and of good quality.
The subsequent special investigation commission of the chamber of deputies focused
on the accusation of data manipulation and administrative and political irregularities of the
census process, emphasizing political responsibilities, especially of the INE Director and his
closest advisors. Following that, the prosecution office conducted its inquiry, investigating
the possible commission of a crime in data imputations and the erroneous presentation of the
census results. The prosecutor concluded that, despite several irregularities and faults
detected, given the existing legislation, mishandling census data did not constitute a crime
and desisted from further investigation. Finally, there was the evaluation carried out by
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general comptroller, with a focus on procedures and the compliance with public
administration regulations, that found numerous anomalies and non-compliance of rules and
requirements, so it was ultimately the comptroller who deemed the census as "illegal."
As observed, these evaluations contain different methodologies, assumptions, and foci
on the census’s singular event. This battery of assessments generated many tensions and
intense debate about what was evaluated, how it was assessed, from what perspective, how
was the quality of the analysis, as well as the technical capabilities, political intentions and
the evaluator biases. Disputes over evaluation go beyond the evaluation committees. The
2012 census resulted in highly public and contentious disagreements among the media,
political actors, experts, census specialists, and citizens regarding the nature of the
evaluation, the quality of the evidence, and ultimately what constituted a successful versus a
failed census.
Most of the actors interviewed considered the inability to reach the goal of expected
coverage a primary determinant of a failed census. According to the literature, the
construction of the idea of policy failure is much more complicated than the incapacity to
meet the proposed goals. However, the national commission of experts’ evaluation marked a
point of no return in the idea of failure. When the commission announced the census
omission by 9%, higher than previous censuses, higher than other countries of the region and
much higher than expected, the idea of census’s failure settled deeply in public opinion. This
situation points to the idea of social construction of failure that is so relevant in the literature
(Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996; McConnell, 2015). Once the 2012 census was framed as failure by
the commission of national experts and then confirmed by President Piñera's apologies, the
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idea of failure was installed, and despite subsequent efforts to recover the data, there was no
way to turn back.
However, the judgment on the failure of the census differs between actors. While for
the public, the media, and most of the interviewees, the high omission was the determinant of
the failure, for other actors the discussion goes beyond the 9% figure by pointing out some
nuances about what is behind that number. For example, the debate among census specialists
and statisticians goes beyond census coverage or omission rate to address the quality of the
data gathered and the usefulness of that information for decision-making, An INE
demographer explained,
Our conviction that the census was bad was not because the omission rate was much
higher than the historical one, the 9%, but because it was an omission rate that was
very, very asymmetrically distributed at a regional, local and demographic level, and
thus distorted the basis of the information.
Along the same lines, another census expert pointed out the severity of the data bias,
I do not understand how there are statisticians and statistical directors who say that a
lousy census is a good sample, which is what Coeymans said, and that's what Labbé
said, ‘But we have millions of records.’ Sure, but biased, and if it's biased, I cannot
make a population inference, and I cannot do public policy, because it is biased
already!
Beyond the omission rate and expert criteria, the census case reveals different
benchmarks under which different actors understand the failure. Some interviewees
emphasized the waste of public resources; others argued that the census failure was
eminently political and mostly constructed by the opposition parties to damage Piñera's
government; others considered the whole situation as a communication failure because of the
inability of the government to handle media and public perception about census problems.
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For a group of interviewees, the collapse of the census was due to the INE’s political
and technical incapacity to rescue some data and learn about what happened. In this
connection an INE interviewee stated, “Yes, the 2012 census was a failure. But the failure
was not because of all the garbage, no! There was not the slightest rescue of what was good,
nor learning; there wasn’t!” For other interviewees, the cause of the failure was the lack of
transparency of the whole census process, because bad practices were observed in the
formulation, implementation, and also in the delivery of results. Thus, and referring to the
INE authorities' lack of honesty, an INE manager pointed out, "You can make a mistake, you
may have made a bad decision, you may not achieve the expected results, but in an honest
way." For other actors, the critical factor making the census a failure was losing confidence
in the data. "The failure,” stated one INE manager, “we regressed in credibility and
confidence. Those factors distinguish stages of development, believing or not in an official
figure is what distinguishes a developed country from an undeveloped one.” Likewise,
another expert interviewee declared: “the problem is that the census was politically burned
out, and could no longer be fixed. No one was going to trust that census.” Hence, there is no
single or simple explanation. Indeed, all of these interpretations of the census failure are
aligned with policy failure characteristics and their convoluted nature, features widely
emphasized in the literature.
The case shows the multiplicity of criteria to judge and evaluate the failure.
Additionally, this debate sparked a reflection on how to evaluate a census, as expressed by
one INE high official:
How do you rate a census with 90% coverage? You would say: it depends. Because if
this were a developed country, I would say it is of poor quality, but if it is in Haiti, I
would say it is excellent. Therefore, you cannot catalog for the result; you have to
251

look for other elements, other characteristics. Because, when you evaluate a census,
you need to have all of that in perspective, where it is being developed, with what
tools it is being designed, and who are the ones that are evaluating.
The discussion among specialists, experts, and politicians about what elements should
be considered for the evaluation, who should have done the assessment, and how the census
should have been evaluated was relentless and heated. Undoubtedly, one of the most
conflicting situations was the discrepancy between the census assessments of the national
expert commission and the international specialists. The tensions were in several regards: the
disagreement over the criteria used and the technical quality, timing and opportunity, the
political biases that could influence the evaluations, as well as recommendations on the use
of data for public policies. All of these again are very much in line with the literature on
policy failure and the incessant discrepancies that trigger these phenomena.
As we have seen, the considerations and debates on the quality of the 2012 census,
the evaluations carried out, and the ideas of failure were numerous. Given this complicated
scenario, the new government of Bachelet announced a new census in 2017 under the
traditional de facto strategy, which marked the cessation of the debates, at least for a while,
and a clear political gain for the incoming administration.
From the policy cycle point of view, the different evaluations (political, technical, and
administrative) finally determined that the innovative de jure census had effectively failed.
Thus, although contrary to the regional trend on censuses, the 2017 census returned to the
traditional de facto strategy.
Under the enormous pressure of having up-to-date data for policy decision-making,
five years after the failed census in 2012, the INE carried out a new census in an abbreviated
version and under de facto methodology. With an omission rate of 4.7% (Gob.cl, 2018), the
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2017 census was considered successful by the INE, international organizations, political
actors, and citizens. A blogger highlighted the recovery of the democratic sentiment: “The
last census revived community feelings, […] thus extending a tradition as old as the love for
this homeland” (Hopenhayn, 2017). A political analyst commented: “No one can deny that
the census process was a success as far as citizen participation is concerned” (Navia, 2017).
Likewise, CELADE's Demographics Officer emphasized some positive elements of the 2017
census:
There was a very coordinated effort among the different units of the census, statistics,
logistics, etc. This was an advantage to other censuses and also an example of how to
solve many things in the future. What I saw there was a lot of innovation.
The 2017 census evaluation was positive, the symbolic value of the de facto census
for the actors and especially for the citizens, was a determining element for the census
success. So much so, although the technical arguments are against it, many actors–including
politicians, experts and even INE officials– considered the balance tipped towards a de facto
for the 2022 census. However, and based on technical arguments, the INE announced the
2022 census would be the under the de jure methodology (Pulso, 2020). Accordingly,
preparations are underway, including the definition of the questionnaire's topics through the
participation of government agencies and citizen consultation (INE Noticias, 2019c, 2019d).

This chapter reviewed the 2012 census case in Chile using the policy lens,
emphasizing those elements of the policy that influenced the failure of the census. Both the
policy formulation and implementation stages exposed severe deficiencies in the policy, and
the evaluation stage revealed the tensions inherent in policy failure cases. According to the
policy cycle and the main stages—formulation, implementation, and evaluation—the
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following Diagram N.10 synthesizes the critical elements of the analysis from the policy
lens.

Diagram N.10. Analytical Keys From the Policy

Policy Formulation
•From de facto toward de jure census
•Authorative and rushed decision
•Lack of time to prepare
•Lack of participation
•Lack of census leadership
•Underestimation of the complexity of the census

Implementation
Re-Formulation
•De facto census in 2017

•No previous experience
•Lack of resources
•Top-down, hierarchical approach
•Distance between goals and means to fullfill the goals
•Inadequacy of control and supervision mechanisms
•Significant levels of conflict and high ambiguity
•High expectations and low commitments to the goals

Evaluation
•Numerous assesments
•Different benchmarks and methods to asses census quality
•Intense debate regarding evaluation
•Data is not useful for public policy purposes
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CHAPTER 7
POLICY FAILURE. ANALYSIS FROM THE ORGANIZATIONAL LENS

This chapter analyzes the case–available in Chapter 5–through the organizational
lens, focusing on the Chilean National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de
Estadísticas, INE), the agency responsible for carrying out the census as the unit of analysis.
This second lens relies on different organizational literature (organizational theory,
organizational behavior, organizational sociology, and organizational psychology) to explore
the INE dynamics regarding the 2012 census.
Some of the reasons organizations fail to implement policies are due to policymakers'
and legislators' lack of concern over administrative issues and miscalculations of the
organizations' capacity to drive the policy. Too much emphasis has been placed on the policy
formulation and much less—or sometimes none—on the characteristics of the agencies and
the mechanisms and conditions of policy implementation. The role of the organization, its
routines, values, and other characteristics also determine and shape the policy (Derthick,
1990).
There is abundant and diverse research literature on the complex nature of public
organizations. This chapter does not intend to build a novel theoretical perspective, but
instead will explore some organizational features that are associated with the failure of the
2012 census (Rainey, 2009). Therefore, and according to the thorough analysis performed,
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this chapter focuses on the most relevant factors that impacted the census. These are: goals
and values, the structure of the organization, leadership, capabilities and motivation, power
struggles, and decision-making and groupthink. Appendix N.4 presents maps of themes
identified by the content analysis performed.

7.1.

Goals and Values
Organizational goals are defined as “conceptions of desired ends-that participants

attempt to achieve through their performance of task activities” (Scott, 2003, p. 22). A way to
explore the INE's goals is to examine what the INE does as well as formal statements of what
the organization seeks to provide. The INE is one of the oldest public organizations in Chile,
founded in 1843, and is responsible for producing and coordinating the country’s official
statistics. INE's work is complex and covers a variety of areas. Through surveys and other
sophisticated data strategies, the INE collects information all over the country and delivers
data to different users such as companies, government agencies, unions, researchers and the
general public. Currently, the INE develops 70 statistical products, in areas such as social
statistics, agriculture, economics, employment, environment, demographics, and vital
statistics (INE, 2020). Some of the most important products are the National Urban Survey
on Citizen Security, the Consumer Price Index, the National Employment Survey, the Census
of Population and Housing, and the Agricultural Census (INE, 2020).
The INE institutional mission is: “We are the public institution of Chile in charge of
generating the country's official statistics and articulating the National Statistical System,
with the purpose of disposing of quality information for decision making at national and
territorial level” (INE, 2020). Complementarily, the INE’s vision is: "Our statistical
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production will respond, with efficiency, modernity and methodological rigor, to the changes
in Chilean society and territorial needs, seeking to increase the value of statistics for the
development of the country” (INE, 2020). There is agreement among the interviewees that
the INE has a genuine commitment to provide quality statistics to citizens. However, there is
also agreement that INE is still far from achieving these important goals, especially regarding
the expected role on national statistics.
Accordingly, one of the main characteristics of the institution is its commitment to the
production of public value, in the same vein that the literature calls Public Service
Motivation (PSM), that is, those beliefs, values, and attitudes of individuals to go beyond
self-interest, and trigger the desire to serve the abstract idea of the public interest
(Vandenabeele, 2007; Schott et al., 2019). All interviewees agreed that this motivation is
very strong in the INE and its employees, as one INE official states: “the INE’s business is
trust, that is our main product, it’s the public good that we must safeguard." Also, INE
professionals feel that the INE is a unique agency, because, through surveys and concrete
data, it connects citizens with public policy decisions. An INE interviewee echoed, “The INE
does something no other service or other public institution has: that the INE arrives every day
to someone's house."
For INE members, history and achievements are an immense source of pride. There
are many stories of methodological and operational innovations and collective effort to
achieve quality statistical products. These are powerful shared beliefs that operate as
interpretive frames of history and are generally resistant to experience (Levitt & March,
1988). For many, the INE has always been synonymous with "objectivity and trust," values
embedded in the beliefs of its members and citizen perception. Thus, interviewees agreed
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that the INE has always been a technical institution, highly respected by citizens and political
actors. They also underscored the professional commitment of their public officials, the pride
of being INE and belonging to "the big INE family." An informant remembered this feeling
of pride, "they [INE officials] had tremendous pride, that is to say, I always remember in the
conversations they felt very proud that their statistics were stable and not dependent on the
government of the moment."
However, the 2012 census event and the escalating consequences deeply wounded the
INE pride and this strong sense of belonging, as an INE official said, “because somehow,
everyone in the institution, no matter what position within it, administrative, assistant,
everyone lived this [census polemic] as a personal issue, as a grief, it's not just the problem of
the place where you work.” Likewise, another INE high official explained how the census
errors affected INE officials,
There were people in the INE who started out as a pollster, then became a supervisor
and with that work educated their children, that is, there are still people with a sense
of belonging and enormous pride, and those people were affected when they said that
the INE did everything wrong [...] that pride, let's say, was stained in some way.
Although the INE had good reputation and historical prestige, several interviewees
agreed that the INE was, and still is, a precarious public organization failing to meet expected
standards. In the words of an interviewee, "It was obvious that the INE was in, not a crisis,
but even before the census, it came with strong issues of institutional deterioration." In
comparison with other public services of the state of Chile, the INE was lagging. This
fragility of the INE is due to several factors; the most relevant are the institutional
configuration and the lag in modernization processes. On the one hand, emphasized by most
stakeholders and the current bill, is the lack of INE independence from the executive branch;
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it is under the tutelage of the Ministry of Economy, and therefore, it is not an autonomous
body as the most prestigious statistical institutes in the world. The INE Director is a political
trust position. The election of the director relies mainly on the president’s criteria, not
necessarily on management skills, technical expertise, or career achievements, which
contradicts its technical nature. The following quote from an expert expresses the seriousness
of this situation,
The institutionality of the INE is badly made, poorly designed. The INE urgently
needs to have a technical high-level council to ensure technical independence. Today
it’s just another public service of the government, and that cannot be! In what serious
countries does that happen? None!
The INE has been unable to modernize; it is a stagnant organization in terms of its
vision, processes, and management of human, financial, and technical resources. An INE
manager interviewed referred to this idea, “The INE has been left aside, I do not know why
[...] I think it was a precarious institution in human resources, technological resources, in
infrastructure.” Another interviewee pointed out a similar idea referring to the INE at the
time of the 2012 census: “In the INE things were upside down, they did their job, but there
were unclear procedures. In other words, it is a rather precarious public institution, different
from this idea that the INE is super professional.”

7.2.

Organizational Structure
Another essential feature to understand the INE and its role in the census policy is the

structure and characteristics of the organization itself. A formal organization is understood as
“groups of individual members assembled in regular ways and established structures and
procedures dividing and specializing labor, to perform a mission or achieve an objective”
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(Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 145). Some elements of organizational structures are the size,
degree of centralization of decisions, levels of complexity, and the degree of formalization of
practices (Rainey, 2009).
About the size, the INE is a medium-sized agency with around 2,300 staff members
throughout the country in its central and 15 regional offices (INE, 2020). Regarding INE
funding, by 2012, the INE budget was 45 billion Chilean pesos where 17 billion were for the
de jure census; in 2017, the INE budget increased to more than 67 billion and 27 billion
pesos were allocated for the de facto census25 (all figures as of December 2018) (INE, 2020).
Below, Chart N.1 shows the evolution of the INE budget from 2004 to 2019. Accordingly,
there is a clear budget increase in 2012 and 2017, corresponding to the census funding.

25

In 2018 figures, 45 billion of Chilean pesos are equivalent to US$ 57 million, and 67 billion of Chilean pesos

to US$ 85 million.
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Chart N.1. INE Budget 2004-2019
(Millions of Chilean Pesos at 2018)26
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Source: own elaboration based on budget INE law 2004-2019 (INE, 2019)

At the time of the 2012 census until mid-2019, the INE had the following
organizational chart: under the National Director, there are three Sub-directorates,
administrative, technical, and operations, as well as all regional directorates. As in most of
the public institutions in Chile, and given the unitary and centralized structure, the INE
national director concentrates the decision-making; the regional offices replicate the national
structure and follow the decision made by the central level. The most important units for the
INE are the administration, operation and technical Sub-directorate. Diagram N.11 presents
the INE organizational chart in 2012.

26

Complementary to census allocation of resources in census years (2012 and 2017), there are also census

resources in the years before and after each census.
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Diagram N.11. Organizational Chart, INE 2012

National Director

Staff

Operations SubDirectorate

Statistic Infrast.
&Technology Dept.

Technical SubDirectorate

Administration SubDirectorate

Audit Dept.

Internal Control
Dept.

Legal Division

Communications
Dept.

Regional Directions

Institutional
Development Dept.

Source: own elaboration based on the INE integral management balance (INE, 2019)

The chart shows the dependence of the Sub-directorates and departments of the
National Director. Along with the Director, the Sub-directorate s (in color) are the most
important units of the INE. In addition, the INE organizational charts of 2017 and 2019 are
available in Appendix N.6.
However, in line with Meyer & Rowan (1977), the organization's formal structure
does not necessarily reflect how things are actually done. Thus, the INE had a complicated
internal structure, with many units, departments, and sub-departments that work on different
topics and products. An INE professional described how complex the organization is: "The
INE is so big! You work there, but you don't know the whole INE. It's like the elephant story,
some know the trunk, others the tail, others the ears, but the complete elephant is tough to
know."
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The INE tasks’ organization was around different projects such as household surveys,
employment surveys, the CPI, or the census, among many others. Thus, INE's management
model in 2012 focused on products rather than work processes, which required significant
coordination efforts between departments for each of INE's projects. The analysis performed
confirmed the coordination difficulties, the lack of clarity, and the constant stress on officials
caused by INE's working structure. One of the most critical points refers to tensions and
competitions between work teams, especially between the technical and operations Subdirectorates, which, according to some interviewees, were the center of power struggles. This
is confirmed by an organizational culture analysis (CSP, 2016), which, in addition to noting
the absence of mechanisms for assessing processes and products, highlighted these
coordination difficulties: "lack of coordination among work units: inadequate organizational
structure. The current structure favors competition among units, duplication of work and
commands, and ignorance of the work performed by other units” (p. 5).
One of the INE's critical issues is the absence of a permanent census unit or
department within the organization's structure. As a former INE authority pointed out: “The
INE has never had a permanent census department. Never. It has demographers, it has
geographers, but there are no people dedicated between census to census to review, think, or
prepare.” Contrary to a commonly-held idea that the census is the most critical task for a
statistical institute, the census's importance is not echoed in the INE structure or decisionmaking. Historically, the census was an annexed or exceptional project, as a former INE
manager declared, "the INE manages the census as a project apart from the work of the Subdirectorates, though with some communicating vessels."
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Contrary to expectations—a permanent census unit—what happened before the 2012
version was that, in the years previous to a census, INE authorities set up the census team,
taking professionals out from other units, and then, the entire organization got involved in the
census. Before 2012, INE workers’ commitment made up for the lack of resources and
inadequate preparation. INE interviewees remembered that the 2002 de facto census was a
tremendous logistical and technical undertaking with plenty of institutional mystique. All
INE employees did their utmost for the census, because as an INE professional said, the
census "belonged to the whole INE." Consequently, the census was a short-term project for
the INE, and therefore, there were no incentives (neither financial nor political) to invest or
strengthen the project for ten more years. Thus, technical knowledge and practical experience
dissipated and professional teams disbanded over time.
Interviewees agreed that the 1992 census was a great one, but that already the 2002
census was challenging and showed hints of problems yet to come: the difficulty of singleday operatives, hardship in covering certain territories and lack of volunteers. Overall, the
2002 version achieved its objectives and is considered by several stakeholders as a good
census, with great support from relevant actors, reliable data, and a low 3,8% omission
(Tacla, 2006). After the experience of 2002, the need to strengthen the census unit and
formalize hitherto informal practices was clear to many actors. This reinforcement would
have meant strengthening the census team, making it permanent and with more and better
financial and human resources. However, the strengthening of the census unit did not
happen; on the contrary, the team continued being marginal to the INE, with a high turnover
in leadership, lacking resources, and a shortage of any real power. In the following quote, a
former INE manager refers to the idea that the census was never a priority at the INE:
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Although they [INE authorities] said the census was the most critical project for the
INE, in practice, INE Directors did not give it the necessary importance, they did not
ensure the required competencies. They continued working as if the census is a
separate ‘animal,’ from a perspective of voluntarism, almost like it [the census] was
going to grow up alone.
The lack of formalization of the census in the structure of the INE explains, for
example, the absence of detailed documents about census processes, because once the census
project ended, the urgency decayed and the team was gradually dismantled. Therefore, it is
an informal knowledge that rested on particular people; some remained in the INE in other
tasks, and others left the INE. Along these lines, an official of the INE referred to the lack of
systematization of the experience of running a census: "Unfortunately, in these special
projects [such as the census] there is no knowledge management because there is no
repository; there is none. Although the methodology is written, the how, the why are not
written."
This lack of formalization of functions, processes, and coordination has been an
obstacle to achieving goals (Scott, 2003). Faced with these deficiencies, it is not surprising,
then, the emphasis that all INE interviewees place on the importance of experience in
working at the INE or in the census project. Thus, the interviewees stressed the role of
specific people for the achievement of a good census. A former INE manager declared, “the
difference with the previous censuses is that they had Odette Tacla who is an eminence of
censuses” (Cabezas, 2013). Likewise, interviewees also emphasized that, except the head of
census, the professionals of the 2012 census team didn’t have census experience, an INE
interviewed related, "the only one who really had ´gone through´ two censuses, with actual
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implementation experience, was the head of the census project […] But he was the only
one.”
Therefore, unlike the 1992 and 2002 census, where most INE professionals had the
experience of the 1982 and 1992 versions, by 2012, most of experienced professionals no
longer worked at the INE. The interviewees commented that some of them left the
organization searching for better job opportunities, but others left the INE due to changes in
government and INE administration. That's how the head of the census described the
situation: "for the 2012 census there were very few people with that experience, in fact, you
can count with the fingers of a hand the people who had 'gone through' a census " (Carrasco,
2013, p. 5).
This absence of a permanent census unit with adequate capacities is not a recent
concern for INE managers and census experts. However, for the 1992 and 2002 censuses,
and despite difficulties, the INE was able to articulate work teams and come out successful.
However, no doubt those were other times and another INE. According to the interviewees,
in the years 1992 and 2002, it was a smaller INE, more cohesive, and with more "soul" than
the 2012 INE. Also, the nature of the de facto census as a social endeavor and citizen symbol
gave prominence to the INE and, therefore, officials from all areas were actively committed
to achieving a good census. In this regard, a former official commented on the efforts made
to get the entire INE involved in the previous census: "In the 2002 census, director Máximo
Aguilera generated an organizational imprint including a coaching process carried out by an
external company for seven months" (Jara, 2013). For INE workers, especially those in the
institution for a long time, the memory of INE's collective experience of past censuses is
alive and very powerful. These feelings and achievement memories contrast with the 2012
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census, where there was no significant involvement of other units of the INE, not until the
end of the census, when there was no time and the problems were severe, as recalled by an
INE professional:
And the internal discourse to INE officials was that we were going to be able to
continue doing our usual jobs. […] So, when the census operation began, they [the
INE authorities] didn't ask the units for support, because there were fourteen, fifteen
thousand people hired. So, they told us, to the officials, to continue with our routine
tasks because the census was going to work fine.
Despite the decades, previous censuses' experience is still alive in the INE and many
other actors. Thus, for several interviewees, whether or not there is a census unit, the
census’s enormous complexity ultimately requires commitment, leadership, and “mystique”
capable of uniting efforts from numerous actors throughout the country.
In 2019, the INE began a necessary institutional restructuring process based on
international standards of statistical business processes models. It is an ambitious
transformation expected by INE officials, which modernizes the INE and corrects several
deficiencies in its organizational structure and processes (Estrategia, 2019). Some of the most
significant advances are the separation of functions between the technical and operations
Sub-directorates, and a greater emphasis on work processes. Accordingly, the INE declared,
"this reorganization leads to the INE’s statistical production no longer being structured based
on products, but based on processes, thereby achieving gains in efficiency and effectiveness
in the various internal procedures” (INE Noticias, 2019b).
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7.3.

Leadership
Since Max Weber's early works on bureaucracy and types of authority, different

branches of public administration literature emphasize authority and leadership in
organizations (Weber, 2009; Schein, 2004; Parry & Bryman, 2006). The 2012 census case
evinced that the INE's performance is particularly sensitive to leadership styles. The INE's
authority relied on the Director, his/her skills, and its vision for the institution. For the INE,
the lead role goes beyond the idea of influence and coordination of activities toward
achieving objectives, closer to the notion of leadership as a “manager of meaning” (Parry &
Bryman, 2006). For example, the interviewees emphasize the modernizing vision of Máximo
Aguilera (INE Director, 1997–2006), he promoted the improvement of processes, increased
the institution’s funds, and fostered a significant technological update. Under the Aguilera
administration, despite some difficulties, the INE successfully carried out the 2002 census.
The interviewees frequently touched on Aguilera’s leadership in numerous efforts, creating a
commitment of the entire organization to achieve a good census.
Likewise, the interviewees remember the leadership of Mariana Scholnik (INE
Director 2006–2010), a woman with great technical knowledge, who was responsible for
essential changes in the INE organizational structure, improvement of teamwork, and
coordination between units. According to the interviewees, she saw an opportunity to
improve the INE due to Chile's entrance into the OECD, developing an inspiring vision of a
more professional INE, increasing the resources and INE prestige, and, in that way,
strengthening technical capacities. An INE manager remembers those progressive times with
some sadness, "It was a time that was imbued with a lot of mystique because Mariana
Scholnik was very clear about where the Chilean statistics should go, where our public
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statistics were going." Confirming this idea, an INE professional at the time referred to the
Director's vision:
She was very professional, she had more technical knowledge than charisma, but she
knew what she was doing. I will never forget that she always said: 'I’m building the
INE of the future, the INE of ten more years, not the INE of today. Maybe you won't
understand what we're doing now, you just have to trust ten years'. And you’ll realize
that everything that was achieved in the INE is what was founded at that time.
Thus, more or less in tune with the particular views of the previous INE Directors,
interviewees recognized an inspiring vision and modernizing endeavors, as an INE
professional noted, “the different directors who passed through the INE, Máximo Aguilera,
Mariana Scholnik, were making their different efforts to professionalize the INE." However,
due to health problems of Scholnik’s, there was a significant decline in the INE performance
during the latter half of her organizational oversight. In this period, the lack of leadership
generated conflicts between different units, a lack of follow-ups of modernization efforts, and
uncertainty. The interviewees remembered those years as a complicated time for the
institution, with ambiguities and confusion, technical and human tensions; and a sense of
losing the course. In this context of institutional confusion and under President Piñera’s term,
the government demanded Shkolnik’s resignation, and then Francisco Labbé took over as the
Director.
INE officials believed that the Director should come from the organization itself,
someone with high technical knowledge and who knew the organization’s complex
dynamics. So, Labbé was not the Director that the INE expected. He came from the
academy—he was a professor and dean of the economy department at a private university—
though not a statistical expert, and without experience leading organizations, nor the
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knowledge of the public sector’s intricacies. Different interviewees agreed that the choice of
Labbé as Director of the INE was inadequate, as an INE official stated, “Labbé had neither
the character, nor the contacts, nor the wisdom, nor the prudence necessary to take charge of
an institution with this number of officials and with that budget.”
The arrival of Labbé in 2010 to the INE was unusual. In contrast to standard practice
in the Chilean state, whereby directors replace upper management in its entirety when
assuming command, the new Director did not dismiss managers or modify positions; not
even remove the chief of staff—a job that is usually of personal and political trust. According
to those interviewees closest to Labbé, that was an explicit strategy of the Director, as a sign
of trust in INE's technical capabilities and political independence. Other interviewees
understood the absence of changes to Labbé's lack of knowledge about the public sector and
statistical matters; and another group of respondents also thought that for Labbé, the INE was
just a step in his academic career rather than a commitment to public statistics.
Therefore, the structure and INE tasks remained the same, and in practice, the
Director did not get much involved, as one INE manager recalled: “Labbé was a very absent
director, very absent. He was distracted; that is the feeling. I think he always felt like he was
on someone else's farm.” Labbé’s only action was to hire a few personal advisers and
appoint one of those advisers, Mariana Alcérreca, as the CEO of the INE, a special position
Labbé created, but strange for Chilean public agencies; the same CEO referred to her
appointment, “[Labbé], names me—in quotation marks—because the position does not exist;
I was a fee-contract employee, but he names me internally as CEO, which is a figure from a
private structure that does not exist in the public world.”
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Alcérreca is a right-wing commercial engineer with experience in both the private and
public spheres; she knew the INE well because she was a consultant in institutional
management matters. INE officials knew her because of their work together and in general,
had a good opinion about her management knowledge and skills. Thus, without having an
official position or experience in statistical matters, she was the one who defended the census
strategy change before the National Census Committee and participated in all INE key
decisions. As CEO of the INE, she gradually became the Director in the shadows. In the
words of an INE manager, “In the Labbé administration, Mariana Alcérreca was who
actually did the job. She was the Director of the INE.”
At the beginning, Labbé’s decisions were well perceived by managers and officials,
because things did not change much, as one manager said: “during the first period of Labbé
we worked in peace, I cannot complain, because the old man was lazy; we worked, and he
did not get involved at all." At the same time, the work with the CEO was collaborative and
dynamic; in general, INE officials respected Alcérreca. An INE manager better explained the
CEO role in the following excerpt:
Mariana Alcérreca mediated between Labbé and the INE. Then we worked with her.
She analyzed the budgets, decided what is done and what is not done, what figures
come out and when they come out, everything, every decision went through her. Little
by little, finally the discussion was only with her. Labbé just put his signature on it.
The model with the CEO as mediating figure worked for a time with relative calm,
until the change of the census strategy and other difficulties arose. From the perspective of
INE officials, Labbé was never politically or technically legitimized as a leader. The initial
silent style of leadership later passed to an authoritarian style or as many interviewees
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alluded to "irresponsible" given that the Director made decisions without knowledge, and
without consulting experts or those in charge.
The INE is a centralized institution where the role of the Director is predominant in
terms of the decision-making structure. As noted, the leadership of the INE had been under
stress since the previous administrations, but the arrival of Labbé, the increasing
empowerment of his closest advisors, and the mediating CEO figure finally ended up
aggravating the organizational tensions, and eliminating any clear leader.

7.4.

Capabilities and Motivation
Another key feature is the motivation of INE employees and the capabilities

(technical, political, professional) to develop the work entrusted to them. There was
agreement among the interviewees that despite significant efforts, the INE didn’t have the
professional and technical capabilities to match the complexity of its task. To understand this
issue, it is important to distinguish the situation of the INE's senior managers and other
professionals.
In 2003, the State of Chile initiated a major civil service reform for the selection of
senior public officials (SADP, according to the Spanish acronym) seeking to overcome
historical patronage and move to merit-based recruitment and selection system toward a more
effective and efficient state (Olavarría-Gambi & Dockendorff, 2016). Until 201827, this
selection process only considered second and third–line professionals; then, the INE Director
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New regulation to the SADP includes public and merit-based selection of top public managers at the first and

second level of the hierarchy. (E&N, 2017; Servicio Civil, 2020).
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remained chosen based on personal trust or political affinity criteria. The interviewees agreed
that thanks to the SADP, the INE has achieved to recruit managers with better credentials,
offering them better salaries and stability in a process that also provides technical and
political legitimacy. However, given the existing regulation, the positions of senior public
officials selected by SADP can be removed by the president or the director in office (by the
criterion of trust or affinity), which finally threatens the professionalizing effort. Despite this
difficulty, INE senior officials have high technical capabilities.
The rest of the INE professionals' situation is quite different and related to the
contractual structure of the mixed model of the Chilean public administration28. There are
three types of contracts defined by law: “planta,” “contrata” y “honorarios.” The "planta" are
the permanent positions assigned by law to each public institution, with possibilities of being
head, as well as earning tenure, official responsibilities, and better working conditions. The
"contrata" or “by contract” positions are transitory and by law, last only until December 31 of
each year. Public positions correspond to these first two categories. The “honorarios” or fee
contracts correspond to the institution’s non-regular tasks, and are not public employees,
which is the most precarious type of contract (Ley N.18,834, 2005). The law establishes the
size and configuration of type of contracts for the agencies, an issue that entails rigidities in
hiring and career possibilities for civil servants. Accordingly, like most public agencies in
Chile, the INE has different employment types with different career paths, benefits, and
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In their analysis of the Chilean public employment, Chamorro and Rosende (2018) expose the contradictions

of public employment’ mixed model, observing the obsolescence of the employment structure, conflicts
between types of workers, complexities of the pay structure among other problems.
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levels of responsibilities, and generates conflicts between types of employees, resentment
and lack of motivation for the employees in precarious labor conditions.
Chart N.2 shows the evolution of the INE's staff. Given its transitory nature and that
they were not public office positions, the fee contract positions were not even officially
considered as part of the INE until 2010. As observed, the number of “honorarios” civil
servants is the most numerous at the INE, which also happens in other public administration
agencies in the country (Valdebenito, 2017).
Chart N.2. Number of INE Officials According to Type of Contract (2004-2017)
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INE workers are frequently compared with the professionals of the Central Bank.
Although there are many jobs in the two organizations with similar professional requirements
(advanced statistics, logistics), interviewees confirmed that the INE has fail to attract and
retain professionals with high technical qualifications, such as those in the Central Bank. A
manifestation of this situation is the inability to attract professionals from the best
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universities in the country, as expressed in the following quote: "The INE is full of
economists from the University of Santiago, and not from the University of Chile, because
those from University of Chile [most prestigious] work only one year here, and then they
leave to the Central Bank.” Another expression of this deficiency is wages. Concerning the
skills required (statistical, logistical), the INE offered lower salaries than the private sector’s
and the Central Bank, as expressed by one interviewee, “the situation in the INE was a
shame, that is, you look at the payroll, and it is clear you can't attract anyone good to work at
INE." Consequently, and over the years, the INE has developed a kind of "inferiority
complex" regarding the Central Bank.
This feeling of inferiority is compensated by a strong institutional identity and
commitment to the public function. INE workers are usually career professionals, trained and
promoted in the organization and worked there for a long time, a fundamental element of its
identity. As an INE interviewee describes: "the people here define the INE as a proletarian
service, as middle class, as hard-working people." Additionally, there is a high valuation of
the learning that happens in the INE. The following quote of an INE interviewees expresses
this professional pride: “there is no career, no master, no doctorate or post-doctorate that
prepares you to lead the INE. Everything is learned there, because the INE does a very
special thing, such as calculating the CPI, that is not taught anywhere else.” Similarly,
another interviewee emphasizes this idea of the INE as a learning school:
You learn statistics in the university, but the statistics of the INE are learned in the
INE. You learn everything, that is, how to impute data, how to decide… Because you
do not always have complete information—the data samples are not enough, that is,
sometimes you have to make decisions how to do it, whether to impute or not. All of
that is learned there, at the INE.
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Thus, the INE is conceived as a unique learning school, as indicated by a former High
official: "we are training top managers, this is a hotbed of professionals, and sometimes they
leave us for better salaries, and I do not feel sorry, on the contrary, I feel proud because we
are training the best."
Despite the importance and emphasis of the technical rigor for the organization, the
INE’s greatest strength was not its technical capabilities, but the sense of belonging and
commitment of their employees to the public function, their public service motivation. Thus,
the heart of the INE, the constituent elements of its identity, is its people, all those
professionals, who year after year worked far beyond their responsibilities. An INE manager
characterized the exceptional vocation of their workers: "The INE survives thanks to a group
of officials who are willing to immolate themselves."
Another element that affects the self-esteem of INE officials is the different
contractual conditions and the labor precariousness of most of them. Although this situation
is not exclusive to the INE– it exists throughout the entire Chilean public administration—
labor tensions tend to worsen due to government changes. Thus, job instability and the lack
of recognition is a sensitive issue for all INE workers because most of them have been by
contract or in the fee contract category for years (vulnerable and without benefits), as a
former INE high official stated: "It is a very feeble institutional structure, because they are all
‘honorarios’ with all the difficulty that that means.” These contractual schemes also have
complex consequences for decision-making. For example, managers not in the category of
public employees—without accountability—assume decision-making positions, a situation
that is very much resented by INE workers as it threatens the civil servant career and puts at
risk the technical focus of the INE. This was the position in which the head of the census and
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the CEO were in; neither of them was a public employee and both significantly influenced
census decisions.
The testimonies gathered evidenced numerous attempts to advance the
professionalization of the INE and its autonomy. However, unfortunately, the very meager
results have led to the INE to continue being perceived as a "two-bit" service. Experts,
managers, and other actors agreed that the INE worked below the standards that Chile's
statistical institution should have. According to the interviewees, many practices are not
written, and knowledge relies on specific people, all revealing a series of operational and
managerial shortcomings within the institution´s culture. An INE manager referred to this
worrisome situation, “the INE was accustomed to doing things without a serious
methodological framework or professional standards, that is traceable, replicable. In the INE
it was a lot of trade and little professionalization.” Another INE official added: "In each
professional rests the responsibility to do their job well, because institutionally it is not
regulated, it is not established."
Experts, managers, and other actors agreed that the INE worked below the standards
that Chile's statistical institution should have. Numerous practices are not written, and
knowledge relies on specific people, all revealing a series of operational and managerial
shortcomings within the institution´s culture. An INE manager referred to this worrisome
situation, “the INE was accustomed to doing things without a serious methodological
framework or professional standards, that is, traceable, replicable. In the INE it was a lot of
trade and little professionalization.” Another INE official echoed a similar idea: "In each
professional rests the responsibility to do their job well, because institutionally it is not
regulated, it is not established."
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7.5.

Conflict
Another dimension that appears strongly in the analysis of the census case is the

conflict between the groups and the power dynamics involved. Different literature addresses
power and the conflicts within organizations. For example, Vaughan (1999) points out that
conflict appears when there is disagreement over the goals of the organization; also, Clegg,
Courpasson, and Phillips (2006) note that resistance to power (or authority) and uncertainty
generate conflicts and diminish the efficiency of the organization. In the case of the INE and
the census, conflicts between groups accounted for a very tense organizational scenario
during the 2012 census.
The decision to change the census strategy marked a turning point in the INE because
it exposed the existing fragility of the organization and its vulnerability toward the decisions
of the Director. An INE manager said of this complicated situation, “this is like the chronicle
of a death foretold because it is evident that the institutionality of the INE depends only on
the goodwill of the officials, and on the vision of the director of the moment."
From Director Labbé's and his supporters' point of view, INE officials' constant
opposition–due to partisan politics– deeply affected the census. However, most interviewees
believed that these arguments did not make sense. Interviewees confirmed that several of the
signers of the letter of accusation were right-wing and supporters of Piñera, as well as some
INE high officials and the CEO– who made the accusation to the press in April 2013.
Regarding the letter, an interviewee recalled that "the group was divided into half and half.
Those who could be from the political left and those who were pro-government. Some people
were absolutely right-wing and signed the letter." A former INE official emphatically
discarded the idea of damaging the census: "We can disagree on the method, but make it fail?
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I mean, it's a fallacy that I rule out." Likewise, another INE interviewee categorically rejected
ideas of a political conspiracy:
Never, never, never, never in everything that happened at the INE or with the disaster
that came after the census, nobody ever did partisan politics; neither did we who
denounced [through the letter], nor did they. Rather it was a thing between honesty
and human stupidity, about how to do things well, do you understand me? So, there
was no coordination of the left to undermine Piñera, I assure you!
However, the INE was resistant to Labbé, his advisors, and his decisions. The INE
professionals felt threatened by the lack of technical criteria in the Director's decisions, and
Labbé increasingly distrusted the opposition of the INE officials, attributing it to political
reason. Consequently, Director Labbé empowered his closest advisers—young professionals
without public sector experience or statistical knowledge—to acquire more and more
prominence and incidence in day-to-day decisions, which generated tensions with the INE
career professionals, both in professional terms and interpersonal relationships.
The Director was gradually excluding technical decision-making professionals and
setting up a work team parallel to the INE’s formal structure, finally reaching the point where
the INE was utterly divided. On one side, Director Labbé and his closest advisers, while on
the other side, there was the INE’s formal structure, headed by the Sub-directorates. In the
middle was the CEO, who tried to mediate between the groups and lead the INE. All this
points to the fragmentation of decision-making, given the existence of this parallel-group that
competed with the INE’s formal structure of decision-making, and the lack of formal
responsibility, since there was no accountability over those decisions. Similarly, policy
failure literature pointed out this complicated situation, Gerodimos describes it this way:

279

“significant decisions were based on (confidential) expert advice by (unelected) civil servants
(under oath of secrecy) with minimum consultation.” (2004, p. 922)
The INE is an organization that values technical knowledge above all. Neither Labbé
nor his advisers (except the CEO) were able to earn the respect of public officials and
managers. The environment was rife with mutual animosities, with team Labbé distrusting
INE officials, institutional inertia, and the organization’s increasing politicization. Likewise,
INE officials doubted the technical inability of the Labbé team and its derogatory attitude
toward the experience of INE professionals and public sector values.
Despite the CEO’s mediating efforts, the tensions between the Director's team and the
rest of the INE increased. Little by little, the Director’s team became isolated and all
decisions, even the more technical ones, were made by this small group of people: the
Director, the head of census, the CEO, and Labbé’s advisers. The existing conflict between
groups led to the cessation meetings and other instances of technical work; one INE high
executive commented about the census meetings: "I arrived at the INE, but the census
committees had already dissolved; now the committees were only Labbé, Mariana [the
CEO], Mathews [advisor], and Carrasco [head of census]." Likewise, another INE
interviewee referred to a similar situation in the case of the CPI: “then they met about a
problem with the CPI, and they did it behind closed doors. Only the advisers of Labbé
participated but nobody from the technical team!”
Thus, the milieu of the 2012 census was notable for the mistrust and power struggles
between groups. The different expressions of these tensions were: hiding information (e.g.
emails or memos that were sent only to some and excluding others), making decisions behind
others’ backs (e.g. without consulting experts, bypassing those formally responsible, not
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inviting some key officials to essential meetings), and heated technical discussions (with
shouting and even insults). As the census problems became more visible, secrecy and
conflicts between groups were more intense.
No doubt, the critical moment was when, instead of recognizing data collection
problems and poor coverage, Labbé and his closest team performed data imputation without
solid technical foundations leading to what the interviewees called the "cloning" of houses
and people. For most respondents, this was a clumsy and irresponsible attempt to hide real
problems and "disguise" the census poor results; for other actors, it was a malicious and
corrupt action in the face of imminent failure. The analysis of the case reveals that along with
firing the head of the Technical Sub-directorate, the data imputation was "the final straw"
that triggered the public letter from INE officials and the whole accusation of data
manipulation in the media. The following quote from an INE official expresses some of the
tensions mentioned:
That was Labbé’s big mistake! He despised the people of the INE because he is a
right-wing guy, who does not understand public administration. A right-wing person
thinks that people in the public administration are stupid and mediocre and he [Labbé]
never thought that we were going to discover the errors in the imputation, with the
cloning of homes and people.
7.6.

Decision-Making and Groupthink
Another critical element that emerges from the analysis of the case points to decision-

making dynamics and their role in the census failure. The way how Labbé and his close
working team operated possess features of what social psychology literature called
groupthink, a particular mode of thinking of small, cohesive groups that leads to suboptimal
decisions when under pressure (Janis, 1982). Usually, small groups tend to share values and
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seek agreements, but what is characteristic of the groupthink, is that, under certain
circumstances and conditions, the unity of the group and the existence of a conflict trigger
the collective over-optimism, lack of vigilance, and sloganistic thinking that finally lead to
flaws in decision-making (Janis, 1973; ’t Hart, 1990; Stern & Sundelius, 1994).
It is worth remembering that several works on failure offer concepts close to the idea
of groupthink, such as the “arrogance of the Whitehall” (Dunleavy, 1995), “overconfidence”
(Cortázar, 2015), “culture of secrecy” (Gerodimos, 2004), “overvaluation and wishful
thinking” (Parker et al., 2009), among other characteristics—or even pathologies—of
decision-making groups that lead to policy errors and failures. Thus, the question about the
role of decision makers' attitudes has been a permanent concern of the policy failure
literature. However, the conceptual richness of groupthink–definitions and categories– allows
for a more in-depth analysis.
There are three key characteristics of groupthink that are consistent with the census
case: (i) decision makers conform to a small and cohesive group, (ii) there are structural
flaws in the organization (such as insulation of the group, lack of tradition of impartial
leadership, homogeneity of members), and (iii) a provocative situational context (high stress
from external threats) (Janis & Mann, 1977; ’t Hart, 1991). The first element is establishing a
small, closed group (Labbé, his advisers and the head of census) at the top of the INE with
authority to make decisions. Second, is the aforementioned institutional fragility, represented
by weaknesses in the leadership, lack of technical autonomy and formalization. Last: the
threat of the student movement in the first right-wing government after 20 years of center-left
governments. Hence, these conditions facilitated a concurrence-seeking tendency of group
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members. This way of thinking is then expressed in groupthink symptoms and thenceforth in
defective decision-making.
There are several groupthink symptoms observed in the census case. An expression of
the overestimation of the group is the illusion of invulnerability, as a perception “shared by
most of all the members, which creates excessive optimism and encourages taking extreme
risks” (’t Hart, 1991). Labbé's young advisors had no experience in the public sector and did
not have the status of civil servants, so their decisions had no accountability and no formal
consequences. Different interviewees remarked that Labbé and his team were convinced of
the census’ success; from their perspective, all the effort would mark a modernizing
milestone in the INE and Labbé would be the best INE Director in the history of the country.
Another expression of groupthink is the belief of the inherent morality of the group,
which encourages the members to ignore the moral consequences of their decisions (Janis,
1971). This characteristic is most evident in the case by the hiding of information, the
dubious imputation models performed, the presentation of the census results in an equivocal
way, as well as the denial of errors committed. Groupthink states that people with good
intentions can end up making terrible decisions and behaving in unethical ways. Some of the
interviewees captured this very situation: "I am sure that Labbé didn't act like that to harm
anyone, I am certain. Labbé acted like this for his ego and was very badly advised by two
silly little boys." On the contrary, other interviewees attributed responsibility to a lack of
ethics, as made explicit here, "then what happened in the INE was that the perfect storm
began to form, between wrong decisions of the past, the personalities of the current
management, and the advisers' lack of ethics."
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Regarded close-mindedness within the group, another groupthink symptom is the
rationale. It refers to a collective effort to construct plausible justifications to discount
warnings and other forms of negative feedback, which might lead the member of the group to
reconsider their assumptions (Janis, 1971). Concerning the census problems, there were
numerous warnings about the risks of the methodological change, other difficulties of the
implementation (resources, training, data collection), and also about the poor quality of the
data obtained. However, the reaction of Labbé’s team tended to justify decisions already
taken. For example, when the coverage problems emerged and INE officials warned about
the significant backlog, Labbé's team argued that it was due only to data entry delays. On the
efforts to warn about the problems, a former senior INE official declared, "the one who
makes the most controversial decisions is Mr. Labbé ignoring the technical precautions that
we raise" (Cámara Noticias, 2013b).
Likewise, another symptom of groupthink is the exaggerated and stereotyped views of
rivals and enemies. Members of the in-group may convince themselves that out-group
members “are so evil that genuine attempts at negotiation of differences with them are
unwarranted, or they are too weak or too stupid to deal effectively with whatever attempts the
in-group makes to defeat their purposes, no matter how risky the attempts are” (Janis, 1971,
p. 86). This characteristic is very prevalent in the census case, from Labbé’s and supporter’s
perspective, the vast majority of actors—INE managers, officials, international organizations,
and even the members of the first evaluation commission—were considered enemies, actors
of the opposite side with the clear intention of destroying the census for political reasons.
Several interviewees referred to Labbé and his team's disregard for the INE's technical
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expertise and a clear disdain for the rules of public administration, which reinforces their
perception that all out-group members were incapable.
Additional symptoms of groupthink refer to several pressure mechanisms on the
uniformity of the group including self-censorship, illusion of unanimity, direct pressure on
dissenters, and also the emergence of self-appointed mind-guards to protect the group from
adverse information that might shatter their shared complacency about the effectiveness and
morality of their decisions. The analysis confirmed the existence of these symptoms, for
example, the actions designed to discredit the findings of the national commission, the
concealment of information to the Minister of Economy and Director Labbé himself.
Regarding the latter, some respondents emphasized how protected Labbé and the government
were from truthful information, as expressed by one interviewee, “their own people hid
information from them; they told them a very nice story. They did not tell them the truth."
Also, there were several actions to block dissenting opinions, such as hiding information, as
one interviewee pointed out: “during the data collection, the control and supervision was
carried directly by the census team, and it was hidden from the technical Sub-directorate."
Similarly, the INE decision-making and leadership evinced groupthink symptoms,
observable from the time of the strategy change until the period of evaluations and
investigations.
In the context of an agency like the INE and a Director with significant power, there
was a miscalculation about the INE’s capacity to implement the census, especially under a
new strategy that was entirely unknown for all the actors involved. Labbé had only been in
the INE a little over a year, and neither he nor his closest advisors knew the INE well enough
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or understood the complexity of the census endeavor. All these facts show that the census
was addressed from a fragmented institution with a high level of internal conflict.

This chapter reviewed the 2012 census case using the organizational lens, focusing on
the INE elements that influenced the failure of the census. The analysis revealed an INE with
a professional reputation, but whose greatest value is their public servants motivation, their
high commitment of its officials with the generation of public value. However, it also
revealed several organizational and management weaknesses: delays in modernization
processes, lack of leadership, organizational rigidities, and the marginality of the census
project. Thus, in the context of institutional fragility, the Labbé administration and decisionmaking style sharpened tensions between INE work teams, which along with the dynamics of
groupthink, accounted for an organization in crisis at the time of the census. All this
evidenced a precarious organizational scenario, where the INE could not generate the
necessary safeguards on the change of strategy or ensure adequate implementation of the
ambitious new census. Below, Diagram N.12 synthesizes the central element of this chapter
according to three areas: values and goals, organizational flaws, and organizational
dynamics.
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Diagram N.12. Analytical Keys from the Organizatioal Lens

Values and Goals

Historical prestige &
technical reputation

Organizational
Flaws

Organizational
Dynamics

Lack of political autonomy

Director lack technical &
management skills

High Director´s influence

Lack of collaboration &
conflicts between groups

Complex organizational
structure

High commitment to public
value

Lack of formalization of
practices
Absence of permanent
census unit
Rigidities & labor
precariousness

"The INE family"

High Levels of politicization

Deterioration of the
organizational climate
Parallel structure of decisionmaking

Low capabilities & selfesteem

Isolation of INE authorities

Lag in modernization
processes

GroupThink
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CHAPTER 8
POLICY FAILURE. ANALYSIS FROM THE SOCIETAL LENS

This chapter analyzes the case of the 2012 census in Chile through the societal lens,
paying attention to elements of the political, social, economic, and institutional contexts
affecting the failure of the census. This third lens focuses on the societal context–the country
of Chile–as the unit of analysis relying on sociological, neo-institutionalist, and institutional
logics literature to observe the role of the context and institutions on ideas and practices.
Literature has focused on the causes and characteristics of failure but not the broader
context of where failures occur, leading to a limited and causal comprehension of policy
failures (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2013; Peters, 2015; McConnell, 2016). Thus, “to say,
therefore, that one factor alone is the cause of a failure, would be to neglect the range of
individual, institutional and societal factors that interacted to produce that failure-as well as
their complex interdependencies" (McConnell, 2014, p. 4). This dissertation addresses this
deficiency directly, placing one of the three lenses over those contextual elements that
contribute to understanding the census failure.
The context is broad and complex, and therefore, difficult to capture and interpret.
Aligned with the Lenses Framework, this dissertation does not attempt to cover all the
elements of the context, but only those that emerged as significant to understand the
circumstances, characteristics, and interpretations about the failure. This chapter is devoted to
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the four following features of the context of the 2012 census: the political context, the new
rules of the game, census and statistical institutionality, and the clash of logics.

8.1.

The Political Context
Research has shown that the political dimension plays an essential role in the success

or failure of policy, and different approaches incorporate the political aspect as a cause or
expression of failure. For example, support or lack of support from stakeholders can lead to
failure; there are also blame allocation dynamics and electoral gains when a policy fails.
Furthermore, a failed policy can trigger damage to a coalition's electoral reputation or even
governance crisis (Weaver, 1986; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; McConnell, 2010a). The
societal lens does not focus on the political dynamics at the policy level but the political
context in which the census deployed. This points to the historical contingency that
recognizes that processes must be understood from moments of time and specific
environments, since "economic, political, structural, and normative forces affecting
individuals and organizations are indeed historical contingent (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p.
109). Thus, this section delves into some characteristics of the political dynamics and
political–institutional configurations.
Regarding the political situation, Chileans elected Sebastián Piñera with 51.6% of the
votes in the second round (SERVEL, 2020). He had the support of the alliance of center-right
parties "Coalición por el Cambio" (Coalition for Change) better known as the "Alianza"
(Alliance), formed by two parties, “Renovación Nacional, RN” (National Renewal) and the
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“Unión Demócrata Independiente, UDI” (Independent Democratic Union).29 Piñera was and
still is one of the wealthiest people in the country, heading in 2010 the first right-wing
government after 20 years of regimes from the center-left coalition of parties, Concertación,
who have stayed in power since the recovery of the democracy in 1990.
With a clear tenor of private-sector efficiency and a managerial style, Piñera´s
government emphasized the de-bureaucratization of the state and efficiency toward the social
and economic development of the country. Thus, Piñera began his government with an
opening pitch of excellence; he stated: "In 20 days I feel that we have advanced more than
others, perhaps, in 20 years" (Cooperativa, 2010). Consistent with these ideas, rather than a
presidential cabinet with political experience, their ministers were prominent personalities
from the business world and academia, with the idea of having the cabinet "of the best"
(Segovia & Gamboa, 2012). From this logic, the appointment of Francisco Labbé, an
academic and economist from the University of Chicago as head of the INE, was not
surprising.
Piñera's government began by facing unexpected situations. First, coping with the
devastating effects of the February 2010 earthquake—an 8.8 magnitude on the Richter
Scale—and ensuing tsunami, and a few months later, with the accident of the 33 workers
trapped in a mining operation. Regarding the latter, the Minister of Mining Laurence
Golborne and the President himself led the successful rescue of the miners after 68 days
trapped underground in what was a major engineering feat and a global media event (The
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RN is a liberal-conservative party, and UDI is a national conservative party based on the “Gremialismo” or

guildism movement ideas (Catholic social teachings).
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New York Times, 2010). These incidents occupied the agenda during the first year of the
government, but the second year's main characteristic was the diverse citizen protests,
especially the student movement that began in May 2011 (Segovia & Gamboa, 2012).
From the perspective of symbolic language analysis, Yanow (2000) offers the concept
of “metaphor” which goes beyond a figure of speech or literary device, but as a way of
understanding and acting; as she describes: “uncovering the metaphoric roots of policy or
agency language and acts is one way of discovering the architecture of the policy argument”
(2000, p. 43). From here, the ideas of “the government of excellence” and “the government
of the best” worked as powerful metaphors. Thus, changing the census method and making it
"more professional and of better quality" as well as the idea of “the best census of the history
of Chile,” worked as an example of the new government policy style. Accordingly, for the
interviewees, the change of census strategy was consistent with this government’s values and
policy agenda.
Complementary to the concept of metaphor, but focusing on a broader understanding,
the neo-institutionalists Meyer and Rowan (1977) propose the concepts of “myths,” those
beliefs taken for granted, shared values, meanings that provide legitimacy and shape
practices and routines. The authors explain, “Institutionalized products, services, techniques,
policies, and programs function as powerful myths, and many organizations adopt them
ceremonially” (p. 340). Thus, the metaphors of excellence and the census as a modern and
efficient public endeavor expresses a “myth” that the government practiced that confronted
traditional beliefs to gain legitimacy.
This idea of “excellence” is strong in testimonies, speeches, and documents of the
census. For example, in the short memorandums and presentations used to endorse and
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“defend” the census strategy change in different instances–before the Minister, the President,
and the National Census Commission (Alcérreca, 2011a, 2011b; INE, 2011b, 2011a). These
"artifacts" emphasize the advantages of the new modality and frame the new census with the
prevailing discourse of efficiency. The memorandums highlight the benefits of the new
format: 1) An additional cost of US$13 million while the country would save approximately
US$180 million because of the elimination of the holiday. 2) Improving coverage as there is
a reduction in the risk of censusing with volunteers. 3) Better data collected through bettertrained, better-paid census takers. 4) Places Chile at the level of most Latin American
countries regarding census modality (Alcérreca, 2011a, p. 4,5, 11). Documents also
mentioned difficulties of the new strategy, but without giving adequate weight to the
complexity entailed, as shown in the following quote: “the main risk is the understanding of
the concept of habitual residence, which is controllable with a good design of the census
operation, the training of census takers and communication to the population” (INE, 2011b,
p. 5). Similarly, Director Labbé utilized the idea of "the best" when he announced the new
census strategy: "this decision was adopted after the INE studied for several months the
advantages of this change, which are summarized in better quality of information collected,
greater coverage, greater security and lower costs for the country” (La Tercera, 2011).
The specific configuration of the policies also conveyed significance, as Yanow
described, “policy meanings are often communicated and interpreted in such detail as the
activities, programs” (2000, p. 71). Therefore, the emphasis on saving resources or the
limited importance of the new strategy's risks reflects the understanding of the census
endeavor. Thus, the 2012 census embodied ideals and myths of a new way of governing and
doing policies, steeped in enthusiasm and a genuine conviction that it would be a much better
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census than censuses in the past. Other examples where the census expressed these meanings
were: the outsourcing of the recruitment of census takers to a private company, the emphasis
on professional pollsters, the phrase of the President about "the best census in the history of
Chile," and the INE announcing the successful historical census coverage.
In the context of the government’s ideas of excellence, another relevant antecedent
for the census was the controversy over the poverty measurement figures, known as the
CASEN polemic. Regarding poverty measurement, in the last decades, CEPAL (UN) used to
play an essential role in data processing and mainly to ensure the comparability of the
poverty figures. However, during the data processing of the CASEN 2011 survey data, the
Social Ministry of Development asked CEPAL to include a new variable that finally
improved the figures, from 15%, the same as in the previous administration, to 14.4%
poverty. Then, and without CEPAL approval, authorities presented the statistics and
announced the decrease in poverty as a great achievement of the Piñera government. The
episode was a huge technical dispute that pitted CEPAL against the government. The crisis
led to CEPAL’s refusal to continue collaborating with the government on the survey and
sparked a wave of criticism from the academic community questioning the delivery of results
and demanding transparency about the methods (El Mostrador, 2012; CIPER, 2012b). The
reactions did not wait; The Economist raised the question of manipulation of poverty figures,
“whether the center-right government of Sebastián Piñera has fiddled the poverty numbers to
flatter its economic record” (2012); likewise, an influential columnist openly asked: “Is the
president lying about CASEN? [...] Did the government cheat?” (Peña, 2012); another
analyst stated, "the political and communicational lack of expertise of the government is
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trying to pass off an (at least) neutral data as a sort of national historical achievement" (Diaz,
2012).
The CASEN controversy confirmed and intensified the existing distance between the
UN agencies and the Piñera government; something that had never happened in previous
administrations. Some signals of this distance were: first, the lack of CELADE´s consultation
or involvement in the decision to change the census methods, then the conflict over the
poverty figures, and later, the absence of CELADE support or expert advice in the census
data processing. Regarding the lack of collaboration with CELADE, an INE interviewee
referred to the political element in the relationship with the UN: “I believe that for some
reason, the right-wing has animosity towards international organizations; they think that it is
full of communists, and that's why they don't relate to them, and that's a mistake.”
The problems of poverty data in 2012 and census figures in 2013 are linked with the
idea of the government of the best, expressing a particular understanding of the role of data
to present government achievements to reinforce this idea of excellence. In this line, a
senator declared, “the ruler [Piñera] has pushed governmental actions towards collapsing
goals and uncontrolled actions that seriously damage the public system and the prestige of
the State. What happened with the 2012 Census is no coincidence”(Senado Prensa, 2013a).
Likewise, a prominent economist referred to the obsession for excellence, “the obsession of
the government to show that they are not just a good government but that they are the best in
history has led them to push too much the presentation of figures that have caused damage to
their credibility and weakened the statistical institutions” (Emol, 2013). Similarly, a political
analyst stated, “[President] Piñera has been obsessed by trying to be the best government in
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the history of Chile, and he played with the numbers a bit, not by changing them but in the
way they have been presented… sugarcoating [them]” (Financial Times, 2013).
Thus, the enthusiastic beginning of the government in 2010, with the president's high
popularity after the successful and mediatized rescue of the miners, contrasts with managing
problems, increasing controversies, and the growing social demands in the streets.
The characteristics of the political system in Chile are another relevant institutional
feature to understand census failure. One of them is the above-mentioned exaggerated
presidentialism, resulting in a high capacity of the executive branch in advancing or delaying
law initiatives (Fuentes, 2015). Another characteristic of the political system is that since
2006, and as a way to reduce presidential powers, governments went from six years to only
last four years without reelection, which has sharpened a short-term policymaking
perspective.30 Although actors recognize the importance of leadership turn-over for a healthy
democracy, there is an agreement among interviewees from different political views that this
particular configuration of the presidential period, is harmful to public policies’ quality.
Pointing to a lack of medium-and long-term vision in the INE, an interviewee, noted,
"Without re-election; you can't even install yourself when you have to leave.” Some of the
difficulties that such a short-term government entails are immediate objectives, lack of
planning, abandonment of policies that have no political return, and disconnection between
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Since the restoration of democracy in 1990, the length of government has changed in Chile. Given the post-

dictatorship "transitional" character, the term for President Patricio Aylwin was four years (1990-1994), then
Presidents Eduardo Frei and Ricardo Lagos six years (1994-2000 and 2000-2006, respectively). But then, the
reform in 2005 reduced the presidential term to four years without re-election in the following period but
allowed in the subsequent one.
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policy design and implementation. A former minister pointed out the harmful consequences
of the four years on government agencies: “time is not enough because between evaluating
and deciding what to do, time passes. Governments are so short, four-year governments
without re-election, is fatal!” Similarly, the following quote from a former INE high official
explained this short-term perspective and its consequences:
There is no public policy able to transcend the four years if it is not glamorous. A
policy like this to build [a better] INE, is going to bear fruit in eight years or maybe
more, so they [government] answer: perhaps later, we're going to put it in tenth place,
it's not a priority. Somehow, this is a metaphor, but they need to cut ribbons, it's what
a minister does, that is, they don't make long-term public policies [...] four years is a
straitjacket.
Another effect of four-year governments is that it intensifies electoral competition.
The presidential race is extremely intense, which also influenced decisions about the census.
For example, the importance of showing the government’s seal through a more efficient and
modern census, and the crisis management once the polemic was uncovered. Regarding the
control of the census polemic–from the first accusations of data manipulation and inquiry
commissions—a critical context situation was the political instability and electoral tensions
of the governing coalition. Four moments attest to this instability. First, the prospective
presidential candidate Laurence Golborne, the key actor in the rescue of the miners, dropped
his candidacy due to the uncovering of situations concerning his lack of probity (Diario
UChile, 2013b). Second, the Minister of Economy, Pablo Longueira (in charge of the INE),
emerged as a new presidential candidate, which left the INE without a minister in command.
Third, after winning the primary elections, Longueira dropped his presidential candidacy
because of a severe depressive condition, leaving the Alliance coalition without a candidate
to compete against Michelle Bachelet for 2014-2018. Finally, only four months before the
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presidential elections, Evelyn Mattei–former labor minister—became the right-wing
candidate (El País, 2013).
As noted, the political context under which the census polemic emerged was
disturbed by the political climate, and therefore government authorities ended up ignoring the
warnings about census problems. They did not grasp the seriousness of what happened in the
INE because the political pressure was enormous, and the government needed to show
results. Regarding the government's lack of awareness of the INE struggles, an analyst
pointed out, "In those days, La Moneda [government palace] was more focused on the
internal conflict on the right." (Jimenez, 2013b).

8.2.

The new Rules of the Game
Aligned with the notion of “setting”—as the background or scenario with particular

values and norms where the failure episode unfolds (Oppermann & Spencer, 2016a)—there
are relevant elements of the context of the census constituting this institutional setting.
Compared to the 2002 census, the setting under which the 2012 census deployed was very
different, including some “new rules of the game” for public administration. Particularly
noteworthy are new institutional regulations of the Chilean State and the influential role of
social media.
The first institutional transformation is the 2008 transparency law. Like other
countries in the region–such as Mexico, Colombia, and Uruguay–Chile implemented a legal
and institutional body to prevent corruption, promote transparency, and guarantee citizens’
rights to public information (Olavarría-Gambi, 2012). The regulation demands all public
agencies actively provide information about their policies, activities, and funding, and any
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citizen can request additional information about the state's actions, which is guaranteed by
law (Transparencia, 2020). For the interviewees, the transparency law marks a turning point.
Transparency regulations brought additional pressure to public agencies because all technical
decisions and activities were required to be appropriately substantiated and transparent,
which challenged deep-rooted practices. An INE interviewee referred change as follows:
“today everything is freely accessible, so you have to prepare and present the database for
any researcher to review, and therefore it must pass the ´test of whiteness.´”
The case evinced a tension of practices due to the demands of the transparency law in
different moments of the census policy, such as the decision on changing the census
approach, hiring, the presentation of results, data processing, and the dubious imputations
situation. INE Interviewees remembered deep-rooted disagreements and discussions
regarding transparency demands, as a senior INE executive recalled, “Labbé never wanted to
understand the issue of transparency, never! And we warned him. I told him 10, 20, 50
times.” The following excerpt, from another public official, reflected on how this new
context put pressure on the 2012 census:
There is a huge difference between this census and all the previous ones: the
transparency law. I can tell you that most likely, even old censuses have done similar
practices in many statistical products. Still, those databases were not deliverables,
were not public, and in this census, the database was going to be open access. So that
is a risk they [INE authorities] didn't control, and that's the risk we warned them,
saying: You know what? When this database became public, we're going to get
caught. This can't be!
Hand-in-hand with transparency, another element of this setting, is the public
procurement law enforce since 2003 (Ley N.19,886, 2003), which created a public purchase
system, called "ChileCompra," which regulates all contracts and transactions paid by the
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State through standardized procedures (ChileCompra, 2020). As with the transparency law,
the existence of the acquisition system highlights the differences in the institutional contexts
under which the 2002 and 2012 censuses operated, as an interviewee said: "I can't just go in
there and decide what I want to buy and talk directly to a supplier, no, I can't do that! It
works differently now." These differences became even more constricting, given the lack of
planning and the limited time to prepare the census. Alluding to the time pressures and the
purchasing norms, an INE interviewee said, "when you have to bid the times are very definite
and you have to follow them, there was no option to get out of ChileCompra.”
Unlike older INE public officials knowledgeable of public administration demands
and times, and used to working under the procurement regulations, the newest INE
professionals usually come from the private world with different practices and expectations
regarding purchasing, and especially timing. Interviewees reported many arguments within
the INE regarding how to deal with procurement regulations and transparency, revealing a
significant difference in ideas and values. Thus, while for INE officials following the
regulations was mandatory and accounted for openness and public probity, for the others, the
rules were perceived as bureaucratic impediments, especially given the scarcity of time. As
described in the case, later inquiries revealed that the 2012 census failed to comply with
several hiring and procurement rules.
Another significant context phenomenon that impacted the census is the rising power
of social media. Interviewees acknowledge that social networks—such as Facebook and
Twitter–on the 2012 census were much stronger than expected. An interviewee stressed,
“they never imagined, in the INE, …that [social media] would explode and that year it did
explode, because nobody was aware of the power of the social media gained from that time
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on.” Thus, the always vigilant social media tend to be much more sensitive to problems and
difficulties, and the 2012 census wasn’t the exception. An INE interviewee remembered the
permanent pressure of different problems spreading out in minutes through social media,
“now people are much more aware of what fails or doesn't fail, they don't care if you're
successful, but if there's something wrong, it's a seed, it's very effervescent;” another
interviewee pointed out “It's a different world, it's a world where the news runs super-fast, it's
super easy to belittle through social networks.”
This new social and institutional context–transparency and procurement regulation,
social media–exerted enormous pressure on the census, making the census task more
complicated than in the past. The following excerpt of an INE interviewee illustrates this
idea,
The INEs are used to hiding these issues ‘under the carpet’ in Latin America. For
example, in the past, there was no context in which, due the transparency law, all
salaries must be published; due the transparency law, we have to count on all the
information that you give me, otherwise it is going to be a twitter chain saying: ‘I
have not been censused, I have not been censused.’ In 2002 nothing like that
happened.
There is a saying among demographers and statisticians: "There is not a perfect
census." Despite low omission rates and people's good opinion about past censuses in Chile,
indeed they had some problems. For example, the 2002 census had difficulties in recruiting
volunteers and significant omissions in specific areas on the census day that needed
recovering. Interviewees who participated in previous censuses acknowledged that, by
today's standards, there have also been non-transparent data processing practices in the past.
A government interviewee referred to this, “I believe that, before, there were even more
serious errors; however, now it is much easier for an error to go viral.” However, the new
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scenario has no room for old practices, as an INE interviewee stated, “when you have a
power like the one that social media has now, which is evolving faster and faster: ultimately,
you cannot hide information, you cannot think that no one will talk to each other.”
Therefore, censuses always had several logistical and methodological difficulties. In
this line, President Piñera declared, “and all censuses, also in 1992 and 2002, had many
problems [...] but no one knew, and no one discussed it" (BioBio, 2013). Nonetheless,
transparency demands and social media have changed the way to consider and confront
census challenges, since any difficulty or mistake is now available to find and disseminate.

8.3.

Census and Statistical Institutionality
Institutions are powerful forces affecting the structure and dynamics of relationships

of organizations and individuals. From the societal perspective, another critical element to
understand the failure of the census is the statistical institutionality and the role of relevant
organizations.
United Nations agencies and regional statistical communities constitute relevant
institutions to understand the census case. The UN is the most influential organization in
demographics and censuses matters worldwide.31 Countries all over the world follow UN
population and statistics recommendations, use their detailed handbooks and engage in
international working groups. In general, there is an abundant exchange of methodologies,
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Some of the agencies are: United Nations Statistical Division (UNSD), United Nations Population Division

(UNPD), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).
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and experiences between countries (UN, 2013; UNECE, 2015; UN, 2019). In Latin America,
the relevant agency is the Latin-American Center of Demography (CELADE).
However, the 2010 census round was marked by significant difficulties to the extent
that Latin-American demographers called it "the lost decade" because, despite having many
favorable macroeconomic conditions, the region wasted the opportunity to conduct good
censuses (Villacis, 2017a). As said by an international expert,
The last census round is the one with the most significant errors: just look, Paraguay
crashed, Chile crashed, Peru crashed, Colombia basically is a repetition, Brazil has
errors that they do not admit, but has errors, Venezuela is unknown because it has
been a gigantic mystery.
Thus, the 2012 Chilean census was not the only failed census in the region during the
2010 census round. Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, among others, also had
problems of a different nature (complementary information regarding Latin American
censuses is available in Appendix N.7). Following is a brief analysis of the census problems
in some countries of the region.
Bolivia also had problems with the 2012 census. The difficulties started from the
configuration of the forms and its questions, and sharp criticisms for lack of participation,
then continued with severe problems in the enumeration process. A regional expert noted,
"they also had many problems, perhaps not so much in census omission, but mostly quality.
That's why I’m telling you, ‘coverage and quality’ because you can have a 1% omission, but
all the variables may be badly declared.” Just as had happened in Chile, in Bolivia, the
academic community affirmed: "the census was a failure," stating, "We will never know the
census omission and even less the quality of the answers given by the population, because
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among other defects, the training of enumerators was improvised. In reality, the entire census
was improvised” (Pereira Morató, 2014, p. 200).
The 2005 census in Peru also has similarities to Chile, and citizenship and
stakeholders also framed the census as a failure. The country went from the de facto toward
de jure methodology, having various troubles in data collection. Census results revealed
severe omission problems (over 7% estimated at the time) and very high numbers of
unoccupied dwellings (18% versus 4% from the previous census) (La República, 2006). All
Peruvian actors, including the President, criticized the census results, and ultimately, the
country repeated the census in 2007, this time under the de facto approach achieving an
omission rate of 5,9% (Villacis, 2017a).
The case of the census in Uruguay is paradigmatic since it is a small country of 3
million people with a high level of education. Still, they had many problems implementing
their de jure census in 2011. A demographer interviewed recalled: "The census had a pile of
problems. There were places where they couldn't go because they didn't have people to go.
Then the census spread over so much time that nobody cared anymore." However, the
Uruguayan Statistic Institute faced the problem on time, as the UN officer stated, "we are
using the census data, but for them, it was a disgrace in terms of the historical quality of the
censuses they always have had."
A different situation was the 2010 census in Argentina, which shows the vulnerability
of a de facto census. On the day of the census, the former President of the nation, Nestor
Kirchner, died, which caused social disorders that affected the census implementation. So
too, the parallels with the Chilean case are noteworthy: the idea of failure, the general
distrust, and endless debates regarding data quality obtained. In this line, Sacco pointed out,
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"In Argentina, the affirmation 'the census is a disaster' is frequent among journalists, people
on the street, academics and occasional or frequent users of census data" (2015, p. 1). Also,
this expert drew attention to the absence of a thorough review of what happened, “there was
no official evaluation of the 2010 census by the statistics institute. Chile performed two
evaluations of its census, but Argentina did not run an official one.”
In 2005 Colombia tried a new census methodology, incorporating technological
advances (Personal Digital Assistant, PDA) and significant conceptual and operational
modifications. However, the country was not prepared, an expert interviewed remembered:
“the new director was convinced that new technologies were everything, so he wanted to
conduct three censuses in one, population, agricultural, economic, and he couldn’t perform
any." Added to several difficulties in the supervision of the census, the enumeration extended
for over a year, bringing additional complications regarding the comparability of data
(DANE, 2014). As in Chile, the Colombian census problems led to political confrontations,
and in general, stakeholders did not legitimize the census despite a special commission
identifying reliable data (Villacis, 2017a). Given the previous failure, Colombians had high
expectations for the 2018 census. This time, with the omission of 8.5%, the census also had
difficulties. Some problems detected by a commission of experts were: budgetary limitations,
absence of a pre-census, poor training, a long period of enumeration (10 months), inadequate
monitoring systems, and connectivity difficulties (DANE, 2019a, 2019b).
Undoubtedly the most dramatic case is the 2012 census in Paraguay, with a 24.6%
omission rate (Ruiz, 2016). Paraguay made significant changes: from a one-day enumeration
to a three months’ census, from the census with volunteers to paid census takers, from a
paper questionnaire to the use of PDAs. In the opinion of the experts interviewed, the census
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was adequately prepared. However, the intense political crisis—that ended with the
deposition of the President—and subsequent change of government, diminished the support
for the census, especially regarding the timely availability of resources, leading to several
enumeration problems (Ruiz, 2016). Referring to this case, an expert interviewee narrated,
“the census was broken. It was not possible to carry out the plan exactly how they prepared.
The census in Paraguay went into tremendous chaos. It's a very painful story.” There were
also technical difficulties, such as lack of experience in de jure censuses, inadequate training
in new technologies (PDAs), and a dearth of logistical planning adapted to the new format
(Villacis, 2017a). Despite the idea of repeating the operation, census data were finally used.
An expert commented, “the census worked as a large sample. So, the census wasn’t useful
for many things, but served to estimate fertility, mortality, migrations, and to update
population projections.”
As observed, the way countries dealt with their census problems was critical to fix
census data. In this line, there were political and technical efforts to address census problems,
most of them with the critical support of CELADE. However, the 2012 census in Chile didn’t
have that support because of the government's distancing from international agencies. The
following excerpt from an INE official stresses how negative not relying on UN support to
confront census problems was:
Paraguay and Uruguay saved their censuses because they worked with CELADE.
However, [in Chile] here they hid from CELADE what they had done, and the
procedure was so fast and so gross statistically, that CELADE realized the wrong data
estimations, because of course, everything was super inconsistent! Instead of having
them by your side, explaining why and trying to find ways to solve the problems.
That is, countries explain these problematic issues, buy they [INE authorities] moved
away from CELADE.
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Consistent with the literature, the situation of censuses in the region reveal different
yardsticks to measure and understand failure. As an INE official interviewed stated, "If you
look at Latin America, there are censuses twenty times worse than the Chilean that were
saved. Paraguay's census with 25% omission, and Bolivia's census was also saved." Thus,
values, worldviews, narratives and history influence the understanding of what is policy
failure, expressing a "cultural bias." Thus, the way Chile reacted to the census problems
appeals to its values and self-perception in the light of expected quality standards. In this
line, the following words from an international census expert illustrate the paradox of
perceptions of failure that differ from country to country, highlighting the particular
reaction–and quite exaggerated– of Chileans to their census´s failure,
The census in Argentina was much worse than the Chilean census. Still, nobody
became hysterical because the coverage was bad […] For me, that was the most
curious thing [in Chile], the hysterical public reaction, because, for some, coverage
was too good and for others, it was too bad. I didn't understand that, especially in a
continent where all the censuses were bad, starting with those censuses with adequate
resources, like the Colombian, which was bad, much worse than the census in Chile
[…] and then saying they [Chileans] are performing a new census with the same
people, without time to list all the errors, or to know how to correct them; that seemed
to me, from the public policy point of view, the most ´curious´ thing. It is exceptional
because there was no statistical tradition to do it, there were not even economic means
to do it, and yet everyone [in Chile] was convinced that there was no other way
forward!.
On the relevance of the context to understand failures, the evidence shows that the
2012 census in Chile is not an exceptional case, but another expression of the difficulties
with censuses in Latin America. The Chilean census wasn’t the only one with problems and
indeed not the only framed as “failure.” As stated by an INE official interviewed,
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All the countries that have done it [the methodology change] the first time have gone
to hell. That's a fact; it's not just Chile […] all the countries have gone to hell. And it's
because there's no expertise, because they didn't work it before. They didn't do the
previous work.
The censuses’ problems in the Latin American region are linked to institutional
weaknesses. There is agreement among interviewees that National Statistics Offices (NSO)
share severe fragilities: lack of funding, inadequate leaders, scarcity of professional
capabilities, and lack of autonomy.
The lack of adequate funding for the statistical offices has been a persistent difficulty
in the region. In part due to the economic instability of the countries, but according to the
interviewees, it is also because of the low priority given by governments to public statistics.
Consistent with this perception, evidence indicates that when countries value the importance
of data, they are more willing to invest resources in statistical matters (Alessandro, 2017).
Alluding to reliable statistics, an INE interviewee stated, "we have to invest in statistics
because you realize that if you don't have quality public statistics, whether you're from the
left or the right, the country could fall off.”
Other weak institutional features are the leadership and skills of the director of the
NSO. For the interviewees, the professional profile and personal characteristics of the
director are critical. Thus, added to the academic credentials, the NSO values a director that
came from the institution itself (as happens in Brazil or Mexico), and with enough political
abilities to handle the complex tasks of a statistical institute. So an expert interviewed
pointed out, "how skillful the director is critical, especially with a capacity that I find very
difficult to have, which is to deal with your own bureaucracy.”
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Another regional weakness is the professional capabilities of public officials. On the
one hand, interviewees reported a shortage of highly trained professionals, especially since
CELADE ceased offering demography training. On the other hand, Latin American countries
are not investing in their demographers and statisticians. Except for Chile–which has a statefunded scholarship program–or Brazil–which trains their professionals– the other countries
are not investing in specialized knowledge. However, interviewees pointed out that there are
some highly trained professionals, mostly educated in universities of Europe or the US, but it
is getting harder and harder for statistical offices to attract and retain them. Low salaries,
political instability, and poor working conditions–specifically lack of job security–
disincentive specialists to stay in the NSOs. Referring to this situation, an interviewee
claimed, "then, what happens is like a state policy, which systematically expels professionals,
because they end up doing that, expels them, or does not form them, or does not attract them.
They don't keep them; the salaries are very low.”
There is agreement among interviewees that the main problem of the NSO is the lack
of political autonomy and independence (legally and also in practice), which also appeared
strongly in the Chilean case. An international consultant stressed this idea, saying, “the first
key for me is–the one that does not exist in most countries–but the first is independence or
autonomy.” Likewise, another expert alluded to the political factor: "there are also political
tensions, countries where the institutes receive more pressure than others, or when
government changes, the work teams disarm." An example of this situation was the 2012
census in Paraguay, where the political crisis and subsequent change of public officials,
modified the entire census plan leading to numerous problems. Another example is
Colombia, despite the technical reputation of the statistical office DANE, and considered by
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the interviewees as one of the best in the region, it was susceptible to political pressures. An
interviewee characterized it as having "a lot of vulnerability because the DANE is at the
ministry level and the DANE´s Director is basically a minister, so any political fuse… you
know that ministers very easy to change, so the DANE has that weakness."
Despite the weaknesses, interviewees agreed that Latin America's census difficulties
have not been from technical expertise but institutional origin. These are the words of an
expert from the Latin American Census Observatory (OLAC): “You can have the best
statisticians in the world, you can have the best methodology, you can send people to the best
demography programs, but if institutionally you have problems, the statistical operations will
have severe flaws.” Referring to the implications of not having a strong NSO, the same
expert points out:
Managing a statistical institute is 51% political and 49% technical, so you need
technical references, you need a substantial background in methodological, statistical
issues. However, if you don't have a political ability to defend that methodology, you
fail. And falling in the best of scenarios, in the least hurtful, you lose your job, and
that's it, but in the most harmful, you can drop a census, you drop a survey and affect
the statistical programming of an entire country like the Chilean case.
The capacities of the NSO in Latin America are quite dissimilar, for example, in
Colombia, "the high capacities of the DANE can be attributed, mainly, to a deep-rooted
technocratic tradition in certain entities of the Colombian State" (Alessandro, 2017, p. 69),
leading to a firm desire in maintaining prestige and confidence, despite difficulties in the
2005 census. In other countries, the precariousness of public statistics is deeper. For example,
El Salvador, did not undertake a census in the last decade, and presents a severe problem of
under-registered mortality. Similarly, other countries also have weaknesses in their registers,
as a demographer interviewed stated:
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Only regarding birth registration, you have no idea how big the problems are. Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador perform well; however, what is happening in Brazil or Central
America are very serious things because there are groups of much older kids, I'm
talking about thousands of children, that are just registered at the age of two, three
years old.
These institutional weaknesses observed by regional experts are consistent with the
analyses developed by the Inter-American Development Bank IADB (Taylor, 2016;
Alessandro, 2017; Beccaria, 2017; Dargent et al., 2018). They define “statistical capacity” as
"the existence of a permanent structure or system that has the necessary resources to generate
relevant and quality statistical data in a sustained manner, and to disseminate them in an
adequate and timely manner" (Beccaria, 2017, p. 2). From here, the IADB analyzed the
statistical capacity in ten NSO in Latin America, focusing on four key dimensions: resources,
institutional, methods, and diffusion (complementary information in the Appendix N.7).
Although the analysis did not include the Chilean case, the results reinforce the previous
findings of this study, as stated by the report: “this institutional weakness is manifested
through National Statistics Offices (NSOs) with scarce human, technological and financial
resources, limited autonomy and technical weakness, which do not allow them to produce
statistics under common criteria and in an integrated manner” (Dargent et al., 2018, p. ix).
Despite this interest on studying institutional statistical capacities in the region, the
interviewees agreed over the lack of plans and funding to address the problems. An
interviewee explained, “there are people working on how to improve projections, on how to
improve questionnaires, technologies, but there is not work on institutional issues at the
regional level.” Thus, experts had a rather pessimistic view of the future improvement of
statistical offices in the region.
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CELADE stimulates and facilitates a meaningful collaboration among countries in the
region, and provides guidance and support in demographic and statistical matters. However,
interviewees agreed that this UN institution had lost importance. On this decline, an
interviewee said, “there is a perception that comes since CELADE stopped training
demographers, no longer offered demographics courses, no longer trained, as it lost the
prestige it had.” Also, interviewees agreed about the shortage of demographers and lack of
generational renewal; in this line, another expert stated, "there is also a generational problem,
they are very good, but they had their moment around twenty, thirty years ago.” Thus, for
many, this lack of young demographers is accompanied by a lack of updating on
demographic techniques.
In addition, some interviewees express discrepancies with specific CEPAL
methodologies, in particular with census conciliation and population projections. The
countries of the region rely on CELADE, leaving little room for other approaches and
updates. In the opinion of one specialist, this "has caused a kind of lethargy, an absence of
new methods or a new influx of demographers." Regarding these discrepancies with
CELADE approaches, another expert pointed out:
CELADE is very well known for having its own method, for having its own vision of
how to handle things and that is not the only way to do things in demography, it is
disconnected, it is as if they were two parts of an island without connecting with the
methods that are now used worldwide
Most interviewees highly value the work of CELADE and the support it provides to
NSOs. As one interviewee pointed out, “this CELADE conciliation is very much appreciated
because it helps to cover up the mistakes made by the institution that conducted the census,
and this is done in many countries.” Several interviewees agree with this lag on demographic
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issues, as one interviewee said, "I believe there is a general demographic crisis. It has nothing
to do only with CELADE.” Therefore, the tensions over census data processing are framed in
these questions about CELADE methodologies, and apprehensions about its updating and
leadership.

8.4.

Clash of Logics
The case of the census shows that the street protests were critical for changing the

census strategy. However, from the societal lens, the student movement, and its ideas, reveal
a context of deep ideological disputes that affected the census policy. To better understand
these dynamics, the societal lens relies on the literature of institutional logics. This
perspective emphasizes the interrelations between individuals, organizations, and society
under different and diverse "logics of actions" (Zilber, 2013). Thornton and Ocasio define
institutional logics as: "The social constructed, historical patterns of material practices,
assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their
material subsistence, organize time, and space, and provide meaning to their social
reality”(1999, p. 804).
The demands and ideas of the social movement attest to the logics of action prevailing
at the time of the census; therefore, from this lens of analysis, it is essential to delve deeper
into the protest’s characteristics. The main features of the Chilean students' movement were:
massive character (large crowds of protesters in the street), high support from citizenship,
and its prolonged presence in time. The marches and mobilizations began in May 2011, and
then, increased in number and intensity, the student movement's strength was impressive.
Between April and December 2011 there were 122 days of marches and social protest actions
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(Fernández, 2013; T0, 2011), resembling the power of social movements in the 80s to
recover democracy (Vera, 2011). Besides, the citizens firmly held the demands of the social
movement. Public opinion measurement showed that 89% of Chileans supported the
movement's claims and that education quickly became the country's most crucial problem–
passing from 24% in May to 73% in August (CERC, 2011). The social movement remained
active with mobilizations, proposals, and negotiations during the 2011 and 2012 years.
Unlike other similar social movements of that time—such as the Indignados in
Spain—the emergence of the Chilean movement was not a response to specific economic or
political circumstances. The students break out in the streets and the political agenda
contrasting with the institutional stability and stable economy—the unemployment rate was
under 7%, GDP over 5%, and controlled inflation (Banco Central, 2020). However, the
emergence of the movement during Piñera's administration is no coincidence. He was the
first right-wing president since the dictatorship, and also a businessman, governing with a
managerial and technocratic style, lacking skills to engage with civil society, so in this way,
representing the market values that were in question (Oyarzún, 2012). Also, Piñera's ideas
were far from the citizens' demands, so far that his presidential plan proposed to maintain the
current economic scheme: "This Government Program consolidates the bases of the social
market economy development model, which has been successfully applied for more than
three decades in the country" (Piñera, 2009, p. 15).
Thus, 2011 and 2012 were years of profound transformation, where the country faced
radically opposing discourses and ideas. From an institutional logics perspective, that was a
time of confronted logics of action. On the one hand, the student movement emphasized
participation, social justice, accusing the inequalities of neoliberal market policies, and

313

claimed: "The end of profit" or "Education is not for sale," and also declaring “The failure of
the neoliberal economic model” (Fernández, 2013; Vera, 2011). On the other hand, and
contrary to those values, authorities offered partial solutions and more resources to improve
education–under the existing model–; and the right-wing businessman President declared that
education "is a consumer good" (T13, 2011).
The protesters were able to articulate the frustration and malaise of the citizenry
against the system. They placed on the agenda problems which had persisted for a long time,
most of which point to the inequalities caused by the market-oriented policy reforms
implemented by the dictatorship, starting with demands over tertiary education32, but then
extended to other areas such as health, pensions, and democracy (Vera, 2011). As Grugel and
Nem pointed out, “it is fair to say that the radical demands of the student leaders resonate in
Chile, precisely because they echo ideas about equity and justice that dates back to pre-1973
politics –albeit in a form updated for the contemporary era” (2015, p. 364). The claims
pointed out toward a paradigm shift, a new way to understand society and face social
problems. The following quote from a protesters organization illustrates the idea, “the
citizens understood that this system no longer stands, and it is necessary a change of
paradigm. Moving from education seen as a consumer good and financed by families, to
education as a social right, guaranteed by the State" (CONFECH, 2011).
The strength of the social movement led to many debates and abundant scholarly
studies, especially from sociology. The literature on the 2011-12 student movement identifies
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Between 2005 and 2010 around 80% of tertiary education expenditure came from families, while the average

in OECD countries was quite different: 70% public and 30% private spending. The latest data showed that
private expenditure on tertiary education in Chile decreased to 68% in 2016 (OECD, 2019).
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three explanations for their emergence: The first idea alludes to the stage of the country's
socio-economic development, reaching a per capita GDP of over US$15,000 and the
emergence of a more educated and empowered "new middle class" (Fleet, 2011). The second
reason is the crisis of the neoliberal model expressed in multiple and growing inequalities.
The third reason is the crisis of the political system, with limited representativeness and
legitimacy (Luna, 2016). The latter two explanations are linked because of the political,
economic, and institutional model established by the dictatorship (Vera, 2011; Oyarzún,
2012; Fernández, 2013). These explanations reinforce an underlying logic of action that
emerges with the student protests.
From disappointment for unfulfilled promises and malaise for the inequalities, the
student movement questioned existing ideas, values, and institutional arrangements,
provoking a clash of institutional logics, which would grow and deepen the following years.
The social movement opened the doors to protests of social discontent over the persistent
inequality,33which along with a process of detachment from established political parties and
representative institutions, led to the politicization of disparities, and the emergence of new
social actors demanding structural reforms to reduce them (Roberts, 2016). In the voice of
one of the leaders of the student movement, "We realized the problem was bigger, the
problem was structural […] The debate became about the link between education and the
bigger economic model in Chile” (The Guardian, 2012).
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These new social movements go beyond the reduction of the income gap, addressing other types of

inequalities such as gender, social orientation discrimination, barriers of access to the justice system, indigenous
rights, differential access to quality public services, among others (Castiglioni & Rovira, 2016).
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In this context of malaise against public decisions and deep questioning of the current
market-oriented policies, the INE proposed a "more modern, safe and professional" way to
perform the census. Here is where the perspective of institutional logics becomes palpable in
the case, because "The core assumption of the institutional logics approach is that the
interests, identities, values, and assumptions of individuals and organizations are embedded
within prevailing institutional logics" (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 103). Thus, it is not
possible to understand the decisions and tensions of the 2012 census without the more
significant dynamics that occurred in Chile at the time; they are deeply connected. The
census approach somehow embodies the clash between the logic of efficiency based in a
market-oriented way to run policies—professional paid pollsters, outsourced recruitment, and
the whole efficiency frame—and the ideas of participation and policies towards social
justice. The new census meant the abandonment of a long and highly valued tradition of
citizenship. The following excerpt from a citizen´s blog, illustrates the nostalgia of the old
census with volunteers, "people peeped out to see if the ´census girl´ was coming, children
and dogs accompanied me through the dusty streets, happy all of them, they and I... happy to
be part of the same thing, protagonists of the same country" (Bravo, 2012). Similarly, a
former government authority stated:
I think the mistake was also to break with tradition. It was known that they [censuses]
were so important for the people, and besides, everyone has memories when they
were students and went to census. So, there is one powerful thing related to the
republican tradition of the country [...] So, to break that tradition? I think that was a
mistake.
This clash of logics also shows a popular longing for a better past, a time where the
census belonged to all Chileans. The abrupt abandonment of this symbol shows what King
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and Crewe (2013) called “cultural disconnection” of the policy, as the new census format
failed to read the predominant desires and values and therefore came into conflict. For many
interviewees, it was an illusion to believe that such deep-rooted practices could change from
one day to the next. The following excerpt from an INE high official, illustrated the power of
the de facto census experience:
Chileans, in general, are very much doing things the same way. It's as if the next
mayoral elections were 100% electronic, No! because the people, especially the older
people like to go to the ballot box. The people love to talk in the line, they see the
same people in charge of the voting station, and they greet them because they already
know each other. So, you can't make those changes overnight.
From this paradigmatic level, the understanding and explanations for failures rest in
more significant ideological assumptions. Hindmoor and McConnell allude to the conflict of
profound values and ideas that lead to paradigmatic pathologies, understanding them as:
“[T]he grander models and principles that guide societies are at the heart of often bitter
disputes about the ideals best able to provide societal success and avoid failure” (2015, p.
67). Thus, there are judgments and interpretations regarding the census that are impregnated
with the tensioned paradigms.
The tension of logics34 is clear in the opposing approaches of the 2012 and subsequent
2017 census. While the former emphasized the country's economic savings and the efficiency
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In line with the increase in social demands in the last decade, it is important to highlight the intense social

upheaval and citizen movement that broke out in October 2019 in Chile, which has been called the “Estallido
social” or “social outburst of 18/O.” The trigger was the rise in the cost of the Santiago subway, but as with the
student movement in 2011, it then gave way to even deeper demands for structural changes to reduce
inequalities. Therefore, and in line with the "clash of logics" observed in the census case, the current social and
political crisis, also during Piñera administration, have similarities in terms of the underlying logics in conflict.
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of the process, the latter rested on the recovery of democratic values and the census as a
citizen's feat. A political analyst referred to this tension:
The focus on efficiency led Piñera's government to want to conduct a census that
would not interfere with the country's economic activity [...] Piñera forgot that the
census is also an opportunity to build community and strengthen civic values. Just as
if the organizers thought the “Teleton” is only an event to raise money, forgetting that
it is also an opportunity to remind us that we must be in solidarity with the less
fortunate, the Government believed that the census was just a process to count people
and did not remember that it was also an exercise to help us understand that we live in
a community. Bachelet's government, on the other hand, understood well the
participative sense implied by the realization of a national census in a single day with
high participation of volunteers (Navia, 2017).
Thus, the governments of Piñera and Bachelet, and their 2012 and 2017 censuses,
embody fundamental values and logics of action that were and still are under dispute in
Chile. The societal lens places the 2012 census case in a broader context, understanding
policy failure in light of tensions in existing paradigms.

This chapter analyzed the census case through this third lens of analysis, the societal
lens, focusing on political, social, and institutional elements that influenced the census
failure. Regarding the political context, the analysis observed how the idea of excellence of
the Piñera government worked as a powerful metaphor for the census strategy change, which
added to the short-term policymaking perspective, the intense electoral competition, and the
significant political crisis the government was going through. In addition, this lens observed
that the growing influence of social media and new State regulations generated enormous
pressure over the census policy. Another finding is that the failed Chilean census is not an
exception but part of a trend of census problems and severe weaknesses of the NSOs in Latin
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America. Finally, this lens analyzes the role of the social movement leading to a profound
clash of logics of which the new census was also a part, confronting market-oriented
ideologies with participation and social justice ideas. The Diagram N.13 below presents the
elements of context according to four dimensions: the political context, the new rules of the
game, census and statistical institutionality, and the clash of logics.

Diagram N.13. Analytical Keys form the Societal Lens

New Rules of the Game

Censuses and Statistical
Institutionality

• The growing power of social
media

•New census methodologies

•Transparency and procurement
regulations

•Latin American census failures
•National Statistical Offices and
institutional Capacity
•Transformations in the
demography field
•The role of CELADE

Political Context

Clash of Logics

•The Government of the Best
and census
•Short-term policymaking and
intense electoral competition
•Governing coalition and the
political crisis

•The eruption of the Student
Movement
•Market oriented policy vs.
participation and social justice

2012 Census
Failure in Chile
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•New census challenged deeproot values and practices

CHAPTER 9
POLICY FAILURE. A MULTI-LENS ANALYSIS

According to the Lenses Framework proposed in this dissertation, the previous
chapters analyzed the 2012 census failure case from the policy, organizational, and societal
lenses. Thus, from different analytical backgrounds, each one of those lenses separately
investigates and reveals some stresses of the census case and by doing so, responds to the
first research question of this study, which is, how do various lenses/perspectives understand
policy failure differently?
The study attests that each lens of analysis reflects a unique understanding of the
failure, its conditioning factors, characteristics, and interpretations of the actors within the
lens perspective. However, each separate perspective is not enough to understand the elusive
phenomenon of policy failure. In simple words, "without each other, each one is nothing."
Thus, the previous chapters have gradually revealed that the lenses complement each other.
What one lens ignores, the other unveils, what is critical to one of them, also resonates by
others, or even, what one lens emphasizes, the others lenses nuance.
Therefore, to the three previous analyses, this chapter offers a fourth: a multiple lens
analysis of the 2012 census case. The multi-lens analysis combines and articulates different
lenses examining the interactions and relationships amongst those lenses. This analysis does
not fuse the perspectives of single lenses, but rather complements them, thus addressing the
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dissertation's second research question: How does a multi-lens approach contribute to a
better understanding of policy failure?
To illustrate the relationships between lenses, this chapter focuses on critical events
and topics, which, from the narrative provided in Chapter Five, are key to understanding how
the case unfolded. From each selected theme, it performs a two-step exploration. First, it
identifies relevant insights and findings provided by the previous lenses, and second,
analyzes the relationships between lenses. Thus, by delving into the individual lenses
findings, and the relationships between them, the analysis shows how a multi-layered
observation contribute to a better comprehension of the census failure. Following the
chronology of the case and the key issues that emerged from the analysis, below is the multilens analysis of the following themes: census strategy change, expectations, decision-making,
carrying out the census, data processing, media polemic, and evaluations and inquiries.

9.1.

Census Strategy Change
The policy lens study revealed several deficiencies regarding the decision to change

the census method–from the de facto toward a de jure approach– the most significant was the
delay on census preparations, the eruption of the student movement, and the overall
weaknesses of the census project. The analysis showed several shortcomings of the census
project. There was a high turnover of the census team heads, leading to conflicting visions
and missing leadership regarding the 2012 census. Besides, the census team did not have the
best professionals, the experience or skills necessary to undertake the census task. Also, the
analysis exposed significant delays in the de facto census preparations. In that context, the
student movement broke in 2011, jeopardizing the viability of having enough volunteers for
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the enumeration. The risk of a dearth of census takers threatened the success of the de facto
census operation, as the vast majority of the volunteers were typically students, the
protagonists of the student demonstrations. All of this, led the INE authorities to alter the
census strategy just a few months before starting the enumeration.
However, the policy lens does not explain the change of census strategy entirely, and
this is where the analysis is enriched by looking at the findings from other lenses. The study
from the organizational lens identified INE flaws that enabled this sudden change of strategy,
such as the lack of collaboration and tensions within the organization, and particularly the
absence of a permanent census unit. The census was a minor project for the INE; it was not
part of the institution's structure, nor did it have the necessary resources or stability to
adequately plan the census. Some signs of this instability are the high turnover of heads of
census mentioned above, the scarcity of skilled professionals for the census, and the team
members' labor insecurity. Thus, the low importance of the census within the INE, combining
with the lack of census leadership and low capabilities, made fertile ground for the abrupt
modification of strategy without opposition.
The analysis from the societal lens brings other insights regarding the census strategy
change. A first antecedent is that other Latin American countries moved from de facto
toward the de jure approach in that decade. Therefore, although the student mobilization
eruption triggered the census strategy change, it was possible because it strongly resonated
with this trend in the region. Thus, even though previous INE authorities ruled out moving to
a de jure census by 2012–as it required considerable planning, testing of instruments, and
other significant preparations–moving toward a de jure census was not strange for the INE.
The societal perspective analysis also identified the strength of the government's ideas of
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excellence with a focus on policy efficiency. From here, moving toward a de jure census,
conducted by professional surveyors, with better quality data, and lower costs, aligned with
the ideas of efficiency, spurred the decision to change the strategy. Finally, in line with the
clash of logics reflection, the analysis recognized the importance of the de facto census for
citizenship, embodying solidarity and nationhood values. However, INE authorities did not
weigh the census significance for the Chileans, the values it represented, and the resistance to
change.
The census strategy change allows for observation of the interactions between lenses.
Diagram N.14, presented below, and the following in the chapter, synthesize each lens's
findings regarding the theme, and some relationships with the other lenses' findings. These
diagrams help envision the Lenses Framework exercise, graphically placing together the new
understanding achieved by combining the lenses' different perspectives. The diagrams
distinguish each lens with a different color–policy in green, organizational in blue, societal in
red–to facilitate identification of the lenses. Each diagram displays the most significant
relationships between lenses for each theme, as seen in the dotted lines connecting the
themes. In addition, a list of the key features of the themes presented in this chapter is
available in Appendix N.8
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Diagram N.14. Census Strategy Change Across Three Lenses
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The Diagram exhibit some relationships between the lens findings. There is a link
between the census project's marginal role within the INE organizational structure and the
overall census weaknesses with the delay in census preparations. The student movement
threat also gave credence to moving toward the de jure census, as other countries in the
region had. Similarly, the census team's weaknesses explained the scarce opposition to the
change of strategy and the values at stake. Finally, there are some reinforcing dynamics
between lenses. Given the marginality of the census project within the INE organizational
structure, the lag in preparations, and the census project's whole weaknesses, the ideas of
efficiency gained strength for the census strategy change.

9.2.

Expectations
The policy lens analysis showed that high expectations about the census generated

enormous pressure on the policy, particularly during the implementation process. Thus, there
was a contradiction between the enthusiastic public statements about the new census and the
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lack of planning, scarcity of resources, and adequate skills to undertake the census task
successfully. This tension in line of what literature calls “policy trap”–expectations of
government are greater than their capacity to execute the policy (McConnell, 2020).
The organizational lens observed the INE´s complicated relation to the expectations.
One of the INE´s main strengths was its high technical reputation, which led authorities to
blindly trust the institution's capacity to face the new challenge. Also, there was the pride,
commitment and public service motivation of INE employees, who historically worked hard
to achieve the INE's goals, and who faced the challenge of the new census, without even
being adequately prepared. Besides the above, there is also the role played by the INE
Director in building the high expectations, who, without experience or expert advice,
enthusiastically promoted the new census project. Thus, from the INE´s perspective, these
three elements sought to compensate for the lack of planning to meet census and the INE
expectations.
The societal lens also revealed the high expectations of the first right-wing
government since the dictatorship. The analysis noted the power of the "government of the
best" ideas over the census, in line with the government's maxims on the modern state, i.e.
more efficient, less bureaucratic. These expectations–present on the government's agenda,
policies, documents, and authorities statements–reveal the time´s guiding ideas. However,
from the idea of the clash of logics proposed, there were tensions over those expectations,
which reflect deeper social dynamics and conflicting views. So, just as expectations reveal a
logic related to efficiency and professionalism, another logic misses participation and the
community sense. The student demonstrations were the voice of these "other ideas," with
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sharp criticism of the market system and demands for greater participation. Diagram N.15
below illustrates the most relevant findings regarding expectations.
Diagram N.15. Expectations Across Three Lenses
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The three lenses reveal the strength of expectations in the census case. There were
high expectations regarding the new modern census, regarding the INE's performance, and
the Piñera government achievements. Each of these elements separately provides valuable
insight for understanding the failure. Still, by integrating them, it is possible to observe how
they leverage each other. The idea of "government of the best" is expressed in the "best
census in history," which was possible only because of the confidence in INE´s professional
capabilities. Also, the government's prevailing ideas of efficiency resonated in INE
authorities, and in that way increasingly feeding the high expectations. Expectations are a
clear manifestation of the dominant ideas and desires, but they also reflect logics in tension,
an implicit clash of ideologies that gradually became stronger. Like this, the multi-lens
analysis shows the reinforcement of high expectations between lenses.
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9.3.

Decision-making
The policy lens analysis evidenced the lack of census leadership and the overall

weaknesses of the census project. Thus, the analysis observes that decisions were far from
best practice. Some shortcomings that reflect the lack of technical foundations in decisionmaking were: lack of proper pilot tests to assess the census strategy change and its logistical
and methodological implications, failing to follow international recommendations on survey
protocols, absence of a timely post-census survey, lack of expert advice on data processing,
and ignoring recommendations on estimating missing data, among others. Therefore, the
analysis showed a lack of technical criteria or census experience with other censuses in
which to base census decision-making.
From the organizational lens, the first analytical key is the role of the INE Director.
According to INE's institutional configuration, the director's appointment is not based on
merit but on the president's trust, which allowed the economist Labbé to head the INE, who
had neither experience in public administration nor statistical expertise. The director's
centrality, along with the inexperienced Labbé, manifested a scenario of distant leadership of
low legitimacy within the INE. Another critical situation was: the establishment of a parallel
decision-making structure to the formal chain of commands of the INE. Thus, despite their
lack of expertise, Labbé´s advisors had a significant influence on decision-making–over the
census, and other projects–bypassing formal authorities, all of which generated enormous
distress and conflicts between groups. Thus, despite INE CEO efforts–who operated as a
bridge between the director´s team and the rest of the INE–census decisions were
permanently under significant stress. Another related element is the lag in modernization
processes in the INE. As stated, the INE had rigidities in its internal work dynamics and
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important lags. There was no documentation or registers regarding previous censuses’
experience because decision-making used to rely on public officials and their cumulative
experience. This lack of formalization of practices gave room to a decision-making style that
did not rely on technical knowledge.
The societal lens revealed significant institutional weaknesses of the National
Statistical Offices (NSO) in Latin America that adversely impacted their policies' quality and
effectiveness. Thus, Chile had difficulties, but the whole region was lagging on census
matters. Some critical difficulties faced by NSOs were the lack of autonomy and inadequacy
of their directors. In addition, the societal analysis shows the prevalence of the ideas of the
"government of the best." With a focus on efficiency and market-oriented policies, decisions
regarding the census endeavored technical quality, effectiveness, and lower cost. Diagram
N.16, presented below, synthesizes the elements described regarding decision-making, and
the interactions between lenses.
Diagram N.16. Decision Making Across Three Lenses

Decision-making

Policy Lens

Lack of Technical
Criteria

Census Project
Weaknesses

Census Leadership

Organizational Lens

Lack of
Formalization of
Practices

Central Role of the
INE Director

Parallel Structure

Societal Lens

NSO Fragility in
Latin America

328

The Government of
the Best

One interesting finding from this analysis is the lack of formalization of the
cumulative knowledge and usual practices gave room to a new decision-making style, this
time distant from technical criteria. This decision-making method became even more
prevalent because of the knowledge gap, the lack of experience in de jure censuses, and the
overall weaknesses of the census project mentioned before. In addition, all three lenses
showed elements that reinforced a particular style of decision-making, because there is a
relationship between the NSO's flaws, the specific profile and central role of the INE
Director, and the absence of technical criteria in census decisions. Another cross-cutting
element points to the dominant ideas of efficiency–the government of the best–which led, to
the establishment of a parallel decision-making structure aligned with these ideas. These
ideas became sounder by the undisputed authority of the director, and the weaknesses of the
census project, thus leading to decision-making that aimed at the census efficiency.

9.4.

Carrying Out the Census
The detailed case description and the study from the policy lens exposed many

problems during the census enumeration, showing little by little the weaknesses of the
formulation process, lack of resources, minimal planning, and the poor capacity of the INE to
correct the mistakes that occurred along the way. Some implementation problems were: the
scarcity of census takers, inadequate training and misleading information, but the most
problematic was failing to control and supervise the enumeration.
The organizational lens showed an INE under pressure during the implementation
stage, which exacerbated conflicts between groups within the INE–the Director and his close
advisors on the one side, and the rest of the INE on the other side. These tensions involved a
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lack of technical collaboration to solve problems, poor communication, and an increasingly
deteriorating working climate. The analysis also revealed a clear manifestation of groupthink
dynamics. Director Labbé and his close advisors had an unrealistic view of what the new
census endeavor entailed. Also, they gradually showed intense groupthink symptoms, which
led to flawed decisions–such as reducing the budget a few days before starting fieldwork, not
acting in time to correct the misclassification of houses, and ignoring the warnings of the
reports of lagging, among others. Consequently, some symptoms observed at this stage were:
the overestimation of the capacities to achieve a successful census, the blind confidence in
the census project, non-acceptance of different visions, concealment of information, and
pressure on the dissenters.
As stated, the societal lens also revealed that the Chilean census was not the only one
with problems; on the contrary, many countries in the region faced implementation
difficulties, and some specifically when moved toward a de jure census modality. Besides,
the analysis showed that the census met complex and unexpected social transformations that
affected its implementation; this included the power and high presence of social media and
the challenge to run a census under the new regulations of the Chilean public administration.
Finally, the societal analysis again manifested the power of "the government of the best”
ideas in the implementation. Authorities’ statements stressed the many advantages of the new
format, and the achievements made, such as the quality data collected and the high coverage
achieved. Diagram N.17 below synthesizes some features arising from each lens and the
most important interactions between them.
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Diagram N.17. Carrying Out the Census Across Three Lenses
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There is a strong link between the census formulation flaws and the enormous
pressure experienced by the INE during the implementation. Some of the causes were: the
rushed selection of censistas, the problems during the training, the administrative burden of
the payments, the adaptations of the logistics of enumeration, and the additional efforts to
correct erroneous classification of households. All of them were complicated processes with
no contingency plans. Thus, the analysis shows a vicious circle where the flaws in the
formulation generated enormous pressure on the organization, which also affected the INE's
ability to conduct the census competently. This pressure grew as implementation problems
became more complex, hand in hand with increasing conflicts within the institution. The
combined lens analysis exposes elements of context that heightened pressure on the INE and
the census. The unexpected explosion of social media–monitoring and overseeing every
detail of census implementation–and the additional constraints public administration
regulations–strict public procurement, and accountability procedures. Besides, these
implementation problems were not exclusive to the Chilean case, other censuses in the region
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suffered. The multi-lens analysis also reveals the relationship between the ideas of “the
government of the best" and INE organizational dynamics during the implementation stage,
leading to conflicts between groups, and groupthink symptoms. The latter, the groupthink
dynamics, had a clear impact on the control and supervision of the enumeration, especially in
the secrecy of information on the enumeration progress, an issue that later aggravated the
conflict within INE.

9.5.

Census Data Processing
After a very complicated enumeration process that spanned four months, the INE

faced the additional challenge of data processing. The policy lens analysis identified a lack of
planning throughout the policy cycle, and data processing was no exception. Although there
was plenty of literature, handbooks, and detailed international recommendations on how to
address data processing and solve census data problems, there was no work plan with
validated technical criteria. As described in the case, the manner the data was processed was
a trigger for the "data manipulation" controversy. Thus, the lack of a data processing plan
according to the new approach, and the absence of clear technical criteria, explains the lack
of rigor in the treatment of data, including the handling of missing data and the imputation of
dwellings.
Similarly, the organizational lens provides insights about data analysis. In
combination with other tensions within the INE, the convoluted implementation of the census
left in its wake a conflict-ridden organization at the time of data processing. In a climate of
distrust, technical confrontations and heated discussions between groups were commonplace.
Unlike past censuses, where the census team conducted the data processing with strong
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support from the INE technical area, the 2012 census data processing was carried out by an
INE Director´s small trusted group, all happening in a "behind closed doors" mode. This
dynamic shows the growing symptoms of groupthink. Some dynamics observed in this stage
were the blind belief of the group's inherent morality and the idea that those who did not
support the group's decisions were enemies plotting against the census and the government.
Thus, census data processing was carried out under a context of mistrust, secrecy, and a lack
of accountability.
The analysis from the societal lens complements previous insights regarding data
analysis. On the one hand, there were significant institutional weaknesses of the NSO in
Latin America, which is consistent with the perception of decay of the demography in the
region– CELADE no longer trained demographers, highly skilled professionals were scarce,
and the perception of CELADE's diminished influence. On the other hand–despite this
perception–the analysis revealed essential statistical and demographic collaboration where
countries relied on CELADE experience and support. The NSO in the Latin American region
turned to CELADE for expert assistance on different matters, such as planning,
methodological transformations, data collection, errors and omissions and experiences from
other countries. Notwithstanding the many mistakes made with their censuses, thanks to
CELADE´s technical support, some countries corrected errors and managed to “save their
censuses.” However, with the 2012 census in Chile, the Piñera government broke off
relations with some UN bodies and dispensed with CELADE's advice throughout the census
project. Therefore, at the time of data processing, the INE did not have any specialized
support to address the data´s complex problems or the correct data imputation processes.
Diagram N.18 summarizes the main features of census data processing.
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Diagram N.18. Census Data Processing Across Three Lenses
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The nonexistence of rigorous planning and the lack of any expert advice or
specialized international guidance regarding data processing–especially given the new de jure
mode, and the significant problems in data collection–increased the INE´s level of conflict.
Another link between lenses points out the relationship between the lack of clear technical
criteria for data processing and the perceived demographic decay, including the institutional
weakness of the NSOs, and the scarcity of demographers. However, of the elements revealed
by the lenses, undoubtedly, groupthink dynamics are critical for understanding data
processing and the dire implication in the census´s failure. Some aspects that account for the
existing groupthink were: the isolation of the group in charge of data processing, the lack of
collaboration with specialized instances, the secrecy in handling the information, the blind
confidence in the census success, the belief in the inherent morality of the group, and the
overestimation of the group´s skills to process census data.
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9.6.

The Media Polemic
Another theme for this multi-lens analysis is the controversy over the census data

which exploded because of the accusation of data manipulation made through the press by
the CEO of INE, an episode known as the media polemic. The case disclosed the existence of
various signals and warnings of the census problems. Some of them were: recommendations
for postponing the census, analysis of critical issues, backlogged enumeration reports,
suggestions for data presentation, as well as a specialized analysis warning of severe
problems of consistency in the data collected. Despite these alerts, when authorities presented
the census´s final results, the many errors in the data were exposed–demographic
inconsistencies, lack of clarity on estimation methods, and various errata.
The organizational lens showed a very conflicted INE, with constantly heated
discussions, groupthink dynamics, and a growing politicization. All this led, amid an internal
INE crisis, to firing INE's high authority on technical matters. Then eleven INE high officials
raised their voices–through a public letter–defending the institution's values, denouncing the
deplorable management within the INE, and expressing their concern about the institution's
loss of professional quality. Subsequently, the INE's CEO–who served as the director's righthand–was accused of manipulating the census data. From an organizational point of view,
both the inadequate processing of census data and public denunciation directly affected the
heart of the INE, its professional reputation, and its workers' pride and commitment to the
civil service. Thus, the organizational lens reveals a highly conflicted INE that was further
weakened by the media controversy.
The analysis from the societal lens reveals necessary contextual and political
conditions to understand the controversy. On the one hand, Chile has a policy-making style
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focused on the short term, determined by governments' political pressure that only last four
years without re-election, and are always eager to show policy results. On the other hand, the
warning about census problems, as well as the later denunciations, happened in the middle of
a major political crisis of the governing coalition. In addition, there was a major financial
scandal that left the coalition without a presidential candidate just months before the election.
This political crisis touched the INE, as the institution was without a minister in charge
(when Longueira was nominated as the new presidential candidate). Finally, and related to
ideas of the government of excellence, the societal lens revealed other cases of
“manipulation” or data “misrepresentation,” in particular, the lowering of poverty figures
episode. All this exposes the enormous weight that the presentation of data had for the
government, understood as a sign of success and compliance with expectations. Diagram
N.19 illustrates the critical elements described, and the most significant relationships
between lenses.
Diagram N.19. Census Media Polemic Across Three Lenses.
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The first element worth noting is the link between the warnings and the political
crisis. The political crisis and the focus on the short term led government authorities to turn a
deaf ear to the signals of poor quality of the census and problem alerts–attributed solely to
internal conflicts and the growing politicization within the INE. A second prominent element
is how the exposed census errors and the accusation of data manipulation profoundly
threatened the INE's core values, an issue that triggered the public letter from INE's
professionals. A third element is a relationship between the complaints, the open letter, and
the data manipulation accusation. The letter arose after the firing of the technical Subdirectorate and pointed to serious concerns about the INE's direction and the risk to the INE’s
professional quality; and the accusation made by the CEO regarding the dubious processing
of the data. With different focuses, both complaints arose because the warnings didn't work;
they are desperate calls for attention to political and organizational problems. Finally, there is
a relationship between the accusation of data manipulation and the background of the
government's dubious handling of figures. Thus, the precedent over poverty figures, the
CASEN scandal raised suspicions about government behavior patterns to show good results
within the context of the government's expectations of the best.

9.7.

Evaluations and Inquiries to the Census
Consistent with policy failure literature, the 2012 census case exhibited a significant

controversy and intense debate–both academic, political, and social–over the criteria and
perspectives to assess the success or the failure of the census. The policy lens analysis
showed several investigations and assessments, which were carried out by different actors,
and through various methodologies. Of all the evaluations, undoubtedly, the most significant
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was the commission of national experts, which identified severe census errors, concluding
that the 2012 census was not suitable for public policies, and recommended carrying out a
new census in an abbreviated version. After that assessment, there were several more, one
carried out by international census consultants, the chamber of deputies, the comptroller, the
public prosecutor's office, and finally, a statistical and demographic analysis of the census
data, carried out by the INE.
The organizational lens presents a conflicted and depressed INE at the time of the
inquiries. The growing internal conflicts, the lack of leadership, and the whole census scandal
deeply affected the organization, generating distrust, and damaging its core values. Thus, the
different investigations–meetings, hearings, report writing, public statements–produced even
more pressure on the institution, all of which under intense and merciless press coverage,
worsening conflicts in an increasingly deteriorated organizational climate and creating new
polarizations. While some defended the census quality and sought ways to fix the data and
"save the census," others argued that the whole census failure–including the commission
investigation–was part of a major plot to damage Piñera's census in the run-up to the next
election. Other people, convinced of the census’s poor quality, supported a new census to
count with reliable data for policy decision-making.
Finally, the societal lens shows the political crisis of the governing coalition, not only
because of the absence of a minister in charge but also because of the wear and tear of the
government pressured by many social demonstrations. This political crisis influenced the
convening of the commission of experts, the selection of their members, the President's
apologies for the poor quality of the census, and the subsequent call for an additional
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evaluation seeking a "second opinion." All this took place in a context of political turmoil,
loss of direction, and with the presidential elections only a few months away.
Diagram N.20. Evaluations and Inquiries Across Three Lenses
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There are relationships between lenses that contribute to a better understanding of the results and
implications of the set of evaluations over census policy. First, the political crisis influenced the assessments,
affecting the convening of the evaluation committees, without clarity on the criteria and expectations of such
evaluations, and with little or no political management of the crisis. A second element is that the government's
political crisis echoed a crisis in the INE, which faced the evaluation processes from a growing internal
polarization. The multi-lens analysis shows that the two crises overlapped and enhanced each other, which is
something not observed from the individual lenses separately. Finally, a third factor is the damage caused to the
INE by the investigation process, but especially the drastic and unexpected results, which contributed to
worsening relations within the INE and profoundly affected institutional values.

9.8.

Individual Lenses and Multi-lens
Based on the analysis from the policy, organizational, and societal lenses, this chapter offered a fourth

analysis of the 2012 census failure in Chile, but this time from a multi-lens perspective. This analysis provides a
double insight. First, identifies the contributions and distinctions from each one of the lenses regarding a
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specific theme; and then, explores the relationships between the lenses’ findings. These analyses reveal how a
combined examination provides an enhanced comprehension of the failure case. Both steps are part of this
multi-lens analysis; it is not possible to address one without the other.
As the saying goes: "Nothing is true, nothing is a lie; all depends on the glass you look through,”35
reflecting the classic epistemological tension about perceiving and knowing social reality, which is at the very
heart of the policy failure literature. This dissertation recognizes the enormous complexity of social reality and
the different ways of beholding it. Accordingly, the Lenses Framework of this study does not intend to simplify
the complexity of the failure phenomenon nor to propose an integrated or unique framework, but to offer a
different way of observing and analyzing policy failure.
It may be useful to return to the analogy proposed in Chapter Three about the house and the
photograph. Photographs reflect the lenses or the different ways of observing and capturing social reality. Each
photograph has a frame, an intention, and can capture some characteristics of the house. Thus, each photograph
tells a story, and just as it reveals certain things about the house–color, shape, materials–it also ignores others.
When there is more than one photograph of the same house, there are more lenses involved, different ways of
observing; so, added to what each photo provides, there is a richer understanding of the house because of these
different viewpoints. Thus, the Lenses Framework proposed in this dissertation is, similar to the above analogy,
an instrument to achieve a richer understanding. Each lens is like photography, revealing a set of characteristics
and tensions of the case. Then the multi-lens analysis allows combining those different perspectives for
enhanced comprehension of this very convoluted subject of policy failure.
In line with the Lenses Framework´s fundamental idea, the understanding of the failure of the 2012
census differs according to the criteria and perspectives, varies depending on the observation lens. Analysis
from the policy lens offers an easy understanding of why the policy failed–such as the rushed methodology
change, lack of funding, poor planning, and lack of supervision. Therefore, if only this "photograph" existed,
there would be only one narrative with a series of convincing explanations for the census’s failure. Likewise,
the organizational lens analysis offers an additional “photograph,” that, independently of the previous one,

35

In Spanish, the rhyme is: “Nada es verdad, nada es mentira; todo depende del cristal con que se mira.”
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provides other explanatory clues to the flawed census–such as marginality of the census project, groupthink
dynamics, and the delay in process modernization. In the same way, the societal lens provides insights into the
country’s social and political context–such as short term policy-making, political crisis, underlying clash of
logics–that affected the failure. Thus, each lens analysis, each narrative helped to better grasp the failure of the
census.
However, it is important to emphasize that the multi-lens approach is much more than just an addition,
it is a new perspective. First, because it brings together individual perspectives, recognizing the findings and
valuing the contribution that each one provides. And second, because when the contributions of each lens are
analyzed together, new findings emerge. Just as there are elements that only emerge from individual analyses,
so too there are factors and new understanding that only arise in this integrated analysis. Consequently, and
following Aristotle’s words: “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” Therefore, a multi-lens analysis,
that recognizes individual perspectives and their relationships, provides an even enhanced understanding of the
census failure.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS

One of the hallmarks of policy failures is that they are controversial. There is rarely
agreement among political or social actors, or even among researchers, regarding what
failure means, implies, or what factors are associated with it. From this convoluted nature,
this dissertation explored the following research question: How do we understand policy
failure? To answer the question, the study offered the Lenses Framework as a novel way to
address policy failures and applied this perspective to the failure of the 2012 census in Chile.
The chapters of this dissertation reveal a challenging path to understanding policy
failure. Along with an all-encompassing literature review of policy failures in Chapter Two,
and the proposed analytical device of the Lenses Framework in Chapter Three, Chapter Four
described the method of the study. Then, and following the case study approach, Chapter
Five presented a detailed narrative of case of the 2012 census failure. Following that,
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight analyzed the case from the policy, organizational, and
societal lenses, revealing how each lens offered different insights into the case. Finally, in
Chapter Nine, the multi-lens analysis provided a more comprehensive perspective of the
failure episode.
Concluding, this chapter discusses some critical topics arising from the dissertation
and highlights the contributions of this study. First, it reviews the common characteristics of
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policy failures in the case. It then discusses the relationship between policy failure and
learning, examining the type of learnings–or the lack of learning–in the census case.
Subsequently, it presents the academic contributions of the dissertation. Next, it provides
policy contributions and recommendations. And finally, it proposes future areas and topics
for research.

10.1. Common Characteristics of policy failure in the case
The 2012 census case illustrates most of the common characteristics of policy failure
observed by literature: perception of damage, avoidability of failure, high visibility, the
government as responsible, blame allocation–avoidance dynamics, and variation in the
judgment of failure over time. This section presents a detailed analysis of these
characteristics in the case.
Perhaps the essential characteristic is the idea of harm or perception of damage
caused by failure. The literature distinguishes between damage, intensity, extent, severity, or
duration, all pointing to the effects of the damage that extends beyond the scope of the policy
(Linder & Peters, 1987; Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996; Howlett, 2012). Consistent with the
literature, all actors, regardless of their roles and political positions, perceived that the census
event produced some type of damage. An example of the damage is the country's enormous
economic cost: at least 30 billion pesos for the 2012 census36, equivalent to more than $US50
million (all figures as of December 2018). Other types of damage are the amount of energy,

36

This figure considers the resources allocated to the census project in INE budgets from 2008 to 2014 (INE,

2020).
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time, and other resources devoted to containing the controversy, examining the failure, and
searching for solutions, which played out over several years. Another harmful effect was that
the lack of reliable data severely affected the focus and quality of the country's policies and
the allocation of resources to the territories. Hence, the census failure generated adverse
consequences far beyond not achieving census goals. The policy lens revealed broad damage
to the policy, resulting in the effective invalidation of the 2012 census with a commitment to
run a new census in 2017. The organizational lens observed severe harm to the INE's
professional reputation and deterioration of the organizational climate. Finally, the societal
lens noted how the controversy and the endless process of inquiries affected government
stability, generated a loss of social trust, and high degrees of politicization.
The notion of policy failure is not limited to the damage it has caused. Another
characteristic is whether policy failure was intentional or not. When public opinion and
policymakers perceive the event as deliberate, the judgment of failure is strong and
consequences long-lasting as opposed to a perception that the event was not intended
(Howlett, 2012; Stone, 2002). This dissertation’s analysis indicates that there was no
intentionality for the census to fail. As revealed by the different analytical lenses, it occurred
a result of many factors, such as policy decisions, organizational dynamics, and the country’s
social and political context.
Another key feature is the avoidability of the failure event. The failure´s judgment is
stronger if the actors believe that the event could have been foreseen, avoided, or better
controlled (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996; Gray, 1996). Avoidability is a prominent theme in the
case. Different actors at different moments considered the census failure, whether by action
or omission, to be preventable and avoidable. There were plenty of questions such as: What
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would have happened if...? What could have done differently? Or statements such as: "with
expert help, we could have saved the census;” "If census expectations hadn't been that high,
census errors wouldn't have been so bad;" "in a less troubled INE, they could have prevented
the crisis from escalating.”
The case presents many voices expressing the avoidability of the failure. From the
policy perspective, the notion of avoidability was in: the decision to change the census
strategy, not to postpone the census date, the late post-enumeration survey, the lack of expert
support for data processing, and the distorted presentation of the census results. Similarly,
from the organizational lens, the judgment on whether the failure was avoidable was
observable in: the absence of opposition to the abrupt change of strategy, the lack of proper
follow-ups and timely correction of enumeration problems, the deficit of coordination, and
especially in the insufficient warnings about problems. From the societal lens, avoidability
appears linked with the President's statement of the best census in history, and the inadequate
crisis management, particularly regarding the media and census evaluations.
The visibility or “publicness” of the event is another typical characteristic of policy
failures (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996; Howlett et al., 2015). The 2012 census failure had high
visibility, extensive media coverage, and significant social media attention. Some factors
explaining this salience were: First, the eruption of the controversy–the data manipulation
accusation–quickly captured public attention. Second, the dispute lasted for a long time, as it
was rekindled many times by different events–the accusation, the investigations process, the
new census. Third, in line with census's public nature, all actors have a point of view and
something to say about the census. Fourth, the census failure represented damage to a
country's core values (Brändström & Kuipers, 2003). The last factor associated with the
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event’s public nature was the political moment, since the controversy appeared a few months
before presidential elections.
The search for liability, responsibility, and blame is another characteristic of policy
failure. As the literature suggests, in the census case, the allocation of the responsibility falls
on the government, public officials, and policymakers (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996; Howlett et
al., 2015). In terms of individuals, charges fell on the INE Director Labbé–for implementing
the strategy change, taking bad advice, denying difficulties; President Piñera–for appointing
Labbé; and the INE Director Coeymans–for crisis mismanagement. The liability also relied
on groups, mainly on the director's advisors–for technical amateurishness, inability to listen,
overconfidence, and stubbornness; INE's high officials–for not upholding professional
standards, dereliction of duty, and failure to warn in time; as well as the opposition coalition–
for managing the crisis for electoral purposes and not trying hard enough to rescue the census
data.
Inherent in policy failure episodes are the dynamics of blame avoidance and blame
allocation, the so-called blame games (Hood, 2002; Howlett, 2012). The census case displays
some blame avoidance strategies. One of them was “the risk defensive strategy” (Hood,
2002), which involved statements by representatives, and government authorities, stressing
positive elements of the 2012 census, such as lower costs, better training, and better data
quality. Similarly, the appointment of evaluation commissions exposes the common strategy
of delaying the blame. Another strategy was the narrative to limit the liability, for example,
the impression of the political plot, or the technical justifications of the data processing
model (Brändström & Kuipers, 2003). Regarding blame allocation, the most common
strategy is scapegoating (Hood, 2002, 2007), which fell mostly on the INE Director Labbé.
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Besides, in the context of the 2013 presidential campaign, the contending coalition
emphasized the damage caused, and by announcing the new de facto census, it reinforced the
allocation of blame to the Piñera government (Hansson, 2018). The analysis observed a
connection between the assignment of blame, and the dynamics of groupthink (’t Hart, 1990).
The INE Director (with his close advisors and the head of the census) presented several
groupthink symptoms, including overconfidence, isolation, and blindness to failure. Hence, a
large part of the liability ends up falling on them.
The last characteristic is that the judgment of a policy's failure changes over time
(Marsh & McConnell, 2010; Newman & Head, 2015). Based on the research process and the
analysis performed, there are some interesting distinctions about time. First, the severity of
the judgment of the census failure increased over time. Statements and testimonies closest in
time to the census and the scandal are less harsh in their judgment than ones developed later.
Second, the 2017 census revitalized the 2012 controversy among political actors, the media,
and the academic community, and the favorable perceptions regarding the 2017 census
worsened the judgment of the preceding failure. Third, aligned with the idea of a clash of
logics, the profound social and political crisis that exploded in October 2019, challenged
efficiency-oriented policies and exposed a worn-out and failed government–the second
presidency of Piñera–exacerbating the perception of the failure of the iconic 2012 census.

10.2. Learning from Failure
There is a close relationship between policy failure and policy learning. The analysis
of a policy failure implicitly includes reflection so as to avoid repeating mistakes or to help
correct the course. However, learning from failure is not simple. As reviewed in Chapter
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Two, there are political, organizational, and institutional barriers to learn from failures
(McConnell, 2010b; Newman & Head, 2015). While this dissertation’s focus was not on
policy learning, the case analysis provides interesting insights. This section discusses the
window of time between censuses, the narratives of failure that prevent learning, learning
according to lenses–policy, organizational, and societal–as well as the question regarding the
right kind of learning.
Window of Time to Learn
The issue of learning is rather compelling in this case. A census involves a
multiplicity of complex logistical, methodological, and operational efforts in a rapidly
changing social context, so the possibilities for mistakes–and learning–are numerous. Unlike
other policies, censuses take place only once every ten years, with a long window of time–to
learn and plan–between one census and the next. Thus, there are two critical windows of
learning, the one coming from the 2002 census experience, and the second, which gathers the
2012 census errors for the 2017 version.
Preparations for the 2012 census took the lessons learned from the 2002 version and
UN recommendations. On this, the societal lens revealed the importance of collaboration,
mainly through CELADE–regional workshops, handbooks, and technical support–which is
very much in line with the concept of lesson-drawing (Rose, 1991). However, the abrupt
change of strategy, along with other factors–lack of resources, absence of expert support,
census unit weaknesses–ended up disregarding lessons learned from the 2002 census–such as
recruitment, training of volunteers, or logistics on the census day. Besides, this dissertation
offers a unique feature to observe learning, the implementation of the 2017 census, which
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involved an unusual and shorter window of time, and a different learning challenge due to the
“failure” of the last one.
Narratives for Learning
Unfortunately, policy failure is no guarantee of learning; several barriers and
resistances prevent it. One of the most common obstacles to learn from failures is the
multiplicity of interpretations about its causes, characteristics, and consequences. Walsh
(2006) argues that learning from failure requires two conditions, a clear explanation of the
failure, and a viable alternative for improvement. However, in the confusion of blame games
and the various inquiries on census problems, the analysis performed did not find a single
explanation or narrative of what the census failure was about, and along those lines, the
avenues of the resolution were also confusing.
Some of the narratives in the case were: i) The narrative of “the government's
obsession to achieve census goals at any cost," explaining the disguising of the data to attest
census success. There was no learning or clear solution from this narrative, but rather
addressed the problem by exposing the crisis. ii) In reaction to the previous narrative, “it is
not a failure, but complicated data processing,” which emphasized the technical complexity
of the data processes performed. The solution route was the elucidation of the questioned
criteria through expert inquiries. iii) Another narrative was the “the census is not a failure,
this is a political boycott," denying problems and attributing the polemic to a political
strategy to damage the government. Besides exposing the boycott and diminishing the issues,
the solutions proposed from this narrative were strengthening the organization's autonomy to
de-politicize the institution. iv) An additional narrative was “there is no perfect census,”
which, while acknowledging several problems, focused on fixing the census. This narrative
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framed the problem as a complicated and challenging data problem to be solved by highly
qualified demographers and statisticians. v) The prevailing narrative was "the census can't be
fixed, let’s do it again," which underlined the severity of the errors, the impossibility of
saving the data, and the urgency for reliable data, proposing a clear solution: a new census in
2017. Hence, to learn in the context of contested narratives is difficult and even improbable.
Even though the latter narrative prevailed, it does not mean it was the best, the right one, or
the one that facilitates learning. It reflects the power struggles and searches for explanations
in a context of government changes and urgency to close the controversy.
Types of Policy Learning
The Lenses Framework acknowledges the multidimensional nature of policy failures.
Similarly, policy learning has many facets and therefore requires different ways of observing.
Based on the model of Types of Policy Learning proposed by Bennet and Howlett (1992), the
census case presents differences on learning according to the type of learning, the purpose of
learning and domain–the program (policy), the organization and the broader social paradigm
(societal)–(see Diagram N.8 in Chapter Two).
Of the three domains, the policy showed the most straightforward learning in the
census case. In line with the concept of lesson drawing, census errors allowed for
improvement of the instruments and the entire program change for the 2017 census, and thus
presented instrumental learning. Some upgrades were: a supervision system, better
articulation within the INE, collaboration with other actors, better communication strategy,
improved training for census takers, and transparency. For the model of Bennet and Howlett,
policy networks are the learners, however, the case didn’t provide enough evidence of
widespread learning beyond INE professionals and CELADE.
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A second domain is government learning, where the actors who learn were the INE
public officials. The case showed a worn-out institution, with a complex structure, inertia, a
leadership crisis, and difficulties in improving its processes. Although there were
improvements at the organizational level–such as collaboration with CELADE, technical
meetings, and a greater focus on transparency–most of the learning was circumscribed to the
policy dimension. The INE energies were on implementing a successful census, deprioritizing other INE process-related improvements. Consequently, the failure of the 2012
census did not trigger an organizational change. Nevertheless, organizational learning is
generally slow, history-dependent, and requires time for the experience of failure to be
expressed in new practices (Levitt & March, 1988; Desai et al., 2017). In 2019, the INE
began a process of organizational improvement, and these transformations could correct
organizational difficulties linked to the 2012 census failure, a topic for further study.
The third domain aims at social learning, where the learners are the communities.
The societal lens shows how the 2017 census represented social values recoveries such as
democracy and participation. However, the case shows contradictory evidence of learning at
the societal level. On the one hand, it points to a paradigm-shift of policymaking that
confronts dominant ideas of efficiency-oriented policies. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the
2017 census returned to the known traditional de facto strategy, thus rejecting innovation.
Therefore, lessons learned at the societal level did not reach social policy learning, as it
would require changing the actor's beliefs (May, 1992). Amid the clash of logics, between
market-oriented versus participatory policies, the 2017 census represents a way of making
policies within that dichotomy, but not learning how to overcome this tension.
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Negative Lessons?
The literature warns that learning does not always address the problems that caused
the failure and that even learning may not be positive in the long run (Dunlop, 2017b;
O’Donovan, 2017). The case of the failed census evinced instrumental learning at the
programmatic level. Still, there are conflicting views on whether the learning was in the right
direction, particularly about returning to the de facto method in the 2017 census.
With some exceptions, census literature and expert opinion point to the risks of
implementing a one-day census by means of volunteers. From this perspective, the de facto
census in 2017 was "a step backward." By wiping the slate clean, it does not adequately
capture the lessons from the 2012 census mistakes, and coming back to the traditional census
pointed to dysfunctional learning or a "negative lesson" (Dunlop, 2017a). As a counterpoint,
from a different perspective, given the context, the INE authorities justified the return to the
old method because of the urgency of having reliable data, and its abbreviated nature
(shorter, less risky). However, the high valuation of the 2017 experience defied most experts'
warnings, generating doubts and somehow tilting the balance for a de facto census. As noted,
whether the lessons were positive or negative depends on the perspective of those observing.
For demographers and some specialists, this was a negative lesson, but the return to the de
facto census was positive for citizens and other political actors.

10.3. Academic Contributions
The study of the failure of the 2012 census provides significant scholarly
contributions. Some of them were already explored in this chapter–the common
characteristics of failures and the connection between policy failure and learning. This
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section focuses on the following contributions: the Lenses Framework as a powerful
perspective, the value of the multidisciplinary approach, the role of the context in the
analytical framework, the importance of the Latin American perspective, and this
dissertation’s teaching potential.
The Lenses Perspective
Policy failures bring out the inherent epistemological tensions across the spectrum
between positivist and interpretative perspectives; in simple words, whether the failure is
observable and measurable, or if the failure results from perceptions and social construction.
Beyond this irreconcilable tension, this dissertation assumes that policy failures exist, they
generate severe damage, are convoluted, multidimensional, and socially constructed. Unlike
other approaches that attempt to address the complexity of the phenomenon by structuring
and simplifying it, this study assumes this epistemological and methodological conundrum as
part of the unembraceable nature of policy failures. Thus, instead of struggling against or
reducing the complexity, it makes it their ally and the starting point of observation.
Therefore, based on previous findings and tensions of the literature, this dissertation proposes
a new way of observing policy failures: the Lenses Framework.
The Lenses is a powerful metaphor. In a very simple way, the idea of lenses provides
critical distinctions for this dissertation. Lenses encompass assumptions that shape
observation, determining what to observe, and with what intention. Also, they have frames
that reveal some elements and ignore others, and they contain the concept of perspective,
emphasizing that the observer's position is also critical for the observation.
Accordingly, the use of the Lenses Framework with the 2012 census case allowed
different insights. The policy lens highlighted the abrupt change of strategy, the
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implementation problems, and evaluation tensions. The organizational perspective revealed
difficulties in INE's structure, leadership, internal tensions, and other escalating struggles
within the organization that shaped the census. And the societal lens revealed the institutional
framework, political tensions and context influencing the development of census policy.
However, the contributions of individual lenses separately are not enough to understand the
complexity of policy failures. Each of the lenses shows a "photograph," an insightful and
valuable perspective, but that is not the only one. The lenses need each other, they
complement each other, and from here emerges the multi-lens analysis
Consequently, the multi-lens analysis identified the relationships between the
previous lenses findings, and showing new distinctions. Thus, without building a unified
theory, the multi-lens approach, that is, the more integral analysis of the contributions of the
individual lenses, delivers a more comprehensive picture about the census case, and without
a doubt, the understanding that emerges from the lenses as a whole is better than from each
one separately.
Multidisciplinary and Transdisciplinary Approach
This dissertation relies on different disciplines and research traditions. It gathers
concepts and distinctions from public policy, public administration, political science,
economy, and sociology among others. Each discipline contributes from its concepts,
distinctions and points of view for understanding policy failure. Thus, this study starts from a
multidisciplinary approach i.e. it draws on the particular contribution of the different
disciplines and areas of study. But at the same time, this dissertation is also transdisciplinary,
i.e. it comprises several disciplines and research fields in a transversal way, seeking to
generate an integrated knowledge from each disciplines' contributions. Accordingly, the
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Lenses Framework encompasses the idea that in order to understand a multi-layered
phenomenon, as policy failure, it requires a multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary approach.
The Lenses Framework opens up new possibilities for exploring policy failure by
using other lenses of analysis. Depending on their topics of interest, Scholars from different
disciplines may incorporate new perspectives into their study of policy failures, such as
inequality, gender, power, governance, participation, or climate change, among many other
"lenses."
Hence, this dissertation's contribution is not confined to the 2012 census case in
Chile, and the power of the Lenses is not limited to the use of the policy, organizational and
societal lenses. The Lenses Framework's strength lies in the ability to look at the same
phenomenon from different angles. This receptiveness to the diversity of approaches
reinforces the multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary nature of the Lenses analytical device.
The Role of Context
Despite significant advances in research on policy failures, there are still
shortcomings that lead to a limited and even causal understanding of the phenomenon. One
of these weaknesses is the lack of attention to the context. However, policy failures do not
occur in a vacuum but embedded in a cultural, political, social, and ideological context. The
setting of the failure event is never neutral, but influences, and sometimes decisively, the
interpretation, the path, the political reactions, the management, as well as the consequences
of the failure. This research overcomes these shortcomings by encompassing contextual
factors as a constitutive perspective of the Lenses Framework. Thus, the model draws
attention to–and even intentionally forces it–the relevant aspects of the context where the
failure occurred.
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In this dissertation, the societal lens enriched the census failure analysis, stressing
elements not observed or inadequately weighted by the policy or the organizational
perspectives. Thus, analyzing failure episodes in context indubitably provides a better
understanding of failure.
Latin American Perspective
This study reports a significant advance in the literature, both through abundant case
studies and analytical models, to cope with the policy failure complexity. However, these
contributions come mostly from developed countries, especially Europe, the United States,
Canada, and Australia. With few exceptions (Figueroa, 2014; Olavarría-Gambi, 2018),
research is scarce on from Latin America’s policy failures. Thus, this dissertation contributes
to the flourishing stream of research on policy failures, from the Latin American context,
particularly, the Chilean setting.
Teaching Potential
The case of the 2012 census has great teaching potential. The first element of this
teaching potential relies on the Lenses analytical device. The exercise of analyzing through
lenses offers a structure that facilitates epistemological distinctions, and fosters reflection on
the ways of knowing and investigating social reality. Thus, observing the same phenomenon
from different lenses is a challenging academic exercise that defies previous convictions and
encourages discussion.
A second feature of the teaching potential relates to the research approach. The case
of the 2012 census failure is an excellent example of the case study approach and its flexible
and multifaceted nature. Some case study´s significant characteristics in this dissertation are:
the many and diverse sources of information, the different triangulation strategies, the
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relationship with the theory, and the detailed and engaging narrative. Besides, this is an
uncommon type of case study; it is about a case that contains other cases, in line with the
concept of embedded units of analysis proposed by Yin (Yin, 2009).
The last element of teaching potential refers to the dissertation’s central topic, the
failure of public policies, and how the analysis of failure triggers reflection on learning. The
case study of the 2012 census exposes the circumstances of the failure, the decisions made,
the interpretations about the events, and the actor´s reactions, among other relevant evidence.
Thus, through a rich narrative, the case enables the readers to ask questions, to form their
interpretations, and especially to transfer information from the case to other settings. Thus,
the narrative promotes a reflection that goes beyond the case, allowing policymakers–and
future policymakers–to reflect on their practices, perspectives of analysis, and reactions when
facing mistakes or failures.

10.4. Policy Contributions
This dissertation is concerned with how policymakers and researchers address the
convoluted nature of policy failures: with what lenses, biases, and types of understanding.
Accordingly, in tandem with academic contributions, this study holds policy implications,
some of which are closely connected to the academic ones. This section reviews the
dissertation's policy contribution, the understanding toward learning, the use of the Lenses
Framework to untangle policy failures, and the challenge of the pragmatic approach. Besides,
it offers recommendations for the census policy, and the National Institute of Statistics.
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Understanding for Learning
As the 2012 census failure case disclosed, policy failures are immersed in disputes
between narratives and multiple perspectives. When it comes to political failures, the
complexity and confusion are such that there is a tendency to seek explanations quickly in
order to get out of the crisis. The problem is that the dominant explanations block other
points of view, leading to an incomplete conception of failure, and reducing the probability
of learning from mistakes. Therefore, the first step to learn from failures is to be aware of
policy failure's convoluted nature and recognize the multiple explanations or narratives in
dispute. A better comprehension can unblock ignored dimensions, providing the opportunity
to propose mechanisms to learn from past mistakes, prevent failures, or handle them better
once they have occurred.
Failure is no guarantee of learning. Dominant explanations of the policy failure can be
dangerous; some of these interpretations could lead to repeat mistakes, waste resources, the
wrong lessons, or even lead to a major government crisis. This dissertation shows that policy
failures are elusive, complicated, and messy, and unfortunately, there is no "recipe" for
learning from them. However, there are plenty of learning opportunities. Another step to
advance in this direction is to promote culture, strangely enough, that "embraces" mistakes
within the government agencies. Moreover, it is necessary to value this analytical exercise of
error and trust our policymakers and public officials' capacities. By exposing the risks of not
learning and the benefits of multi-lens analysis of policy failures, learning possibilities could
be less one-dimensional and, therefore, better.
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Lenses to Untangle Policy Failures
Policy failures shake up policymaking. The events of failure are controversial, and
policymakers react to them from their perspectives, with the tools at hand and under existing
circumstances; therefore, when facing policy failures, policymakers simply do what they can.
Later, after the failure, the policymaking dynamics–time constraints, political pressure–
prevent or even inhibit a more thorough analysis of past mistakes. Even though linear and
causal explanations of the failure are usually helpful for decision-making, and given their
simplicity are also tempting, they do not provide sufficient knowledge to grasp the policy
failure’s slippery nature. That causal understanding can lead to wrong decisions and even
aggravating the damage. As the saying goes, "brushing things under the rug makes a
mountain." Therefore, unlike other public policy situations, where political guidance to
action, quick and decisive decision-making, has several advantages, this is not the case with
policy failures.
Thus, this investigation teaches that to better deal with failure episodes and learn from
them; policymakers require to "untangle" the "tangled" nature of policy failure. Here is where
the simplicity of the lenses metaphor provides useful insights for policymakers. First, failure
events involve multiple interpretations and perspectives regarding the causes and
implications of the failure, and there is rarely a unique or linear explanation. In other words,
there are "many threads in that tangle." Second, policy failures are not limited to policy scope
but involve different realms: the policy, the organization, and the broader societal context.
While each of these lenses provides an understanding of failure from its perspective, it is a
partial view because it observes some components but ignores others. By considering the
three lenses together, the understanding of the failure, its expressions, breadth, and effects, is
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better. Third, to truly understand policy failures is by accepting its multifarious nature,
recognizing different perspectives involved. While these are only the first steps in dealing
with policy failures, they provide a different scenario for dealing with controversy and
eventually learning. As decision makers come to terms with the complexity of the failure
events, they can distance themselves from the controversy and make better decisions.
Pragmatic Approach
This research is rooted in a pragmatic approach to policymaking, i.e. it bases its
contribution to its practical consequences. The challenge of the pragmatic approach is
twofold. It challenges academic research to be useful, to build bridges with decision makers,
putting research findings at the service of decision-making. Additionally, it challenges
decision makers to rely on scientific or academic evidence, which requires the development
of analytical skills. Responding to these challenges, this dissertation moved away from
strictly scholarly models, it did not seek to build a unified theory, but to explore simple and
useful ways to better understand policy failures through the use of the Lenses. Moreover, the
study provided useful insights and recommendations presented (see below).
Recommendations for the Census Policy
To advance to a long-term census unit. The census cannot be a minor project, as it has
a strategic role for public policies, the country´s administration, resource allocation, and is
the source for other statistical instruments. Besides, the census challenge requires assessment,
learning, and planning between a census and the next. In order to succeed with the census,
this requires a formalized and funded permanent census unit.
To strengthen census capacities. The idea of censusing, counting and characterizing
the population, has become increasingly complex in the world–new formats, implementation
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difficulties, new social problems. To meet these challenges, it is necessary to strengthen the
capacities of those working on the census. Along with cutting-edge permanent training, it is
essential to develop an ambitious program to attract and retain highly trained, flexible, and
experienced professionals.
To consider the different layers of the census policy. The census involves highly
technical and logistical knowledge. Still, its success depends not only on the correct exercise
of that program, but also on the political, social, and even symbolic elements. Thus, it is
necessary to promote an interdisciplinary approach in the whole census policy cycle.
Whether through advisors or within the census team, it is critical to incorporate
complementary perspectives to address the multifaceted census task better.
To manage expectations for the 2022 census. The census is a logistical and statistical
exercise, but it is also much more than that. Due to the next census will be again under the de
jure methodology, it is critical for the INE to properly manage expectations, because it could
be a determining factor in the undertaking's success. There are still tensions at play that may
affect the policy: the deep-rooted framing of failure of this census modality, the high citizen
valuation of the de facto census, the criteria whereby the census considers good or bad.
Properly managing these dimensions can make the difference between a successful and
unsuccessful census.
To innovate on census policy. To innovate on census policy. The census is an
expensive and increasingly complex operation, many countries have explored alternative
sources and methods in order to have quality data. The failure of the 2012 census was a
significant blow to innovation. However, census challenges go beyond the decision about de
facto or de jure methodology. It is critical to advance in the coordination and use of the good
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administrative records that Chile has, and also to explore alternative methods and testing of
instruments, formats, and other complementary surveys, including logistical, methodological
challenges.
To promote and safeguard census collaboration. The census is a very particular
policy, and although it may seem contradictory–given the time between censuses–there is no
time for trial and error as it is a once-in-a-decade policy playing a critical role for the
countries. Whether through the UN or direct cooperation between countries, it is necessary to
share knowledge, methodologies, and ways of addressing problems. And thus, it is essential
to enhance this collaboration through formal mechanisms, resources, and incentives in the
right direction.
Recommendations for the National Institute of Statistics
To advance to independence and autonomy of the INE. The changes in the regulation
of the public senior management system introduced in 2018 contribute to the merit-based
selection of the INE Director, but this is not enough, as it still does not guarantee his or her
permanence in the institution or political independence. About INE autonomy, whether
through an independent budget, powers by law or a new autonomous structure (similar to the
Central Bank), it is critical to advance toward a funded institutional arrangement to safeguard
the autonomy of the INE from the executive branch. These arrangements are not just formal
or administrative steps, but political and symbolic, they aim to reinforce the idea of a
technically robust and politically autonomous institution.
To progress in the INE's modernization program. Consistent with the institution's
present and particularly future needs, it is imperative to develop recruitment, training, and
retirement plan for INE employees. Also, to advance in the formalization of practices,
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reviewing processes, and decision-making practices. These elements are vital for the INE to
be, in practice and not only on paper, articulating the National Statistical System.
To promote and strengthen INE's technical instances. To promote technical instances
of decision-making, analysis and outreach within the INE, with other government and also
with academic institutions. Particularly in this matter, to effectively support the role of the
INE's Advisory Council–composed of five specialists–with oversight and advisory role.
To integrate multiple perspectives. Along with strengthening the technical dimension,
this is essential to promote permanent instances of collaboration and participation that
provide different insights. This means going beyond the input of statistical experts,
economists, or policymakers, but integrating perspectives from social organizations,
businesses, and citizens, for more relevant and legitimate policies.
To take care of the INE. INE values, history, and commitment of their employees
constitute their identity, which was significantly damaged by the census failure, as well by
other following controversies. It is crucial to recover the public service motivation so
characteristic of INE. It is also necessary to gather and assess institutional culture and
history, work on improving institutional self-esteem, and always foster a healthy
organizational climate.

10.5. Study limitations
The study of the failure of the 2012 census in Chile provided interesting academic and
policy contributions. However, this research is also subject to limitations, presented below.
There are some methodological limitations. Some key actors were not interviewed.
Despite several efforts, whether for political or personal reasons, some key actors in the case
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rejected the interview, including the former INE Director Francisco Labbé. Additionally,
given time constraints and limited resources, most of the policymakers and stakeholders
interviewed are from Santiago. With some exceptions, this dissertation does not sufficiently
capture the perspective of regional or local actors.
There are some limitations regarding the case study approach and the qualitative
nature of the dissertation, that, even though these are inherent of the research design, worth
mentioning. First, the results of this study are not generalizable in statistical terms, nor to
draw causal lessons. The census case provides an opportunity to transfer learning to other
settings in line with the ideas of analytical generalization and transferability of findings.
Second, as it is a qualitative study on a complex topic, it is not replicable either. The
interviewees' statements and perceptions respond to a given context and time when the
research was carried out, i.e. if this study were to be conducted again, at a different point in
time, for example in 2022, it would provide other insights.
Another limitation points to the time frame of the study. Aligned with the statement
“Failure has fluid boundaries” (Wajzer et al., 2016, p. 35), it was difficult to delimit the
case's time. Although this research focuses on the 2012 census failure, the subsequent 2017
census and the very characteristics of policy failures (whose perception varies over time),
exceeded the study's scope. The interviews were conducted in 2017 and 2018, but the failure
episode's effects continued influencing policy and the INE and the emergence of other events
linked to the case. The analysis of these new events was advantageous in terms of the
richness of information collected. However, the thoroughness of the examination made time
limits of the case more diffuse.
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Another limitation pointed to the relationship between failure and learning. This study
is about understanding policy failure; nevertheless, the 2017 census and the very nature of
failures (which implicitly refers to learning), created new edges in that direction. The case
exhibited several lessons from the mistakes made in 2012, such as INE's internal organization
to deal with the census, the importance of collaboration and articulation with other actors, the
training strategy, efficient supervision, and control system and a policy of transparency
throughout the process. However, neither the 2017 census nor learning from failure analysis
were at the central focus of this study; therefore, this dissertation did not deepen the learning
dimension. It remains a future challenge.
Also, there are some limitations related to possible biases. On the one hand, the study
was carried out in a context where the census already had a failure frame, requiring constant
vigilance to this and other possible biases, using validity mechanisms. On the other hand, as
in all qualitative research, the researcher's characteristics–political view, disciplinary
perspective, gender, personality–may have influenced the study at some point–information
gathering, interviewing, analysis, writing, etc. While the investigation applied diverse
validity mechanisms, including permanent reflexivity, it is important to remember that this
dissertation still is a single researcher study; therefore, the researcher's interests and
characteristics bound the whole research process.
Finally, the Lenses Framework is a powerful figure in this dissertation, but it is not
intended to be the only way to analyze policy failures, the most explanatory, or the most
comprehensive. For now, it is more a way of observing to understand a complex
phenomenon, but it is undoubtedly an analytical framework feasible to refine.

365

10.6. Further Research
This dissertation provides several opportunities to investigate further and deepen
several topics, such as, the nature and characteristics of policy failure, learning from failures,
the census policy. Below are some interesting topics for future academic and applied
research.
Without a doubt, an attractive research opportunity is to investigate the 2022 census
endeavor under the Lenses Framework, i.e. observing the characteristics of the next census
policy, the INE configuration for the census task, the coordination organizations involved,
and the influence of political, social, and institutional contexts on the census development.
The 2022 census will again be under the de jure methodology–the one used in 2012–and also,
it will be a more complex and longer questionnaire than the short version applied in 2017. In
addition to the planning and logistical complexities, there are challenges in politics,
communication, coordination, and participation, among many others. Besides, it is
particularly interesting to study the link between the 2012 census failure, the 2017 census
experience, and the transfer of those lessons learned in the 2022 version. The 2022 census
study would allow us to go deeper into the repercussions of the 2012 failure, the different
learning types, as well as how the judgment over failure unfolds over time.
As pointed out in the study, Chile was not the only country facing difficulties
problems in the 2010 census round, various countries in the region also had significant
difficulties. Policy failures are messy, and the incentives are not in the understanding of that
complexity. Therefore, beyond explanations and predominant narratives in each country’s
census failure, a more in-depth analysis could foster a better understanding of the
particularities faced by each country, but also those common features in the region. From
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here, an interesting research opportunity is a comparative study on census failures–such as
Paraguay, Peru, or Colombia–analyzing similarities, differences, and how those experiences
reveal unexplored insights for preventing census mistakes.
Consequently, this dissertation also opens up study opportunities on census policies in
the Latin American context. The study drew attention to the importance of international
collaboration to develop successful censuses, but especially to learn from mistakes and
prevent failure. Therefore, another research topic is to explore the formal agencies, but also
informal mechanisms of information and cooperation in Latin America. These findings will
allow making better use of existing bodies, to make more use of existing strengths, and
promote better and new collaboration strategies for Latin American countries.
This study revealed tensions over the need to have a better legal body for the INE,
especially regarding political independence. After seven years of the census failure case and
other scandals linked to the INE figures, the bill to strengthen the INE's institutionality is still
"resting" in Congress. Thus, a future research topic is to delve into the relationship between
policy controversies and legislative dynamics. That is, exploring how the policy polemics–
such as the 2012 census–promote or impede the progression of problems on the public
agenda and the role of political actors and the media.
Policy failure is an emerging field of study mainly carried out by developed countries.
However, the Latin American region suffers as many failures as other countries, and given
the ever-present scarcity of resources, it is even more critical to prevent policy failures. It is
important to continue investigating and promoting further research, both on policy failures
and policy learning. For this, paramount is the collaboration between researchers in sharing
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theoretical perspectives, identifying cases, developing comparative studies and building, little
by little, a corpus of Latin American knowledge.
Another topic for future research in Chile points to a failure in other policy areas. The
study evinced how the context of growing criticism toward market-oriented policies affected
the judgment of policy failure on the census. The census was not the only policy labeled as a
failure in the past ten or maybe 20 years. Consequently, another research topic is to explore
further the ideas of failure in other policy areas, such as the water-rights market, health
insurance, urban motorway concessions, and especially the country's pension savings
administration system (AFP according to the Spanish acronym). The events of the social
outburst in Chile in October 2019, the subsequent social and economic crisis, and the
pandemic' ravages reemphasize the importance of an ongoing and multi-perspective analysis
of the country's critical policies.
In the same line, another topic for further exploration is crisis management on
different policy failures. The failures will continue to exist, but the extension and damage
they cause may vary depending on the controversy management. At the height of the crisis,
policymakers make bad decisions, do not listen to dissenting views, do not ask for help, and
ignore the warning signs. From a distance, questions arise, such as: Why did they not react
on time? However, many elements are involved in the confusion, which are difficult to
recognize amid a crisis. As this dissertation revealed, that is precisely the characteristic of
failures, they are convoluted and somehow also misleading. Therefore, based on a
retrospective and critical analysis of policy failure cases, a further study focusing on
identifying moments, critical factors, decision dynamics, and contexts that contributed to the
failure, and therefore, could constitute turning points.
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Another area of future studies aims to explore different applications. A first study
topic refers to learnings toward prevention and better management of failure events,
particularly in Chilean settings. This implies to explore the meanings and interpretation of
Chilean decision makers regarding the census case, and from that reflection, extract pertinent
lessons, learning that makes sense to them and their practices. Along the same lines, another
investigation edge refers to delving into the different ways of interpreting and observing
policy problems, identifying critical moments or elements that could work as "warning
signs," and contribute to addressing these complicated policy situations in a better way.
Therefore, the whole emphasis here is to delve into the actual policymaking dynamics and
context.
The analytical generalizability of case studies allows a particular reflection from the
case, fostering questions, insights, and even transfer learning from the case to other settings.
Another attractive opportunity of this dissertation is to develop a teaching case for public
policy students and policymakers–including a paper and methodology. The case of the failure
of the 2012 census in Chile allows for the study of the complex nature of policy failures and
to foster thorough analysis and lessons drawn.
Finally, a cross-cutting concern of this dissertation is the relationship between
technical or academic knowledge and decision making. Hence, another topic of study is
investigating the mechanisms, formats, and instruments of the transfer and diffusion of
knowledge toward policymaking, but at the same time, to study the other way around, that is,
the transfer of the policymakers' experiences and practices to academia. With this renewed
perspective, the challenge is to analyze the characteristics of these mechanisms, their
relevance, facilitators, and barriers. In order to better prevent, better react to, and overcome
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policy failures, a "traditional academic approach" is not enough. Under this study's pragmatic
approach, it is crucial to advance toward building connections, or "bridges" between
academic knowledge, and decision-making. For that, both academics and policymakers
should make their contributions, which probably would require different research strategies;
without a doubt, this is something for further exploration.
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APPENDIX N.1.
INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

Interview Guideline: INE Directors and High officials
Identification of the interviewee
What is/was your relationship with the INE? When did you start this involvement? Can you describe your
position or your connection with the organization?
What was your relationship with the census 2012? What was your role?
Formulation of the policy
How was the census prepared for 2012? Who was involved in the formulation of the policy? Can you
describe how the formulation of the 2012 census was?
Actors, organizations, and stakeholders over time
Who were the stakeholders involved in the implementation of the 2012 census? In your opinion, who had
critical participation in the Census? How?
What are the relevant relationships with other institutions?
Policy goals and expectations
In your opinion, what were the expectations about the 2012 census? Why? Once the policy launched, how
was the perception of the complexity of the implementation?
How do you describe the commitment to the census among relevant actors?
Hierarchy, policy arrangements, and control
How was the overall structure to carry out the census? Can you describe the mechanisms of supervision for
the census? How did that work? Why?
Actors and capabilities
How would you describe the professionals in the INE? At the moment of the 2012 census, what was your
opinion about the abilities to run the census?
Leadership
How would you describe the type of leadership in the INE regularly? How was that leadership regarding
the census 2012? Can you give us examples of leadership styles?
Organizational culture, climate, and public value
For someone outside the organization, how would you describe the main features of the INE? How is this
institution from inside? What can you say about the public role of the INE?
How do you describe the INE atmosphere of work INE regularly? How during the census 2012?
Power and political dynamics support/opposition to the policy
How would you describe the political environment inside the INE? How do you describe the political
situation during the 2012 census?
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What is the role of partisan politics in this institution? How does that operate?
How do you describe the support/opposition to the census? Who supported, and who did not? Why? How?
Availability and allocation of resources
What about the availability of funds to carry out the census? What about human resources and capabilities?
What were other resources critical to the implementation of the census? Why?
Achievement of the goals and polemic
What is your opinion about the results of the census? Why do you think it happened?
What do you think about the polemic regarding the results census? What do you think about the reports and
other inquiries?
Failure
Do you think that the policy was a failure? Why?
What are the chances of other situations like the census 2012 happening again? Why?
Complementary questions about the economic, social, and political context
What was the social, political, and economic situation at the moment of the census implementation? What
was the perception of those situations' problems? Can you recall any facts that happened previously and
during the census?
Interview Guideline: INE Census Team
Identification of the interviewee
What is/was your relationship with the INE? When did you start this involvement with the INE?
What was your relationship with the census 2012? How would you describe your role?
History of the Census
How was the policy of the census carried out in the past? In your opinion, what were their most
distinguishing characteristics?
Formulation of the policy
How was the census prepared for 2012? Who was involved in the formulation of the policy? Can you
describe the formulation of the 2012 census?
Actors, organizations, and stakeholders over time
Who were the stakeholders involved in the implementation of the 2012 census? In your opinion, who had
critical participation in the Census? How?
What are the relevant relationships with other institutions?
Policy goals and expectations
What were the expectations about the 2012 census? Why? Once the policy launched, how was the
perception of the complexity of the implementation?
How do you describe the commitment with the census among the census team and other relevant actors?
Hierarchy, policy arrangements, and control
How was the overall structure to carry out the census? How did that work? Why?
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How was the relationship between levels of the enumeration arrangement?
Can you describe the mechanisms of monitoring and control of the enumeration? How did they work?
Communication and coordination
How do different units or individuals in the INE coordinate? What is the most common modality? How do
you describe the coordination and communication for the census 2012?
Implementation according to the plan
How do you describe the overall implementation of the census? What are the main difficulties faced by the
census? Was there any unexpected situation? Which one?
Power and political dynamics support/opposition to the policy
How would you describe the political environment inside the INE on a general basis? How do you explain
the political situation during the 2012 census?
How do you describe the support/opposition to the census? Who supported, and who did not? Why? How?
Availability and allocation of resources
What about the availability of funds to carry out the census? In your opinion, what other resources were
critical to the implementation of the census? Why?
Leadership and capabilities
How would you describe the profile of professionals in the INE? At the moment of the 2012 census, what
was your opinion about the abilities to run the census?
How would you describe the type of leadership in the INE regularly? How was that leadership regarding
the census 2012? Can you give us examples of leadership styles?
Achievement of the goals and polemic
What is your opinion about the results of the census? Why do you think it happened?
What do you think about the polemic regarding the results census? What do you think about the reports and
other inquiries?
Failure
Do you think that the policy was a failure? Why?
What are the chances of other situations like the census 2012 happening again? Why?
Complementary questions about the economic, social and political context
What was the social, political, and economic situation at the moment of the census implementation? What
was the perception of those situations' problems? Can you recall any facts that happened previously and
during the census?
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Interview Guideline: Other organizations
Identification of the interviewee
Can you describe your organization? What is your job? When did you start this involvement with the INE?
What was your relationship with the census 2012? How would you describe your role?
Actors, organizations, and stakeholders
How would you describe the relationship of your organization with the INE on a general basis? How about
the census 2012? Can you give examples of the way that collaboration worked? What is your opinion about
the commitment to the census among participants?
Who were the stakeholders involved in the implementation of the 2012 census? In your opinion, who had
critical participation in the Census?
Policy goals and expectations
From your agency, what were the expectations regarding the 2012 census? Why? Once the policy started,
how was the perception of the complexity of the implementation?
Leadership and capabilities
How would you describe the profile of professionals in the INE? At the moment of the 2012 census, what
was your opinion about the abilities to run the census?
What do you think about INE leadership? How was that leadership for the census 2012?
Power and political dynamics support/opposition to the policy
In your opinion, how was the political environment during the 2012 census?
How do you describe the support/opposition to the census implementation? Who supported, and who did
not? How?
Availability and allocation of resources
What is your opinion about the availability of funds to carry out the census 2012? What were other
resources critical to the implementation of the census? Why?
Achievement of the goals and polemic
What is your opinion about the results of the census? Why do you think it happened?
What do you think about the polemic regarding the results census? What do you think about the reports and
other inquiries?
Failure
Do you think that the policy was a failure? Why?
What are the chances of other situations like the census 2012 happening again? Why?
Complementary questions about the economic, social and political context
What was the social, political, and economic situation at the moment of the census implementation? What
was the perception of those situations' problems? Can you recall any facts that happened previously and
during the census?
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Interview Guideline: Scholars and other Experts
Identification of the interviewee
What was your relationship with the census 2012? How would you describe your position/role?
Achievement of the goals and polemic
What is your opinion about the results of the census? Why do you think it happened?
What do you think about the polemic regarding the results census? What do you think about the reports and
other inquiries?
Failure
Do you think that the policy was a failure? Why?
What are the chances of other situations like the census 2012 happening again? Why?
The economic, social, and political context
What was the social, political, and financial situation at the moment of the census implementation? What
was the perception of those situations' problems? Can you recall any facts that happened previously and
during the census?
Based on the nature of the relationship of the interviewee with the census or the INE, there are more specific
questions (available in previous guidelines).

376

Interview Guideline: Post Failure
Identification of the interviewee
What was your relationship with the policy of the census 2012? How would you describe your
position/relationship with the census 2012?
Census formulation and implementation
Before your involvement with the census case, what was your opinion about the process of elaboration of
the 2012 census? And what about the process of enumeration?
Census Polemic and Inquiry
Can you describe your role regarding the inquiry of the census results? When did this involvement start?
Who were the individuals involved in this investigation? In your opinion, who had critical participation in
the investigation?
Can you describe the Inquiry process? What elements facilitated or impeded the evaluation?
What is the role of partisan politics in the inquiry process? How do you describe the support/opposition to
the inquiry process? Who supported, and who did not?
What is your opinion about how the consequences/impact of your inquiry?
If you could start this inquiry process again, would you do something different? What? Why?
What is the contribution of your inquiry? What about the contribution of other investigations?
Failure
In sum, what is your opinion about the results of the policy? Why do you think it happened?
Do you think that the census 2012 was a failure? Why?
What are the chances of other situations like the census 2012 happening again? Why?
Complementary questions about the economic, social and political context
What was the social, political, and financial situation at the moment of the census implementation? What
was the perception of those situations' problems? Can you recall any facts that happened previously or
during the census?
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APPENDIX N.2.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTERVIEWS
Type of

Date

Place

Min

Interviewee
INE Directors

Type of

Date

Place

Min

07/17

Office

29

Office

47

Interviewee
07/18

Coffee Shop

145

Central

05/17

Office

151

Government

05/17

Office

76

09/17

Office

40

INE High

06/17

Coffee Shop

30

05/17

Office

49

officials and

06/17

Coffee Shop

91

05.17

Coffee Shop

63

professionals

06/17

House

104

Member of

10/17

Internet

30

05/17

Office

175

Inquiry

06/17

Coffee Shop

120

06/17

Office

87

Commissions

05/17

Office

58

04/18

Office

72

07/17

Office

126

06/17

Coffee Shop

88

04/18

Skype (Bogotá)

122

10/18

Office

56

04/17

Office

36

06/17

Office

182

Experts and

08/17

House

105

04/18

Coffee Shop

50

Scholars

06/17

Coffee Shop

91

04/17

House

135

06/17

House

91

06/17

Coffee Shop

171

06/17

Office

127

04/17

Office

57

08/17
INE Advisors

Census Team

09/18

Skype (Canada)

65

06/17

Skype

37

07/17

Office

49

09/18

Skype (CA)

101

05/17

Coffee Shop

49

10/18

Skype (PA)

57

12/17

Coffee Shop

50

Other

04/18

Coffee Shop

47

06/17

Office

70

Organizations

05/17

Office

61

08/18

Coffee Shop

98

10/18

Office

98

03/17

Coffee Shop

223

06/17

Skype (Talca)

60

05/17

Office

40

03/15
07/17

Coffee Shop

68

06/17

Coffee Shop

65

06/17

Coffee Shop

89

Source: Own elaboration
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APPENDIX N.3.
IRB APPROVAL

December 7, 2017
Maria Angelica Pavez Garcia Public Policy and Public Affairs
RE: Your application dated 4/3/2017 regarding study number 2017077: Using Lenses to Understand
Policy Failure. The Case of the 2012 Census in Chile

Dear Ms. Pavez Garcia:
I have reviewed your study listed above and have determined that this study qualifies as exempt
from review under the following guideline: 101(B)(2) Educational surveys/anonymous surveys. You
are free to conduct your study without further reporting to the University of Massachusetts Boston
IRB.
If you decide to modify the project in such a way that it may no longer qualify for the exemption,
submit a modification request to the IRB for review before the implementation of the modified
research project.
Thank you for keeping the IRB informed of your activities.
Sincerely,
Sharon Wang, CIP, CIM Senior IRB Administrator
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APPENDIX N.4.
MAPS OF THEMES ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT LENS

This appendix presents theme maps developed as part of the qualitative content analysis
performed. The colored boxes are the first study themes, which come from the theoretical
framework and interview guidelines. Later, other themes or codes (presented as colorless
boxes) were created as part of identifying new ideas and reviewing codes, themes, and subthemes. These maps reflect the process of analysis, and do not necessarily constitute the results
of this research. Below are the theme maps of the policy, organizational and societal lens.
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Diagram N.22. Policy Lens (Part 2): Implementation
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Diagram N.23. Policy Lens (Part 3): Evaluation
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Diagram N.24. Organizational Lens (Part 1)
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Diagram N.26. Societal Lens (Part 1)
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Diagram N.27. Societal Lens (Part 2)
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APPENDIX N.5.
MILESTONES OF THE 2012 CENSUS CASE

Below is the timeline of the milestones and main events of the 2012 Census and the
National Institute of Statistics INE, from 2010 to 2019.

2010
•
March- President Sebastián Piñera took office after 20 years of center-left governments; this is the first right-wing
government since Pinochet´s dictatorship.
•
August- New government fired INE Director Mariana Scholnik.
•
October- President Piñera appointed Francisco Labbé as the new Director of the INE.
•
October- Argentina ran a de facto census.
•
September-December- Uruguay performed its first the de jure census.
•
November- Ecuador ran a de facto census.
2011
•
January- The pre-census for de facto modality started.
•
May- Student mobilizations begins. Protesters all over the country demanded quality public education, free, and for
all. These marches will continue until the end of 2012.
•
June- Eduardo Castro, head of census, resigned. Advisor Eduardo Carrasco is the new Head of the Census.
•
June- Labbé appointed Mariana Alcérreca as the CEO of the INE, a new position especially created by the Director.
She has been working as a half time advisor since November 2010.
•
July- Change of president's cabinet. In the ministry of economy, Juan Andrés Fontaine leaves the fold, and Pablo
Longueira enters, who would later become a presidential candidate.
•
August- INE authorities decided to change the census strategy from de facto to de jure.
•
August- Internal census INE committee (Sub-directorates) analyzed the methodology change and proposed postponing
the census.
•
August- INE authorities presented the change of methodology to the ministry of economy.
•
September- CELADE warned Director Labbé against the risks and difficulties of the census methodology change and
proposed to postpone the census.
•
September- INE authorities presented the new census strategy to the National Census Commission, the intersectoral
supervisory body of the census matters. The commission approved the strategy change.
•
September- Expert international Canadian advisor Jacob Ryten warned INE authorities regarding the methodology
change. According to Ryten, the major challenge would be recruitment.
•
September- Government officially announced the census strategy change toward the de jure strategy.
•
October- The pre-census process finished.
•
November- Eduardo Carrasco, head of the census project, visited Paraguay to observe the preparations for the new de
jure census implementation.
•
November- Census Team finally approved the last version of the census questionnaire, including the changes for the
de jure approach.
2012
•
January- INE began the recruitment process of census takers. The company Trabajando.com took over the
applications.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

January- Census Team and INE authorities disputed the amount of salary for census takers.
February- INE central and regional offices selected applicants for territorial managers, supervisors, and census takers.
Census takers' training began.
March- INE authorities inform a budget reduction of 10%. INE Regional offices had to adapt the initial census plan.
April- Census takers denounce changes in working conditions.
April- 2012 Census begins.
April- Censistas denounced changes in salary. The government explained and solved the exposes.
April- Censistas resignations and turnover started. The availability of trained census takers became a permanent
concern for the census team.
May & June- Several INE internal reports of lag in the census process.
May & June- INE managers identified misclassifications of dwelling.
June- Internal INE reports estimated a shortage of population count.
June- Census Team initiated a particular plan to correct census errors and recover incorrect classified dwellings.
June- The government announced two weeks census extension from the initial plan.
July- INE finished the enumeration process after a second extension period.
July- Disagreements within the INE regarding the presentation of results.
July- INE Sub-directorates warned about the high figures of absent residents and unoccupied dwellings. They also
pointed out the UN recommendation regarding the presentation of census data.
July- CEPAL delivered poverty measurement analysis reaching 15%. Government authorities asked CEPAL to
modify the calculation and added a new variable, which led to a decrease in the figure to 14.4%.
August- INE officials and Labbé team argued intensively over the census coverage. Director Labbé proposed the
thesis of new constructions of dwellings as the explanation’s coverage differences.
August- The government proudly announced the historical coverage of the census (at the household level). Data didn´t
properly distinguish between estimated and actual censused population.
August- INE internal disputes regarding census data delivered.
August-September- CASEN polemic came to light. Due to the controversy, UN high officials resigned, and the
CEPAL decided to end the collaboration with the Chilean government on poverty matters.
October- INE ran the Post-Enumeration Survey to measure census omission and other errors. However, this survey
was useless, as was applied with too much time lag of enumeration.
October- Paraguay began its first version of the de jure census.
November- Bolivia ran the de jure census.

2013
•
January- The government proposed to the Congress a bill for the strengthening and autonomy of the INE.
•
March- Data analysis ended. First census results. INE internal disputed over the census coverage.
•
March- Consultant Eduardo Arriaga performed a first demographic analysis and other quality tests to the census
database and warned about significant inconsistencies of the data.
•
March- CEO and INE managers warned the ministry of economy about some census problems.
•
March- The CEO Alcérreca first attempt to resign because of significant discrepancies over the data handling.
•
March- The President, the minister of Economy, and Director of the INE proudly presented the final census results.
•
April- High official from the Social Development Ministry requested clarification regarding the census data presented.
•
April- Two newspapers presented Census results before the official release. Confidential data leakage problem. INE
managers warned Director Labbé about the confidentiality threat.
•
April- INE presented three errata regarding census results.
•
April- Prestigious economist from the BCI Bank published a report questioning the INE methodology to measure the
CPI. The news triggered an academic debate regarding methods and INE capabilities.
•
April- There were Heated disputes between Labbé team and INE Managers regarding CPI figures, census data, and
other internal technical concerns.
•
April- Labbé fired Marcela Cabezas, the head of the technical sub-directorate at the INE.
•
April- Several politicians and technical actors questioned census results.
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•
•
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

April- High officials of the INE post a public letter to the Director, exposing their concern over Labbé´s lack of
technical decisions, leadership, and the damage for the INE.
April- Presidential candidate of the right-wing coalition Laurence Golborne dropped his candidacy due to several
accusations of lack of integrity.
April- CEO Mariana Alcérreca denounced the investigative journalism newspaper CIPER, the numerous flaws of the
census data delivered, accusing of "manipulation" of data.
April- CEO Mariana Alcérreca resigned to the INE.
April- chamber of deputies ordered a special investigation about the census data and the INE.
April- INE started an internal audit regarding the leakage of census information.
April- INE Director Francisco Labbé and his close advisors resigned from the INE.
April- Due the denouncements, the government ordered a special investigation and summonsed five national experts to
run an external inquiry about the census data, known as the national commission.
April- INE Authorities asked the prosecutor office to run an investigation for possible crimes falsification of a public
instrument, embezzlement of public funds, and “eventual violation of statistical confidentiality.”
April- The Economist Juan Eduardo Coeymans was appointed as the new INE Director.
June- Primaries elections in Chile. Michelle Bachelet and Pablo Longueira won their respective coalitions.
July- Presidential candidacy of the right-wing coalition, Pablo Longueira, dropped his candidacy due to severe
depression.
August- After weeks without a presidential candidate, Evelyn Mattei became the presidential candidate of the Alliance.
August- The national commission of experts presented the results of the three-month inquiry of the census data and
process, denouncing the numerous flaws and recommending not using the data and running a new census as soon as
possible.
August- Huge controversy regarding the commission results. “save the census" vs. "census to the trash can"
perspectives.
August- President Piñera apologized to the Chileans for census errors.
August- INE Director ordered a new inquiry, looking for a “second opinion.”
August- Government announced a second census evaluation by EUROSTAT and the World Bank. However, those
international agencies didn’t agree to carry out the investigation.
September- INE hired three international census consultants, recommended by EUROSTAT, known as the
International commission of inquiry. They started a three-month evaluation.
November- Commission of international consultants delivered their results. Acknowledging several weaknesses of the
information gathered, the commission pointed out census data is useful for public policy decisions.
November- Based on the international consultant’s report, INE and Government authorities emphasized the validity of
the census and dismissed the need for a new census.
November & December- There was an intense political and technical debate regarding the different results of the
inquiry commissions. The discussion lasted for more than three years.
November- Presidential candidate Michelle Bachelet announced the need for a new census.
December- INE authorities declared the 2012 census is valid.
December- Presidential election. Michelle Bachelet President for the second time.

2014
•
January- chamber of deputies commission of inquiry finished the extensive investigation over the 2012 census,
identifying several irregularities and blaming Francisco Labbé and advisors for the census failure.
•
February- INE published the revised results of the census.
•
March- Michelle Bachelet presidential term began.
•
March- New Government discharged Juan Eduardo Coeymans and appointed the economist Ximena Clark as the new
INE Director.
•
March- Four deputies asked the General Comptroller to run an extensive inquiry about the Census 2012 from the
administrative and legal point of view.
•
March- New INE Director Ximena Clark ordered a technical audit to the 2012 census data.
•
March- Census webpage was pulled down until the results of INE investigations.
•
March- General Comptroller of the Republic presented the results of their especial evaluation of the INE.
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•
•
•
•
•

March- New government announced a new census would take place in 2016 or 2017.
May- INE appointed Ninoska Damiánovic as the new head of the 2017 census. Also, Odette Tacla, an expert in
censuses, supported the census team as an advisor.
June- CDE started a new investigation process against Francisco Labbé.
September- INE presented the results of the special audit to the 2012 census database. The report concludes the
Census data did not accomplish the minimal requirements and quality standards of a census.
October- head of census Damiánovic and advisor Tacla resigned due to problems with the INE Director Clark.

2015
•
February- General Comptroller presented audit results performed to the recruitment process of the 2012 census,
identifying severe and several irregularities.
•
March- After five months without Head of the census, INE Director appointed the engineer Patricia Morales.
•
June- General Comptroller of the Republic presented the results of the integrated 2012 census' audit identifying
numerous irregularities and liabilities of the census process and confirming the inappropriateness of the process.
•
September-December- Politicians and other actors asserted data manipulation of the National Employment survey
figures. Then, a complex technical debate regarding the ability of the INE recently modified survey to capture new
dynamics of the labor market.
•
November- INE announced the new census will take place in April 2017 under the "de facto" strategy.
•
November- The Bachelet government sponsored a new bill for the statistical institutionality of the country. This
project reinstated the previous bill delivered by the Piñera administration.
•
December- INE announced censuses would run every ten years but also intercensal counts every five years.
2016
•
January- The prosecutor's office desisted further investigation and concluded there weren't legal foundations to
determine crime in the census case.
•
January- INE began the preparation for the 2017 census with abbreviated questionnaires and de facto approach.
•
February- INE started the first stage of the pre-census 2017.
•
May- Head of the census project, Patricia Morales was fired, and INE Director appointed Carolina Cavada, former
Director Clark advisor, as the Head of the 2017 Census.
•
June- INE started the final stage of the pre-census 2017.
2017
•
January- INE Director presented census planning, progression, and contingency plans to a special commission of the
chamber of deputies.
•
March-April- Some scholars and former INE authorities intensively criticized the 2017 census, arguing inadequate
preparation, higher costs, and lack of volunteers.
•
April- The de facto 2017 census on April 19th. Authorities, scholars, stakeholders, public officials, and citizenship
positively evaluated the census day.
•
August- INE Director Ximena Clark presented the first count of the census.
•
April- INE kept censusing missing areas.
•
May- chamber of deputies approved the bill for the strengthening of the INE and the National Statistic System. The
law passed to the senate for the next legislation step.
•
October- Perú ran a de facto census.
•
December- INE Director Clark delivered the results of the 2017 census.
2018
•
January-March- ANFINE INE official public associations denounced lack of participation in INE and asked the
incoming Minister of Economy to remove Director Clark and to validate census 2012 data.
•
January & June- Colombia run a de jure census.
•
March- Director Clark was fired, and Government appointed the economist Guillermo Pattillo as the new INE
Director.
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•
•
•

May- INE Director Pattillo presented the 2017 census final results.
December- Central Bank special report objected to the INE employment figures. According to the Bank, the INE did
not measure the contribution of immigrants in the labor market. Director Pattillo recognized the survey's weaknesses.
December-Reacting to the employment polemic, politicians and other actors stressed the relevance of advancing in the
INE bill and ask Piñera government to push for the passage of the law.

2019
•
January-August- New INE internal audit unit identified inconsistencies regarding the CPI figures. INE Director
Pattillo filed a criminal denounce on the INE official responsible for the CPI process, accusing of "manipulation of
data."
•
August- Academics and politicians debated over Pattillo denouncement.
•
August- INE began consultations and participative processes toward the design of the 2022 census questions.
•
October- Social outburst in Chile: equality, asking for equality and structural social and economic reforms.
•

November- After a month of social protest, disturbances and violence all over the country, there was national political
agreement in Congress for a new constitution. The process would start in April 2020 with a plebiscite to decide the
mechanism of elaboration.
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APPENDIX N.6.
INE ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS

From the year 2012 to 2018, no significant changes in the organizational structure of
the INE. Below are the organizational charts for 2017, and the 2019 new organizational chart,
after the restructuring process started in June 2019.
Diagram N.28. INE Organizational Chart in 2017
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Diagram N.29. INE Organizational Chart in 2019
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APPENDIX N.7.
CENSUS COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Table N.16. General Characteristics of the 2010 Census Round in Latin America
Characteristics
Data
Collection
Length

Preliminary
Results

Data
Access

Type of Data
Access

1 day

2 months

Online

Tabulated

Scanner

1 day

2 months

Online

Radatam
Search

Census
Type

Type of
Type of data
Questionnaires
Capture
Basic and
De Facto
Scanner
extended

Country

Year

Argentina

2010

Bolivia

2012

De Facto

Brasil

2010

De Facto

Chile

2017

De Jure

Colombia

2018

De Jure

Costa Rica

2011

Cuba

Standard
Basic and
extended
Standard
Standard and
Internet

PDA

3 months

1 month

Online

Search

Scanner

1 day

2 months

Online

Search

PDA

10 months

2 months

Online

Search

De Jure

Standard

Scanner

1 week

7 months

Online

2012

De Jure

Standard

Digitalization

2 weeks

.

.

Ecuador

2010

De Facto

Standard

Scanner

2 weeks

2 months

Online

El Salvador
Haití

.
2018

.
De Jure

.
Standard

.
.

.
.

.
.

.
.

Honduras

2013

De Jure

Standard

Digitalization

3 months

.

Online

Mexico

2010

De Facto

Digitalization

1 month

5 months

Online

Nicaragua

2017

De Jure

Basic and
extended
Standard

.

.

.

.

Panamá

2010

De Facto

Standard

Digitalization

1 day

7 months

Online

Paraguay
Perú
Dominican
Republic
Uruguay
Venezuela

2012
2017

De Jure
De Facto

Standard
Standard

PDA
.

2,5 months
2 weeks

.
.

.
Online

Radatam
Search
Radatam
Search
.
Radatam
Search
.
.

2010

De Jure

Standard

Digitalization

1 week

3 months

Online

Tabulated

2011
2011

De Jure
De Jure

Standard
Standard

PDA
PDA

4 months
3 months

2 months
2 months

Online
Online

Tabulated
Tabulated
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Radatam
Search
Tabulated
Radatam
Search
.
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Table N.17. Census Undercount by Country (DA AND PES)
Evaluation According to Indirect (Demographic Analysis) and Direct (PostEnumeration Surveys) (%). Based on National Statistical Offices 1950-2010 Data

CENSUS ROUND
INDIRECT EVALUATION (DA)

DIRECT EVALUATION (PES)

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Argentina

2.8

2

7.0

Bolivia

2.9

Brazil

1.8

3.6

Chile
Colombia

9.6

7.3

12.0

Costa Rica

2.3

2.6

7.3

3.8

9.3

5.4

6.2

2.1

4.3

4.7

5.8

4.1

3.7
2.9

Cuba
Dominican
Republic

0.9
9.9

7.8

9.8

7.7

5.3

4.6

Ecuador

7.9

7.2

3.3

4.3

5.7

5.9

0.3

4.3

6.7

5.5

El Salvador
Guyana

3.7

Haiti
Honduras

7

Mexico

5

5.3

18

1.6

1.3

Nicaragua
Panamá

6.3

6.7

Paraguay

6.9

25.6

Perú
Uruguay
Venezuela

4.9

4.1

4.3

2.6

3.9

2.1

1.9

3.1

7.7

6.5

2.1
7.4
2.1

10

7.4

6.9

2.1

4.9
6.8

Source: Méndez & Sacco, 2016, p.10
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Table N.18. Census Undercount by Country (UN Projections)
Census Figures (%) Compared to UN Population Projections)

CENSUS ROUND
Country

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

.

4.1

3.6

1.8

2.2

4.2

3.5

Bolivia

13.4

.

11.3

.

10.7

3.8

3.1

Brazil

5.1

5.2

4.5

4.1

5.0

4.2

4.5

Chile

8.2

6.1

7.6

2.5

2.1

3.1

9.8

Colombia

12.4

7.4

5.2

11.7

9.8

5.2

.

Costa Rica

17.3

10.7

7

10.2

.

3.8

6.9

Cuba

7.6

.

2.8

1.9

.

0.2

1.7

Dominican Republic

11.3

9.3

11.0

8.6

5.4

4.2

5.7

Ecuador

11.3

9.3

5.2

6.1

7.5

6.6

4.4

El Salvador

16.2

12.5

6.7

.

6

4.1

.

Guyana

12

7.5

13.1

17.6

18

10.4

.

Haiti

4.8

.

10.7

16.4

.

6.7

.

Honduras

9

9.7

12.3

9.3

.

5.7

.

Mexico

9

9.7

7.2

4.5

5.4

5.3

5.9

19.3

21.7

24.7

6.1

4.9

Panamá

14

7.6

6.9

10

6.5

6.9

6.5

Paraguay

11.7

11.1

10.3

11.3

7.8

7.3

26.1

Perú

.

5.6

4.8

5.6

5.8

4

.

Uruguay

.

2.4

1.6

2.4

2.8

2.5

3.2

11.8

11.6

12.3

9.9

10.5

8.9

8.5

Weighted average

8.3

7,0

6.2

5.7

6,0

4.9

5.2

Single average

11.4

8.9

8.4

7.9

7,0

5.1

6.9

Median

11.7

9.3

7.1

8.6

6,0

4.6

5.7

Interquartile range

5.1

5.1

6.3

7.5

4.2

2.9

4.3

Argentina

Nicaragua

Venezuela

Source: Méndez & Sacco, 2016, p.10-11
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Table N.19. Statistical National Capabilities Index
Selected Latin-American Countries by Dimension (2015-2016)
COUNTRIES
Dominican

Dimension

México Colombia Brazil

Perú

Ecuador

Republic

El
Argentina Bolivia Salvador Guatemala

Resources

8.25

8.33

8.02

6.85

6.91

7.35

6.00

5.81

6.26

5.67

Institutional

9.17

7.07

6.78

7.26

6.78

5.00

4.40

5.56

5.19

3.46

Methods

9.36

9.85

8.78

7.19

7.31

7.52

6.00

5.78

5.55

3.93

Diffusion

8.54

7.52

7.75

7.61

6.77

4.83

7.40

5.87

4.53

4.85

8.83

9.19

7.83

7.23

6.94

6.18

5.95

5.76

5.38

4.48

Average
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APPENDIX N.8.
RELEVANT THEMES IN MULTI-LENS ANALYSIS

Diagram N.30. Relevant Themes in Multi-Lens Analysis
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